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Rwanda, my mother, let me console you, 
That`s why I was born, and you brought me up, 
Now that I`ve grown up, and have the strength, 
Now that I`m mature enough, let me work for you, 
I will console you using the gifts you entrusted me. 
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Abstract 
This study generally obtains from the analytical boundaries of the discipline of political 
science. Its point of departure is that scholarship on Post 1994 Rwanda which, among other 
inherent flaws, is inundated with narratives about the causes of the Genocide and its 
immediate outcome like the number of deaths, yet its violent-continuous outcome particularly 
the resurgence of violence which led to visitations of violent conflict in Rwanda during its 
post-conflict reconstruction phase is scantly delineated. The theoretical and public-cum-
Security policy meaning of how the Rwanda Patriotic Front managed to address the 
resurgence of violence is the major undertaking of this study.  
For that matter, in method, the study is qualitative; obtaining from archival analysis, histories, 
case study and literature survey. It draws from documentary sources, publications and 
scholarly journals, newspaper reports, official and unofficial documents of government, 
bodies, Non Government Organisations and intergovernmental bodies, international and local 
legal instruments, archival records, key informant interviews, and video and audio records as 
``units of data collection`` and the Hutu refugee phenomenon as the ``unit of analysis``; in 
order to problematise Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction phase, particularly its 
development in state capacity. To that effect, the either supporting or off-putting evidence 
from Rwanda during the period in review, 1994-2005, was examined basing on the logic of 
the grounded theory methodology, specifically the ``theoretical elaboration`` procedure of 
Vaughan,  to interrogate the meaning of state capacity, human security and the related 
debates, in the quest for an analytical framework to aid in explaining and understanding  the 
issues which  structured  the resurgence of violence that bedeviled the post conflict 
reconstruction phase of post genocide Rwanda.   
Accordingly, in its quest to understand and explain: how Rwanda`s development in state 
capacity addressed the  resurgence of violence which punctuated Rwanda’s post-conflict 
reconstruction period, the innovative contribution of this study to the body of knowledge 
about Rwanda and to the debate surrounding its conceptual concerns  is that: Rwanda`s post-
conflict reconstruction phase teaches us that where state capacity fails to address and 
maintain the ``human security condition`` of the populace,  violent conflicts are abound as 
political demagogues manipulate the ``human insecurity effect`` on the people to mobilise 
them into group violence. Also it emerges that where threats to human security and state 
security converge to lead to a resurgence of violence during post-conflict reconstruction, 
development in state capacity is inevitably tilted towards addressing state security related 
concerns at the expense of human security related concerns, thus, a ``security dialectics``; a 
somewhat metaphysical convergence of  human security and state security at the causative 
level of the resurgence of violence, and the emergence of a somewhat  ``boomerang effect``, 
inevitably latent  at the public policy level of addressing a resurgence of violence as a focus 
on addressing state security undermines human security and consequently state security itself; 
leading to a somewhat conflict-continuous condition punctuated with violence and 
destruction. 
 
Keywords: Human Security, State Capacity, Post-Conflict Reconstruction.  
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Preface 
This study is not only generally historical in its treatment, but it also has a history; for 
between 11
th
 to 13
th
 March, 2009, the researcher (I) was part of the HIV/AIDS 
Conference for the African Military which was jointly organised by the African Union, 
Institute of Security Studies based in South Africa, and the Uganda Peoples Defence 
Forces (UPDF).  
At the conference,  a debate ensued to the effect that since HIV/AIDS affects both the 
officers and men of the militaries, and the civilians; that civilians infect soldiers and vice 
versa, and that soldiers have civilian relatives who are constantly decimated and 
orphaned by HIV/AIDS. The researcher (I) had reasoned that:  the fight against the 
HIV/AIDS scourge in the military would be incomplete without involving the military in 
attempts aimed at curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS among the civilians.  
The logic of the submission by the researcher was informed by the theoretically alluded 
to convergence of human security concerns (in this context HIV/AIDS) and state security 
concerns (in this context African militaries). He (I) argued that HIV/AIDS had, albeit 
unfortunately, blurred the ``curtain wall`` between the military and the civilians, thus the 
harmonisation of civil-military relations.  What followed was a brief debate of the 
probable policy framework and contexts under which the civil-military relations of 
HIV/AIDS would be addressed. The researcher later problematised HIV/AIDS and the 
military within the theoretical frameworks of human security, state capacity, bio-politics 
and the theory of civil-military relations in the context of Uganda. The outcome was a 
monograph submitted for the award of a Master of Arts in International Relations of 
Makerere University.  
However, among the several contexts which were discussed during the conference was 
that of post-conflict reconstruction and HIV/AIDS, more so where the authorities are 
overwhelmed by several demands particularly that of addressing a resurgence of 
violence. Evidence adduced was generally anecdotal, but the agenda, in passing though, 
was broadened to encompass other issue areas, inter alia, food security, economic 
security, environmental security as issue areas which the militaries in Africa ought to 
focus on, but the recommendations made were HIV/AIDS specific.   
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The HIV/AIDS focus aside, this study carries forward the discussion within the context 
of post-conflict reconstruction punctuated with a threat of a resurgence of violence within 
the broadened agenda of the discussion which it puts in a nutshell as human security; 
with the state (government) as the agent that is supposed to operationalise its state 
capacity (ability) to ensure human security during post-conflict reconstruction. The push 
and pull issue areas in that scheme of things are of particular interest to this study and its 
elaborate narrative. The focus, at the formal theoretical level, is on problematising human 
security and development in state capacity within the context of post-conflict 
reconstruction with the resurgence of violence interference.   
Accordingly, a pilot case study aimed at testing the viability of the initial 
conceptualisation of the study and data collection procedures was conducted in 2010 with 
a focus on Rwanda. 
The choice of the context, that is Rwanda, was informed but by three issues; first that the 
civil-war in Rwanda which started in 1990 culminated into a genocide that had no equal 
precedent in the history of post-colonial Africa, second that whereas the conflict in 
Rwanda ended in 1994 with disastrous effects, the capacity of the Rwandan 
state/government to function was quickly restored at least to functioning normality, that 
by  1995, the Rwanda Patriotic Front had successfully exerted its control and influence to 
cover the whole territory of the Central African State, and third that the events that took 
place in Rwanda had great ramifications on the geo-politics of the Great Lakes Region. 
The genocide in Rwanda, particularly against the Tutsi, saw a somewhat pre-emptive 
violence against the Hutus in Burundi as an attempt by the Tutsi in Burundi to avoid the 
Rwandan experience.  
Also, the genocide in Rwanda saw the movement en masse of the Hutu political elites, 
together with more than a million Hutu civilian refugees  and literally created another 
``Hutu State`` in Eastern Congo. The Hutu refugee phenomenon in the Eastern Congo 
saw a resurgence of violence in Rwanda and as this study illustrates later, this Hutu 
refugee phenomenon also inadvertently saw the collapse of Mobutu`s regime in Zaire, 
and posed a security threat to the stability of Tanzania and Uganda. 
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Accordingly,  to thwart the security threat which the Hutu refugee phenomenon presented 
to Rwanda, the Rwandan government led by the Rwanda Patriotic Front entered into the 
Eastern Congo, the then Zaire, and  militarily dislodged the Hutu refugee warriors. The 
incursions of the Rwanda Patriotic Army against the refugee warriors were later to give 
way to the imperativeness of overthrowing Mobutu`s regime in Zaire as a way of further 
neutralising the Hutu warrior threat by  denying them a guardian in Mobutu. The 
incursions of the post genocide government led by the RPF in Zaire (now DRC) depicted 
the ability of the Rwandan government implement its military security policy and its 
military ability that enable it to penetrate the diverse Congo from its Eastern part to its 
Western located Capital Kinshasa and eventually overthrew Mobutu. Indeed whereas 
throughout its known history the Rwandan state has been defined as possessing a 
bureaucracy with a capacity to implement policies and penetrate the Rwanda society, the 
incursions of Rwanda into the Congo to repulse the Hutu refugee warriors for the period 
September 1996 to 1997 at the fall of Kinshasa depicted Rwanda`s ability to penetrate 
other territories in its quest for its internal stability.   
Indeed the enduring Rwandan refugee phenomenon has had a historical influence in the 
body politics of the Great Lakes Region, for some members of the RPF, as refugees in 
Uganda who ran away from Rwanda after the Hutu revolution of 1959, later became part 
of the National Resistance Movement and the National Resistance Army, which 
successfully waged an armed rebellion in Uganda in the 1980s against Milton Obote the 
then President of Uganda. Particularly, Paul Kagame and  Fred Rwigema, men who were 
at the helm of the Rwandan armed rebellion against the government of Habyarimana 
were equally very instrumental in the Yoweri Museveni led armed rebellion and 
subsequently served in his government. Kagame served as the Chief Intelligence Officer 
in Yoweri Museveni`s government after the war which ended in 1986 and Rwigema who 
had served Deputy Commander of the First Mobile Force of the NRA rebel group which 
was led by Museveni later became the Deputy Minister of Defence and Deputy 
Commander in Chief of the National Resistance Army in 1986 upon the overthrow of the 
then Uganda Government which was being led by the so called Military Junta of Tito 
Lutwa Okello and Bazilio Olara Okello. This serves to underscore the extent to which the 
violent conflicts in Rwanda have had ramifications on the politics of the region. The 
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violence in Rwanda has variously had an impact of the political power configuration of 
the Great Lakes Region; particularly as a result of its refugee generating capacity, and it 
such a system of things discussed in the paragraphs preceding this that informed the logic 
of choosing Rwanda as a general case for this study.   
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
 
To investigate the viability of the conceptual concerns of this study, which emerged from 
the deliberations of the conference delineated in the ``prologue``, a pilot study was first 
conducted at the beginning of 2010.  The pilot study was oriented by the question: 
What led to the resurgence of violence in Rwanda, and how did the government in 
Rwanda address it?  
Accordingly, the pilot case study, which preceded this detailed study,  based on literature 
survey, and focused interviews with scholars and security policy practioners on the Great 
Lakes Region to  bring  to bear that Rwanda during its post conflict reconstruction phase 
variously made considerable progress in the development of Rwanda`s state capacity in 
the aftermath of the conflict which culminated into the genocide, but how the attained 
levels of state capacity addressed the resurgence of violence is an issue not delineated. 
Also from the pilot case study it emerged that the refugee related issues that could be 
collapsed into the human security conceptual categorisation were at the centre of the 
resurgence of violence, but the conceptual and policy meaning of that system of things is 
not sustained.     
To sustain the outcomes of the pilot study a focused central question was adopted to 
orient this detailed inquiry into the concerns of the study. The question was as follow: 
How did the development in the state-capacity of Rwanda during post-conflict 
reconstruction serve to address the human security issues which threatened a resurgence 
of violence?   
  To broaden the analytical scope of the study the following specific questions were 
adopted:  
1. How did human security concerns historically structure violence during the 
genocide and did the weaknesses in state-capacity aggravate the situation? 
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2. How did human security concerns threaten a resurgence of the structure of 
violence during post-conflict reconstruction, and did they also serve to undermine state-
security?  
3. What was the nature of Rwanda`s development in state capacity during post-
conflict reconstruction? 
4.   How did the development in Rwanda’s state capacity during post-conflict 
reconstruction serve to address the human security concerns that threatened and 
subsequently led to the resurgence of violence? 
1.1.1 Summary of the content of the Chapters 
Apart from the introductory chapter and the conclusions, the rest of the chapters of this 
study obtain from  the aforementioned questions, and they  are organized basing on the 
logic of ``theory building structures``
1
; with each chapter introducing a particular 
theoretical dimension to which the study intends to make an advancing contribution and 
later from review of either supporting or  off-putting evidence advances  a specific 
argument that cumulatively sustains the general concern  of the study which is 
encapsulated in its central question: How did the development in the state-capacity of 
Rwanda during post-conflict reconstruction serve to address the  human security related 
issues which threatened a resurgence of violence?  The summary of the chapters is as 
follows: 
Chapter one discusses the meaning of the four cardinal concepts that orient this study, 
and the debates surrounding their operationalisation. The concepts are: Human Security, 
State Capacity, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. It elucidates the academic and policy 
debates that have punctuated the treatment of those concepts, and how this particular 
study situates itself in those debates.   
As such, many but three important ideas emerged from the debate surrounding the 
concepts adopted by this study:  
                                                          
1
 See, Robert. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Forth edition, Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, Vol.5 (United States of America, SAGE, 2009), 177-178, for a precise exposition of the 
meaning of the logic of “Theory-Building Structures” as an illustrative structure for case study 
composition. 
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One, that within the academic and policy debates on human security are suggestions that 
human security and state security can communicate to each other in a somewhat 
``security dialectics`` arena, and that the ``boomerang effect`` is probable where one of 
the two security areas is given prominence at the expense of the other in the 
operationalisation of a State`s security policy particularly during post-conflict 
reconstruction. What is generally missing in this system of things is an elaborate and 
context specific empirical exposition to such theoretical techno-logic.   
Therefore, this study by far, using the case of Rwanda, provides an empirical case to such 
conceptual underpinning.  
Two, the imperativeness of State-Capacity in enabling post-conflict reconstruction, and 
three, that thwarting the resurgence of violence during post-conflict reconstruction is 
central to the reconstruction agenda. The chapter gives a somewhat review of the 
literature about Rwanda, particularly its post-genocide phase   and the emerging 
knowledge gaps therein. It also gives a general treatment, briefly though, to other conflict 
areas of Sub-Saharan Africa; delineating how their circumstances also accrue to the 
conceptual concerns of this study, particularly; human insecurities and weaknesses in 
state capacity.  
Three, that the Chapter outlines how this study situates itself into the conceptual 
framework that emerges out of the treatment given to the conceptual concerns of this 
study. The methodological orientation of the study is also discussed, the rationale given 
to give topicality to the study design adopted and how the study proceeds in its inquiry as 
it employees the concerns of the study design adopted to unravel the either supporting or 
off-putting answers to the questions that guide the treatment of this study.   
Chapter two addresses the research question: how did human security concerns 
historically structure violence during the genocide and did the weaknesses in state-
capacity aggravate the situation?, and through a detailed literature survey of monographs 
about Rwanda, and an analysis of the histories about Rwanda, as documents with 
historical relevance to Rwanda are predominantly relied on to make particular arguments, 
this study interrogates the widely asserted view that strength in state capacity led to the 
violence which culminated into the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. From its inquiry, the 
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study found out that the violence in Rwanda is historically linked to weaknesses in the 
capacity of the Rwandan state to function. It is sustained that whenever and wherever the 
Rwandan state, at different historical moments: pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, pre-
genocide, failed to address human security related concerns, violence was abound. The 
conclusion from the treatment of this chapter is that weaknesses in state capacity have 
historically structured the violence in Rwanda which reached its apex during the genocide 
of 1994.  
Chapter three gives a treatment to the question: how did human security concerns 
threaten a resurgence of the structure of violence during post-conflict reconstruction, and 
did they also serve to undermine state-security?, and it bases on evidence about Rwanda; 
collected from a detailed literature survey of monographs about Rwanda, histories about 
Rwanda, archival analysis, and limited focused  informed opinion survey through 
interviews of the affected and actors during Rwanda`s post conflict reconstruction phase.  
 
From the evidence reviewed, it emerges that human security related concerns threatened 
a resurgence of violence in Rwanda during its post-conflict reconstruction phase, and 
basing on the logic of case study research, a particular case is singled out to give 
conceptual and empirical density to the concerns of this study. The case singled out is: 
The Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo. The reason to why the Hutu refugee 
phenomenon is singled out owes much to its historical effect; as it represents a major 
metaphysical thread that has been at the centre of the  causes of  the ``conflict 
continuous`` situation that has historically defined and sketched the visitations of 
violence that have characterised Rwanda`s history. The Rwandan refugee saga effect, as 
this study traces in chapter two and chapter 3 has been monumental in the structure of 
violence in Rwanda.  
 
The evidence brings to light the extent to which the human needs which would have 
guaranteed the survival, which to this study is; the human security condition of the Hutu 
bonafide refugees; were manipulated by the Hutu exiled political elites to preside over a 
resurgence of violence in Rwanda. This sustains the logic of chapter two that in the 
context of Rwanda, human needs, the absence of which more often lead to the human 
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insecurity condition, particularly led to the resurgence of violence in instances where they 
were manipulated by political demagogues. 
The manipulation of the human needs and its human insecurity condition effect on the 
refugees, by the political demagogues who wage a violent conflict against the Rwandan 
state also reflect the extent to which threats to human security can converge with the 
threats to state security to lead to a resurgence of violence during post-conflict situations. 
This convergence negates the radical assertion to the effect that the two security areas; 
human and state security, firmly contradict each other. This emerging point gives 
topicality to the notion of ``security dialectics`` which was advanced by Pauline Kerr that 
there are instances where the two security areas communicate with each other. The 
``communicative zone`` in the context of the experience that is Rwandan was: the 
Rwandan Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Zaire, which today is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.      
Chapter four gives treatment to question: how did the development in Rwanda’s state 
capacity during post-conflict reconstruction serve to address the human security concerns 
that threatened and subsequently led to the resurgence of violence? It further gives 
answers to the question: What was the nature of Rwanda`s development in state capacity 
during post-conflict reconstruction? 
The chapter obtains from the evidence on Rwanda`s state capacity during the period in 
review. The evidence was obtained from IMF`s Government Finance Statistics; the 
World Development Indicators and the Correlates of War, the Political Terror Scale;, 
Transparency International, ``Weberianness`` Index, and the outcomes of public goods 
and service delivery. National legislations of Rwanda enacted during post-conflict period 
are also reviewed. This is further beefed up by evidence gathered from focused literature 
survey of the scholarly monographs about Rwanda; review of historical documents 
particularly those of international actors, and archival analysis.  
The chapter is theoretically anchored in the debate which obtains from the question: How 
should the state be organised during post-conflict reconstruction situations. In giving 
answers to this question, the liberal peace approach stands in sharp contrast to other 
approaches particularly the state -centred approach, and from the Rwandan experience, 
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however, it emerges that even where the approach to the reconstruction of the state is 
generally inclined to the liberal peace approach, functioning institutions of the state are a 
prerequisite. But the building of functioning state institutions ought to have an agenda, 
and in the context of Rwanda the agenda was for economic liberalisation and to facilitate 
``limited cosmetic`` democratisation designed particularly for propaganda with the 
purpose of collecting internationalised funds. 
Chapter five gives a treatment to the question: how did the development in Rwanda’s 
state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction serve to address the human security 
concerns that threatened and subsequently led to the resurgence of violence?, and it thus 
makes the point that whereas at the causative level of violence during post conflict 
reconstruction; human security related concerns converge with state security related 
concerns to lead to a resurgence of violence during post-conflict reconstruction phase, at 
the public policy level, where the resurgence of violence is practically addressed, human 
security concerns are traded-off for state security. 
 
It emerges that in its quest for state security that was being undermined by the violent 
incursions against Rwanda by the Hutu refugee warriors; the Rwandan government, led 
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), opted for a military approach to thwart the 
security threat that had eluded the international community. The international community 
led by the United Nations Organisation and the Security Council failed to disarm the 
refugee warriors as they continuously exploited the human security related concerns of 
the bonafide refugees to mobilise them into group violence against the Rwandan State. 
The international community continuously discussed the magnitude of the threat which 
the Hutu refugee warriors posed to Rwanda, but to continuously fail to pursue practical 
measures to thwart the threat. 
The international community, particularly the United Nations and others international 
actors, including Canada that enthusiastically professes the imperativeness of 
humanitarian intervention as a measure to ensure the sanctity of human security; delayed 
to take action to ensure the separation of bonafide refugees from the Hutu refugee 
warriors who had held them hostage in their camps. 
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The Hutu refugee warriors used the refugee camps as recruitment grounds and safe 
havens that when the Rwandan Government embarked on a military campaign to 
annihilate the Hutu refugee warrior threat, the human security related concerns of 
bonafide refugees were undermined. The logic of the Rwandan government military 
campaign into the Eastern Congo was informed by the logic of group punishment on the 
Hutu refugees and the military tactics adopted were no respecter of the human security 
related concerns of the bonafide refugees.   
As such, generally, the study advances that in the context of Rwanda, it emerges that 
during post-conflict reconstruction, punctuated with a resurgence of violence as a result 
of the convergence of human security and state security related concerns, where the 
survival of the State and the regime in power is threatened, then, human security is 
literally sacrificed at the altar of state security. This implies that in the context of 
Rwanda, the ``Security dialectics`` obtains/obtained at the causative level of violence 
during post-conflict reconstruction, but to be improbable at the policy level of addressing 
the resurgence of violence as human security related concerns are consciously neglected. 
State security predominates and its sanctity cannot easily be traded-off; more so where 
the international community, the theoretical guardian of human security, inadequately 
acts in addressing the security threat to the state emerging from conflict; where the threat 
is a result of the convergence of human security and state security.   
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1.1.2 Contribution and significance of this study 
The innovative contribution of this study to the body of knowledge about Rwanda and to 
the debate surrounding the conceptual concerns of this study is that: Rwanda`s post-
conflict reconstruction phase teaches us that where threats to human security and state 
security converge to lead to a resurgence of violence during post-conflict reconstruction, 
development in state capacity is inevitably tilted towards addressing state security related 
concerns at the expense of human security related concerns, thus, a ``security dialectics`` 
a somewhat metaphysical convergence of  human security and state security at the 
causative level of the resurgence of violence, and the emergence of a somewhat  
``boomerang effect``; inevitably latent  at the public policy level of addressing a 
resurgence of violence, as a focus on addressing state security undermines human 
security and consequently state security itself; leading to a somewhat enduring  
symphony of violence and destruction.   
The contribution is sustained in five arguments which this study sustains, and they are as 
follows:  
1. The argument that: neglect and manipulation of human security concerns by the agents of 
state capacity contributes to the structure of violence during conflict. 
2. The argument that: weaknesses in state capacity contribute to structure of violence during 
a conflict.  
3. The  argument  that:  human security concerns and weaknesses in state capacity which 
emerge  as concomitants of violence during a conflict  threaten a resurgence of violence 
thus further threatening human security and state security during post-conflict situations 
4. The  argument that: where development in state-capacity militarily  addresses the 
resurgence of violence, which resurgence accrued from the convergence of  human 
security and state security related outcomes of the conflict, then, human insecurity is 
aggravated during post-conflict reconstruction making further  resurgence of violence 
probable. 
 
5. The argument: that during post-conflict reconstruction situations, issues related to human 
security can undermine state-security and vice versa.  And from the logic of this 
9 
 
argument, the study advances supporting and off-putting answers to the effect that there 
is a convergence of threats to human and state security in post-conflict situations.  
 
Accordingly, the significance of this study is at three levels: conceptual, empirical and 
public policy operationalisation during post-conflict reconstruction situations and it goes 
as follows: 
 
At the conceptual level, the study contributes to efforts aimed at reaching a conceptual 
framework and an analytical framework in which the post-conflict reconstruction of 
Rwanda can be understood within the context of a resurgence of violence in post-conflict 
situations. Whereas this study is about Rwanda, the emerging analytical framework, 
though with a measure of context controls will be useful in allowing policy makers and 
academics a tool to use in comprehending other situations where the end of conflicts has 
more often meant a resurgence of violence in some countries, particularly in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa. Countries where a resurgence of violence has occurred include, 
but not limited to; South Sudan, Central Africa Republic, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
 
At the empirical level, the study advances supporting and off-putting evidence to the 
effect that human security and state security mutually reinforce each other in post conflict 
situations. It also investigates the circumstances under which the mutuality of the two 
security areas; human and state security can hold. As such, though this study has 
indicated that at the policy operationalisation level, more so in situations where  post 
conflict reconstruction are punctuated with a resurgence of violence, state capacity tends 
to be tilted towards  ensuring state security related concerns than a focusing on human 
security; this contradiction ought not to be canonized but rather to continue 
problematising the contradiction as a means to finding out a media or a balanced policy 
framework which can allow the realization  of the two security areas without foregoing 
any. This requires further empirical policy based research. If human security and state 
security related issues, as it emerges in this study, converge to lead to a resurgence of 
violence, then the policy framework to addressing that convergence ought to be diabolic 
in nature. Reaching a diabolic public policy approach to address the convergence of the 
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two security areas at the causative level of violence is not for conjecture but rather public 
policy research engagements. That gap ought to be filled. 
   
And at the public policy operationalisation level, the study underscores the importance of 
factoring human security related concerns into the analysis of the causes of a resurgence 
of violence and how public policy decisions address such concerns during post-conflict 
reconstruction situations. Accordingly, this study will assist in directing domestic policy 
in post-conflict countries towards a focus on human security by directing state capacity to 
addressing the human security conditions of the population in a bid to thwart resurgence 
of conflict. State capacity attained during post conflict reconstruction ought to be directed 
to improving on the elements of human security, exploiting the pacification benefits that 
come along with a commitment to those elements. For example the feeling that the 
government is providing for the citizens as far as health is concerned legitimizes the 
government in the minds of the people, dissidence is undermined, and this thwarts 
insecurity and security dilemma complexes. 
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1.2 Background to the study: Post-Genocide Rwanda in the academic 
and Policy Literature: Towards a statement of the problem. 
 
A survey of what pass for seminal publications on post-genocide Rwanda
2
 depict that 
much of this literature   gives answers to three important questions: What was the history 
of violence in Rwanda? What led to the genocide? How did the genocide unfold?  Who 
was responsible, and for what?  What are/were the effects of the genocide? What was 
done? What is being done, and what needs to be done for the Genocide not to reoccur?  
The answers that have been given to those questions can conveniently be collapsed into 
the Donald Horowitz framework of understanding ethnic groups in conflict. It emerges 
from the narratives about Rwanda; the Tutsi-Hutu ethnic division pervaded the social, 
economic and political aspects of the Rwanda society. That the ethnic identities pre-
dominated any form of identity in Rwanda be it religious identity, blaming  colonialism 
as it  widened the metaphysical gulf between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups,  
``ranked`` one ethnic group over the other by elevating the latter over and above the 
former be it social, political and economic engagements.  The later in the history of 
Rwanda, after colonialism the Hutu, who were the majority had to compete for political 
power in order to be the centre of the control of the Rwandan political, social and 
economic space. The Tutsi ethnic group was magnified by the colonialist as being fine in 
character, in intellect, with angular body features and naturally shrewd to fit into 
positions of authority.  That the elevation of the Tutsis over the Hutus by colonialism 
increased the tension between the two groups that the Hutus felt that it was more urgent 
to fight Tutsi domination before even uprooting the colonial administration of the 
Belgians. The divisions between the two groups were canonised by colonialism and they 
attained a semblance of ``permanent`` group differences which fed into nepotism when 
the Hutus managed to gain control of central authority. This Hutu nepotism entrenched 
                                                          
2
 In the scholarship about Rwanda, the term post-genocide, generally refers to the historical moment in the 
history of Rwanda that immediately began after the 100 days of the genocide to the present. The post-
conflict reconstruction phase of Rwanda, which started in 1994, is also collapsed under the post-genocide 
historical moment. It should also be emphasised that the genocide marked the peak of the civil-cum-violent 
conflict which started in 1990, but the end of this conflict was/is erroneously treated as being synonymous 
with the end of the genocide, yet the genocide ended first before the end of civil-conflict as a resurgence of 
violence occurred ending in 2005 at least within the territorial boundaries of Rwanda. The end of the 
resurgence of violence within the boundaries of Rwanda coincided with the end Paul Collier`s so called 
``Post conflict reconstruction decade``.    
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the Hutu social identity as it coalesced the common Hutu to ``maximise positive 
distinctiveness`` strengthening their belief in the functional necessity of Hutu power at 
the political level as the guardian of Hutu existence.  This kind of narrative marries the 
social identity theory of Henri Tajfel into the discourse about Rwanda.
3
 But the thinking 
of Horowitz predominates that it is in scholarship about Rwanda, that propositions of 
Horowitz social psychological theory are balanced well with the approaches to 
understanding conflicts which he dismissed as being insufficient in explaining conflict.
4
 
Indeed, propositions of the modernisation theory, economic interests and cultural 
pluralism subtly influence the narratives about Rwanda in all their complexities.  
With an aim to set a somewhat springboard for this study, at this point, a cursory 
discussion of the bodies of literature on Rwanda is undertaken, and it is as follows: 
 
First, following the logic of path dependency and historicity as a method of inquiry, 
scholars that have specifically addressed the history of violence in Rwanda outline that 
the history of the genocide had its roots in the political, economic and social power 
configurations that can be traced as far as the pre-colonial moment of Rwanda. To them 
colonialism only sustained the status-quo, particularly the social categorization of the 
Rwandan society, that pitted the Hutu against the Tutsi. It is noted that colonialism, 
though culpable for sustaining the gulf between the Hutu and the Tutsi categorization, as 
the colonial administration sustained the Tutsi oligarchy at the expense of the Hutu social 
categorization majority, the history of Rwanda even before colonialism also saw 
manifestations of violence among these categorizations. 
5
 
 
                                                          
3
 See, Henri Tajfel:  particularly Chapter. 12, Social categorization, social identity and social comparison 
In: Henri Tajfel, Human groups and social categories, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981):54-267, 
for a thorough exposition of his ideas on social psychology.    
4
 See, Donald Horowitz, Ethnic groups in conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
5
 See, Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: Nyiginya Kingdom, (Oxford: James Currey, 2004)., 
David Newbury, Pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties(The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol.34, No.2 ,2001): 255-314, 
URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097483 ., Catherine Newbury and David Newbury, A Catholic Mass in 
Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda (Canadian Journal of African 
Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, Vol. 33, No. 2/3, Special Issue: French Speaking Central 
Africa: Political Dynamics of Identities and Representation,1999: 292-328. URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/486267. 
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However, whereas at this level of scholarship about Rwanda, manifestations of violence 
in Rwanda are clearly outlined, a knowledge gap as regards the meaning of the nature of 
violence during pre-colonial Rwanda to the debate concerning group violence within the 
state is not addressed. Noteworthy is that facts are advanced with a historical effect, but 
with less effect as far as theorization about violence is concerned. This study analyses the 
facts advanced within the theoretical and conceptual context of human security and state 
capacity. 
 
Secondly, whereas ethnicity is underscored when it comes to giving answers to the 
questions of: what led to the genocide? How did the genocide unfold? Who was 
responsible and for what?, it emerges from the narratives about Rwanda which give a 
treatment to those questions; that ethnicity parse did not lead to the genocide but rather 
the overwhelming fear of losing power by the political elite who adopted a survival 
strategy which entailed the manipulation of the economic predicament of the masses, 
particularly the poverty of the Hutu, to stir group violence. To this level of scholarship 
about Rwanda, it is the manipulation of the concerns of the common Hutu population
6
 
that led the 1959 Hutu revolution, the visitations of violence against the Tutsi`s in the 
1960s and subsequently the genocide of 1994.The logic of the violence against the Tutsi 
at the various moments of violence, it is outlined, was for the sustenance of the Hutu 
power establishment. 
7
     
                                                          
6
 It is a major contention of this study that the common Hutu population as opposed to the Hutu political  
elites would not have participated in group violence which culminated into the genocide of 1994, had they 
not been cajoled into that system of things by the Hutu political elites. It is sustained that the Hutu political 
elites to elicit the participation of the Hutu masses into group violence, evoked the historical fears of the 
common Hutus, for instance, the fear that the Tutsi were going to subjugate them, subject them to the 
historical injustices which they suffered during the day of the Nyiginya Kingdom. It is this system of things 
that is referred to as manipulation in the context of this study.  
7
David Newbury and Catherine Newbury, ``Bringing the Peasants Back In: Agrarian Themes in the 
Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda´´ (The American Historical Review, Vol. 
105, No.3, Jun., 2000):832-877, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2651812)., Catherine Newbury, The 
Cohension of Oppression: A Century of Clientship in Kinyanga, Rwanda, Reprint (Madison: University of 
Winsconsin, 1975), 212., Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (Praeger Publishers, 1970), 197., Gerald 
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide, 1959-1994(Kampala, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 
1995)., Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, Reprint 2007)., Scott Strauss, The Order of the Genocide: Race, 
Power, And War in Rwanda (London: Cornel University Press, 2006)., Alison Liebhafsky Des Desforges, 
``Leave None to Tell the Story``: Genocide in Rwanda (Vol. 3169, Issue 189 of Human Rights Documents: 
Africa, Human Rights Watch, 1999)., and also  see, Edward Silvestre Kaweesi, The Role of the Church 
during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: A keynote address delivered at the Panel Discussion on the Role of 
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Indeed, it has been at this level of scholarship about Rwanda that a conclusion has been 
variously advanced to the effect that because the Hutu genocide regime systematically 
executed the genocide, then, it exhibited considerable state capacity. Instructive of these 
conclusions is the one provided by Leander Heldring. He negates that plausibility of the 
assertion that weaknesses in Rwanda`s state capacity led to violence.  To Leander, in the 
context of Rwanda, strength in state capacity led to violence even before the advent 
colonialism.
8
 
This study argues and sustains that contrary to Leander`s assertion, weaknesses rather 
than strengths in state capacity have shaped and shaken violence in Rwanda since the 
days of the Nyiginya Kingdom. The study gives a treatment to this system of things later 
in Chapter two of this study.  
 
Equally important is the literature on the outcome of the genocide. It is underscored that 
Rwanda had to grapple with external and internal challenges. It is noted that immediately 
after the conflict which culminated into the genocide, the new government in Rwanda, 
grappled with several challenges: the new refugee problem, reconstruction and internal 
insecurity, the question of what sort of political structure to adopt, and the attitude of the 
international community.
9
  Also the question of what should be the nature of political 
reforms to be undertaken in order to address the root causes of the conflict was daunting. 
It was reasoned that democratic reforms in Rwanda would inadvertently lead to 
democratic despotism of the Hutu majority, and that many of them had participated in the 
killings, over the Tutsi minority (the victims of the genocide).
10
  
 
Also the new government inherited a devastated country; socially disintegrated, shattered 
infrastructure and a state that had collapsed.
 11
 Constitutional challenges were also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Church in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, at memorial Topf & Sons (Sorbenweg 7, Erfurt, Germany), 
26, May, 2013. 
8
 Leader Heldring, State Capacity and Violence: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide (CSAE Working 
Paper, WPS/2014-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2014).  
9
  Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1995. 
10
 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 2007. 
11
 See, Peter Uvin, The Gacaca Tribunal in Rwanda, (an extract from Reconciliation after violent conflict, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003). 
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manifest and there was a need to forge a constitution which would provide a coherent 
structure to manage ethnic differences.
12
 It is outlined, though with a touch of 
exaggeration as the study particularly puts in the subsequent chapters, that the country 
had been ransacked. There was not any penny in public coffers. There were no offices 
intact, no chairs, no desks, no paper, no telephone, nothing at all. The people had been 
terrorised and traumatized. The hospitals and schools had been destroyed or ransacked. 
Rwanda health centres, one in each commune had been ruined. The stocks of basic drugs 
and health supplies had been looted. Water supply lines were non-operational. Qualified 
staff had been killed or had fled the country including teachers. In the whole country 
there were six judges and ten lawyers. There were no gerdarmees. Indeed, Rwanda was 
almost: ``starting from zero``.
13
 Metaphorically speaking, the road to reconstruction was 
rough.  
 
It is against the logic of the challenges which the Rwandan state had to grapple with in 
the aftermath of the genocide that the body of literature that gives a treatment to the 
questions; what was done? What needs to be done for the genocide not to reoccur?., is 
replete with analytical acknowledgment of Rwanda`s development progress. The 
monumental effect of Rwanda`s development has been variously outlined.
14
  
 
To that effect, it has been outlined that Rwanda, for the period in review, realized 
development indicators that were unrivalled in the region--the Great Lakes Region. The 
African Peer Review Mechanism, 2006, notes how poverty levels were reduced from 
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 Jean Marie Kamatali, Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in, J. Oloka-Onyango, 
ed., Constitutionalism in Africa: Creating Opportunities, Facing Challenges (Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 2001).  
13
 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed, 2009, 247-248. 
14
 See, Gerald Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1995.,Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Collapse, War and 
Reconstruction in Rwanda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making, Working Paper No. 28, (Crisis States 
Working Papers Series, No.2, February 2008, ISSN 1749-1800): 25., David Booth and Frederick Golooba-
Mutebi, Policy for agriculture and horticulture in Rwanda: A different Political Economy?, Working Paper 
038, Paper produced as part of the FAC Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa (PEAPA) work-
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Mutebi, Is the Bride too Beautiful? Safe Motherhood in Rural Rwanda, Research Report 04, March 2012, 
(Published on behalf of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) by the Overseas Development 
Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD, UK www.odi.org.uk)., David Booth and 
Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda, Working Paper 16, 
March 2011, (Published on behalf of the Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) by the Overseas 
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60.4% in 2001 to 56.9% in 2005, with 64% of households having access to safe source 
drinking water. As far as education is concerned, enrolment in primary is said to have 
increased from 74% in 2001 to an 86% net rate in 2006. As regards health, a remarkable 
increased access to antenatal facilities was reported, and 47% of the population was 
reported to be covered by health insurance. The progress of the Government of Rwanda 
in democracy and good political governance were also reported during the reconstruction 
period as epitomized in the adoption of the 2003 constitution and the subsequent national 
elections.
15
  
 
Equally important is the much reported extent to which Rwanda exhibited a commitment 
to economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic 
development. The UNDP Rwanda particularly  notes how in 2001, Rwanda put in place a 
long term development framework that obtained from international development 
commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals. It was also added that Rwanda 
had even managed to thwart corruption, a cancer that bedevil many African countries and 
that its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals had been widely 
recognized.
16
 
 
Also, SIDA reports how figures from Rwanda have continued to indicate progress in 
development. It was reported that the poverty level in Rwanda had decreased from 56.7% 
to 44.9%, with extreme income poverty going down to 24%, and that the poverty rate in 
Rwanda has been reducing at an average of 2.4% per year (for the last five years starting 
from 2007). As regards health, maternal mortality is reported to have halved in the last 
decade (since 2001), with more than 90% of the citizens having access to basic health 
insurance.
17
Indeed, it should be added that the Rwanda Vision 2020 document epitomizes 
the commitment of Rwanda to development.
18
 The goals in Vision 2020 are in line with 
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 African Peer Review Mechanism, National Commission Report, June-December 2006. 
16
 UNDP Rwanda, Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development, 
2007. 
17
 SIDA Work in Rwanda, Successful Development Policy Reduces Poverty in Rwanda, (SIDA REPORT; 
Wednesday, February 29, 2012). 
18
 The key pillars of the Vision 2020 document are: Good Governance and Capable State, Human resource 
development  and knowledge based  economy, a private sector -led economy, infrastructure development, 
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the Human Security paradigm. In its language, the Vision 2020 document seems to put 
people first: 
 
How do (sic) Rwandan envisage their future? What kind of society do they want 
to become? How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity? 
What are the transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory 
social and economic situation? These are the main questions Rwanda Vision 2020 
addresses.
19
 
   
From the semantics of the Rwanda Vision 2020 document, inference can be made that 
Rwanda, in its journey to development, takes matters of Human Security and State 
Capacity to be sacrosanct. Therefore the authorities in Rwanda are said to have resolutely 
embarked on an agenda that was aimed at championing development. A two-pronged 
development agenda was adopted, with an emphasis on building state-capacity, as 
reflected in the straightforward commitment to the practical implementation of the 
Rwanda Patriotic Movement war manifesto that was precisely encapsulated in the 8-
points programme and the increased provision of services: security, health care, 
education, among others.    
 
It is acknowledged that the ability of the Post-War government to thwart the much 
anticipated failure of the state in the aftermath of an extraordinary bloody conflict 
figuratively spoke and indeed at the present reveals much about the ability of the state in 
Rwanda that quickly restored relative normalcy during its post-conflict phase. Golooba 
Mutebi explains how even the ardent critics of the authorities in Rwanda marvelled about 
the swiftness by which state-capacity was restored. He selectively quotes Reyntjens 
saying: 
 
The Regime was able in a short-time to establish total control over the state and 
society. This control was seen in the maintenance of an efficient army, able to 
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operate inside and beyond the national borders; the establishment of ``re-
education``, ``solidarity`` and ``regrouped camps``; the villagization policy 
(known as imidungudu policy)…; and establishment of an important intelligence 
capacity with the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) operating inside the 
country and the External Security Organisation in charge of operations abroad. 
While many other African countries tend towards state collapse, the Rwandan 
state has re-affirmed itself vigorously.
20
  
 
It should be underscored however that Rwanda`s post-conflict/genocide development 
ought not to be presented in a canonised manner. Its alleged successes story ought to be 
problematised at the empirical and theoretical levels of social science cum conflict 
research. This is because it has been argued that the failure of the donor community to 
evaluate whether development of the Rwandan state in the 1990s was addressing the 
social problems of the ordinary people of which poverty was central, partly structured the 
civil war which culminated into the genocide of 1994.
21
 The marginalised Tutsis joined 
the ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front rebel group against the Habyarimana`s regime, 
and the regime exploited the social problems of the Hutu masses, particularly the poverty 
of the youth, to mobilise them into group violence.  
 
Indeed, moving along the lines of the basic needs or the human needs approach to 
conflict, a  common thread runs through the literature which details the explanation of the 
causes of the genocide, that scarcity of resources like land and non agricultural jobs, 
coupled with a growing population and the fear of losing political power by the Hutu to 
the Tutsi,  which meant losing the leverage over the distribution of resources, served to 
elicit the massive participation of the Hutu in the mass murder of the Tutsi and the Hutu 
moderates.
22
  Indeed to Diamond the Rwanda crisis constituted a somewhat Malthusian 
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catastrophe,
23
 as if to suggest that the Hutu majority were mere ``able ministers of 
depopulation`` just used to reduce pressure on the meager resources. Conceptual density 
as regards the extent to which human needs constituted an integral element to the 
structure of violence which culminated into the genocide has been arguably attained 
given the number of seminal publications on Rwanda that make reference to such a 
system of things. But what are generally missing are the theoretical implications of this 
scheme of things on the debate concerning post-conflict reconstruction and the threat of a 
resurgence of violence which metaphorically hover over the life head of a state emerging 
from a conflict. This study particularly makes a contribution to the attempts aimed at 
theoretically aligning the experience of Rwanda beyond the narration of what transpired 
during the genocide in a bid to intellectually problematise the Rwandan catastrophe to 
further inform the body of theory to guide post-conflict reconstruction as an academic 
and public policy concept.  
 
Importantly, the youth were the most affected by the improvidence of the human needs 
that guarantee human security. With many out of school, without employment and 
without land to engage in agricultural production,
24
 the same youth were mobilized by the 
government to form the notorious ruthless Interahamwe (vaguely translated as those who 
attack together), a gang of machete wielding youths that played a central role in the 
execution of the violence that culminated into the genocide. Indeed, at the end of the 
genocide, the Interahamwe youths together with other former officials in the Hutu 
extremist government and Hutu civilians, the number put at approximately one million, 
sought refuge in neigbouring countries particularly Zaire, now Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and that this saw a humanitarian and environment cataclysm in the whole 
region.
25
 A question therefore emerges: How did the new government address the issues 
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surrounding those refugees? This study examines how the development in state-capacity 
during post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda served to address the refugee phenomenon 
which emerged after the genocide, for it is the unresolved refugee phenomenon that led to 
the civil war of the 1990s which culminated into the genocide.
26
 Indeed a neglected 
Rwandan Hutu refugee phenomenon or a politically mishandled refugee continuous 
situations by the government of Rwanda, was destined to lead to a conflict continuous 
situation that was to pervade Rwanda`s post conflict reconstruction period. Mention 
should also be made that even before the genocide, low levels of state capacity were a 
characteristic of Rwanda`s body-politics. It is a legacy that was bequeathed partly by 
colonialism.
27 
Therefore, though entirely ironical, it has been stated that the conflict 
which culminated into the genocide availed Rwanda with an opportunity to amend 
whatever went wrong to prepare for a better future,
28
 and the amendments required 
functioning state machinery with capacity to enable them to be at the vanguard of 
progress.  
 
However, from the literature surveyed, we are not allowed a detailed treatment of the 
nature of state capacity which Rwanda forged during its post-conflict reconstruction 
period, the challenges which it faced as it embarked on the development of state capacity, 
and what generally the issue Rwanda state capacity meant within the context of trying to 
thwart a resurgence of violence which is a sacrosanct objective of post conflict 
reconstruction process. We are also not told how the development in state capacity served 
to address the issues that threatened a resurgence of violence for Rwanda`s development 
ought to be analyzed within the context from which it emerged-- that is violence.  This 
study focuses on these gaps in its quest to contribute to the discourse about post-genocide 
Rwanda. It particularly focuses on forging a conceptual framework in which Rwanda`s 
post-conflict reconstruction can be purposefully problematised with an objective to 
inform post-conflict reconstruction process elsewhere.  
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It should be emphasized that Rwanda`s development in state capacity has not been 
without it critics. The governance style of the government led by the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front has been inundated with scholarly criticism. The conclusion from the literature that 
has been cynical of the Rwandan development experience has generally been that with 
continued suppression of the cardinal elements of democracy as manifested in abuse of 
human rights, freedom of press, suffocating any form of political dissent and the 
domination of the Rwandan political space by the Tutsi, Rwanda is destined to witnessing 
more visitations of violence. 
29
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However this kind of literature does not also help us in understanding whether the 
inadequacies in Rwanda`s post-genocide governance have parallels with the structure of 
violence which culminated into the genocide save for the prophetic insight which they 
advance that Rwanda is most likely to return to turmoil. What they perceive as inherent 
flaws in Rwanda`s governance may even be attributed to the somewhat political 
engineering process which may have aimed/aim at thwarting a resurgence to genocidal 
tendencies, that is if the logic of path dependence
30
 is to be applied. This study among 
other concerns advances that Rwanda`s political, social and economic set-up during post-
conflict reconstruction ought to be comprehended within the parameters of the structure 
of violence which led to the genocide. It is thus argued that human security related 
concerns were part of the determinants of the structure of violence that culminated into 
the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and that human security was part of the scheme of things 
which threatened a resurgence of violence and actually saw a resurgence of violence 
during the post conflict reconstruction phase of Rwanda for the period in review, 1994-
2005.  
 
It is sustained that development in state capacity ought to have focused on addressing 
such human insecurities like the question of the predicament of the ``second case load`` 
of refugees. Indeed state capacity during the post-conflict reconstruction phase of 
Rwanda focused on addressing the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo, then Zaire, and as such, this study also examines the manner in which 
state capacity addressed human security related concerns in Rwanda and the implication 
of the approach adopted on the general debate concerning human security during post-
conflict reconstruction situations.  
 
Therefore,  this study is about  human security,  how the concerns related to it determine 
the structure of violence during conflict and the imperativeness of aligning development 
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in state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction to addressing those concerns if a 
resurgence of violence is to be thwarted.  This scheme of things is clarified on later. The 
study obtains from the view that unmet human needs lead to fear among people, and this 
compromises their security as individuals a scheme of things precisely put as human 
security. It is underscored that when human security is threatened, it makes individuals to 
easily fall prey to mobilization into group violent schemes with political objectives. The 
relationship between human needs and human security is discussed in one of the 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
As it will be noted later, one of the cardinal objectives of the post-conflict reconstruction 
phase is: thwarting a resurgence of violence, and that it is the Hutu refugee phenomenon 
in Eastern Zaire which threatened and indeed led to a resurgence of violence in Rwanda. 
This study therefore, in its scope, is limited to the Hutu refugees who went to Zaire, now 
Democratic Republic of Congo, as the population under investigation.  The Hutu refugee 
phenomenon, it is advanced, highlights a convergence of human and state security, and 
underscores the imperativeness of focusing state capacity to addressing the security 
challenges which accrue from it. This is because it is mainly the Hutu refugees in Zaire 
(now Democratic Republic of Congo) who threatened and continues to threaten a 
resurgence of violence in Rwanda. They acted and act as a recruiting ground for the Hutu 
elites and other Rwandan elites with an aim to undermine the regime in Kigali.  The 
civilian refugees found and continue to find themselves in deplorable living conditions: 
which were/are manipulated by the Hutu elites to recruit them into the ranks of the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This posed and continues to 
pose a threat to the national security of Rwanda. This analytical thread is sustained in the 
subsequent chapters and the study investigates, in a detailed manner, how Rwanda 
handled this dilemma. 
 
In terms of time, the study is limited to the period 1994-2005. This is because apart from 
the fact that Paul collier provides a nine years` time frame for post-conflict reconstruction 
with a commitment to thwarting resurgence of violence,
31
 the period in review was also 
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particularly challenging for the new government in Rwanda. It is during that period that 
the new government was financially and administratively constrained, and all state 
apparatuses needed resuscitation. So, the question emerges: How were the gains made 
during the resuscitation of state capacity aligned to addressing the risk of the resurgence 
of violence? And what was the nature of the development in Rwanda’s state capacity in 
light of the general theorisation concerning post-conflict reconstruction? The study makes 
a theoretical and empirical contribution along the path of these two questions among 
other important questions earlier stated. 
 
In addition, in terms of content, the study is limited to the analysis of the human security 
challenges that the Hutu refugees had to grapple with, how their predicament was 
manipulated by the Hutu elites to recruit them into the rebel outfit to undermine the 
territorial integrity of Rwanda—state security, and indeed the continuity of the new 
regime in Rwanda. The study also covers how the development in state capacity forged 
by the new regime in Rwanda addressed the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Zaire, 
and the complexities which surrounded the options which were adopted in addressing the 
problem.  
 
Therefore, to put it in a nutshell, the research agenda of this study is specifically focused 
on the Hutu refugees in Congo., and  a specific question is derived: How did the 
development in state capacity which was realized during Rwanda`s post-conflict 
reconstruction address the problem of Hutu refugees in Congo? In interrogating the 
mentioned specific question the study primarily argues that: Human security related 
concerns were part of the scheme of things which threatened a resurgence of violence 
after the conflict of genocidal proportions in Rwanda, and that  development in  
Rwanda`s state-capacity during post-conflict reconstruction  focused on addressing such 
issues. The study obtains from this logic to bring to bear either supporting or off-putting 
answers to its central and specific questions of this study stated earlier. 
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1.3 Research Design: 
 
In design this study is generally qualitative as it sought to make qualitative arguments. 
However, in method, the study is multi-methodological in its inquiry as it employs: 
archival analysis, histories or historicity, case study and literature survey. This is because 
of the nature of the specific questions which this study strived to address.  Some 
questions obtained from the logic of; who, What, Where, how many, how much, and 
these methodologically required a detailed literature survey and archival analysis.  Other 
questions where generally: how and why questions and these required a historical 
treatment and case study approach.   
In this study both qualitative and quantitative data are employed to make qualitative 
arguments. Data was also collected from multiple sources and generally triangulated to 
construct a measure of validity. Accordingly, historical monographs about conflictual 
Rwanda, official and unofficial documents of governments, agencies of the United 
Nations Organisation, Non Government organisations, and intergovernmental agencies. 
Also the study relied on articles in scholarly journals and publications. Newspaper reports 
and archival records, selected focused interviews with selected informants, selected focus 
group discussions and video and audio records were also employed.  
It should be emphasized that generally the study relies on literature about Rwanda written 
in the English language and that translated from other languages into English. This is 
because of the diversity of the literature about Rwanda written and translated into English 
in comparison to other languages.  As regards the usage of the works written by French 
authors, for instance, the study relies on the works of Jan Vansina particularly his work: 
The Antecedents of Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (2004), the works of Rene 
Lemarchand particularly his two seminal works on Rwanda: Rwanda and Burundi (1970) 
and The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (2009) and some works of Gerald 
Prunier and variously those Fillip Reyntjens. This is because Rwanda until the 
ascendancy of the Rwanda Patriotic Front to power, the official languages were 
Kinyarwanda and French thus the imperativeness of using some works written by French 
authors. But to go into the nitty-gritty of the involvement of the French authorities 
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particularly in the politics of Rwanda which preceded the genocide, the study relies on 
the correspondences of the French leadership of France housed by the so called 
Mitterrand Archives    
The study particularly obtains from the archives of the United States Department of State 
and those from the Mitterrand Archive by drawing on de-classified diplomatic 
correspondences about Rwanda, as an original unit of data, to triangulate other data 
sources; especially academic monographs and reports of international agencies.  The 
reasons to why the study variously bases its arguments on the archival records; 
particularly the ``public use files`` of the diplomatic cables of the United States are as 
follows: 
 
First, that the correspondences were meant to practically guide the foreign policy of 
United States in its focus on the Post-Genocide Rwanda and the refugee crisis it 
generated. So, it would have been illogical for the United States to engage in self-deceit 
by trading in diplomatic lies within correspondences meant to its foreign policy 
administration. It should be emphasized that these cables were internal to the units of the 
States Department of the United States, in the correspondences, it is indicated that even 
the anecdotal evidence, onto which other multi-lateral agencies like the UNCHR 
sometimes based their reports had to be cross-checked by the intelligence gathering units 
of the USA to guard against taking administrative actions based on rumuors. The jargon 
used is that of ``hard facts``. 
 
Also it is the only available to public single data set that captured the trend of events in 
post-genocide Rwanda on a daily basis and a lot of attention is paid to detail in these 
correspondences; sometimes even the subliminal signals made by speakers during 
meetings were captured, and that the correspondences, unlike other data sets reviewed 
like the reports of international agencies, books and monographs about Rwanda, do not 
make a claim at thoroughness, they quickly point out inadequacies in the verification of 
incidents were they emerged. They outline what was verified by the intelligence, and 
what the intelligence failed to verify. The correspondences also capture the intentions of 
other actors, as the intelligence system of the USA has the capacity to ``tap into`` the 
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inner working of other actors – state and non-state. For where the intelligence system of 
the United States ``taps``, even the Pope is not spared.  
 
In addition to the archived correspondences of the United States, the archived diplomatic 
correspondences of the French from the Mitterrand Archive and the French Parliamentary 
Commission are also employed to capture the perception of the French of the Rwandan 
genocidal Saga. This is because the French were a key ally to the government of 
Habyarimana and were at a vantage point to know the inner working of the regime that 
presided over the massacres which culminated into the genocide of 1994.  
 
Generally, data collection was majorly guided by a retrospective design to understand 
and explain how Rwanda managed to address the resurgence of violence during its post-
conflict reconstruction period (1994-2005). It based on retrospective data, historical data 
about the period under review; to describe and explain how Rwanda`s development in 
state capacity addressed the Hutu refugees ``new case load`` phenomenon which did not 
only entail a threat with human security dimensions; but also with state security 
connotations directed at the   Rwandan state.  
In addition even data outside the period in review but analysing the events which 
occurred or analysing events related to the events which occurred during the period in 
review is treated in retrospect.  However, a selected few interviews with key informants, 
who were identified  by the researcher using the snowball method by  using the  formal 
contacts within the state apparatuses of Rwanda and Uganda as the point of departure , 
were employed to give topicality to the themes which emerge from the 
textual/documented data about Rwanda. Interviews are only employed to the extent they 
serve to enhance the arguments from documents than acting as a point of departure as far 
as the arguments of this study are concerned. This is because interviews, more so those 
concerning the experience that is Rwanda, are undermined by retrospective bias owing to 
the emotional nature of the Rwandan genocide, and the ``Never Again`` ideology in 
Rwanda which criminalises the Hutu-Tutsi distinction; and that both public and private 
discussions about Rwanda leads to what has been referred to as ``amplified silence`` in 
the study of Rwanda. Indeed one informant, a consultant with the Rwandan Ministry of 
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Education, in reference to the considerable measure of silence even in the social 
interactions among the Banyarwanda (this study variously uses the word 
``Banyarwanda`` to connote the ``people of Rwanda``) remarked: 
``The Banyarwanda are intriguingly silent even in the midst of each other. When 
with foreigners they at least open-up, but again with studied reservations in 
interaction, and a Munyarwanda (a noun used in reference to one Rwandan) can 
tell you something in one minute and change it in the next upon realising that he 
has revealed much (sic). They leave in fear of each other and are overly 
suspicious. ``
32
    
Indeed it is because of the notion of ``amplified silence``, depicted by the revelations of 
the informant in quotation above, that the study had to drop the logic of phenomenology 
as a philosophical approach to generally guide its inquiry, opting for the grounded theory 
methodology that allows a measure of flexibility in social science inquiry.  A positivist 
approach could not also be adopted for this study because of the unpredictability of the 
units of analysis for this research, that is, the Hutu refugee phenomenon. 
As such, despite the fact that of the 30 informant interviews (targeted from the 50 
interviews which were conducted during the pilot study) and 4 focused group discussions 
conducted during the study; only 6 informant interviews passed the reliability test of 
consistency adopted by the study and 1 focused group passed the reliability test of 
consistency. The reliability test of consistency for this particular study was executed by 
the researcher repeating an interview with a person in case of informant interview or a 
group in the case of focused group discussion. Repeating answers could be inferred as 
consistency. For the sake of confidentiality the location and positions of the informants 
and focused groups are not provided. 
To that effect, basing on the logic of the case study  methodology, this study, particularly 
obtains from the case of the Hutu Refugee phenomenon in the Eastern Congo, which 
during the period under review, was referred to as; Eastern Zaire. The Hutu Refugee 
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phenomenon entailed the Hutu Refugee warrior phenomenon; which threatened and 
subsequently led to a resurgence of violence in Rwanda. 
In analysis, the study was generally oriented by the logic of explanation building; with an 
objective to reflect on post-conflict reconstruction as a public policy process and the 
security debate concerning the applicability of human security as a practice and concept. 
The data theory/ philosophical approach, that is, the grounded theory methodology was 
therefore adopted to explore its conceptual and theoretical concerns of the study, which 
revolved around; human security, state capacity, and post-conflict reconstruction and 
related debates. The meaning of the grounded theory methodology in light of the 
mentioned concepts that orient this study is as follows: 
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1.3.1 The Logic of the Grounded Theory Methodology and the study 
 
Mamdani, in a preface he gives to his book on the Rwandan genocide, contends thus: 
… (the view)that knowledge is about the production of facts….  translates into the 
stubborn resistance to theory in the name of valorising the fact. From this point of 
view, the claim is that theory is deadening: instead of illuminating, it manipulates 
fact. The assumption is that facts speak for themselves. But facts need to be put in 
context, and interpreted; neither is possible without a theoretical illumination.
33
  
Accordingly, this study juxtaposes the facts about Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction 
with the conceptual and theoretical concerns surrounding human security and state 
capacity during post-conflict reconstruction, in a bid to understand the appropriateness of 
the two concepts in explaining and understanding the factors which shaped and shaken 
Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction, particularly its security architecture. The outcome 
is a closure, of what Glaser and Strauss, refer to as: ``the embarrassing gap between 
theory and empirical research``,
34
 but within the context of Rwanda and also clarify on 
the conceptual and theoretical debate concerning human security and state capacity.  
In that regard, the study adopts the logic of the grounded theory methodology.  The 
grounded theory methodology is adopted as a strategy of inquiry for this study as  it 
provides a framework through which theory and empirical research can be interwoven to 
explain and understand a phenomenon, that is, Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction 
experience.   
The ‘Grounded Theory’ methodology requires that, for a researcher to attain the objective 
of developing a theory they should be committed to a constant juxtaposition of data 
collection with analysis; which is precisely put as: ``constant comparative method.`` 
However, in instances where there is an existing theory that seems to be appropriate in 
explaining and guiding the understanding of the area under inquiry, then, the grounded 
theory methodology is applied to elaborate and improve on the existing theory by 
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comparing data with the assumptions of the theory, as one tries to explain a 
phenomenon.
35
  
 
However, it is Diane Vaughan, who delineates a systematic way of expounding and 
improving on an existing theory using data: an endeavour she expresses as ``theoretical 
elaboration. `` To her, elaboration connotes a process through which a theory or concept 
is refined using qualitative data analysis; with an objective to find out the instances in 
which it can be useful in explaining and understanding a phenomenon.  Vaughar contends 
that the process of theoretical elaboration requires that a researcher chooses a case to act 
as, ``the locus for exploring the research questions—and then makes the theoretical case 
for it. `` Other researchers can pick on other cases to continue on the elaboration of a 
given theory or concept.
36
  
 
Accordingly, following the logic of the grounded theory methodology, specifically the 
``theoretical elaboration`` procedure of Vaughar, the study uses the case of Rwanda in 
Post Conflict Reconstruction; against which research questions stated earlier are 
explored. The study uses the Human Security approach and State-Capacity approach as 
the Grounded conceptual and theoretical framework.  The data about Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction experiences of Rwanda are analyzed in light of the tenets of Human 
Security and State-Capacity. The choice of Rwanda obtains from the magnitude and 
exceptionality of the nature and effects of the conflict that reached genocidal proportions 
and the extent to which Post-genocide Rwanda has attracted considerable academic 
debate. Arguably, it is one of the most published phenomena about post cold War 
political Africa and generally our political earth.   
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1.3.2 Analytical Procedure  
Therefore, the study, obtaining from the scope of the study delimited in terms of: time, 
content and population, proceed logically in the analysis of data collected using the 
Template Analysis Style:
37
 
 
Note: This diagrammatic representation of the `´Template Analysis Style`` is adopted 
from, Crabtree and Miller, A template approach to text analysis: Developing codebooks, 
in, B.F. Crabtree & W.L. Miller, eds., Doing qualitative research (Newbury Park: CA. 
Sage, 1992):93-109. 
Diagrammatically, as seen above, the study moves from the known to explain the 
unknown. It does not literally speaking; try to reinvent the wheel as far as the analysis of 
post-conflict reconstruction processes is concern.  Rather, it primarily uses what has been 
said and written about Rwanda to find unities and disunities in its post-conflict 
reconstruction to give topicality and conceptual density to the stated questions of the 
study.  
As such, the analysis moves from the TEXT
38
 among others;  scholarly monographs 
about Rwanda, archival documents; particularly the diplomatic correspondences of the 
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 See, Crabtree and Miller, A template approach to text analysis: Developing codebooks, in, B.F. Crabtree 
& W.L. Miller, eds., Doing qualitative research (Newbury Park: CA. Sage, 1992), 93-109, for a thorough 
exposition of the Template Analysis Approach. 
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 William L. Miller and Benjamin F. Crabtree, Clinical Research, in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. 
Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 1994), 345-346., argues that if the goal of the researcher is 
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United States on post-conflict Rwanda, government documents, newspapers 
(international and local), documents and reports of major international organizations, 
international and local civil society organizations. 
Orderly, identification of units that relate to development in the state capacity of Rwanda 
and the human security concerns takes place; Revision of the categories that reflect state 
capacity and human security that appear in the various texts considered is done to create a 
kind of coding for the issues emerging in a bid to facilitate interpretation of the 
connections in literature to verify or off-put the stated questions of the study.  
The connections are further beefed up with usage of other primary sources with emphasis 
on unstructured interviews
39
 with key informants, audio and visual recordings (motion 
pictures) of some actors in the Rwandan experience. Key informants were largely 
selected by the snow ball technique. The rationale for choosing informants by snow ball 
method owes to the crisis of confidence which surrounds the body research about 
Rwanda and its Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo. Volunteering information 
on a ``high security concern`` like that of refugee warriors requires a degree of trust 
between the interviewer and the interviewee which could only be guaranteed by one 
informant introducing you to another informant whom he considers to be knowledgeable 
on the question in review. The limitation in this kind of arrangement was that 
knowledgeable informants outside the network identified through the snowball technique 
were missed, but this negative outcome was offset by the conceptual density attained 
from textual analysis.    
To further offset the relative inadequacy of the snowball technique, the study employed 
focused group discussions of the refugees who have not returned to Rwanda with an 
objective to understand their human security concerns. The study cross examined the 
textual evidence against the Human Security concerns raised by the affected (particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
exploration, discovery, or seeking to understand what others have gone through, he/she has to be close to 
the text- the written word that precisely puts the observations and feeling of others. 
39
 Andrea Fontana, Interviewing: The Art of Science, in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, 1994), 366, observes that unstructured interviewing is ideal in an 
attempt to understand the complex human behaviour without the researcher imposing his pre-conceived 
ideas on the respondent that is a characteristic of structured interviewing using instruments like a 
questionnaire. 
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the Hutu refugees still at large in Eastern Congo, Tanzania and Uganda).  The study 
partly relied on the refugees who are still at large because of the ‘amplified silence” of 
the returned who could not respond to the particular human security related questions of 
this study because of the restrictions of the legal framework in Rwanda. The implications 
of their continued stay in refuge on the conflict carrying capacity of Rwanda; is an area 
for further research which this study recommends. But, again, aware of the danger of 
retrospective bias, the outcome from these focused group discussions are only utilised to 
the extent to which they give topicality to the thematic concerns which emerge from the 
textual data, and such intrusions do not pervade the whole unit treatment of thematic 
concerns of this study which obtain from the concepts, that is, Human Security, State 
Capacity and Post-Conflict reconstruction; which guide the logic of this study.  
The delineation of the meaning and the debate surrounding the concepts and how this 
study utilises them is as follows:   
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1.4 Conceptual and theoretical issues: Human Security, State 
Capacity, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development: 
Mapping out a conceptual Framework, identification of 
conceptual gaps and the delimitation of the scope of the study. 
1.4.1 Introduction 
By way of reiteration, in its inquiry and analysis the study is guided by the concepts of 
human security and state-capacity within the context of post-conflict reconstruction. At 
this point a clarification on the meaning and the debate surrounding this study, and how 
they orient this study is worthwhile.  The treatment is as follows: 
1.4.2 The meaning of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and its nexus with 
development and security 
First, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction process is central to the avoidance of a resurgence 
of violence after a conflict, and development is an integral element of the post-conflict 
reconstruction process.
40
  So, as noted earlier, the study asks: How did Rwanda`s 
development in state-capacity during post-conflict reconstruction serve to address the 
human security concerns that threatened a resurgence of the structure violence?  
 
 In other words put as the ``peace process``-- the transition from war to peace,
41
 Post-
conflict reconstruction entails a number of activities. These activities range from 
cessation of hostilities through negotiated settlement or through an ultimate victory by 
one side against the other, embarking on security sector reforms, undertaking political 
reforms like embarking on electoral reforms, creation of institutions for dispensation of 
justice, reconciliation, and a commitment to development with a focus on social and 
economic development.
42
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 See, Reiko Kage, Making Reconstruction Work: Civil Society and Information after War`s end 
(Comparative Political Studies: 2010 43:163, originally Published Online 5 March 2009. 
DOI:10.1177/00104/14009332128, http://cps.sagepub.com/content/43/2/163), Pierre Englebert and Denis 
M. Tull, Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States  
(International Security, Vol.32, No.4, Spring 2008):106-139, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans 
Soderbom, Post-Conflict Risks (Peace Research, vol.45, no. 4, 2008). 
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 J. `Bayo Adekanye, Arms and Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies (Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 
34, no.3, 1997, ISSN: 0022-3433, pp.359-366, (heading 2)).  
42
 Ibid., 1997: 360. 
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To Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, post-conflict reconstruction can precisely be put 
as ``state reconstruction``:  aimed at reconfiguring the ability of the state to monopolise 
the means of violence, and efforts to enable it to be at the vanguard of the provision of 
law and order; other social services like health, education, transport and communication 
infrastructure, observance of human rights and streamlining economic activities   through 
regulations.
43
   The usage of ``state reconstruction``; however as a pointer to ``Post-
Conflict Reconstruction``, seems to underscore the imperativeness of re-organising the 
institutions of government so that they can ably execute their functions like provision of 
law and order, and the provision of public services.   
 
To Rugumamu, post-conflict reconstruction is that process that takes place in a ‘country 
Conflict’-- a country that has recently experienced conflict to failed state levels. To him 
the process entails repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure with 
a commitment to rebuilding institutions and society.
44
 Rugumamu`s definition resonates 
well with the World Bank framework for reconstruction which places great emphasis on 
infrastructural development to ensure the development of societies emerging from 
conflicts. However, conscious of the imperativeness of a functioning sovereign, as it will 
be delineated in the proceeding parts of this study, it is a major contention of this study 
that ``state building``--- the putting in place of institutions for governance: administrative, 
extractive and coercive, is important; for functioning government institutions are central 
to public policy making and execution, and it is this system of things that this study takes 
to be ``State-Capacity``.  
 
The imperativeness of state-capacity, as it is conceptualised in the proceeding parts of 
this study, is said to be central to even building the rather coveted political orientation 
that is democratic culture after conflict. Though democracy is not the central focus of this 
study, it is worth mentioning that a capable state, which can ensure provision of public 
goods like law and order, education, health and security, is central to the nurturing of 
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 Englebert and Tull, Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, 2008:106-139. 
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 Rugumanu and O. Gbla, Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building, In Post-Conflict Countries in 
Africa: Some Lessons of Experience from Rwanda (The African Capacity Building Foundation, Revised 
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democracy.
45
 So state-capacity and the provision of public goods which  ensure the 
satisfaction of human needs which guarantee  human security (the exposition of the 
imperativeness of human security in post-conflict reconstruction situations is done in the 
subsequent parts of this chapter), become important mutual elements of reconstruction. 
 
It should be noted that the Post-Conflict Reconstruction phase involves national and 
international actors,
46
 and where national actors are to be involved; the state as a unified 
actor has to play a central role. The state cannot play a central role if its institutions are 
not coherent enough to champion reconstruction. This calls for the resuscitation of the 
failed, failing or collapsed institutions of the state to be able to execute their mandate 
which entails ensuring law and order, and the provision of social services. Roland Paris 
talks of institutionalisation during post-conflict reconstruction to ensure a functioning 
polity.  To Paris institutionalisation is an urgent stage if the country emerging from a 
conflict situation is to progressively recover.
47
  This point to the need for state-capacity 
during the post-conflict reconstruction period, and this provides a furthering empirical 
case, which is Rwanda during its post-conflict reconstruction, 1994-2005, to the rather 
hypothetical assertion of Paris.    
 
However it should be mentioned that conceptualising state capacity during post-conflict 
situations can be problematic for we are told that state failure as a result of conflict does 
not always translate into state collapse (the highest level of state failure) as some 
institutional structures of government may persist into reconstruction phase. Indeed, it is 
not a moment to isolate when we read that in 1998, when the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD-Goma) took over Eastern Congo, they retained the existing 
administrative regional structures, and that the Forces Nouvelles in Northern Ivory Coast 
also did the same. So, reconstruction after conflict may obtain from the existing local 
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December, DOI:10.1177/0010414011428587, http://cps.sagepub.com/content/45/7/903, 2011).  
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 Rugumanu and O. Gbla, Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building, 2003. 
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  Roland Paris in, Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical versus contemporary studies of the Liberal 
Peace, (International Studies Review, 2006. http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Paris_ISR_Oct2006.pdf) (8), 
425–440.   
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institutional arrangements that may have survived the conflict, but not beginning from the 
``scratch``.
48
  
 
Needless to mention Post-Conflict situations present a number of challenges to the 
government particularly the fear of a resurgence of the conflict.
49
 More often the 
challenge of the resurgence of violence accrue from internal and external security 
challenges; some of which might have been either as a result of the effects of the violent 
conflict or the unresolved causes of the violent conflict.  This study contends that  the 
actors during the post-conflict reconstruction process, which in the context of this study is 
the state (government); have to grapple with those security challenges as well as the 
demands from the external actors who are precisely and commonly put as the 
International Community.   
 
The International Community, arguably led by the United Nations Organisation, demands 
for swift adjustments of governments to democratic standards;
50
 standards that largely 
obtain from the Liberal peace framework as an approach to the realization of economic, 
political and social development: issues that are central to the existence of states 
emerging from conflicts.
51
 The transition to democracy is treated as a somewhat conditio 
sine qua non that has to be met in order to gain access to post-conflict reconstruction aid. 
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 Englebert and Tull, Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, 2008:126. They also cite Rotberg, ``Failed 
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of authority`` with completely no functioning public institution or authority and the state is ``a mere 
geographical expression….`` In recent memory no state has reached such a non-functioning level, even one 
was to cite Somalia as an example; we should be quick to pick the University of Mogadishu as a 
functioning public institutions in Somalia, and others can be added onto that. 
49
 See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mäns Sönderbon, Post-Conflict Risks, July., 2008,  Stephen D 
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Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peace Building (Journal of Latin 
American Studies 2002):1-3; notes that what is very high on the agenda of the United Nations during Post-
Conflict Reconstruction is the promotion of democracy and good governance as sacrosanct attributes of 
post-conflict peace –building initiatives.  
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 Roland Paris in, Bringing the Leviathan Back In, 2006, (8), 425–440, argues that the Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction agenda of the international community in countries emerging from conflicts generally 
obtains from the tenets of the contemporary conception of the liberal peace thesis, with an emphasis on 
electioneering, civil society involvement in politics, political parties and increased observance of human 
rights and freedom.  
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The International community uses the privileges of power
52
 to push for a liberal agenda 
in countries emerging from conflict, elevating such an agenda to a level of a political and 
economic imperative for a successful reconstruction.
53
 
 
Evidence suggests that the debate on Post-Conflict Reconstruction has generally been on 
its nature, what it should entail, the direction it should take, the nature of governance to 
be adopted, and how to pursue development. Indeed, after conflict, what concerns the 
people, governments, and the international community can be collapsed under a singular 
name tag: development; although at different levels. The development concerns at both 
the level of government and the international community converge at the question of how 
to overcome the challenges to peace through development.
54
   
 
It should be noted that building a functioning polity is central to ensuring that the central 
objectives of the post-conflict reconstruction phase are met.  This point to the direction of 
building the capacity of the institutions of government to ably address issues that might 
lead to resurgence of violence.  Resurgence of violence can accrue from neglect of 
military security challenges that may even emanate from external dynamics like refugee 
warrior communities, and sometimes it might accrue from low human security as a result 
of the neglected human needs of the populace of the state emerging from a violent 
conflict; which is more often reflected in the improvidence and sometimes  sheer 
manipulation of inequity in the provision of public goods like education, transport 
infrastructure, and job opportunities by the political elites. So, to this study any 
development attempt aimed at thwarting further violence after a conflict should have to 
focus on both the concerns of the people as far as their security is concerned and the 
security of the state (which glorifies military security concerns). 
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 Emphasized should be made that it has been severally argued that development is a 
precursor to a peace without recourse to violence. But what should be the focus of 
development during post-conflict reconstruction if a resurgence of violence is to be 
avoided or at least contained when it occurs?  To answer that question, it has been 
suggested that the answer lies in appropriate development in the aftermath of a conflict 
and that development is precisely put as national sustainable development planning
55
.  
Human security is stated as an integral element of National Sustainable development that 
is supposed to be catered for during post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
Human security focuses on the security of the individual as this study will delineate later. 
This study contends that ``the wretched``, if we borrow the lingua of Frantz Fanon in his 
seminal publication: ``The Wretched of the Earth``; the people, who have been sore put 
by the conflict, hope for a settled life when the sounds of the guns subside, but to put 
their expectations in a simple measure: they hope for increased Human Security which 
entails personal security, health security, food security, environmental security, 
community security, political security, and economic security.
56
 The realization of 
development, be it in Human Security, requires an array of functioning institutions of 
government: the machinery of the state-- its government; should be in position to 
streamline the development process during the reconstruction process. Even where the 
international community is at the vanguard of the reconstruction process, the 
state/government has to be empowered to take over the development process as the 
international actors start to roll-out.
57
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Therefore, it a major contention of this study that the rejuvenation of the administrative 
and extractive state apparatus; the instruments that allow the state to function properly is 
a very urgent task. The state apparatus: the Public Service for economic and financial 
control, educational control, state security control, Health control; elements that are 
sacrosanct to a country’s state capacity are also supposed to be a centre of attention 
during reconstruction.   
 
It is also contended that the institutions for governance have to be reformed in a manner 
that can promote development. Reforms that are aimed at reducing corruption, poor 
planning, and misuse of resources through unnecessary expenditures have to be made to 
ensure a more responsible state to champion a successful post-conflict reconstruction.
58
 
This means that if development is central to the post-conflict reconstruction process; then 
development ought to focus on ensuring that a resurgence of violence is thwarted, and  
that development has to be structured in such a way that it entails  improvement in the 
ability of the state to plan and execute its functions (state capacity). The improvement in 
the state`s capacity to execute its functions aims at enabling the institutions of 
government  to be in position to address the challenges to peace which may accrue from 
the effects of the conflict,  and the unresolved issues that may lead to a resurgence of  
violence. These issues however differ from one conflict to another, and in the context of 
this study the focus is on the weaknesses in state capacity and    human insecurities; as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
involvement and ownership`´ should be facilitated. This requires a capable state to take on the 
responsibility as the international community rolls back it providence.  They also suggest that the ``supply 
side`´ of governance which entails organisation of markets, tax systems, banks and general regulation of the 
economy, creation of political structures like the constitution, creation of institutions for the observance of 
law and order, has to be given attention during reconstruction. However, this requires a committed and able 
government as the functioning apparatus of the state. 
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governance(fostering the elements of markets, tax systems, banks and regulatory policies to make an 
economy function); to ensure orderliness within the economic and political spheres of the state.  
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issues that structured the violence which culminated into the genocide and that these 
issues persisted even into the post-conflict phase albeit in different standing and 
magnitude, but to lead to a resurgence of violence.  
 
It is thus argued that human security concerns require state institutions to ensure the 
provision of human needs, and that a neglect of providing the human needs that guarantee 
human security can easily undermine not only the security of the individual but also that 
of the state which is pejoratively sometimes put as the regime in the context of political 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  In other words, the study in terms of discourse situates itself in the 
areas of development and security during post-conflict reconstruction. 
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1.4.2.1 The nexus between Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Development 
and Security 
 
Aware of the  internal and external challenges and demands, coupled with a dearth of 
resources which Post-Conflict governments have to grapple with in streamlining 
development in Post-Conflict Situations; the study contends that in trying to 
circumnavigate the question of development, governments ought to grapple with the 
question: What should be the focus of development during post-conflict reconstruction. It 
a major argument of this study  that development during post-conflict reconstruction 
phase ought to focus on addressing the issues that structure (d) the violence during the 
conflict, and those which threaten a resurgence of violence.  It also argues that much as 
post-conflict reconstruction involves an array of actors, there has to be a commitment to 
developing the capacity of the state to plan and execute its functions. This also points to 
the need to focus development to forging an appropriate security policy to thwart a 
resurgence of violence. It is the logic of this paragraph that indicates the direction that the 
inquiry and analysis of this study takes in the subsequent chapters. 
 
It is underscored that violence during conflict is structured by a number of issues; 
including human security concerns, and that without addressing those issues, avoiding a 
resurgence of violence which is the ultimate objective of post-conflict reconstruction may 
not be attained. It is further contended that the structure of violence differs from one 
conflict to another. 
 
Accordingly, this study obtains from circumstances where as a result of weaknesses in 
state capacity; human insecurities became part of the structure of violence during the 
conflict, and where human security related concerns converged with stat security related 
concerns to threaten a resurgence of violence during post-conflict situations. In trying to 
examine this trajectory of issues, Rwanda becomes the study`s natural point of departure: 
a case study against which the questions which orient this study are investigated.  
 
The empirical inquiry of this study is based on Rwanda for two reasons: the extent of the 
violence which occurred, its compounding effects; like the refugee phenomenon in 
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Eastern Congo, and the extent to which its post-conflict reconstruction has been widely 
acknowledged in policy and academic literature.  
 
As regards the time scope of this study, it should be emphasized that the time period that 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction is supposed to take is generally elusive. Sometimes a given 
state may get stark for so long in Post-Conflict situations. But Collier notes that post-
conflict reconstruction should ideally take at least nine years of a commitment to 
activities to thwart the causes of conflict not to recur and attempts to overcome the costs 
of the conflict.  It is noted that the first post-conflict period may contain anything from 
zero to 47 months of peace and the second phase containing 48 months of peace. He 
explains that the period is put under three economic growth episodes each consisting 
three years making nine years from the end of the conflict.
59
  
 
However, much as Collier`s  nine years  of the reconstruction process can be said to be a 
proper delimitation of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the reconstruction process can go 
on beyond nine years as the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan may attest. But because 
no country can be theoretically speaking in reconstruction forever, then, Collier`s time 
frame can suffice to guide the delimitation of the time-frame within which a research 
aimed at capturing the processes of reconstruction in a specific country can be done. This 
study looks at Rwanda within Collier`s reconstruction time framework, and the study 
limits itself to the time period 1994-2005. Though Collier`s framework may be dismissed 
as being conjectural, in the context of Rwanda, the period  can suffice given that it is also 
during that period, as earlier noted, that the State in Rwanda was grappling with a 
considerable measure of political, social and economic challenges; with several 
weaknesses in its state capacity.  
 
 As regards the content scope of the reconstruction process, it should be emphasised that 
reconstruction may go beyond reconstitution of the pre-conflict order, to starting a new. 
The World Bank contends that reconstruction does not connote a return to the pre-
conflict social, political and economic situations, but rather to forging a way forward in 
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terms of creating: ``…enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society. ``60  
However, as noted earlier, it should not be construed that in all instances, reconstruction, 
for the lack of a better phrase: starts from the scratch. Indeed, even where all the 
functioning institutions of society crumble under the heavy destruction and distraction of 
a conflict, a semblance of organisation remains, at least in terms of the Diaspora 
communities, who can always be called on to come to forge a functioning sovereign as 
the case of Somalia, has severally attested..  
 
Further, the reconstruction process requires a commitment to streamlining issues of 
governance, building institutions for governance which to Fukuyama refers to as ``state 
building`` aimed at ensuring provision of urgent services like law and order, and the 
necessary legislation for a peaceful society.
61
  The return to ``a functioning… society`` as 
the World Bank puts it seems to be the central concern of post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts. Also  the provision of what Fukuyama calls ``urgent services`` requires a 
functioning polity—functioning institutions of government like the police, army, 
judiciary, a functioning bureaucracy,  legislature and the executive arm of government to  
foresee the functions of government.  But the issue of content scope within the context of 
Rwanda is elaborated on later, in the section which discusses the Rwandan experience 
within the conceptual frame rendered by human security and state capacity.  
 
As far as who should be at the vanguard of the post conflict reconstruction process, 
though this study underscores the imperativeness of a functioning state/government, it 
does recognise that post-Conflict reconstruction involves the participation of both the 
international actors and the domestic actors; most especially the civil-society. It is also 
important that the government at the helm of the affairs of the state in the post-conflict 
phase is empowered to play its role.
62
  This means that even where  the international 
community has to take immediate action to ensure providence of basic services like food, 
a move towards what Krasner refers to as ``local involvement and ownership`´ should be 
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facilitated. ``Local involvement and ownership`` requires a capable state to take on the 
responsibility as the international community rolls back its providence. This does not 
negate the fact that domestic civil-society organisations also do play a vital role, but that 
is not part of the research agenda of this study.  
 
On the other hand, Post Conflict Reconstruction does not always entail a somewhat linear 
flow of activities; that there has to be a transition from the International community to a 
capable government. There are instances where the state/post-conflict government as a 
local agency plays a vanguard role in the reconstruction with the international community 
playing a facilitation role in terms of monetary support. In Uganda, for example, after the 
conflict that ended in 1986, the National Resistance Movement was at the centre of the 
reconstruction process.  In Somaliland after the collapse of Saidi Bare`s government in 
1991, the political and business leaders provided the direction to reconstruction. With 
little international support in the context of Uganda, and no international support in the 
case of Somaliland, capable local agency or agencies, more so a functioning government, 
which was and still defacto in the context of Somaliland, championed the post-conflict 
reconstruction process.
63
 It is also said that local agency-led reconstruction is more viable 
in instances where the: ``...well organised insurgencies claim victory in wars whose 
outcomes are not negotiated by outsiders. ``
64
  
 
A successful reconstruction process requires a focus on building institutions of a 
functioning sovereignty, and if they are weak,
65
 their empowerment (through 
restructuring and revitalisation process for example through appropriate staffing), and 
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aligning them to focus on addressing the human insecurities that determined the structure 
of violence of the conflict in question and those threatening a resurgence of violence. 
 
Owing to the area scope of the study, it is argued that addressing the issues that determine 
(d) the structure of violence during post-conflict reconstruction situations requires a dual 
approach to security. The dual approach to security in the context of this study is a focus 
on human and state security, with attention to the issues that determined the structure of 
violence but falling within the boundaries of the two security areas, but sometimes cross-
cutting in their cause-effect relationship. 
 
It should be noted, as it clearly emerges from the subsequent specific chapters of this 
study, that sometimes a commitment to the two security areas eludes both International 
and domestic actors, and that a commitment to one aspect may end-up overshadowing the 
other. For example, in the quest for state security, a post-conflict government may 
undermine human security related concerns like personal security, political security, 
water, food and a place of abode, among others. A neglect of one level, either state 
security or human security can easily lead to the increase in the probability of a 
resurgence of violence. Human security may exacerbate the disorientation of the people, 
even civilians: making them prone to quick mobilisation for group violence thus 
resurgence of violence.  
 
It is underscored that the importance of addressing the threats to both Human and state-
security, and concentrates, as part of its research agenda, on how threats to human 
security and state security converge to lead to violence. This is because whereas 
governments recognise easily the importance of ensuring state-security concerns; by 
swiftly embarking on building their militaries, the concerns of the people are sometimes 
relegated at the very periphery of government action, left to the providence of Non 
Governmental Organisations. Yet in some instances the neglect of one security threat 
area undermines another security area.  As such, the study argues that state capacity as a 
central element of development during post-conflict reconstruction, should focus on the 
provision of human securities with emphasis on addressing the human insecurities that 
shape (d) and shake (n) the structure of violence during the conflict. However, the study 
48 
 
by way of underscoring the importance of human security, it also delineates how human 
security can serve to substantially undermine the security of the state which is the central 
focus of the traditional conceptualisation of security. But how does this study 
conceptualise state capacity in post conflict reconstruction situations? The following 
section is an attempt to situate state capacity within the conceptual parameters of this 
study. 
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1.4.3 The Meaning of State-Capacity and its imperativeness in Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Situations 
 
Whereas there are a plethora of definitions for state-capacity and what it should entail, 
their point of departure is the question of the ``scope`` and ``strength`` of the 
government.
66
 State-Capacity entails a measure of ingredients, and indeed little do we get 
the conceptualisation of state-capacity by way of explanatory definition, but by heuristic 
definitions; delineating what state-capacity should be comprised of.  The discussion that 
follows tries to capture the nature of the conceptualisation of the meaning of state-
capacity in the context of Post-Conflict reconstruction. 
 
First forward, Cullen S. Hendrix summaries for us the definitional debate concerning 
state-capacity. He notes that there has been a measure of contest as regards the 
conceptual meaning of state capacity. He however collapses what he calls the competing 
definitions and operationalisation of state capacity into three issue areas: military 
capacity, bureaucratic capacity-administrative capacity, and coherence of political 
institutions..
67
 However, this study looks at the three definition and operationalisation 
areas not as competitive, but rather complementary. This is because the success of one 
issue area requires the presence of the other 
 
It is advanced that civil conflict, which is the focus of this study undermines the ability of 
the state, its state-capacity to provide public goods like education, health, keeping of law 
and order and transport infrastructure at all levels of government; local and national.
68
 
This implies that it is imperative that reconstruction efforts aimed at kick-starting 
development in the post-conflict state have to also focus on building viable government 
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50 
 
institutions for the effective provision of public goods. A capable government has been 
said to be a perquisite for a smooth post-conflict reconstruction process and governance. 
 
 Roland Paris notes that peace building operations have been a fiasco in many countries 
(like in Rwanda and Angola), not because the goals were not clear but rather because the 
means were not well-thought. He castigates the notion of quick liberalisation-- a method 
adopted by the International donors and institutions for economic and political 
development in countries emerging from conflicts.  Accordingly, he advocates creation of 
institutions for governance, curtailing in the short-run political and economic competition 
in a bid   to create foundations for peace and democracy in the long-run. To him 
liberalisation should be preceded by institutionalisation.
69
  
 
As precisely noted earlier, it is contended that the challenges that Post-Conflict 
reconstruction situations pose to the state are similar to the problems of state-building in 
low income countries: grappling with the challenge of poor and weak institutions. It is 
suggested that these problems coupled with the risk of conflict resurgence as major 
challenges to Post-Conflict Countries may not be ably addressed through democracy.
70
 
This is because whereas those who promote democracy assert that it lowers the incentives 
for rebellion—the resurgence of conflict, to the contrary, it is alleged that democracy 
constrains the technical possibilities of government repression; thus making the re-
occurrence of rebellion easier.
71
  This study does not sustain this debate, but rather to use 
the argument therein to carry forward the argument that functioning government 
institutions are central to streamlining the activities which take place during the 
reconstruction process.   
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So the need for functioning government institutions--state capacity, in the reconstruction 
process cannot be overemphasized. To Krasner, the process of streamlining government 
institutions, which is the third phrase in his ``transition phases`` of reconstruction should  
entail: ensuring the providence of public goods by the government which encompass: 
putting in place institutions for taxation, banking and regulation of the economy through 
macro and micro-economic policies; putting in place the institutions for governance like 
the constitution, legislature, judiciary, police and penal systems for rule of law among 
other requirements of a functioning sovereign. He notes that as people emerge from crises 
like violent conflicts, the need for security to guarantee a settled life is primary, and this 
requires the institutions for law and order whose absence or inefficiency may be an 
indication of continued state-failure.
72
 It is alleged that where governments fail to 
maintain monopoly on the instruments of physical violence as a mechanism of 
maintaining law and order, then, the probability of violent disorder which sometimes 
leads to civil-wars becomes manifest.
73
 
 
Accordingly, the relationship between state capacity and conflict has been variously 
explored. It is postulated that a capable government is central to avoiding conflict, and it 
is severally suggested that the fear for a strong repressive machinery of government 
usually keeps the intentions for a rebellion at bay. This should not be construed as 
making a case for too much a government-which is a dictatorship, but rather a situation 
where government institutions are empowered to avoid anarchy as a result of too little a 
government.  
 
Also in instances where the government has the ability to streamline distribution and 
redistribution of political and economic benefits equitably, then, we are told that the 
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motivation of individuals to participate in group violence will be lessened. To Paul 
Collier, the inability of governments to raise enough revenue through effective 
institutions for taxation has been outlined as an issue which undermines provision of 
public goods like education, health, law and order which inadvertently leads to conflict as 
the alternative to be forgone by joining a rebellion is minimal. As such, legal capacity to 
enforce adherence to contracts and fiscal capacity for regulations of financial markets and 
effective tax collection are added onto the definition of state-capacity in the context of 
furthering development.
74
 
 
Thus, the ability of the state to provide for its people is paramount and the inability of 
states to function effectively increases the vulnerability of people to human insecurity as 
a result of poverty, diseases of which HIV/AIDS is instructive, domestic and international 
terrorism, ethnic cleansing, piracy, refugee flows, illicit economies, corruption, famine 
and underdevelopment; vulnerabilities that sometimes have a spill-over effect beyond the 
borders.
75
 Lisa Chauvet and her colleagues note that a weak state/government, ``failing 
state`` is catastrophic at three levels: its effects on denizens of neighbouring states as 
violence spills over, effect on the citizens of the state in question as they grapple with 
poverty and internal violence as a result of the failure of the state to provide adequate 
security and basic public goods such as education, health education, water, personal 
security and transport infrastructure. Their perception index, at the time of writing is that 
the cost of failing state is US$276 billion annually, which is greater than the amount, in 
terms of contribution from the developed countries that is necessary for poverty 
eradication per year. 
76
 This seems to suggest that absence of adequate state-capacity can 
lead to cataclysmic outcomes as it increases the vulnerability of the population to life 
threatening incidences like diseases and physical violence.  
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Explaining how the levels of organised violence undermine the daily life of South 
Africans, which is a great threat to their human Security, Lala Camerer acknowledges 
that improvements in state-capacity with an effective bureaucracy to deliver on 
legislating, mitigating and prosecution of crime related to corruption and violent crime 
will lead to improvements in human security.
77
 So, the meaning of state-capacity rotates 
much on the institutions for governance, and their scope and strength cannot be reduced 
to a single definition. If the research question is military oriented, then, the analysis can 
obtain from the strength and scope of the military in terms of personnel and armoury. If 
the question is largely financial control, then, the definition can be limited to fiscal 
capacity of the state.  
 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this study, the conceptualisation of state capacity that 
Francis Fukuyama advances in his treatment of the imperativeness of state-building 
suffices, and provides a rather comprehensive measure of state capacity. He defines state-
capacity in terms of institutional capabilities of the state, its:  
 
…ability to enact statues and to frame and execute policies; to administer the 
public business with relative efficiency; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; 
maintain high level of transparency and accountability in governmental 
institutions; and most importantly, to enforce laws. 
78
 
 
Fukuyama`s definition rotates on efficiency, and state/government efficiency in conflict 
situations has to be of   ``conflict-carrying capacity`` benefit.
79
The study, obtaining 
particularly from Fukuyama`s  definition, but not ignoring the concerns of other 
definitional issue areas, analyses Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction within the 
confines of state-capacity and human security, other issues which are tackled by this 
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study, inter alia, matters of state-security are discussed in relation to the two central focus 
areas under study.   But what is human security, and how does this study employs it. 
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1.4.4 Human Security and its analytical utility: a bridging concept 
between development, conflict and security in post-conflict 
reconstruction situations 
When the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report of 
1994 gave an exposition to what it referred to as the ``New dimensions of human 
security``, with a call for a focus on the security of the people, a departure from the 
traditional conceptualisation of security that placed emphasis on the security of territorial 
borders of states,
80
 what followed was academic and policy debates with either 
supporting or off-putting reasons for or against human security.
81
 To the UNDP, the 
human security approach, was advanced as ``a new paradigm for development`` which   
required an emphasis on ensuring economic security (job and income security), health 
security, environmental security, personal security (security from crime), political 
security and community security.
82
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So, the initial agenda of human security was development focused but later to be given a 
security connotation as discussion about its operationalisation picked academic and 
policy momentum.
83
 Contradictions in its operationalisation were abounding that it was 
erased from the 2005 Copenhagen Declaration of Social Development and the Canadian 
Foreign Ministry dropped it from its agenda, but the debate about the concept endures.
84
 
This study situates itself in that debate and   in the context of this study, human security is 
not a theory; it is a concept that finds support from the human needs theory, the way state 
security finds support from the theories of political realism. The human needs theory as 
an approach to understanding the causes of social conflict postulates that social conflicts 
happen as a result of unmet  basic needs, and that efforts to thwarting conflicts have to be 
directed at ensuring that those needs are met.  The needs according to John Burton range 
from security, identity, recognition, family and community to personal development.
85
  
These basic needs if not met can lead to pathological fear which undermines the 
wellbeing of the individual and the community leading to social violent reactions and 
thus the ``security nexus`` of basic needs.
86
  It is at this point that in the inquiry made by 
this study, human security is perceived as a somewhat addendum to the logic of the 
human needs approach to the analysis of violent conflicts and their related concerns. 
 
It should be noted that the human needs theory obtains from the logic of Maslow`s 
hierarchical structure of human needs, ranging from; food, water, shelter, safety and 
security. As an approach to understanding the causes of conflicts, the theory combines 
human needs, conflict and peace.
87
 In conflicts which obtain from unmet basic needs, the 
recommendation during efforts aimed at conflict resolution of which post-conflict 
reconstruction is part, has been a focus on ensuring the provision of human needs   by the 
state and non state actors.
88
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However, when Marie Douley talks of pathological fear as a result unmet basic needs 
and then, ``security nexus`` accruing to social mobilization for group violence,
89
 parallels 
are drawn with human security a concept whose definition has been variously put as: 
``freedom from fear and want``.  The providence of human needs is a subject of 
development; violent conflict is sometimes a subject of security lapses, and to this study 
the concept human security presents a somewhat medium, a somewhat metaphysical 
bridge through which the three issues; development, conflict and security metaphysically 
communicate to each other particularly along the continuum of post-conflict 
reconstruction.     
  
Accordingly, an argument is advanced to the effect  that basic needs parse may not 
always lead to violence;  it is only when they lead to ``fear`` punctuated with pain and 
uncertainty about the future that they become a security threat to the security of 
individuals which has been put as human security. The mobilization of individuals to 
engage in group violence upon mobilization becomes easy where fear is manifest, and it 
can be concluded that when unmet basic needs lead to what Douley refers to as 
``pathological fear’, they not only threaten the security of the individual, which is human 
security, but can also determine the structure of violence during conflict thus becoming a 
security threat even to the large community which in the context of this study is the state.  
 
The justification for the adoption of human security as part of the concepts that orient this 
study obtains from it utility as a bridging concept between Security, Conflict and 
Development. It also obtains from the view that the human security concept finds 
topicality in the human needs theory and how it has been used in the discourse 
concerning the nature of the causes of the conflict which culminated into the genocide. 
The study explores how the human needs theory has been used to explain the structure of 
violence in the genocidal conflict which took place in Rwanda. It subsequently argues 
that improvidence of some human needs by the government using its state capacity 
becomes a security concern to the people as it undermines their survival, their human 
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security, making them to leave in perpetual fear, and that it is that fear that is 
manipulated by the political elites who are interested in using violence to attain political 
ends. It is majorly contended that addressing human needs which are central to human 
security becomes a security strategy to avoiding a resurgence of violence during post-
conflict, and that post-conflict reconstruction has to ensure development in state-capacity 
to ensure providence of human needs that guarantee human security. The study further 
postulates that human security does not only undermine the security of the individual but 
also the security of the state in the traditional sense of ensuring territorial integrity 
through military power. 
 
Indeed, the unanimous support that the Jordan consensus document on human security 
received from the Members of the General Assembly underscored the emerging 
importance of human security in matters of state –craft.  It also underlined the need for 
states to focus on human security issues as part of the core business of governments.
90
  
When the resolution provided  that human security issues are matters internal to states, it 
seemed to bring human security more into the domain of internal security discourse, a 
departure from the much contested international security discourse, though the nexus of 
the two security areas cannot be negated. As such, in the internal arrangement of society, 
the state, among other core functions, has also to give priority to the concerns of the 
people—human welfare as it executes its duties if it is to appear legitimate to the people. 
 
 It should be noted that there are other concepts which have been used to analyse the 
violence which culminated into the genocide in Rwanda. Instructive of these concepts is 
the concept of structural violence
91
; particularly employed by Peter Uvin employed in his 
analysis of how development aid in Rwanda fuelled the genocide. He notes how deep 
seated social exclusion which was part of social institution arrangement of Rwanda 
fuelled the genocide. To him the social exclusion was sustained and manipulated by 
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colonialism and it manifested itself through poverty and inequality in the distribution of 
land and income.
92
  
 
However, the concept of structural violence does not avail us with a framework through 
which we can discuss the three moments of a post-conflict society; conflict, development 
and security, with a major objective of thwarting a resurgence of violence. This is 
because whereas the concept structural violence outlines clearly the causes of the 
structure of violence during the conflict, it does not succinctly address itself to the move 
from conflict security through development. Indeed, even Peter Uvin does not employ it 
beyond identification of the structure of violence. Human security fits into that gap as 
illustrated as follows: 
 
 Apart from Amitav Acharya
93
 and Bajpai`s
94
 treatment of human security, much of the 
discussion of the utility or disutility of human security, in essence, does not answer one 
fundamental question: what was the initial agenda of human security? Or to put it 
differently: which questions did the concept initially intend to address? What we read are 
dismissals and counter-dismissals between the critics and defenders of human security.  
The dismissive academic debate surrounding human security has particularly rotated 
around three major threads; the  argument that bringing  Human Security issues into the 
International Security framework that looks at the state as the referent object of security 
will subsequently undermine the notion of the sovereign  state on which the international 
security framework hinges, the argument that  the concept is too broad to be defined, and 
that the several issues areas it suggests to be included on the security agenda will make 
the prioritisation of security threats problematic, and from a typically disciplinary angle, 
the major critic of human security from the state-centric approach to security has been 
that the concept does not resonate well with the known parameters of the discipline of 
international relations and security studies whose main focus is the interaction among 
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states and how to forge order out of anarchy. So, the basis of this line of criticism is that 
human security undermines the discourse concerning the concept security.
95
  
 
It should be outlined that Wendt advises us to be cognizant of the way different research 
projects seek to ask and answer different questions, and that constructive criticism has to 
be cognizant of the nature of questions.
96
 The theorisation about human security should 
and need to factor-in this trajectory, both in the discourse of the critics and that of the 
proponents.   
 
Indeed, to counter the dismissal of the concept human security as a concept without 
utility in the analysis of security concerns, Baldwin argues that security as a policy 
objective entails two conditions which give answers to the questions: ``security for 
whom?`` and ``security for which values?``.
97
 To Baldwin the answers to the questions 
are dependent on the unit of analysis, whether it is the individual, state or the 
international system, and specific research questions to guide the inquiry.
98
  It is to the 
same effect that Roland Paris advises that if human security is to serve as an analytical 
tool, then, it ought to be viewed as:  
 
 ``…a label for a broad category of research in the field of security studies that is 
primarily concerned with non-military threats to the safety of societies, groups, 
and individuals, in contrast to more traditional approaches to security studies that 
focus on protecting states from external threats``.
99
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To Roland human security does not conflict with the traditional conceptualisation of 
security that looks at the state as the referent object for security, but rather as part of the 
``matrix of security studies field``, with human security encompassing ``societies, groups 
and individuals``.
100
 Through Roland does not factor in his analysis instances where 
different elements in the ``matrix of security`` may converge to lead to violent conflict, or 
where a threat to national security might impact on both the security of societies and 
individuals, and where the threats to the security of societies and individuals may 
consequently undermine national security.  
 
Accordingly, the meaning of security and what it should entail can be perceived 
differently in policy making given the particularity of circumstance and when it comes to 
research, it is the nature of the research questions to which answers are sought for in an 
inquiry that determines the conceptualisation of security. Indeed Liotta notes how 
different ``descriptors`` have been added as suffixes to the word security.
101
 He writes of 
economic security, geographical security, gender security, cultural security, social 
security, political security and human security.
102
 Though he views the suffixation made 
onto the word ``security`` as ``basic``, his delineation of the ``boomerang effect``; a 
situation where neglect of either military or human security affects the other serves to 
depict his belief in the imperativeness of the two conceptualisation of security. 
 
Indeed communication between the two security areas is variously suggested. The 
imperativeness of the communication between the two security areas obtain from the 
view that none of the two conceptualisation of security can comprehensively capture 
everything in the exploration and analysis of the security complexities of our world, a 
world punctuated with some security issues areas that are only unique to these times. 
Several issues succinctly put as: growing interdependence, the waning of state 
sovereignty, unprecedented technological advancements, increasing decimation of the 
utility of force, environmental degradation, globalisation of economics and culture, and 
globalisation of modern weaponry, among others; cannot ably be comprehended through 
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what is callously put as : ‘criminal obscurity of some international theorists ´, who 
engage in the conflation of ``word problems`` in their explanation of ``world 
problems``
103
.  Somehow, this study argues that, a conceptual dialogue can, and has to be 
forged in the security discourse if the security concerns of our times are to be addressed; 
to reach what Booth refers to as: ``convergence utopian realism`` which he explains using 
the analogy of the tramlines;
104
 a departure from the   ``Knee-Jerk dismissals`` of words 
as if words were the world they try to put in simple measure. To that effect, Taureck, Rita 
advises us that any critical engagement of approaches should start from the point of 
compatibility and then explore the questions; the nature of questions which the 
approaches in question intend to answer.
105
 So, how compatible are the two approaches to 
security?  Does the compatibility come in as a result of the unified explanatory utility of 
the two? Can one approach help in explaining and understanding what the other does not 
succinctly capture? Can there be a somewhat ``communicative zone`` of securities which 
is the contention of this study? 
 
Amitav Acharya, succinctly captures for us the four oriental threads that converged to 
form the ``human security idea``. They ranged from: One, the growing incidence of civil 
wars and intra-state conflicts which are now outnumbering conventional inter-state 
conflicts, and that civil wars are now claiming more civilians than the men in uniform. 
Two, that the spread of democracy is a political imperative in matters of statecraft. Three, 
the emergence of humanitarian intervention hinging on the lifting of the ``veil of 
sovereignty`` by the international community to intervene in matters internal to states 
more so where human dignity is under attack, and Four, the concomitants of the 
economic crisis of 1990 that saw increased poverty, unemployment and social 
dislocation. To him these threads explain the different directions, sometimes sharply 
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contradictory dimensions that the debate concerning human security took and continues 
to take.
106
  
 
Amitav Acharya, explaining what he calls ``a need-oriented `` approach to human 
security that is very popular in Asia Pacific notes how the regional economic crisis led to 
increased levels of poverty and this culminated into political violence epitomised in 
sporadic violence in Indonesia. To him this depicted how unmet human needs like 
provision of social safety nets for the poor can undermine the security of the individual 
and that of a country; as it leads to political violent conflicts.
107
 Indeed, Edward Newman, 
alludes to Amitav`s explanation. He captures for us the different strands of human 
security, which he calls the ``Different Notions of Human Security``. He explains the 
``Basic Human Needs`` approach to Human Security propounded by the United Nations 
Development Programme as encapsulated in the 1994 Human Development Report. He 
notes that people today are more concerned with job insecurity, environmental 
degradation, food insecurity, and that these conditions if not addressed can lead to 
conflict. To the ``Basic Human Needs`` approach, he adds the ``assertive/ interventionist 
focus`` of human security, noting that this variant of human security obtains from the 
assumptions that the state may instead of guarantying human security abuse it, and that 
this calls for ``Humanitarian Intervention`` to thwart human suffering.  
 
Also P.H.Liotta explaining how terrorism took United States of America by surprise on 
11 September 2001, observes how urgent it is for security policy makers to 
metaphysically outlive their enthusiasm for a security policy framework that limits its 
focus on external aggression and the military as means for security. To him military 
threats and   non-traditional threats: HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, depletion of 
non renewable resources, drug cartels, terrorism, proliferation of small arms, cyber 
crimes; should be given premium in security policy discussions. Accordingly, he 
contends that any security policy that ignores the sanctity of both military and human 
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security threats is destined to lead to a ``a boomerang effect``
108
; a somewhat 
metaphysical arrangement where a public policy on either human or state security one 
security; inadvertently undermines not only the neglected security area but also the 
prioritised security area.   Liotta also underscores the imperativeness of moving towards 
``Holistic thinking`` when it comes to discussions of national security. To him an 
appropriate security policy in today`s dynamic world should be cross-disciplinary in its 
analysis of security concerns. 
 
It is this scheme of things that reflects the meeting point of the so called state-centric and 
human security approaches to security. It is  argued in here  that human security and state 
security, within their practical and theoretical confines, mutually reinforce each other, 
and that neglecting a threat to human security has dire consequences on state security, 
and vice versa. There are complementarities of securities. This study delineates the 
supporting and off-putting evidence underscoring the circumstances under which the two 
security areas either mutually reinforce each other or contradict each other during post-
conflict reconstruction situations.    
 
Indeed, discussing her somewhat emerging ``Security Dialectic``,-- a somewhat 
metaphysical convergence of human security and state security concerns, Pauline Kerr, 
delineates how there is a confluence between state and people as referent objects of 
security, contrary to the two extremes depicted by the state-centric and human centric 
approaches to security. She cites Alex J. Bellamy noting how within the human centric 
school itself, emerging voices are acknowledging the shifting of means and ends: that 
while human security may be an end, sometimes it becomes a means to state security as 
an end. However, whereas conceptually speaking the ``security dialectic`` is clearly 
explained, it is not empirically sustained. This study empirically sustains its logic using 
the case study of Rwanda during its post-conflict reconstruction 
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Also, despite his treatment of human security concerns as part of the international norms 
to which the notion of collective security actions under international law should be 
applied, Sverre Lodgaard underscores the link between state and human security, 
presenting human security as, a ``companion concept`` to state security. He notes that 
whereas state/governments are sometimes a source of insecurity on their people, failed 
states-- states without capacity to govern effectively by ensuring law and order are a 
catastrophe to human security. He adds that observance of human security legitimises a 
government in the eyes of the people. He outlines that the security debate is now past the 
issue of referents; arguing that the point of contention is now on how to come up with a 
security framework that merges the two referents.
109
  
 
Indeed, Barry Buzan teaches us about ``the security problematique``. He notes that 
security has two faces, “internal and external``. To him threats which accrue from both 
internal dynamics; like divisions within the state can undermine the security of the state 
and external threats like aggressive neighbours as it was with Britain with the Nazi 
German. He observes that sometimes external and internal threats converge as it was with 
the internal division in Pakistan which made intervention highly probable in 1971. Also 
the example of Gadaffi`s Libya; with external bombardments in support of the ground 
onslaught by the rebels typifies the convergence of internal and external threats.  
 
Indeed, the report of the Commission on Global Governance pointed to a move towards 
dual referents—the state and the security of the people obtaining from the impact of 
violent conflicts on the lives of people.
110
  Even the report of the United Nations High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, emphasises the imperativeness of 
complementarities of security with emphasis on human and state security, with states as 
the primary provider of security.
111
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As such, from this system of things we can talk of the: ``complementarities of 
securities``-- where each component benefits from the security of the other. And the 
different constituents of the state, when it comes to research, may constitute different 
research agendas; for one may focus on the security of government, territory and the 
other on the security of the population. Another researcher may concentrate on the 
convergence of a security threat or threats to affect all the constituent parts of the state as 
a whole. 
  
Noteworthy, on the imperatives of human security as a way of thwarting turmoil, Bogdan 
Stefanachi explaining the normative utility of human security cites Weinert (2009) noting 
that human security can be a means to ensuring a strong stable state that can guard its 
sovereignty.
112
 Although he does not sustain this idea further, it can be sustained that a 
strong state can also be a means to human security. The study builds on this proposition 
to argue that Human Security is central to the security of the state, and that the 
state/government is central to the providence of the things that guarantee human security. 
By way of reiteration this study empirically sustains the logic of the ``complementarities 
of securities`` using the case of Rwanda during its post-conflict situations.  
 
Certainly even without engaging in further analysis of how human security concerns can 
undermine state security, the example of HIV/AIDS suffices. For instance the UNAIDS 
2006 report precisely puts for us the extent to which HIV/AIDS undermines the military 
machine. It is said that by 2008, HIV/AIDS accounted for 60 percent of deaths in the 
military in the fourteen nations of Southern African Development Community. It 
observes that for every 10 deaths in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 
seven are a result of HIV/AIDS with 50 to 60 percent of the beds at the Nairobi’s Kenya 
Armed Forces Memorial Hospital occupied by soldiers with HIV/AIDS related 
ailments.
113
 It is asserted that increased HIV/AIDS infection undermines the ability of the 
military to thwart external threats as the illness results into loss of skills and institutional 
memory among the experienced officers and men. This has a great bearing on 
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performance and discipline.
114
 HIV/AIDS undermines the very focal point of traditional 
security; that is the military. As such the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS becomes 
not only a matter of human security but also state security.
115
 
Generally, in the context of political Africa, a cursory review of the conflictual areas 
underscores the extent to which human security has not only continued to undermine the 
security of the individual(s), but also that of the state in the traditional sense.  
 
Annan Kofi explains that many African countries are faced with the challenge of forging 
a national identity, unity in diversity, out of several socially different communities. To 
him the prevention of conflicts that emanate from such conditions remain the promotion 
of human security and human development. 
116
  The states, pejoratively reduced to 
``regimes`` in Africa are generally threatened by internal security challenges like 
ethnicity, refugee phenomenon, and unemployed youths.  
 
In Liberia, for example, the economic marginalization of the indigenous tribes by the 
Americo-Liberians made easy the mobilization of the people along ethnic lines to fight 
domination. The poverty that was undermining the wellbeing of the people was not 
attended to by the government. The government was undermined by corruption as 
politicians resorted to self-aggrandizement than meeting the basic needs of the people 
like education. Many people construed lack of access to education as a systematic move 
by the Americo-Liberians to entrench their hegemonic power. 
117
 
 
Also in Ivory Coast, despite Houphouet-Boigny’s shrewd development policies, the 
regional inequalities in economic progress between the prosperous south and the 
underdeveloped North persisted. The fluctuations in the prices of Cocoa and Coffee in the 
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1980s, and the subsequent untimely death of Boigny who had tried to balance tribes in 
political positions, coupled with other underlying causes like the increased economic 
prosperity of immigrants from neighbouring countries like Ghana, Mali, and Burkina 
Faso; saw conflict in Ivory Coast-- a country that had hitherto been referred to as a 
success story in matters of development. Human security related issues like lack of access 
to jobs and lack of access to fertile land which had already been taken by the migrants 
made the indigenous people; more so the youth from the North discontented.  When 
leadership was provided by the mutinying soldiers from the North, the stage for the 
conflict was clearly prepared.
118
  
 
Further still, in Nigeria`s oil rich state of the Niger Delta, the conflict has persisted 
because of a mix of factors, including the human security related concerns which made 
and continue to make the people motivated to join group violence in protest against the 
improvidence from the side of state`s government.  The failure by the Federal 
Government to reign on the corrupt politicians in the region who swindle resources meant 
for service provision; yet the country profiteers much from the oil resources from the 
region has seen a lot of insurgence in the Niger Delta region.  Though the region has 
produced $400 billion oil revenues for Nigeria since independence, according to 2011 
data,  the people are still marginalised: with only one secondary school for 14,679, with 
only 49% of the Delta  population having access to safe drinking water, and with one 
child out of five dying before celebrating his/her fifth birthday. All these inadequacies 
have been blamed on the political leadership in the region that is corrupt and grossly 
ineffective and the recommendations have been generally a call for reforms in 
governance to alleviate corruption to streamline service delivery to the people as a way of 
alluring them away from group violence.
119
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However, it is the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region
120
 that present a larger picture of 
how human security related concerns can lead to periodic bouts of violence; part of the 
several schemes of causes that may include external actors.  
 
First, in the Darfur region of the Sudan, needless to explain in detail the complexities of 
the conflict there; it suffices to mention that the conflict can be traced from the 
``community-level split`` between the farmers and the nomads in the Darfur region. It is 
said that conflictual situations owe to the drought of the late 1970s that turned the 
nomads and farmers into competitors over the land they earlier amicably shared in usage 
during the dry seasons. This competitive existence of the nomads and the farmers 
widened the gulf between two communities. When the farmers, who are racially black, 
started an insurgency against the Khartoum Government; to quench the rebellion, the 
Government armed the nomads who were already physically and psychologically 
disoriented by the marginalisation they suffered when it came to land. They as a result, in 
the quest for security; formed the Janjawiid Militia.
121
   
 
Indeed, to Mamdani, the issue of land was part of the factors that set stage for the conflict 
that some have named genocide. It has been asserted that addressing the conflict in 
Darfur requires not only power sharing at state level, but also instituting reforms to 
ensure equity in the distribution of land.
122
 What Mamdani does not mention is that in the 
wake of societal divisions over resources like land, the onus is always upon the 
responsible government to reign on the warring factions, and forge away forward as 
regards equitable utilisation of the resources. But when a government decides to arm one 
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side against another, then, it becomes an abnegation of the legitimate responsibility of 
government; to act as an arbiter among conflicting societies within the state. This 
underscores the imperativeness of the state in streamlining resource utilisation as part of 
ensuring human securities. Failure of governments to surmount the security problems that 
may accrue from inequity in the distribution of scare resources has seen several conflicts. 
As such, this study, using the microcosm of Rwanda, investigates how human security 
concerns shaped the structure of violence during the genocide and how post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts addressed themselves to surmounting the human insecurities which 
threatened a resurgence of violence.  
 
Furthermore, in the newly independent state of the South Sudan, even before the ongoing 
conflict at the time of writing this thesis; it had long been asserted that although it had 
won its independence from Sudan Khartoum after along popular rebellion against the 
backdrop of the marginalisation, ironically the government in Juba had started grappling 
with bouts of tribal violence as a result of complaints against the political and economic 
marginalisation of the other 67 tribes by the Dinka tribe. Several tribes in the South-
Sudan had contributed to the struggle
123
 yet they had started complaining of land 
grabbing, denial of government job opportunities, tribal based military promotions, 
money laundering by the Dinka politicians and lack of fair political representation. 
Though external factors like the aggression from Khartoum Sudan may have served to 
aggravate ethnic tensions in the South, the alleged lack of commitment by the 
government of South Sudan to ensure equitable provision of the needs which guarantee 
human security like access to jobs and land, was acting as a rallying point for those who 
may have other ulterior-motives like having unfettered access to political power. 
However the general human insecurities felt by the people made them to fall prey to 
political mobilisation for group violence.
124
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The ongoing conflict obtains from such a scheme of things, and it has come with 
astronomical costs both in terms of human and infrastructural destruction. Detailed 
studies will be necessary to unravel the human security dimensions of that conflict.  
 
In Kenya, even before the Post-election violence of 2008, the state was experiencing 
visitations of ethnic violence, though they never culminated into a civil-war.  Among the 
causes that have been outlined is the land question, more so in the fertile Rift Valley 
Region. In the Rift Valley Region of Kenya ethnic groups: the Luo, Kisii, Luhya and the 
Kikuyu who had been displaced to create white settlements in central Kenya; were either 
attracted or driven away by the conditions in the ``settlement reserves`` to migrate and go 
to offer labor on the settlers farms in the so called ``White highlands``.
125
  
 
Conversely, the natives, the historical owners of the highlands: The Kalenjin, Maasai, 
Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) were outrageously pushed into overcrowded 
``reserves``. Even after colonialism, policies which were aimed at streamlining the 
distribution of land proved iniquitous. It is noted, for example, that the ``million-acre 
settlement scheme`` which was designed to purchase land from the white settlers for 
distribution to the landless ended-up being ethnicised as the Kikuyu dominated 
government favoured the Kikuyu against other landless ethnic groups.
126
 
  
It is also said that the Kikuyu ascendency to power after independence came with 
increased access to economic opportunities like government jobs.  Formation of land 
purchasing cooperatives was easy for the Kikuyu than for any other ethnic group.  
Indeed, we are told that of the 160 land purchasing cooperatives, 120 comprised of the 
Kikuyu.  I-t should be stated that though other issues (instructive of which is political 
competition that makes politicians to exploit ethnic allegiances) converged with the land 
question to lead to visitations of ethnic violence in the Rift-Valley Region of Kenya, 
historical iniquities in the distribution of land also served to motivate participation in 
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ethnic violence that has more often pitted the Kikuyu communities in Post-colonial 
Kenya against other groups.
127
  
 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict continuous situation in the Eastern 
Kivu region has been blamed on a number of factors like the aggressive actions of the 
neighbouring countries: Rwanda and Uganda. However, what cannot be left-out in this 
complex situation is the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region. The refugee crisis has 
led to conflictual situations as a result of the predicament of refugees like uncertainty 
about a permanent place of abode, food insecurity, poverty, diseases and lack of access to 
educational opportunities.  These issues which are generally a reflection of the human 
security concerns make civilian refugees susceptible to manipulation by the political 
elites who mobilise them into group violence for political ends. The converge of human 
security with the human rights of the refugees; a pointer to the conceptualisation that the 
absence of the observance of human rights for refugees subsequently undermines their 
human security, has been examined.
128
 What has not been examined is the way this 
convergence sometimes culminates into insecurity complexes for the state.  Saul 
Takhashi alludes to the somewhat ``intersection`` between human rights, human security 
and state security, but being an edited book with several chapters giving a treatment to 
various contexts, a monographically sustained treatment of the intersection that would 
have allowed us a triangulated examination of the various levels of intersection is 
missing.
129
  This study sustains empirically that system of things.   
 
The Citizenship crisis in the Great Lakes Region as Mahmood Mamdani refers to it has 
seen the region into conflictual situations. It should be noted that the Banyarwanda 
refugees in Uganda, who fled Rwanda as a result of 1959 turmoil in Rwanda, played a 
central role in the struggle that brought Museveni of Uganda to political power in 1986. It 
has been said that their insecurity over the uncertainty of their residence in Uganda made 
them to join the struggle of 1986 with the hope that it will guarantee their residence. They 
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are the same refugees that waged the war against the Hutu government in Rwanda which 
among other things was blamed for being hesitant to permit their return and guarantee 
their citizenship on return. 
 
However, as clearly delineated in the introductory chapter, the end of the genocide in 
Rwanda saw a massive movement of political and civilian Hutu refugees to neighbouring 
countries, but most importantly into Eastern Congo (then Eastern Zaire). This refugee 
problem did not only see the civilian refugees grappling with a number of threats to their 
survival-their human security,  it also threatened and indeed led to a resurgence of 
violence which was aimed at destabilising the new regime in Kigali. The Hutu refugee 
phenomenon depicted and continues to depict succinctly a somewhat convergence of 
human and state- security, contrary to the assertion that the two security areas are 
contradictory. The study delineates this scheme of things later, and the questions which 
this study grapples with rhyme well with the question that Jennifer Leaning and Sam 
Arie, ask, though they do make little attempt to explore deeply their question that: 
 
How was it that peace could break out in Mozambique, a hotbed of insurgency 
and ideological confrontation, while in Rwanda, long viewed as a model of 
development, unmanageable violence lay so close beneath the surface of 
society?
130
 
Basing on the Rwandan experience delineated by this study it is argued that human 
insecurities made easy the mobilisation of the Hutu community by Hutu political 
demagogues for group violence. The study also sustains that post conflict reconstruction 
development in state-capacity was focused on addressing the human security related 
concerns which were part of the many other issues that shaped and shaken the genocidal 
violence in Rwanda and those which threatened a resurgence of violence more so the 
refugee phenomenon, but with serious implications in terms of human security and state 
security.  
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Accordingly, to Brian L. Job, the security challenges to the typical state in Africa are 
largely from within. He terms this situation as the: `` insecurity dilemma complex`` as 
opposed to the security dilemma—where the threat to the state is external. He explains 
that the insecurity dilemma complex in most African countries is a result of ethnicised 
politics; where the struggle for power becomes a tribal issue. He reasons that the 
government in power becomes a representation of the interests of a certain ethnic group: 
thus absence of national cohesion, as people are divided along ethnic lines. That in such a 
system of things, the regimes in power are preoccupied by survival, and they manipulate 
ethnicity to suit their schemes for political survival.  This is in contrast to the external 
threats that haunt the life of a developed nation-state precisely put as the “Security 
Dilemma”. He adds that those that are disfavoured perceive the state/regime as 
illegitimate.
131
   
 
Job`s analysis points to the nexus between conflict and the improvidence of human needs.  
From his contention it emerges that with improvidence of the human needs for survival, 
which human needs define the human security of the people, coupled with political 
expediency: conflicts are bound to happen as a way of contesting the powers that be.  
This means that a focus on the provision of human needs like employment for the youth, 
which is important for their human security can also be of great benefit to the 
state/regime or national security for it  serves to thwart conflictual situations or at least 
put them at bay.  However, Brian Job does not explain instances where Insecurity 
dilemma complexes may converge with Security dilemma complexes to structure violence 
during a conflict and how sometimes insecurity dilemma complexes can serve to create 
Security dilemma complexes or aggravate them.  
 
It should be understood that this study does not argue with finality that the nature of 
violence in conflicts in Africa can only be blamed on only human insecurities. It is 
limitations of this study that though it finds it important to show how several causes 
convergence to cause violence during a conflict and a resurgence of violence after a 
conflict, it finds it a rather broad research agenda to pursue.   There are indeed several 
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issues that formed and form the mix of things that have continuously seen these violent 
conflicts; they cannot be explored in a single research agenda. The proposition of this 
study is that human security related issues, which are generally obtain from basic human 
needs, as illustrated in the preceding narratives, are exploited by political demagogues to 
hoodwink people into joining group violence.  
 
Accordingly,  the under- provision of both state and human securities has translated into 
instability in different states particularly Sub-Saharan Africa as delineated in some of the 
preceding paragraphs of this chapter. This points to the imperativeness of dual-referents 
in the context of security; not only for the global south as it has been variously suggested, 
but for the whole of political earth as the chaos, reported in recent years, in the 
economically beleaguered parts of Western Europe served to illustrate; that group 
violence as a result of stress from poverty is not a matter unique only to the global south. 
The calamities of human security concerns are no respecter of race or hemisphere.  
 
As such, the structure of violence in many countries of the so called ``Third World``, 
majority of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, cannot be understood using only the 
analytical framework of the traditional conceptualisation of security which focuses on 
external security challenges. The predicament of the people, grappling with among 
others: economic security, food security, and political segregation, precisely put as 
human security challenges, can determine the structure of violence during conflict and 
the threat of a resurgence of violence after a conflict.  These internal human security 
challenges, this study contends, can also converge with external threats to undermine not 
only the security of the individuals but also that of the state.   This scheme of things 
connote that there is a need for a more comprehensive way of comprehending the nature 
of conflicts and the security of the majority of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
It is in the quest for a comprehensive approach to understanding conflict and security in 
Africa that in 1990, Sunday Abogonye, way before the United Nations Development 
came up with the initial official exposition of the Human Security approach to security, 
recommended thus: 
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…in order to provide an integrated African Security assessment, the non-military 
dimensions of security should be added. Henceforth, African Security as a 
concept should be applied in the broadest sense to include economic security, 
social security, environment security, food security, the quality of life security and 
technological security.
132
 
 
In that quotation, Sunday Abogonye alludes to issues which later came to be at the centre 
of the human security agenda. Abogonye`s analysis negates the thinking that ´´Human 
Security`` and the issues which it entails are a Euro-Atlantic imposition onto the ``other 
world``. Granted is the fact the internationalisation of the concept has generally been the 
business of the Western World and particularly the Western Hemisphere; Canada.  Its 
content however cannot be reduced to the hackneyed rhetoric that it is a somewhat 
forcible imposition of western norms onto other lands. This is because the analysis of 
security from the angle of what affects people has been part of the body-security 
discourse even in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is nothing imperialistic about the conceptual 
origins of the notion of human security; probably the operationalisation of the concept 
can be insufficiently reduced to that perception-interpretive level given the fact that the 
discussion of the concept have always merged with the notion of the Responsibility to 
Protect. Human security discourse is part of the body-security academic discourse and 
public policy security practice in much of Africa.  
 
Indeed, Peter Uvin, in his inquiry about the meaning of peace to majority of the youthful 
Burundians; empirically found out that their voices converged at a somewhat Human 
Security zone. They highlighted that absence of war may not yield peace; more so if there 
is poverty, food insecurity, physical insecurity from crime, restriction in movement, and 
lack of access to basic needs like water, education, among others.   Majority of his 
respondents looked at peace in terms of positive peace/development, and their perception 
of development rhymes with the elements of human security.
133
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Accordingly, from the experience, that is Rwanda during post-conflict reconstruction 
period, it is argued that human security concerns have been and are part of the 
determinants of the structure of violence in most of the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and that because of the weaknesses of the state/government to provide the human needs 
that are central to human security, conflicts are bound to continue. The next chapter will 
trace how human security concerns structured violence in Rwanda across its major 
historical moments, that is: pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and pre-genocide. The 
chapter will aim underscoring the imperativeness of focusing on human security concerns 
as a way of thwarting turmoil. 
 
It is in Sub-Saharan Africa that the imperativeness of broadening the security agenda to 
include non military threats becomes a matter of academic and policy shrewdness. 
Indeed, ignoring human security concerns is and has been a recipe for conflict in many an 
African state. Robert D Kaplan, particularly sharply, summarises for us how despite the 
upbeat that followed the end of the cold war, the world was destined to witness several 
cataclysms. The cataclysms were to be as a result of neglected human concerns like 
diseases, overpopulation, refugee migrations, young bulge, the increasing erosion of 
nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security 
firms and international drug cartels.  
 
He for example narrates how neglected youthful slum dwellers ended up joining the 
ranks of coup plotting leaders like Solomon Anthony Joseph Musa in Sierra Leone. 
Kaplan also notes how the whole of West Africa was going to witness visitations of 
violence as a result of increased population in urban areas that are little planned to cater 
for such densities. He writes from the point view of West Africa but extrapolations of his 
thoughts can be made in the context of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. His warning 
was that the ``Last Map`` of the world will be a complex representation of chaos.
134
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The logic of Kaplan`s thoughts was given credence when  his article was circulated to all 
Embassies of the United States of America as an instrument to guide their operations in 
most of part of Africa, and indeed with little or no doubt, Kaplan`s world has come to 
pass. His prophetic insight generally obtained from how neglected human insecurities 
were going to undermine peace.  Human insecurities per say may not directly cause 
conflict, but rather they may serve as catalysts for group mobilisation for political action 
more so by political demagogues interested in political objectives like capturing political 
power. This study investigates generally how human insecurities served as mobilisation 
gimmicks for political demagogues that championed the genocide in Rwanda, and 
particularly how they threatened and indeed led to a resurgence of violence. The focus 
issue area in the context of Rwanda and in the context of this study is: ``refugee 
migrations``.    
 
The Carnegie Corporation report on Deadly Conflicts note that the failure to mend 
difference within states, and the discrimination of one group against another, coupled 
with improvidence of basic resources like water and land among other causes have seen 
turmoil. Improvidence of basic needs on the side of government makes easy the 
mobilization of people by ``political demagogues``, as they exploit the ``long standing 
grievances`` to recruit people within their ranks to organize an insurrection.
135
 Denial of 
either economic opportunities like access to government jobs in the public service and 
political jobs in the political echelons, or lack of equal opportunities: to land and 
education that sometimes guarantee future economic prosperity has more often led to 
conflict.  
 
Accordingly, basing on the case of Rwanda during its post-conflict reconstruction 
delineated by this study, it is sustained that Human security can be of great utility in 
explaining the structure of group violence in ethnic conflicts as it aids mobilization. And 
if human insecurity aids mobilization for violence, then, attempts to post-conflict 
reconstruction process have to ensure that the human insecurities that made and make 
mobilization for group violence easy are addressed urgently by the actors involved. 
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So, the finding of this study bring to bear the contention that unmet human security 
concerns make people literally susceptible to political manipulation to join violent 
schemes. Therefore in the discussion of the relationship between human security, conflict 
and development, the study argues that unmet human security concerns make 
mobilisation of the people into group violence easy, thus conflict continuous situations, 
more so where governments do not cater for the human needs of the people. The study 
empirically sustains these rather hypothetical assertions using the experience of Rwanda 
during its post-conflict reconstruction phase.  
 
So, the utility of human security at the level of theory and practice lies in the fact that 
those who are interested in security discourse are invited to pay attention to the 
insecurities that may be neglected, but of grave concern in their effects on the people
136
 
and even the state. The inclusion of several issue areas makes the security discourse more 
comprehensive to capture all issue areas that undermine peace and theorisation and 
practice can always obtain from what needs urgent attention.   
 
It should be emphasised that those who dismiss the logic of human security as being so 
much preoccupied with the individual as the referent object of security, and those who 
dismiss traditional state-centric security as being so much pre-occupied with the state as 
the referent object of security from external threats all seem not to factor in the logic of 
national security as both an internal and foreign policy issue
137
.  Samuel P. Huntington 
explains that national security exists in three forms and at two levels. The three forms are; 
military security policy—aimed at undermining external and internal threats to the peace 
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of a given country using force, internal security policy; aimed at dealing with forces and 
activities within states that undermine its peace, and situational security policy; with a 
focus on threats that accrue to strenuous changes in socio, economic and political spheres 
of a state.
138
  
 
Indeed, Barry Buzan`s thinking about the notion of national security seem to rhyme with 
the thinking of Huntington. He notes that an appropriate security policy of a state, though 
hard to fathom, entail an   international security strategy to thwart threats from outside, 
and the national security strategy to grapple with the internal weaknesses of the state that 
undermine its security.
139
 This suggests that the level of analysis can either be at the 
International or national level depending on the issue at stake. 
 
 Ullman who writes in the same year (1983) like Barry Buzan also contends that a 
conceptualisation of national security that limits itself to military threats and solutions is 
``doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous``. This is because the array of 
threats to the national security of the country can range from: `external wars to internal 
rebellions, from blockades and boycotts to raw materials shortages and devastating 
``natural`` disasters such as decimating epidemics, catastrophic floods, or massive and 
pervasive droughts`.
140
 To Ullman, the ability to cause ``death and physical destruction`` 
are a manifestation of any issue which passes for a threat, and this is not limited to only 
military issues.
141
 However, what undermines the recognition of other threats as real and 
catastrophic in their manifestations is that their consequences are gradual and not 
apparent in comparison to the military threats whose consequences are vivid. 
142
  
 
So, from the foregoing it can be tentatively inferred that  the security policy of a state, as 
part of its public policy framework need to be comprehensive enough to cover all issue 
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areas that undermine the peace of the state be it from social, economic or political threats. 
Policy prioritisation of a threat can always depend on its magnitude, in comparison to 
other real and imagined threats.  The study obtains from this logic in its examination of 
the post-conflict reconstruction experience of Rwanda within the conceptual framework 
provided by Human Security and State Security.  
 
It however goes without saying that the debate between human security—postulating the 
individual as the referent object of security, and the state centric—postulating the state as 
the referent object of security, is oblivious of the conceptual nature of the state. From the 
traditional conceptualisation of security it emerges out clearly that the state is limited to 
the territory of the country.  The advocates of the individual as the referent object of 
security criticise the traditional conceptualisation of security for   limiting the meaning of 
the state to government, sometimes put differently as regime security.
143
 Barry Buzan 
whom Booth writes of as the most thorough security theorist of our times treats the state, 
sometimes as a composite of several elements, which he calls the essential meaning of 
the state, with an independent territory, politically organised with a government separate 
from society. However, at other times he defines it in terms of government with an 
obligation to protect its citizens; as it is in his treatment of security against terror 
threats.
144
  
 
Rugumamu, one of the most published African political scholars, treats the state in terms 
of government; noting that the cardinal role of a state is to provide peace and security for 
the citizenry from both internal and external threats.
145
 Rugumamu’s definition rhymes 
well with Waltz definition. Waltz defines the state in terms of its functionality; that it is 
charged with the duty of making and enforcing laws, defending the state from external 
aggression, ensuring that the population has access to food, clothing, housing, transport 
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and other basic necessities of life. Waltz`s definition limits the state to the level of 
government.
146
   
 
So, any   analysis of security has to precisely delimit the meaning of the concept state in a 
simple measure if it is to handle the intricacies of the debate on the referent object for 
security.  We are told that sometimes each component of the state can constitute a 
somewhat security concern but each interdependent on the security of the other.
147
 If the 
state is treated as if it were limited to its functional capacity; the government—the 
functioning arm of the state, then, state security becomes the security of the government 
or regime security, and this absolves those who argue that sometimes governments 
threaten the security of the people they are supposed to protect. In the context of this 
study the focus is on government. Government (s) has/have a role to play in thwarting a 
resurgence of violence in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. This can be done 
through designing of appropriate development policies.  
 
In addition to the above, Pauline Kerr acknowledges that human security has an 
international relations strand, which pitted  it against traditional conceptualisation of 
security, and the development perspective which looks at human security as a perspective 
that relates issues of human development like poverty and inequality in resource 
distribution to conflict.
148
 It is argued that conflicts within states can be explained by 
economic unfairness and social poverty, which lead to social discontent and stress which 
culminate into insecurity. It is also emphasised that states have to take matters of 
underdevelopment to be of ``moral and practical imperatives for all humans and states`` 
for they can serve to exacerbate internal and external insecurities.
149
  The study obtains 
from the logic of  Pauline Kerr`s development perspective of human security to argue that 
human security can only structure a  conflict if it is used to mobilise the people into group 
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violence; for there are instances where low human security does not translate into 
manifestations of conflict.  
 
As such, it is advanced by this study that the issues that make group mobilisation for 
violence highly probable partly accrue from distortions in development. Where the 
government through development fails to settle issues of social equity when it comes to 
provision of what people think are the central needs for survival, conflict is probable. 
This means that an attempt to development after a conflict that manifested itself through 
group violence has to address the ``the incentives for group mobilisation``, if resurgence 
of violence is to be addressed. What should not escape mention is that Leaning and Arie 
use of the logic of the human needs theory in their justification of the use of human 
security as a bridging concept between development, conflict and security. This resonates 
with the caution of Edward Newman that human security is not a theory but rather a 
concept that is supported by theories of social sciences;
150
 of which the Human needs 
theory to study of conflicts is instructive.  
 
This means that whereas human security may be dismissed as a normative concept which 
cannot ably guide intellectual inquiry, the fact that it finds support in long tested social 
science theories of conflict, namely: human needs theory, then, it can be adopted as an 
analytical framework in the study of development in post-conflict reconstruction with 
attention aimed at grappling with the question of how to thwart the threat of a resurgence 
of violence during post-conflict situations. 
 
Whereas the human security International Relations/Security perspective dismisses the 
State as the object and provider of security, those who perceive human security in terms 
of development acknowledge that despite the importance of non-state actors in matters of 
development, capable states are central to streamlining matters of development; directing 
it to addressing non-traditional security challenges of which poverty is instructive. It is 
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for that very reason that Naidoo points out that the thorough understanding of human 
security in the context of Africa should contemplate about the nexus between human 
security and human development.
151
   
 
Human development requires that development focuses on the provision of human needs, 
and this study extends that where human needs are not provided, the survival of the 
people, their human security becomes threatened. It also extends that their fear can easily 
be manipulated by political demagogues to mobilise them into group violence; thus the 
relationship between, conflict, development and security. Indeed, from the lenses of 
Japan`s conceptualisation of human security, human security emerges as a concept that 
can assist in the aligning of development to conflict prevention efforts. According to 
Amitav Acharya, the Japanese conceptualisation of human security is more inclined to 
the ``freedom from want`` variant of the UNDP`s conceptualisation of human security 
which is also the ``more favoured in Asia`` as opposed to the ``freedom from fear`` 
variant that finds support from the countries lying within the western hemisphere. To 
Amitav, ``freedom from fear`` is the political aspect of human security, whereas 
``freedom from want`` is the development and economic aspect of human security. 
Though he argues that the two complement each other than contradict
152
; for the 
analytical depth`sake, the study obtains from both the political and economic variant of 
human security for ``want`` can be manipulated by the power elite to mobilise masses to 
join violent political schemes in the quest for power or in the quest of political 
preservation as a result of an imminent relegation to want in the face of loss of political 
power. This study empirically proves this scheme of things through the review of the 
causes of the genocide in Rwanda, arguing that human security concerns were part of the 
structure of violence during the conflict that even the resurgence of violence during the 
post-conflict phase of Rwanda obtained from human security related concerns. 
 
It should be emphasised that what stands out clearly as the major rejection of the usage of 
the human security concept at international policy level is the argument that bringing-in 
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Human Security issues into the International Security framework that is dominated by 
narratives in support of the state as the referent object of security will subsequently 
undermine the notion of the sovereign state on which the international security 
framework hinges. Indeed, it is the international securitisation of the concept of human 
security-- pushing it to the extremes of supplanting the notion of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; that has generated a considerable furore in international policy 
circles.  It should be noted that the internationalisation of human security obtains from 
the Canadian conceptualisation of Human Security which gives the promotion of human 
security a more radical  international political dimensions; with emphasis on ``lifting the 
veil of sovereignty`` to ensure promotion and observance of human security concerns.  
 
Jennifer Leaning and Sam Aire  contend that Canada`s promotion of preventive 
diplomacy depicted through her unwavering support for The Ottawa Convention on Anti-
Personnel Landmines(1997), and the Rome Treaty for the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (1998), coupled with its commitment to International Humanitarian 
Interventions as seen in its leadership over several United Nations interventions in 
conflict situations; speaks volumes about the extent to which Canada strived to shift the 
referent object of security from the state to the human being.
153
 Canada`s approach to 
human security is/was political, sanctifying international intervention in the face of 
internal conflict to overcome the ``human costs of violent conflicts``.  It is for this reason 
that the Human Security Partnership, championed by Norway and Canada, had nine 
points on its agenda: a focus on elimination of land mines, institution of the International 
Criminal Court, a focus on defence of human rights, observance and enforcement of 
international humanitarian law, protection of women and children in the wake of armed 
conflict, curtailing the proliferation of small arms, overcoming  child-soldering and child 
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labour, and the furtherance of the Northern (arctic co-operation) in matters of addressing 
human insecurities predominant in the global south.
154
 
 
To Canada Human Security entails preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and 
minimise risk and taking remedial action where prevention fails.
155
 Canada`s 
juxtaposition of human security with the notion of humanitarian intervention, which is 
generally a matter of foreign policy, and its suggestion that prevention and corrective 
actions can be taken to ensure observance of human security concerns is problematic.  It 
is problematic to the extent to which it mixes human security with the jealously guarded 
notion of territorial integrity, a matter that has   brought, and continues to bring unceasing 
attack to human security, both at academic and policy levels, yet it would be an 
appropriate parameter of comprehending the convergence of internal and external 
security challenges that have seen visitations of civil wars in many countries.   
 
The debate concerning the Canadian approach to human security obtains from the logic 
of the questions; how conflict undermines human security, and the measures to reduce the 
negative impact of conflict on human security. What is not discussed is how neglect of 
human security needs of the people ``freedom from want`` can explain the structure of 
violence in a conflict. That human security is not only problematic in the course of a 
conflict, but also before the conflict and that sometimes it is part of the issues that form 
the ``tipping point`` for the outbreak of violence. This point to two research agendas: one 
looking at human security issues as part of the issues which structure violence during the 
conflict, and another looking at human insecurity as a corollary of a conflict.   This study 
chooses as its research agenda to focus on how human insecurities mixed with other 
factors to determine the structure of violence during the genocide, how they continued to 
threaten a resurgence of violence, and how development in state-capacity in Rwanda 
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post-conflict reconstruction served to address the human insecurities which threatened a 
resurgence of violence and those that emerged as effects of the genocide. The study also 
examines how human insecurity as a corollary of conflict can undermine both the 
security of the individuals and that of the state.  
 
To further problematise Canada`s conceptualisation of human security, at this point, this 
study notes that Canada´s dismissal of underdevelopment as a threat to human security as 
presented by the UNDP report of 1994 in favour of threats to human security that 
emanate from conflict outbreak is to say the least of it lopsided in its understanding of the 
nature of conflict. Underdevelopment is part of the scheme of things that undermine 
human security, and it has seen conflictual situations in many developing countries. 
Poverty as Amitav Acharya exemplifies in the context of Indonesia can determine the 
structure of violence during conflict.
156
  
 
Also, Canada`s dismissal of the role of the state in favour of international actors is also 
intellectually and practically suspect. Granted is the way some states threaten the human 
security of the citizens as they unleash physical violence  onto the citizens by using state 
agencies like the military and police, but what cannot be dismissed  in absolute terms is 
the  state`s  pivotal role   in matters of human security provision.   Indeed, we are told that 
whenever human security concerns have been presented without balancing them with the 
presumed sanctity of the state in matters of politics, the concerns have faced dismissals 
from theorists and practitioners. To this study such a scheme of things requires a middle-
range position to allow the implementation and further theorisation on human security as 
an academic and policy concept.  Dismissals and counter-dismissals in the debate which 
surrounds human security are to say the least of it a move towards conceptual density as 
far as the development of the human security concept is concerned. All concepts both in 
practice and theory have faced a measure of contest, for they are not natural laws of 
social inquiry, but just ways of looking at our world and comprehending our world is 
always a subject to debate. So, contesting a concept should not be construed as a way of 
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suggesting that it should be relegated to a somewhat waste- paper- basket, but rather a 
call for more empirical inquiry for an in depth understanding.  
 
From the debate surrounding human security and the state-centric approaches to security, 
one fundamental question should be asked: Do the two security agendas serve to 
contradict each other? And if security is socially constructed
157
; that a society at a 
particular historical moment determines what security means to it and at times revises its 
meaning of what security constitutes, then, we have to ask and answer: Do the issues 
raised by human security constitute a threat to our security and that of our world? Do the 
threats suggested by the state centric conceptualisation of security continue to threaten 
our security and that of our world? The answer might not lie in too much semantic-
philosophical-cum- theoretical debates about our world, but rather in empiricism for a 
relegation of matters of societal importance like security to the sometimes hackneyed 
semantical philosophical debates, though important to the philosophical academia, it is 
far farfetched when it comes to availing practical solutions to the practical problems 
affecting us and our world, and the academia ought to take practical interest, pursuing 
practical solutions to the practical public policy challenges of  the practical world. 
 
 Bringing-in empiricism to give topicality to sometimes rather hypothetical philosophical 
debates is central to focusing scientific inquiry to addressing the problems of our 
political, social and economic earth. As such, this study, using the case of Rwanda 
investigates how human insecurities defined the structure of violence during the 
genocide. The study advances  that human security concerns acted as rallying points for 
the majority Hutu against the majority Tutsi and that the political elites manipulated the 
``fears and wants`` of the masses to hoodwink them into joining the scheme of violence. 
The study further advances that human security and state security concerns converged 
along the continuum of the causes of violence to lead to a resurgence of violence during 
the post-conflict reconstruction phase of Rwanda.  
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Indeed we are told from the securitisation perspective of Ole Waever; that an issue is 
constructed into a threat to security by the elites—those at the helm of the government of 
the state, and that once the audience countenances the nature of the threat, then, it 
becomes an accepted security problem.  This process is what is referred to as 
securitisation.
158
  So, this study examines how human security concerns were elevated to 
propagandist levels by the authorities in Rwanda, using them as gimmicks in the 
mobilisation of the majority Hutu to execute mass violence against the Tutsi, and later 
preside over a resurgence of violence that pervaded the whole of the post-conflict 
reconstruction phase of Rwanda (1994-2005).  
 
 Lodgaard outlines clearly how the securitisation and desecuritisation of human security 
is evident at the state and international level through ``speech acts``. Indeed, at the 
international level, he uses an analogy of the Security Council issuing a resolution 
addressing itself to crimes being committed against humanity, and that at the state level-
domestic level, the moment political leaders start referring to the problem in terms of 
security, then, it ceases to be a mere challenge but a threat which has to be addressed with 
a lot of urgency.
159
  
 
From Lodgaard`s reasoning,, security issues are decreed by political practice, and as such 
epistemological academic debates on: what security is and how it is possible; just avails 
us with frameworks in which to coherently place and explain political actions. The 
impulsivity with which political actions are sometimes taken means that solutions are 
sometimes sought after as a matter of expediency, and this only relegates competent 
scholarship to doing a somewhat intellectual ``post-mortem``   in its analysis.  Avoiding 
this kind of logical trap requires a continuous juxtaposition of epistemological and 
ontological inquiries respectively; by bringing-in analytical questions of this nature: what 
security is and how possible it is, to bear with questions of: what kind of security 
concerns do exist? 
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Also, the question of how to measure human security has also generated a considerable 
debate when it comes to the analytical utility of the concept.  It is suggested that the array 
of issue areas—various threats to security that human security entails cannot allow 
systematic inquiry on security.  However, a move towards appropriation of measurement 
techniques of human security is luminous in a number of research initiatives. Pauline 
Kerr notes how Andrew Mark and his team, as a result of incidence mapping, 
concentrated on Political and criminal violence as units of analysis in their Human 
Security Report.  
 
It is also noted that the Commission of Human Security, aware of the broadness of the 
concept, to make it less problematic for research and policy action, they had to organise it 
into interrelated clusters: conflict and human security, and development and human 
security.
160
  This reflects Edward Newman`s recommendation that meaningful academic 
and policy discourse on human security should be structured into different research 
agendas;  with a focus on expounding on its applicability in policy circles,  its 
explanatory and analytical  utility in security academic discourse  focusing on different 
situations particularly to explain among others: the relationship between: 
``socioeconomic inequality, divided societies and civil conflict/violence``, ``AIDS, 
Underdevelopment, and violent conflict, ``International economic fluctuations, domestic 
economic disruptions, social dislocation and violent conflict``, ``international commodity 
markets and civil war``, ``transnational drug markets, corruption in government and 
poverty``, ``literacy rates and birth rates`` ,  ``women`s/girls education and 
development``.
161
 
 
What reflects particularly about  the narratives about Africa in relation to the question of 
measurement of human security is what  Jennifer Leaning, and Sam Arie note  that 
human security can be measured  basing on the existing threats to human security which 
they call: ``Negative indices`` or ``inverse of security``, epitomised in the absence of the 
basic necessities of life like food, water and shelter, and the protection from life 
threatening threats like diseases, economic challenges like unemployment, coupled with 
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absence of psychosocial needs like denial of identity,  denial of citizenship as the case 
might be with refugee returnees, lack of recognition like in the allocation of government 
jobs, denial of participation for example in national activities like elections, and denial of 
autonomy as it might be with groups of people within states yearning for either self-rule 
or a somewhat autonomy of a federal character.
162
  
 
What Leaning and Arie suggest as the ``negative indices`` of human security resonate 
with what Ginkel and Newman outline as the underlying causes of human insecurity: 
inequality, deprivation, social exclusion, denial of access to political power which 
culminate into collapse of the social values which makes violence and conflict probable 
as a result of ``deprived hope``. Thwarting threats of that nature requires a development 
that is conscious of the societal differences. This calls for the necessity of focusing 
research on the applicability of human security issues in pre-conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction processes.
163
 This study should be seen as an attempt to extend to post-
conflict reconstruction situations, in empirical terms though, what Jennifer Leaning and 
Ginkel postulate.  The study contends that the improvidence on the side of the state/ 
governments to provide copying mechanism for the people to reduce on their 
vulnerability to life threatening inadequacies can undermine their security and the 
subsequently the security of the state. The study also postulates that during post-conflict 
reconstruction human security and state security concerns converge to threaten a 
resurgence of violence. 
   
 However, the study carries forward the argument that the magnitude of threats differ at 
different periods, and that one threat may be of greater magnitude than the other thus 
requiring urgent attention. Policy choices are circumstantial, and security issues change—
new ones emerge demanding new policy approaches. We can only understand how to 
analyse emerging policy issues, but not coming up with a somewhat one size fits all 
policy recommendations.  We are told that Barry Buzan left the issue of security policy 
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recommendations to posterity.
164
 This means that avenues to explore other security 
analytical frameworks beyond the already beaten path should be viewed positively for it 
adds on the array of the metaphysical lenses through which our political earth can be 
better comprehended, and the applicability of different frameworks should be left to 
circumstance and convenience for none of us has finality in determining and later on 
influencing daily happenings.    
 
So, it can always be established that a particular threat requires more attention, ``merit 
urgency`` of the ``security label``
165
, though other threats might be luminous. Human 
security and the array of threats it entails makes it easier to discern the issue areas for 
systematic action when it comes to the security of individuals. This study hypothesise 
that development efforts, instructively efforts to build state capacity ought to focus on 
human security issues because  if neglected, they can  undermine the security of the state, 
leading to conflict and a resurgence of violence during post-conflict reconstruction.  This 
is highly probable where human security concerns were part parcel of the issues that 
determined the structure of violence, and those which threaten a resurgence of violence.  
The study, using the case of Rwanda empirically sustains this hypothesis. 
  
Further, an argument is substantiated to the effect that the broadness of human security 
never meant making each and every human security issue a high priority issue but rather 
a presentation of a deeper understanding of the complex probable threats that undermine 
the wellbeing of the individual. And that the selection of what threat to focus on in policy 
implementation should entail not all threats but rather those that undermine the life of the 
population: ``drastically and quickly ``
166
.  
 
Accordingly, a narrow focus on some of the elements of human security, basing on the 
level of incidence and harshness of the threats which are according to the Commission of 
Human Security of 2002 are :  ``critical and pervasive``, is of great comprehensive 
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analytical value in understanding how it undermines the security of the individual.
167
  
This study, through review of documented evidence about Rwanda, and field based 
inquiry about Rwanda unravels the human security concerns that define (d) the structure 
of violence during the genocide in Rwanda, those that threaten a resurgence of violence 
during post-conflict reconstruction, and how the development in state capacity during 
post-conflict reconstruction thwarted the resurgence of violence in Rwanda and its human 
security related concerns.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 Rwanda: the nexus between human security, state Capacity, 
development and the structure of violence in the seven historical 
moments 
 
In this chapter the study gives answers to the following question: how did Human 
insecurities shape the historical structure of violence that led to the conflict which 
culminated into the genocide in Rwanda?  The investigative specific questions include: 
How did that system of things manifest itself in the history of Rwanda, and what is its 
implication on the general theorisation about conflict? What was the role of state capacity 
in that system of things? In this chapter, basing on evidence about Rwanda, it is advanced 
that: human security related concerns have been part of the structure of issues which, for 
time immemorial have structured violence in Rwanda.  
The study, in this chapter, further advances that the history of violence in Rwanda is 
generally related to the history of human insecurities as a result of threats to access to 
human needs which subsequently undermine human existence. At the general level, the 
major point that the study makes in this chapter is that:  contrary to the assertion that a 
strong state presided over the  1994 genocide in Rwanda; as the government apparatus 
arguably meticulously organised and directed the violence which culminated into the 
genocide, and it is therefore argued that the state in Rwanda, as traced from the historical 
Nyiginya Kingdom to the genocide regime, exhibited inherent flaws as regards its role in 
the  provision of human needs to the people, and that this somewhat metaphysical tragic 
thread saw the mobilisation for group violence historically probable. This study, at this 
point, subscribes to the contention that provision of social services to meet human needs 
which guarantee human security is a cardinal measure of state capacity, and the study 
argues in this Chapter that whenever this capacity waned, group violence became 
probable.   
Methodologically, this chapter employs qualitative data, that is, academic and public 
policy documents of which are: books, journals, and reports of national and international 
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civil-societies, diplomatic correspondences and media writing. The data analysis was 
guided by the constant comparative analysis method of the grounded theory 
methodology. Incidents from the texts (documents) were continuously compared and 
coded, and codes were also compared along the conceptual concerns of the study; human 
security, state capacity. Codes for human security were developed basing on the principle 
of ``negative indices advanced by Jennifer Leaning, and Sam Arie,
168
 and state capacity 
was coded basing on the elements of state  capacity as advanced by Cullen S. Hendrix.
169
 
The ``logic of abduction``
170
 was adopted to reach to conclusions concerning the central 
argument of this chapter. 
In this  Chapter it is majorly contended that conflicts are bound to happen in any society 
regardless of the sophistication of the human and institutional arrangements; for it is from 
the very ``neat`` human and institutional arrangement that conflictual situations do 
emerge. It can also be stated that as peace is inevitable in a given society so is conflict. 
They are to use the old English adage:  two sides of the same coin. One side asserts the 
meaning and importance of the other; for how would we have understood the meaning 
and the imperativeness of peace if there were no conflicts? And how would we have 
appreciated the cataclysmic nature of conflicts if we had no imagination of the benefits 
that peace comes with? We do appreciate peace because we are aware that conflict comes 
with distraction and destruction. Even those who are belligerent towards other states and 
people require a safe haven.  The inevitability of conflict means that peace is also 
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inevitable but peace in our conflictual world cannot be attained by a mere assertion of its 
importance. Society whether construed at the global, regional or domestic level ought to 
have institutions-; structures for resolving conflicts, so that they do not progress into 
blood-letting episodes of violence. Violent conflicts indicate a relapse in the structures 
that are meant to curtail probable conflictual situations into turning violent.   
At the level of state-craft, the state, which in the context of this chapter takes the same 
meaning as  government, ought to have the capacity to be at the vanguard of  ensuring 
that conflicts are resolved before turning violent, and to this study, this is referred to as 
``state-capacity``. Government to this study connotes the political structure of the state. 
The study, therefore, advances that in instances where the state/government is weak to 
resolve conflicts before they manifest themselves through violence, then, such a 
government structure needs reformation in a way that gives it the ability and capacity to 
contain conflicts they turn violent.  
As we noted in the Chapter preceding this, the causes of conflicts can either be internal or 
external in their causes, but the two causative levels can sometimes converge to cause a 
conflict. The study does not sustain this line of argument, but rather uses it as a somewhat 
point of departure to advance that internal violent conflict which may be a result of 
contestation for political power, which contestation may be waged from outside the 
frontiers of the state in question, entails the desire to have unfettered access to the 
privileges of power that come with it, inter alia, monetary resources and influence. 
However, whereas to the leadership of any political violent group the objective is how to 
attain political power, this chapter advances that, what makes other people to be swayed 
into or to put it in other words: to be manipulated into joining violence are the concerns 
that are related to their human needs. Human needs may differ from individual to 
individual, society to society, and accrue to the material level at which one stands.  
The study advances that in instances where human needs are not met, where they are 
threatened, then, the mobilisation of the people by political demagogues becomes an 
objective easy to attain. Human needs are central to the survival of people; survival is 
primary and human beings feel grossly insecure if the human needs that are pivotal to 
their survival are threatened. To this study, the situation where threats to the enjoyment of 
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what a society has socially constructed as human needs; needs that have been central to 
the primordial existence of people or a given society, qualitatively  and quantitatively 
reach a level of inadequacy and improvidence on the side of the state and its functioning 
agency: government, that the citizenry feel deprived , and therefore finding it difficult to 
lead a normal life without encumber; is what this study looks at  as ``human insecurity`` a 
presence of which translates into ``human security``.  If people respond to incentives, 
then, the quest for survival, which is largely construed in terms of access to the 
necessities of life, can make people view violence as a means to surmounting threats to 
their survival, both as a means of guarding against loss or as a means to acquisition.   
Political demagogues who view violence as a means to attaining their political goals can 
find a population that is physically and psychologically disoriented by inadequate means 
to needs or scarcity of the needs as generally gullible for political manipulation. The 
study pursues this trajectory as it explains the historical path to the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda.  
The study also advances that the state, the institutions for governance, whose standard 
and cardinal role is to organise society are supposed to play a  role in curtailing violence 
that may accrue from the disenchantment of the population either as a result of inequity 
in resource distribution or fear of losing access to the resources. Where the state fails to 
streamline resource distribution, or where it favours one side against another in resource 
distribution, then, the state becomes culpable of impropriety and improvidence on side 
the people and the presence of demagogic leadership makes violent conflicts probable.  
However, what is unique to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is that violence was executed 
by those who were supposedly favoured in their access to, inter-alia, government jobs. 
As such, it is argued here that the fear of losing access to the resources, which resources 
were unfortunately meagre as the study subsequently elucidates, made the population to 
fall victim to the chicanery of the political elite who wanted to use popular violence to 
instigate fear in those who were plotting against their political power.  The study, at this 
point, in its analysis, drawing on examples from the historical moments which Rwanda 
has transited since the days of the Nyiginya Kingdom, traces a somewhat human security- 
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cum-state capacity thread which literally pervades  the visitations of violence that have 
been part of the development of the state, which is Rwanda.  
It is imperative to precisely note that in scholarship about Rwanda, attempts have been 
rife in giving answers to a number of pertinent questions, but most importantly, the 
questions: Why did people participate en masse in the killing of their neighbours, their 
wives, their husbands and children? Why did the genocide against the Tutsi gain much 
appeal among the Hutu. It has gained credence that there are some the Hutu elites who 
refused to be party to the genocide, but why did the majority engage in the decimation of 
the Tutsi?  Mamdani writes of the ``moral dilemma of the Rwanda genocide``; to 
precisely put his bewilderment about the genocide. To him the extent of violence may not 
have been that much if the people from ``below`` had not countenanced the actions of the 
genocidaires (French word for those who commit genocide). It should be recalled that the 
genocide in Rwanda was well planned and well executed both at local and national 
agency, and it is this scheme of things that has made many a scholar to conclude that; it 
was strength rather than a weakness in Rwanda’s state capacity that saw the genocide, a 
conclusion which this study, using historical evidence from Rwanda, argues against. If 
political propaganda by the elites served to manipulate the psyche of the masses to 
participate in the genocide, then, a question emerges: why did that propaganda resonate 
with the thoughts of the majority Hutu? What motivated the people to join the killing 
spree? Indeed some were forced, but what about those who submissively killed? It is 
among the central contentions of this study that where the state or any other political 
actor manipulates the improvidence of human needs of the people to mobilise them into 
group violence; it indicates a weakness in state capacity rather than strength in state 
capacity.  
The nature of violence which took place in Rwanda has been put at three levels of violent 
killings, one: between the combatants in the civil-conflict; with the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front on one side and the Rwanda government troops on the other. Two: that between the 
Hutu and Hutu as a result of being viewed as ``moderates``; either sympathising with the 
Tutsi or when the poor Hutu looked at them as being rich that their property could be 
shared if killed. Three: that which involved the killing of civilian Tutsi by the civilian 
Hutu mobs. This Chapter focuses on the third level of the structure of violence where 
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Hutu civilian mobs decimated Tutsi civilians. The Hutu masses were mobilised, coerced 
and cajoled into participating in the genocide.
171
 This study monographically approaches 
the structure of the violence which saw the genocide in Rwanda; with a particular focus 
on human security and state capacity.  
To attain its analytical density, the study explores the four historical moments of Rwanda 
and the episodes of violence that pervaded those periods. The historical moments are: 
Pre-Colonial, Colonial, Post-Colonial and Post-1959, and a detailed explanation of how 
human insecurities unfolded in the history of Rwanda is as follows: 
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2.1.1 Pre-Colonial Rwanda:    ``The Garden of Eden in decay``. 
 
At this point the study argues that even in the formative years of the Rwandan state, 
violent conflict largely obtained from human insecurities as a result of scarcity in human 
needs and the inability by the state/government or the responsible authorities to thwart 
those scarcities. The argument is sustained as follows:  
 
It emerges quite clearly that it was majorly land and the issues that revolved around it that 
sowed the seeds of civil violent conflicts in the history of Rwanda since the days of the 
Nyiginya Kingdom.
172
 It should be noted that the pre-eminence and eminence of land in 
the life of human beings cannot be overemphasised. It is a source of survival to the 
people in a number of ways: tilling it for food, erecting structures on it for shelter, a 
source of water for themselves and for the domesticated animals, and a final resting place 
when death strikes—interning the dead in it.  Therefore when it became continuously 
scarce to serve the needs of everybody, even in the historical pre-colonial period; violent 
conflicts were probable.   
Indeed, even politically speaking, any political entity; inter alia, a state, an empire, 
chiefdom, a kingdom, or a principality is geographically expressed in terms of the 
territory (a land mass) over which it claims sovereignty. It is on that land mass that the 
population of a political entity resides. The people reside on land, and derive their 
survival from it. So land is at the primal existence of both the political entities and the 
human being. Indeed, the human community that historically inhabited the regions of pre-
colonial Rwanda,
173
 and the historical Nyiginya Kingdom derived its livelihood from 
land; the farmers planted their crops on the tilled land, the herders grazed their cattle on 
the plains and the foragers gathered their fruits from the forests.  
When land was still in abundance because of the small population, conflicts over arable 
land occurred between the farmers who needed a more stable tenure than what Vansina 
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refers to as ambulatory herders; who could easily move from one part of the kingdom to 
another in the quest for pasture lands. Co-existence between the herders and farmers was 
forged and sustained as a result of the synergetic benefits which accrued to both of them 
in their interaction and utilisation of the same land. It is outlined how farmers got manure 
from the cow dung, and how the herders in return were let to herd on the foliage left after 
harvesting.  But as land became meagre due to population growth among the herds and 
the people, conflict ensured and institutional management of land became a matter of 
functional necessity.
174
 The institutional management of land required institutions with 
ability to adjudicate in land conflicts. The Nyiginya Kingdom was later to be at the helm 
of land management. 
Indeed, even before Ndori institutionalised the Nyiginya Kingdom; political organisation 
was forged in the wake of scarcity of land.  Coupled with the survival needs of the 
farmers and herders, the existing political structures at the grassroots had to forge the 
administrative capacity to surmount the conflicts on land. Rules were made to guide 
cooperation on land. The rules focused on the burning of bushes, access to water points 
and marshes and passage of herds during transhumance, and most importantly the annual 
re-allocation of land were done to balance access of land by the two communities.  
  It is noted  that  the nature of the activities which a group did on land later came to 
define their social naming in society; with the farmers referred to as the Hutu, herders 
referred to as the Tutsi and the foragers referred to as the Twa.
175
 These social categories 
or vocational categorisation later became politically instutionalised, first during the days 
of the Nyiginya Kingdom and later by colonialism. It was during the time of the Nyiginya 
Kingdom that farmers where marginalised in favour of the herders (the study elucidates 
this later). Colonialism sustained the status-quo as it will later be sustained by this study.   
The details of how the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa came to be political classes are extensively 
discussed elsewhere, and therefore beyond the limited focus of this chapter, 
176
 and 
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Mamdani advises us not to dwell much on how the categorisation of the Tutsi and Hutu 
came to be, but rather to dwell on understanding and explaining what made them to turn 
into ``polarised identities``, to an extent of resorting to violence.
177
   
Accordingly, what should be emphasised is that as the population became dense, 
competition for land became inevitable. Conflicts were rife with each group preoccupied 
by its survival. The farmers decried the damage that herds caused as they grazed through 
their gardens, and they also demanded to use their land for planting drought resistant 
crops like yams, contrary to the arrangement that herders would graze their cattle on the 
foliage and marsh remaining after harvest.  What made matters worse is that herds were 
expanding and herders needed access to more land. It is outlined that, ``… each head of 
cattle required an amount of land that was nearly twice what was necessary to support a 
family of farmers. ``
178
 Herders were always in the quest for more land and they started 
encroaching on the land for farmers. This was met with stern resistance and conflict 
abounded.   
Also when population densities were still low, people survived through traditional means 
of tapping; through fruit gathering, hunting and trapping, and that they could afford the 
luxury of leaving an ambulatory existence. The increase in population across the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made people to resort to permanent domiciling thus 
shifting to agriculture, fishing and herding. Claims on territories became inevitable.
179
  
This suggests that skills in land management evolved with the challenge of population 
growth and political and social institutions emerged as a matter of societal functional 
necessity.  As such, state-capacity evolved as a result of somewhat political functional 
necessity; which this study takes to be the need for an authority or authorities to lead 
society in managing practical societal challenges.  
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The desire to manage the distribution of land as a basic need was at the heart of the 
political transformation of the Nyiginya Kingdom.  The objective for streamlining the 
distribution of land by the authorities was to thwart conflicts over it. The marginalisation 
of one group in favour of others, however, served to undermine the credibility of the 
authorities. For instance, the community of foliagers, the Twa community, became the 
victim of the increased need for land by the herders and farmers; as forests were 
encroached on.  Even when alliances were forged between extended families (Imiryango) 
to form a clan whose composition would sometimes include farming and herding families 
united in forging an agreement on the land tenure and defending their tenure,
 180
  the Twa 
were left out. This depicts the historical marginalisation of the Twa. Emphasis should be 
made that the headship for the clan was supposed to come from the extended family 
(Umuryango) that cleared the land in the first instance, and ownership rights (Ubukonde) 
were hereditary with chieftaincy(Abatwale)  but under the King-- the overlord of the 
land. Other family lineages that wanted to occupy the land would seek permission from 
the founding hereditary chief. Newbury writes that those who resided on the land of the 
Abakonde—the early lineage that cleared the forest for settlement were in a somewhat 
patron-client relationship referred to as ``Ubugererwa``.
181
 The clients had to pay   bounty 
to the patrons (abakonde), in form of offering the best of their harvests to his court, in 
addition to offering corvee labour for his service.
182
  The capacity to administer the issues 
concerning land as a basic need was central to the kingdom. 
It should be outlined   that political, social and economic relations in the pre-colonial 
Rwanda evolved with changes in land tenure systems. The development of the state; that 
is Rwanda, in its pre-colonial existence, was related to the desire to forge effective 
control over land. The scarcity of land came with political innovations that were aimed at 
increasing the amount of land that people had access to. Indeed Jan Vansina points out 
that the kingship to which allegiance was paid to by the Chiefs (Abatwale) emerged out 
of the forcible imposition of the militaristic herding lords that wanted increased access to 
land for their herds, thus forcefully acquiring land from the farmers who had initially 
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cleared the land for farming. As such lordship emerged on land, but this lordship was a 
preserve for herders who using a permanent military presence subjugated the Chiefs 
(Abatwale) and their subjects later creating principalities. In these principalities access to 
land was generally in favour of the herders as the Chief Lord maintained a large portion 
of land for the herders. Farmers were granted land rights on partitions referred to as 
``Ingobyi``. In return they would make payments to the land lord in form of land 
clientship known as Ubureetwa and offer corvee labour for his service. Ubureetwa was a 
form of clientship on land, with a patron and a client. The patron could extend land and 
protection to the client, as the client pays a bounty and labour in return.   Lemarchand, 
though writing about the ``buhake clientship``, notes that the clientship system was a web 
of a special kind, that a patron would also be a client to ``a more wealthy Patron`` and the 
wealthier patron was also a client to the King (Omwami). Accordingly, the clientship was 
a central pillar to the Rwandan political system, since the fountain of the clientship was 
the king.
183
  
Coercion was used to ensure compliance.
184
 The subjugation of the farmers by the herds’ 
lords was later to translate into a political arrangement which was to subsequently bring 
violent conflict between the farmers against the herd’s lords. It was just a matter of 
time.
185
 Even as the institutionalisation of the Nyiginya Kingdom started; land continued 
to determine political, social and economic relations.  
Military capacity as a form of state capacity was at the centre of ensuring the effective 
management and availability of land and as it was in the most parts of pre-colonial 
Africa. Kingdoms militarily attacked other kingdoms in the quest for territorial 
expansion, and political authority was exerted onto the inhabitants of   those territories. 
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Indeed, the Nyiginya Kingdom, the one whose territory generally forms the current 
colonially constructed Rwanda, was built through military campaigns against other 
Kingdoms.
186
 From King Ndori to Rwabugiri, the last absolute King before the advent of 
colonialism, the Kingdom expanded from the small territory of Gasabo to include, ``not 
merely the whole territory of the present Republic of Rwanda but also other districts that 
today form part of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. ``
187
   Land was 
viewed as a source of power for the kings and it defined their relationship with the 
subjects. 
 It is Ndori that first created a fully fledged military organisation to be part of his 
administrative structure. The military capacity served as an instrument for forceful 
territorial and cattle acquisitions by his kingdom from other political entities.  Though in 
passing, mention should also be made that the army served as unifying factor in the 
kingdom as all inhabitants from about the age of ten had to serve in the military.
188
 Every 
male, regardless of whether he was Twa, Hutu or Tutsi was an affiliate to the army.
189
 It 
is in the Ibisumizi (the name of Ndori`s army) that the: ``… development of the Rwandan 
language as well as its artistic expression, which was especially reflected in the practice 
of different poetic genres``,
190
 was institutionalised. This seems to complement what 
David Newbury explains that whereas different regions ``cobbled`` together, ``regional 
identities`` were subordinated to ``national logic``.
191
 This subordination of the region 
peculiarities to the national seemed to have started from the military with its universal 
membership.
192
  
With a neat centralised administrative structure, epitomised in the presence of military 
chiefs in the different provinces of Rwanda, conflictual situations on land were largely 
undermined. Indeed before the move to decentralisation of power was done, the military 
                                                          
186
 See, Frank K. Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda, (Kigali: Fountain 
Publishers, 2009), 1-61. 
187
 Ibid, 2004, 11. 
188
 Ibid, 2004, 62.  
189
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 2001, 67. 
190
 Op. cit, 2004, 62. 
191
 Newbury, Pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda, 2001, 266. 
192
 For a through treatment of regional peculiarities in Rwanda,  David Newbury and Catherine Newbury 
refers us to Jan Czekanowski, Forschungen im Nil-Kongo-Zwischengebiet (Leipzig, 1917) who elaborately 
delineates  the norms and customs of the north and north west areas of Rwanda with the norms at the royal 
court that were the norms of  the central and southern regions of Rwanda.  
106 
 
might of the overlord ensured continued loyalty as it could not only guarantee protection 
to the territorial lords but also threaten them into submission. The military was at the 
heart of state consolidation.
193
   Tight control of the population by the military, to which 
all those that were  over ten year’s  were part, ensured sanity even where it may not have 
obtained  all the time.  But the events of the eighteenth century were to prove a challenge 
to the political structures. The military was at the centre of state-capacity during the 
Nyiginya times and military capacity was aligned to the effective control of land which 
was both important to the survival of the individuals, the inhabitants of the Nyiginya 
Kingdom and that of the kingdom with the King as the supreme. 
However, the civil war that persisted from 1796-1801 following the Ndabarasa`s death 
undermined the power of the kingship as the families that made up the royal court 
became overly ambitious in their quest for power.
194
 Power struggles ensued to the 
detriment of a unified administration that had been forged. Civil violence undermined the 
capacity of the king to manage the affairs of his kingdom.    
The availability of land as a human need was central to the survival of the people. It was 
the   pivot of social cohension in the Nyiginya kingdom. Land was the source of unity 
among the people within the kingdom and among themselves. It is land that was central 
to the ritual ceremonies that wielded the social unity that defined pre-colonial Rwanda. 
For instance, the ceremony of the annual first fruits ceremony (Umuganura), where fruits, 
``sorghum and eleusine millet`` were presented to the king by his Hutu ritualists to mark 
the beginning of the harvesting season
195
 was very much related to land.  On land the 
fruits were planted and harvested for the festival which acted as a kind of social glue for 
the people and brought them close to their political leadership. Indeed, whereas internal 
scuffles used to ensue because of power rivalry in the dynastic lineages, natural 
calamities like famine and drought would not only undermine the survival of the people 
but also the power of the king. The power of the king and even his spiritual influence 
were tied onto land, for a wave of drought and famine, were considered to be a jinx on 
the side of the leadership and a threat to the kingdom as people would migrate from one 
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kingdom to another in the quest for survival and this would undermine the power of the 
kingdom which they left. 
196
 This depicts how the threats to the availability of human 
needs that guaranteed the survival of the people which this study conceptualises as 
human security, served to undermine state-capacity, which to this study is precisely the 
ability of the state to plan and execute its functions, which in the context of this chapter is 
the historical review of the capacity of the Nyiginya kingdom to function.  
Accordingly, the state capacity of the Nyiginya Kingdom, in all its complexities, was 
always marshalled to thwart any calamity that would undermine the providence of human 
needs. For instance, as part of the functional institutions of the Nyiginya Kingdom, were 
the ritualists. The ritualists had to be always at the service of the king to use their powers 
to thwart any pestilence and catastrophe that would undermine the productivity of land. 
As such the Corporation of the ritualists was an important structure in the administrative 
structure of the kingdom and central to its capacity to wield unity among the inhabitants 
and consolidate the legitimacy of the king. 
197
 
Indeed, it is not a moment to isolate when we read that occasional rituals were performed 
to ensure availability of rain for continued food supply and pasture in the kingdom.
198
 
The king was concerned with the welfare of his population in as much as he was 
concerned with the security of his realm and whereas he had the military to put enemies 
at bay at his court. The rain makers occupied a central position.
199
 Newbury attributes this 
kind of arrangement to ``the forest ecology of the Congo-Nile`` region where the 
Nyiginya Kingdom was geographically located.
200
  Notwithstanding that, a lapse in the 
availability of food and pasture as a result a pestilence; as it was with small pox that 
attacked herds or drought that made crops and pastures to wither, the political power of 
the king did not always go unchallenged. 
201
 This suggests that the threats to the human 
security of the people as a result of decline in the availability of human needs like food, 
also served to undermine the power of the sovereign, the king, who during the reign of 
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the Nyiginya Kingdom was   equally concerned with the human security concerns of his 
people for without people he was without a kingdom.  
It deserves mention that sometimes issues that generally reflected a human security 
orientation, exemplar of these; diseases and famine, also served to undermine the power 
of the king and the person of the king. Indeed, it is not a moment to isolate when we read 
that upon the death of Gahindiro of the Nyiginya Kingdom, when a succession dispute 
for power ensued between Sentabyo and Gatarabuhura, the latter, on a request for 
assistance from the King of Gisaka (a kingdom that was ravaged by a smallpox epidemic) 
sent a gift to Sentabyo, but the gift which was infected with lice carrying smallpox was 
kept by Sentabyo`s brother who later succumbed to smallpox, and that when Sentabyo 
came to commiserate with his brother, he also succumbed to smallpox and subsequently 
died. 
202
  It should also be mentioned that at the fall of the nineteenth century, the 
epizootic which killed several herds of cattle, which were the sources of wealth, 
undermined the Nyiginya kingdom under Rwabugiri and subsequently made it vulnerable 
to external attacks from the armed African armies and the colonialists. 
203
 This illustrates 
how human insecurities even in the early history of Rwanda; served to undermine the 
power and tranquillity of the state, which at that point in time was represented by the 
Nyiginya and the king.  
Control over land as a guarantee of human security, as it acted as a source of a diversity 
of human needs: food, pasture for grazing, place of abode, and interning of the dead; a 
central pillar in the Kinyarwanda culture, was a function central to political power. 
Accordingly, land was a tool for political control, as earlier mentioned, and before the 
institutionalisation of the Nyiginya Kingdom; the heads of the families that found the 
land or a hill or hills were the legitimate owners of that land. Even when they were 
subjugated by the Nyiginya overlords; they continued to own that land as far as they 
recognised the Nyiginya king as the overall lord. The creation of the Official herds meant 
that the king had to have access to more land and indeed his court would be shifted from 
one area to another and he subsequently owned all the areas that ever hosted his court 
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even when it was re-located.
204
 This is an indication that the political capacity of the king 
obtained much from his control over land, not as a mere territory but also as the primary 
means of survival of his people.  
Proper distribution of the powers over land was central to the tranquillity of the society. 
Gerald Prunier writes that the Chiefs of land were mostly Hutu because agriculture was 
their main vocation,
205
 as if to underscore the fact that Hutu was a word that was used to 
refer to farmers as a social category in Rwanda.   However, it is Mamdani who discusses 
further how problematic was the political move to transfer powers over land ownership 
from lineages (Ubukonde) to the king who then appointed chiefs, who were always likely 
to be from the herding lineages for they were nearer to the royal court and its 
administration, to administer it on his behalf.
206
  The balance of power between the 
farmers who had hitherto been the chiefs of land (abatwale wa buttaka) and the Chiefs of 
herds and the King who was also more inclined to herding was undermined.  Alienation 
of land rights widened the gulf between the farmers and their herding counterparts. The 
control over land created greater power for the king; for apart from cattle, land was the 
singular most important means of production. This means that the capacity of the king to 
manage the control and distribution of land, a central human need was important for 
sustenance of his influence.  
It should be noted that it is only through his claim over all the cattle that the king seemed 
to be in direct control over the means of production. Though this study is not on cattle, 
mention should be made that through the royal herds, the king`s influence in matters of 
production was largely felt.  He would literally confiscate a herd which he admired
207
 and 
through a tax (intore), which was sometimes paid either triennially or triple-annually, he 
could request for some animals to form a new royal herd. He would give away some of 
his cattle to his subjects who would enter into a client-ship contract (Ubuhake)
208
 for 
protection by the king. This scheme of things gave him unfettered ownership over their 
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cattle and the land on which they grazed. Thus the King became the overlord of land and 
cattle. This points to a political structure organised in form of   patron-client relationship, 
a somewhat centralisation.  A unity of administration as far as resources were concerned 
was created and it streamlined allocation of the two means of production and survival: 
land and cattle.
209
  
However, Newbury rejects the universality of the Ubuhake client-ship arguing that the 
practice used to take place among the Tutsi, than between the Tutsi and Hutu, thus more 
of a symbol of an alliance among the politically powerful than of exploitation. David 
Newbury uses the finding of the study which was conducted in South-Central Rwanda, a 
place that formed the nucleus of the Nyiginya kingdom, to give topicality to his 
argument. He notes that the study found out that only fifteen percent of the respondents 
had indicated that their father`s generation participated in the Ubuhake, with the 
percentage coming down to eight percent when it came to grandfathers` generation that 
preceded the colonial rule.
210
 That notwithstanding , the indication that there where those 
who were receiving and those who were giving means that it was neither   a relationship 
of equals nor a congenial relationship for it came with some responsibilities which were 
supposed to be met by the client by periodically returning a cow to the aristocratic ruler.  
At the same time, the modus operandi of the Ubuhake as it was with other political, 
economic and social arrangements of the Nyiginya kingdom kept on evolving depending 
on the interests of the leadership and the demands of the time. So, Saucier`s conclusions 
on the Ubuhake ought to have factored-in the issue of time, and when David Newbury 
uses Saucier`s study to dismiss Maquet`s ``premise of inequality`` in his treatment of the 
Ubuhake, but later to acknowledge how the practice was evolving across a period of time, 
then, at this point we find Newbury quite self-contradictory in his treatment of the 
Ubuhake.
211
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Indeed, capturing how the Ubuhake had transformed across a period of time, Gerald 
Pruner notes that sometimes the practice was used as a measure of ``upward social 
mobility`` for the Hutu, where a Tutsi patron (Shebuja) would give a cow to a Hutu client 
(Mugaragu), if a cow reproduced, calves were shared between the client and the patron, 
and when the client became rich in cows, then, he would be icyihuture, ``de-hutuised`` 
and ``Tutsified``. So, as if to counter-argue Newbury`s argument that Ubuhake was a 
Tutsi limited practice, Prunier contends that it is highly probable that the limitation 
existed before the notion of Tustification of the Hutu had been engineered.
212
 Without 
going into the details of Ubuhake and how the practice evolved, it suffices to conclude 
that it was a form of social interaction and it should be seen as part of the system of 
things that were later, particularly during the colonial period, politically and socially 
manipulated to create a gulf between the Hutu and Tutsi social groups in Rwanda.  
 The conflictual situation which was simmering  as a result of the collapse of the 
somewhat balance of power between the herders and the farmers as regards access to land 
was aggravated  by the increase in population as each great family wanted its sons to 
have unfettered access to lucrative positions in the kingdom.
213
  This hegemonic rivalry 
among the great families fuelled external aggression in the quest for more territories to 
create more officialdom. The   quest for more officialdom also warranted more divisions 
within the existing territories and this translated into increased exploitation of the 
clients—subjects of the kingdom.  
Again land was at the centre of this somewhat political techno-logic. The population 
growth was not limited to the elites but also to the subjects. Guided by the mythology of 
reproducing themselves through children, having many children was seen as source of 
prestige and continued existence. It is said that the introduction of the highly yielding 
American bean (Igishyimbo) led to increased nutritious dieting. Internal population 
explosion was coupled with increased immigration of people into the Nyiginya kingdom, 
more so from the northwest. This added onto the already burgeoning population.
214
 
Gerald Prunier notes how ecological factors may have facilitated the increase in the 
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population in the Nyiginya Kingdom. He observes that because of highlands, the areas 
were insulated from tsetse flies and mosquitoes that may have undermined the survival of 
the people and their animals. . He adds that the highlands made the areas impervious to 
foreign intrusion; first by hostile tribes and second by ``the coastal Swahiri slave 
raiders``.
215
 High population densities led to increased demand for land and this 
demographical change required practical solutions to be availed by the kingdom through 
its capacity. But this time the capacity was to be overwhelmed. 
Where the capacity of the state- cum -kingdom could not streamline the distribution of 
such a human need, conflicts were bound, and inevitably the disintegration of the 
kingdom drew nigh. Gerald Prunier contends that the increase in population and the 
increased demand for land required forging ``centralised forms of political control`` if 
harmony in society was to be maintained.
216
  Strict adherence to family`s (inzu) plot 
(Ingobyi) boundaries was demanded and enforced. From the ingobyi more plots 
(Umunani) were demarcated to be given to the sons upon marriage. Land arithmetic 
became primary, but even with the meticulousness of the arithmetic skills applied by the 
chiefs as they divided and sub-divided plots of land, a category of the landless and those 
with little land emerged. This category later became labourers (Umucaniro) to serve those 
who had enough land in return for food stuffs.  Land became more of a symbol of power 
and influence than ever before, and lineages started raising armies to guide their rights on 
land. The armies demanded food and support in terms of revenues which translated into a 
double tragedy for the farmers who had to pay for the militaries, and also provide the 
corvee labour for the elites.
217
  
Equity in the distribution of land could no longer be guaranteed by the leadership. The 
population of people was miniature in comparison to the burgeoning population of cattle.  
Land was reserved for the royal herds and the official herds of the armies in what 
Vansima refers to as ``a reserved herding domain``.
218
  Access to that land was 
guaranteed by the king who could give client-ship. Client-ship ended up favouring the 
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elite herders living the common herders to either become underdogs of the elite herders 
or to graze on heavily utilised public domains.  
The state or kingship devised further the methods through which the limited land was to 
be administered. Vansima enumerates the various land domains that were created; the 
domain of royal residences, the free domains of the ritualists and the royal cemeteries, the 
reserved domains, the military domains, the public domain under the ``Chief of the long 
grass`` referred to as the Abanyankenke, and the free domains. Indeed the state devised a 
complex administrative structure and capacity to manage the limited land. Hitherto 
powerful provincial chiefs were marginalised and the land under their control was 
subdivided. They later became mere chiefs of land (Umunyabutaka) and were to 
constantly conflict with the Chiefs of the long grass.
219
   
Lack of equitable access to land as a basic need that could guarantee the survival of the 
people; the human security of the Hutus (farmers) who were marginalised in favour of the 
Tutsi later undermined the harmony in the Nyiginya Kingdom. The state-capacity to 
manage the distribution of land was tilted in favour of the Tutsi. We are told that a new 
system of servitude was introduced and it was referred to as Ubureetwa, but to be only 
imposed onto farmers during the reign of Rwabugiri. It is at this point that we note that 
much as Mamdani dismisses the idea of concluding that Hutu was synonymous with 
farming and Tutsi synonymous with herding, when he notes that Ubureetwa as a form of 
client-ship that was imposed on only the Hutu, then, he inadvertently insinuates that Hutu 
were generally farmers as the Tutsi were generally herders.
220
    The chief of land,  on top 
of the dues and bounty in terms of harvests he was entitled to, was added compulsory 
labour for two days out of ``the four days of the Rwandan week``.
221
  This epitomised 
exploitation in the history of pre-colonial Rwanda.   
Needless to go into the discussion of when and how the categorisations Hutu and Tutsi 
began, it should be mentioned that the Ubureetwa pauperised the farmers, and Vansina 
informs us that the word Hutu also carried pejorative connotations in reference to slaves 
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and the poor. This thesis is also supported by Mamdani`s explanation of the Kwihutura -- 
a situation where Hutus who accumulated much cattle would literally shed off their 
``Hutuness`` and thus become Tutsified politically.
222
 Whereas the Kwihutura helped in 
avoiding the hardening of social divisions between the Hutu and the Tutsi (associated 
with political power) as Hutus could become Tutsi upon accumulation of wealth (cattle 
was seen as a symbol of affluence); it goes without saying that with Ubureetwa all 
farmers regardless of the region they inhabited started looking at themselves at as the 
HUTU for it seemed to condemn them into servitude. This indicated a move towards the 
consolidation of the Hutu group of people which was later to play a role in the 
extermination of its Tutsi counterparts.  
Accordingly, all farmers had come to be referred to as Hutu and all herders as Tutsi, and 
when the Ubureetwa was put onto all farmers; with their herding counterparts 
exonerated, animosity abounded. The animosity between the Hutu and their Tutsi masters 
was also aggravated by the introduction of ibikingi at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.
223
   Insurgencies by the ``Hutu`` and counter insurgencies by the ``Tutsi`` 
leadership that was part of the herding community were rife in the Nineteenth Century 
with a major insurgency, we are told by Vansima, taking place ``either in 1892 or around 
1895`` led by a mysterious woman Nyirafugi with a call on her from the Hutu farmers 
that; ``Free us from the Tutsi``. The revolt was quenched but the farmers continued to 
feel grossly marginalised and exploited as a group and they continued yearning for a 
saviour. The advent of colonialism was perceived as the emergence of salvation for the 
Hutu community. The structure of violence was now clear; pitting the Hutu against the 
Tutsi.
224
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Meanwhile the state-capacity of the Nyiginya, at the advent of colonialism, was at its 
lowest as a result of three forms of challenges according to David Newbury. The first 
form of challenges accrued to ecological and epidemiological reasons; with drought 
taking toll of the eastern parts of the Nyiginya Kingdom.   Visitations of small pox 
epidemics and epizootic that claimed more than 90 percent of cattle in some areas 
coupled with the rustling of surviving cattle in the north of Rwanda, more so in the areas 
of Nkore kingdom, which undermined the external good neighbourliness that is central to 
state security. The situation was not helped by European foreign intrusion that had 
allowed sophisticated weapons like guns to the internal dissidents as it was with Kilima 
with power struggles against Mwezi.
225
 It is this system of things that made the intrusion 
of colonialism a successful Venture.  Human insecurities undermined the state security of 
the Nyiginya Kingdom as they served to weaken its state-capacity.  
A somewhat symphony of destruction of Rwanda had just started. Inequity in the 
distribution of land as a result of increased population of people and cattle had pushed 
Rwanda at the edge of a social conflict  that when no corrective action was taken, by the 
powers that be, including the colonialists and the post-colonial leadership to streamline 
land distribution as a central factor in the social and political relations of the 
Banyarwanda, hatred among the two communities became entrenched that when the Hutu 
regime felt threatened by the advancing Rwanda Patriotic Army; which was generally 
considered to be a Tutsi military group, propaganda by the regime to mobilise the Hutu 
population against the Tutsi who were considered to be  their historical tormentors 
rotated on among other things; that the RPA invasion was a scheme aimed at  ``taking 
away the Hutu- land``.  Popular violence became a strategic survival feat. However, 
colonialism cannot be exonerated as far as the structure of violence which culminated 
into the violent confusion which culminated into the genocide of 1994 was concerned, 
and at this point the study focuses on colonialism as an important historical moment in 
the scheme of things that led to the Rwandan genocide of 1994.   The study examines the 
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colonial period with specific attention given to the issues related to human security and 
state capacity.  
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2.1.2 Colonial Rwanda:  ``memorably absurd``. 
The Nyiginya Kingdom, after many years of ``splendid isolation`` where it enjoyed 
continued sovereignty; first as a result of the natural buffers: rolling hills and in the 
middle of natural cover, coupled by the ruthlessness of the Banyiginya (the people of the 
Nyiginya Kingdom) and their king when it came to dealing with aliens, the Kingdom 
became colonised many years after other lands had been colonised.
226
 Officially it lost 
sovereignty at the Berlin Conference of 1885. But official German presence occurred on 
4
th
 May, 1894, when Gustav Adolf Von GÖtzen was received by King Rwabugiri. 
Rwanda became part of the territory which was referred to as the German East Africa 
with Von GÖtzen as the governor.
227
  
The colonial administration of the Germans was short-lived as the colony was handed 
over to Belgium after the First World War in 1923. The German colonial state-capacity in 
Rwanda obtained largely from the Tutsi monarchical model of administration. Though 
the large territories of Germany East Africa like Tanzania were organised 
administratively into the Bezirksaemter (Districts), with the Bezirksamtmaenner (district 
administrators), the administration of Rwanda was left to the institutions of the 
Kingdom.
228
 The Tutsi monarch was facilitated to defeat his political enemies who were 
in and outside the kingdom. The German colonial administration comprised of a limited 
number of personnel, and Tutsi chiefs continued to serve the royal court as well as the 
interests of the colonials. The state capacity of the colonial state relied heavily on the 
tools of coercion which were provided by the German colonials and the administrative 
machinery which was being provided by the Tutsi Chiefs. The method of colonialism was 
generally indirect, and was a reflection of the conjectural construct that the Tutsi were:  
``part of the supposedly superior Hamites (and that they) were natural rulers of the 
country``.
229
 The Belgians at least in the initial days of their colonial administration 
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retained and sustained what the Germans had constructed. Later, though, white colonial 
administrators from Belgium came in to provide suzerainty to the native authorities.
 230
     
From the section preceding this, it has emerged quite clearly that land, among other 
things that are beyond the scope of this study, had seen visitations of conflictual violent 
situations even before colonialism. Survival of the individual hinged on land regardless 
of the vocation; whether for cattle rearing or for farming. When the population, of people 
and cattle increased, the state, albeit not at the level of the modern today`s Rwanda; 
devised the means of containing competition over the limited available land.  However, 
state policy, either consciously or inadvertently became increasingly iniquitous when it 
came to the distribution of land in Rwanda, more so when Ubureetwa, a form of patron-
client relationship, was placed on the farmers with the herders exonerated.  
As noted earlier, the disfavoured farmers invested their hope in the coming of a 
somewhat saviour. The fore-runners of colonialism were as such enthusiastically 
received. Instead of solving the already deepening social crisis over land, however, 
colonialism aggravated the crisis. Land related concerns accelerated social divisions in 
the Nyiginya society, and colonialism served to entrench those; almost somehow 
canonising them. The Tutsi and Hutu identities that had transformed across a period of 
time were elevated by colonialism from social classes to the level of biological 
differences.
231
 The Tutsi were constructed as a superior civilising race that had migrated 
from far land, fine in character and physical characteristics; that made them natural 
leaders of the other races in Rwanda (Hutu and Twa).
232
 Mahmood Mamdani tells us how 
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``the Tutsi/Hutu difference`` was institutionalised by the colonial state or government and 
the Church. John Hannington Speke`s thesis on the ``theory of ethnology`` was promoted 
to the level of an intellectual imperative, yet, Speke had indicated that his was based on 
guess work, ``so much for ethnological conjecture``,
233
 devoid of empirical proof or 
truth.
234
 This construction of the Tutsi as a superior race, it is said that it inflated the ego 
of the Tutsi, but consolidated the feeling of inferiority complex and resentment of the 
Tutsi hegemony among the Hutu.
235
  
The capacity of the colonial state in Rwanda, in all its complexities, was designed to 
ensure the success of the colonial project. The social groups (farmers and cattle keepers) 
were racialised by the institutions of the colonial state. The Church as an agent of 
colonialism, Mamdani teaches us, was at the vanguard of accelerating the racialisation of 
the two social groups; Tutsi and Hutu. It is noted  that way back in 1902, the Catholic 
priest, Father Leone Classe, who was later to become the Bishop of Rwanda,  had already 
concluded that the Tutsi were ``Super humans`` and that in 1917, Francois Menard 
referred to a Tutsi as ``a European under black skin``.
236
 Gerald Pruner quotes the 
Dominican Father, Etienne Brosse who suggested that the Tusti came from the Garden of 
Eden.
237
  It is against that backdrop that when the Belgian authorities wanted insights into 
the nature of the Rwandan society in order to forge an administrative framework suitable 
for Rwanda, the Catholic Priests; Father Arnoux, Hurel, Pages and Schumacher had to 
craft the ``Anthropological treaties`` which Leon Classe consolidated into a single 
document to guide the Belgian colonial government in understanding the native. The 
church, enthusiastic about the creation of a catholic state, coupled with its human 
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resource; the priests and catechists who were well versed with not only the psyche of the 
native but also ``with the languages, cultures, and histories of the different regions, and 
strategic spread``, became part of the colonial historical process, part of: ``an alliance of 
ecclesiastics and administrators``, in charge of colonial Rwanda. 
238
 The Church was part 
of the state capacity of the colonial state in Rwanda. 
Accordingly, the state capacity of the colonial Rwandan state thrived on the constructions 
of the church about the nature of the native that for the period between; 1927 to 1936, the 
church, we are told, was in charge of the social policy.
239
 It should be emphasised that 
whereas the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa social differences had started developing way before 
colonialism; colonialism instutionalised those social differences, manipulated them in 
order  to control society and  that post-colonial regimes sustained colonial constructs in a 
more cataclysmic outcome.   Belgian colonial administration created institutions which 
entrenched and reflected racial constructions that: `` … a very dangerous social bomb 
was almost absent-mindedly manufactured throughout the peaceful years of abazungu 
domination``. 
240
 Mamdani even laments the removal of the ``kwihutura``, a practice 
through which a Hutu would become a Tutsi. To him colonialism created a caste system 
in Rwanda, creating a completely Tutsi oligarchy.
241
   
Furthermore, education, state administration, taxation and the church were racialised and 
organised in a manner that reflected racial divisions. For instance special education was 
given to the Tutsi children, who were being prepared for administration, were taught in 
French, the language of the colonial state in Rwanda, and the Hutus were taught in 
Swahili, the language of manual labourers.
242
  The school of Nyanza founded in 1919 
was exclusively for the sons of chiefs and such privileged schooling also applied to the  
Groupe Scolaire d´Astrida which was founded in 1935 to replace Nyanza.
243
  But what 
crowned the institutionalisation of the race phenomenon in Rwanda was the issue of the 
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identity card, carried by all citizens of the colonial state; indicating whether one was a 
Hutu, Twa or Tutsi. How a Tutsi was identified from a Hutu during the official census of 
1933-1934  that led to identification according to Mamdani is debatable;  with two 
threads to the argument: one, that a 10 cow rule was applied, that whoever had more than 
ten heads of cattle was said to be a Tutsi, and  two: that the 10 cow rule would not have 
been sufficient for identification of the Tutsi for not all of them owned cows and he 
argues that other methods were used for instance the church records, networks  and 
instruments to measure the height, size of the nose and other physical attributes.
244
  
However, Melvern informs us that sometimes determination of an ethnic group to which 
one belonged was arbitrarily done since mixed marriages had already taken place more so 
in the south of Rwanda thus  making physical characteristics as the basis of determining 
ones race deceptive, save for the North where intermarriages had not already gained 
momentum. The racialisation of the social and political Rwanda was institutionalised 
during colonialism that identity cards were given bearing ones ethnic group. We are 
reminded that the identity cards were used during the genocide of 1994 to separate the 
Tutsi from the Hutu.
245
 As such, colonialism availed the institutional mechanisms that 
acted as the infrastructure that made the genocide to be executed without encumber. The 
racialisation of what hitherto were social identities was part of the administrative capacity 
of the colonial state.   
The colonial state, not just in Rwanda, but even elsewhere in Africa demanded a 
considerable measure of efficiency in its state capacity. It was uncompromising and very 
assertive.
246
 The chiefs were supposed to execute colonial policies with a measure of 
ruthlessness. Mamdani refers to this as a somewhat indirect rule; where a minority group 
of people, ``identified as civilised`` by the law, is ``enfranchised and empowered``
247
 to 
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work as proverbial pawns in the chase-like game of colonialism. Indirect rule in Rwanda 
using the Tutsi monarchy and its institutions was adopted first by the Germans and later 
sustained by the Belgians.
248
 In the colonial scheme of things the ``Tutsi`` were the 
victims not the victors because colonial policies and the manner in which they were 
executed, served to worsen the social divisions; alienating the ``Hutu`` from the ``Tusti`` 
and the social crisis that was in the offing in the Nyiginya Kingdom before the advent of 
colonialism. 
249
 However, Lemarchand observes that indirect rule was adopted just as an 
administrative strategic feat for as he quotes Ryckmans: 
Legitimacy is more powerful than violence. The only smoothly functioning organ 
between us and the masses is the legitimate chiefs. They alone, because they are 
legitimate can induce acceptance of necessary innovations.
250
 
The colonial state was no respecter of individual freedoms as a central aspect of human 
security.   State capacity was aligned to the economic exploits of the colonial state. The 
colonial agrarian policies, which were part of the `les reformes Voison`,
251
 rotated on the 
following; forced labour, forced crops, forced sales and was crowned by an array of taxes 
that served to physically and psychological disorient the native.  Mamdani notes that 
agrarian policies were introduced with a considerable measure of state-capacity to 
enforce them. The first level of state-capacity was manifested in the manner in which 
local administration was organised; with ´´ a single hierarchy of chiefs`` that was backed 
by ``customary law`` that legitimised the actions of the chiefs.
252
  It is these chiefs, who 
were majorly Tutsi that were supposed to enforce colonial policies, inter alia; forced 
labour, forced cash cropping, forced sales and taxation.   
State capacity was primary for the success of the colonial state, and the colonial political 
structure was designed to that effect. David Newbury writes that colonialism never 
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weakened the local elite state power, although the functioning of the  state was enhanced 
through a measure of reforms, most importantly the reforms in  administrative capacity 
through downsizing of the number of chiefs and through  ensuring close monitoring of 
their activities by the colonial state to promote standardised procedures of bureaucratic 
control, ensuring ``effective penetration`` of the state in terms of policy execution and 
extraction capacity to enable tax collection, labour conscription, and the territorial 
expansion of the Rwandan state.
253
   
The territory under the direct leadership of the king expanded and his style of leadership 
became more authoritarian even on areas that had hitherto enjoyed a considerable 
measure of autonomy, for instance the Hutu principalities of Northern, Northwest and 
Southwest Rwanda. Lemarchand refers to the situation where the colonialists assisted the 
king in the expansion of his suzerainty, as a matter of ``quid pro quo``: for as it was in the 
case of the Germans; as they supported the crown, the crown equally countenanced their 
colonial economic interests.
254
  We are told that some areas were annexed and added onto 
the King`s area of jurisdiction. Kibari was annexed in 1918 and Bukoya in 1931.
255
 The 
land of the natives of the annexed areas was put in the hands of the central court; which 
also put it in the hands of the local elites who were mostly Tutsi. The local state elites 
where required to execute colonial policies with utmost efficiency.  The alienation of the 
annexed people from their land undermined the cardinal pillar of their security; the land 
on which they live and cultivate food for themselves and their livestock. The nature of the 
colonial policies, how they were enforced, how they undermined the human security of 
the native, and how they accelerated social divisions in Rwanda that led to considerable 
waves of violence is delineated as follows:  
On forced labour, it is noted that pre-colonial labour patterns were sustained,
256
 and that 
the common man was required to put-off days of state labour to construct and maintain 
public works know as the akazi service. The example of how the natives were coerced to 
construct and maintain terraces in the 1950s suffice to illustrate the nature of forced 
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labour; that by 1960, approximately 439,000 kilometres of terraces, ``enough terracing in 
this tiny country to circle the globe eleven times… `` were dug.  We are told that the 
extent of the terraces meant that each person dug 10 meters a day and the ditches took 
over 55 million workdays.
257
 Kamukama  observes  that the native was required to 
participate in the construction of roads. The colonial government tasked the chiefs, who 
were thought to have customary powers over the native, to enforce the road construction 
and maintenance. Coercion was executed through two ways: duress, by beating; Kiboko, 
and taxation.
258
  The native was also required to offer two or three days of the week for 
free labour to the chief on top of the time spent on public works as a form of taxation 
referred to as butake,
259
.  He also had to participate in the construction of permanent 
houses for the chiefs.
260
The native did this without any payment.  
So, the native, as far as the colonial policies were concerned, lost at two levels; the time 
he would have put on his farm was siphoned by public works, and that his labour could 
not fetch any tangible earning. David and Catherine Newbury note that the agrarian 
reforms the colonial policy implemented: ``worked against rural production patterns``.
261
 
Food production was inadvertently affected, the native had little time to cultivate his 
farm,
262
 and it is no wonder therefore that a chain of famines hit Rwanda starting from as 
early as 1940; the same period during which forced labour had picked momentum.
263
  
The access to food as a special human need for the survival of the native was undermined 
as his land had to be put to the production of cash crops. This had violent outcomes. 
   It was not out place  therefore that in the 1950s, when the United Nations Trusteeship 
Council Visiting Missions reached Rwanda, the message from the natives was clear on 
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placards: ``Our Fields, If You Please!``.
264
 This was an agrarian tone, a calling of the 
Rwandans to be freed from the agrarian colonial policies so that they can till their land 
without encumber. This kind of arrangement also widened the gap between the Tutsi and 
Hutu. The Tutsi were exempted from: ``corvee labour and other customary dues``, thus 
becoming the ``leisure class```, concentrating on western education and chiefly roles.
265
 
This solidified the Hutu alliance in their predicament. This solidarity was later to be 
exploited by political demagogues to serve their political goals as the study will elucidate 
later. 
On forced crops, cash cropping specifically that of coffee was encouraged at the expense 
of food production that it is only the intermittent famine outbreaks that reminded the 
authorities of the importance of food production.  Accordingly in 1924 and 1944, 
legislations were passed by the Belgian authorities to enforce food cultivation, digging of 
erosion trenches, usage of manure and planting of trees to ensure afforestation. However, 
even in the quest for food security by the colonial authorities in Rwanda, the burden lay 
more on the Hutus who were coerced by the Tutsi colonial chiefs.
266
   
As such the nature of food production which was promoted was problematic, and it was 
enforced by the chiefs who had to ensure that famine resistant crops (cassava and sweet 
potatoes) that were protein deficient were grown.  The farm of the native had to be 
demarcated in a manner that could reflect the administrative requirement of having part 
of the native farm land cultivated with famine resistant crops. Coffee production was an 
economic imperative that could not be compromised and it was equally enforced in a 
meticulous but ruthless manner.
267
 Indeed, it is for that very reason that we are told that 
by the end of the 1950s, coffee accounted for more than seventy percent (70%) of the 
total export earning of the Ruanda-Burundi Belgian territory, and quoting Leurquin`s 
study titled: ``Le niveau de vie``, David and Catherine Newbury note that by the end of 
1957, 62 million coffee trees had been planted in Belgian`s Ruanda-Urundi. 
268
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In addition to forced-labour and forced crops were forced sales. The chiefs would force 
farmers and herders to sale-off their crops and cattle. The colonial policy decreed that not 
selling ones` assets, of which were agricultural produce, would be construed as lack of 
manners. Rwanda had to be opened for commerce and commerce would only thrive on 
increased sales. Whoever opposed the sale of his property, they would be forced to do it 
at the barrel of the gun. One instance suffices to illustrate the nature of forced sales and it 
goes as follows: that  when it reached the colonial government that Mwami Musinga had 
ordered the native (breeders) to stop selling their cattle, two European traders; the 
Australian Fritz Schindelar and the Boer Praetorious, together with gun wielding escorts 
raided the areas of Gisaka and Nduga. During the raid, they held women as hostages. The 
act of holding women hostage was meant to force the natives to sell their cattle or else 
risk arson done onto their property. Commerce was being promoted at the barrel of the 
gun.
269
 Chiefs, aware of the benefits that would accrue to them in the execution of the 
colonial policies, like the extra taxation of the natives, did not spare even food crops 
when it came to enforcing sales. Beans for instance, a source of proteins had to be sold. 
As a result visitations of famine affect the survival of the people as many succumbed to 
starvation to death. .
270
 The outcome was that the food security, an integral element of the 
human security of the native was grossly undermined by the colonial policies. The 
security of the individual citizen of the colonial Rwandan state was undermined in favour 
of cash cropping, public works and commerce. The native whose survival hinged on land 
was now being forced to not only neglect his farming activities but also use his small land 
for cultivation of cash crops and famine resistant food crops, and force was applied in all 
these endeavours. So, the human security of the native was undermined at two levels; the 
level of food security and that of personal security as the native was coerced. This led to 
infinite sadness that was to see turmoil in the future of Rwanda. 
Use of force was the modus operandi in the execution of colonial policies. Indeed, David 
Newbury and Catherine Newbury; quoting Dorsey in his study titled: ``The Rwandan 
Colonial Economy, 1916-1941``, note that colonialism penetrated the Rwanda rural 
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society using forced cultivation of cash crops like coffee.
271
 Mamdani notes how chiefs 
were whipped by Belgian colonial administrators whenever they refused to deliver on the 
policies as required. So, the chiefs, in order to avoid the embarrassment of being whipped 
in public, they  had to whip the natives to work on terracing schemes, roads, pay their 
taxes on time, engage in cash crop production, ensure that famine resistant crops were 
planted, and promote commerce.
272
         
Also taxation, as a function of the colonial state, was executed in an abusive manner. The 
Germans introduced an array of tax regimes that were sustained by the Belgian colonial 
government.  Mamdani informs us of the Minimum Personal Contribution; a form of 
individual tax that was placed on every male adult.  The church imposed an annual one 
Franc tax levy on the congregation. Ruthlessly collected, but what made matters worse 
was that payment become difficult as chiefs would sometimes literally siphon the wages 
of the natives which were earned from public works. All taxes were universally enforced 
by Tutsi chiefs, but the Ubureetwa, a non monetary form of taxation that dates to the pre-
colonial Nyiginya, the real tipping point that led to the social crisis that saw reprisals of 
the farmers as it was ruthlessly executed by the colonial government. Taxation and the 
manner in which it was enforced constitute a threat to the personal security of the native 
because of the force which was used.
273
 
 The Ubureetwa was carried forward, and it served to entrench social divisions; this time 
in an institutionally racialised environment. Mamdani notes that the Ubureetwa scheme; a 
form of forced labour  where the natives  specifically the Hutu had to participate in the   
provision of  free labour to the chiefs for at least 42 days a year, a reduction from the 
approximately 142 days  that had started during the days of Mwami/King Rwabugiri was 
ruthlessly sustained.
274
 Catherine Newbury notes that much as the days were reduced 
following an edict that put Ubureetwa to one day per week, the fact that the Belgian 
Administration in colonial Rwanda decided to make the practice compulsory for all male 
adults, a deviation from the traditional representation of lineages by a representative, 
meant that Ubureetwa was no longer a group but an individual obligation, and chiefs 
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would go ahead and exploit the naïve natives; who were not aware of the colonial rules 
governing the practice. Even when Belgian colonial authorities issued a decree limiting 
Ubureetwa to only 13 days per year, Chiefs continued exploiting the people by 
demanding that they should work for them for more hours; 3 days for labour for the 
Provisional Chief and ten days of labour for the chief of the local hill.
275
   
By making the native to work for more hours for the chiefs, Gerald Prunier observes that 
the Ubureetwa, which he lexically puts as Ubuletwa, was generalised; extended even to 
areas where it had never been before. The Ubureetwa practice was also elevated from a 
family to an individual obligation. Hitherto a lineage would be represented by: ``a young 
good for nothing`` youth, but during colonialism, all male colonial citizens, sometimes 
women and children had to participate in this system of conscripted labour.
276
  It is noted  
that people were made to cultivate more in the chiefs` gardens than in theirs, and that 
some had to flee to other areas like the Belgian Congo, where Ubureetwa never 
existed.
277
  This aggravated the problem of food security yet food is central to the 
survival of an individual. This level of injustice directly undermined the human security 
of the native and consequently sowed seeds of discontent thus laying a foundation for 
future of turmoil. The state which would have addressed the injustice against the native 
was now the very institution that was sustaining the injustice.  
By sustaining the Ubureetwa, a form of forced labour that was imposed on the Hutu but 
exonerating the Tutsi, done in the name of sustaining and ensuring that the customary 
authority of the chiefs over the population was not undermined, it meant that colonialism 
had failed but in one thing; amending the excesses of pre-colonial Rwanda which had 
seen past conflictual situations.  The Ubureetwa client-ship was even extended to the 
areas that were annexed onto Rwanda during colonialism; like the areas that were 
northwest of Rwanda, and the Hutu kingdoms of Bukunzi and Busoozo. The alienation of 
their land, where the colonialists transferred it to the Tutsi elites which meant Hutu 
subjugation, bred strong anti-Tutsi sentiment among the people in these areas in the 
1950s.  
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Land distribution became the most determining factor in the estrangement of the Hutu on 
one side with the Tutsi Chiefs and the common Tutsi on the other.
278
 Indeed, because of 
land alienation, the Hutu of the annexed areas of the North
279
 aligned with some members 
of the Tutsi aristocracy who were disoriented by the domination of the Abega royal clan 
after the death of King Rwabugiri, organised themselves into  the famous Nyabingi 
revolt
280
 against the Tutsi and their colonial masters.
281
 To Mamdani, it is the Nyabingi 
revolt, with the Tutsi and Hutu on antagonistic sides that portended the future of 
Rwanda.
282
 The structure of violence was being delimited further; pitting the Hutu 
against the Tutsi. 
The gulf between the Tutsi and Hutu became abysmal, and it is David and Catherine 
Newbury that put it in a simple measure, that: ``Economic insecurities, therefore, 
contributed to political mobilisation along ethnic line``.
283
  Linda Melvern notes that the 
exploitation of the Hutu coalesced the ``Hutu group``,
284
 which later acted in unison to 
extricate themselves from exploitation. The economic insecurities were revolving around 
a single pivot point: that is access to land and its usage; and it was not only the Hutu who 
were affected, but also the Tutsi. David and Catherine Newburg quoting Leurquin in his 
seminal report: Le niveau de vie, state that there was no considerable difference between 
rural Hutu and Tutsi when it came to income and food security. It is added that the 
agrarian policies of colonialism were draconically executed. For instance when 
overgrazing became a problem, ruthless methods like forceful selling of produce was 
enforced, idle land was confiscated by the state authorities; reducing traditional measures 
of tapping soil fertility through fallowing. Fallowed land was a traditional source of 
pasture for the cattle keepers. Also when the colonial authorities assumed redundancy 
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among the rural population, labour conscription for public projects/colonial projects was 
improvised.  Local equity was therefore undermined.
285
   
As a result of the exploitation, many Hutus as depicted in the preceding paragraphs 
migrated to other lands to escape the wrath of colonial policies. Many went to Uganda in 
the quest for a safe haven against unpaid labour in Rwanda. Jason W. Clay provides the 
number of those who entered and left Uganda via Kagitumba Bridge from and to 
Rwanda. The figures are as follows: 
Table: 1 Rwandans Entering Uganda via Kagitumba Bridge (1927-1946) 
Year  Arrivals  Departures  
1927 23,000  
1928 35,000  
1929 40,000  
1930 23,000  
1935 15,000  
1936  61,500 
1937  28,812 
1938 60,464 47,776 
1939 13,331 32,912 
1940 71,682 20,708 
1941 65,194 52,388 
1942 42,113 42,910 
1943 38,572 22,451 
1944 18,546 13,272 
1945 41,509 17,365 
1946 38,113 24,501 
The table was adopted from, Jason W. Clay, 1984,12. 
The movement to Uganda was generally blamed on heavy taxation and forced labour. 
Jason quotes the interviews provided by Richards capturing the reasons why Hutu 
labourers went to Uganda. The reasons given were as follows: `` (our) money is only 
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enough for taxes. It causes people to be half naked and their wives too…. ``.  That: ``The 
people in Rwanda work all day long and the money they earn makes no difference 
because they go half- naked still``. That: ``The peasants in Buganda are much better in 
every respect than the people in Rwanda-Urundi``. That: ``In Nyanza (Rwanda) the food 
is short and the people are poor``. That: ``I left because in Rwanda a man and his wife 
have to work from early morning till late at night for the chief…``. That: ``Ordinary men 
work for their chiefs and when they find they have nothing to wear, they leave the 
country to look for money``. That: ´´In Rwanda we work very hard for very little pay….. 
We work all day long and the money we earn makes no difference``. That: ``If I was not 
beaten I would never have come to Uganda…. I left because I wanted a job without 
beatings``. That: ``It is like a holiday to come to Buganda``. That: ‘The Ganda peasant is 
the as a rich man in Rwanda-Urundi. They sell freely what they cultivate, and that: `` 
(the) peasant in Buganda is not like a peasant but he is like a sort of little Chief. ``
286
 
From the above eleven answers to the question: why did you leave Rwanda; which was 
put to the Rwandan migrant labourers in Uganda at the time, it can be concluded that the 
quest for human needs and freedom, which are the cornerstone of human security, forced 
many Hutus to migrate to Uganda.  
State -capacity of the colonial state relegate the providence and availability of human 
needs to the very periphery of state craft. The denial and lack of human needs entrenched 
conflictual tendencies as the gulf between the Tutsi, who were favoured by the colonials, 
and the Hutu reached cataclysmic levels. It is this historical hatred that was later to 
structure the genocide of 1994. 
 Indeed the 1950s political unrests presided over by both the Hutu activists and the Tutsi 
progressives demanded change in state policies to address; poverty, inequality, insecure 
access to land, and the inadequate opportunities for education and issues facing the youth 
like unemployment. The central court that was a citadel of Tutsi power was not 
representative of all those who were categorised as Tutsi. The rural Tutsi as part of what 
David and Catherine Newbury refers to as the: ``Local agency`` as opposed to ``state 
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agency``; also dreaded colonial exploitation through the central court.
287
   So, it can be 
inferred that what widened the animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi were among other 
reasons beyond the scope of this study; the colonial exploitative policies that were 
imposed onto the Hutu and enforced by Tutsi chiefs but exonerating the common Tutsi. 
The Ubureetwa was instructive in this regard.  
However, David and Catherine Newbury reveal to us that much as the colonialists 
claimed that they sustained customs like Ubureetwa for the sake of not antagonising the 
traditional arrangement, the labour conscripted from this arrangement was generally 
synonymous with the main mission of the colonialists in Rwanda and Congo. Labour was 
conscripted from Rwanda for the mines and plantations, and for the cultivation of cash 
crops in Rwanda.
288
  
Mention should be made that all the afore-mentioned policies accrued directly to land. 
Someone would be deprived of land by the local chief in case of non compliance to the 
aforementioned colonial agrarian policies.
289
 Though at first the colonialists had tried to 
protect the farmers from the cattle keepers who used to confiscate their land and 
sometimes randomly graze their cattle in the cultivated fields as the colonialists 
illegalised such activities; it was for selfish reasons than for humanitarian concerns for 
colonialism in Rwanda was interested in cash crop production and cash cropping 
demanded more arable land.  What made matters worse was that colonialism refused to 
recognise ownership of land by ``native collectivities``; land that was communally owned 
for instance by a group of farmers. To the colonialists such land was considered to be 
vacant. One example of the type of land which was considered to be vacant by 
colonialism was the: Ubukonde Hutu landholdings, which were located in north-west and 
south-west Rwanda. It was confiscated and the individual Tutsi elites, because of their 
closeness to the colonial authorities, took the land that customarily belonged to the Hutu.  
This reflected a move towards private ownership of land. The Hutu were very bitter and 
their bitterness became manifest when they burnt the Tutsi houses in those areas during 
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the 1959 revolution.
290
 The structure of violence was elevated to a struggle for survival as 
land was not just a human need; but the most singular source of survival. 
It should be underscored that what fuelled the hatred between the Tutsi and Hutu was not 
so much  because of  forced labour, forced crops and  forced sales, but rather that 
``Tutsi`` chiefs became the instruments of this unfairness. A correlation of the angst that 
had started accumulating during the times of the Nyiginya sovereign also emerged and 
got entrenched during the colonial period. The execution of the colonial mostly agrarian 
policies was brutal even for the native chiefs. The Tutsi Chiefs were given targets which 
they had to meet or else heavily whipped by the Belgian colonial authorities. So instead 
of being whipped, they whipped the Hutu to comply with the demands of the colonial 
master, and it was for this reason that the United Nations Visitation Report of October 
1948 condemned the whipping of the people during forced labour. The report also 
condemned the general subservience of the ``Hutu masses`` in Rwanda. The Hutu were 
subjected to a measure of discrimination be it in political, social and economic spheres of 
life.
291
 The Hutu was denied justice because the Native Tribunals were staffed by the 
Tutsi chiefs. The Hutu were marginalised even as far as education was concerned. For 
instance of all the 349 students who were attending Nyanza Ecole Pour Fils de chefs, in 
1928, were Tutsis.
292
  Hutu chiefs were dismissed in favour of the Tutsi chiefs. Indeed 
going by   the published colonial statistics of 1959, of the eighty one (81) chiefs, only one 
(1) was a Hutu, and of the 1050 sub chiefs only 50 were Hutu.
293
    
The typical ``Tutsi`` chief was elevated and alienated from the rest of society, and it 
should be noted that whereas not all Tutsis were chiefs and not all Chiefs were Tutsi, the 
fact that the ``Tutsi`` were favoured when it came to matters of administration and the 
dreaded Ubureetwa in comparison to their Hutu counterparts, then, hatred was abound.  
The Tutsi were seen as part of what David and Catherine Newbury referred to as, ``dual 
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colonialism``.
294
 But ``dual colonialism`` is an understatement for the church played an 
important role in this system of things. Probably we should be writing of ``triple 
colonialism`` which is an overstatement for the local chief was just a somewhat conduit 
than a beneficially; for even the benefits that accrued to the chiefs could not be compared 
to the cataclysm that was to out of this marriage of convenience. The actions of the 
``Tutsi`` chiefs alienated them and their Tutsi folks from the rest of the population, and it 
is the very reason that violence was not limited to only the chiefs but to all those they 
were identified with in terms of race: The ``Tusti``.
295
   
Struggles for independence were more a struggle against the domination by the Tutsi at 
the central court than against Belgium rule, and indeed when the Belgians started 
planning to leave in 1959, a popular revolution against the Tutsi dominance was 
executed. The Tutsi monarch was overthrown leading to the first Hutu Republic under 
Gregoire Kayibanda.
296
  The revolution was executed with a high level of violence 
against the Tutsi. M. Catherine Newbury concludes that the ``political consciousness`` of 
the peasants that made them to participate in the revolution of 1959-1961 accrued: ``… 
from grievances having to do with exploitation, oppression, and the violation of social 
norms by the elites. ``
297
  The revolution, in all its complexities, is said to have been as: 
 ``…the result of an oppression of a certain social group by another social group, 
(and a group which was oppressed was the majority group.)``
298
  
The Hutu and some progressive Tutsis believed that their freedom lay in being free to 
enjoy full rights on their land, and indeed the revolution undid the Ubureetwa practice. 
The Tutsi elites lost their claim on power and as Mamdani put it ``Victims became 
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killers``.
299
  The Hutu, to put it a little metaphorical, rose above them-selves, and put a 
fight against exploitation. The state capacity of the colonial state was primarily aligned to 
ensure extraction and exploitation of the native and his land. The human needs of the 
native were secondary that even issues of food security which were and are still central to 
the security every Rwandan were ignored. The structure of violence directed to 
overthrowing the status- quo was partly a quest for security on land and the personal 
security of the harassed Hutu native. The Hutu native broke loose his chains if we are to 
adopt a Marxist stance.  
Three events, which were concomitants of colonialism but accruing to the human security 
of the native, facilitated the political consciousness of the Hutu. Apart from being 
disoriented by the agrarian colonial policies, these very policies became a somewhat 
blessing in disguise. Those who migrated from Rwanda to other areas, inter alia; 
Buganda, Kivu, Kilembe, Busoga and Katanga; in flight as a result of forced labour got 
exposed to various ways of political, social and economic arrangements.  They were 
considerably well travelled, well learnt and men of means in comparison to the average 
Rwandan that stayed. Mamdani quoting Catherine Newbury seminal publication titled: 
The Cohension of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, notes that 
11,771 labourers were recorded to have entered into Uganda for just:  the first ten months 
of 1925. So for those who returned, they had the capacity not only to be part of those who 
wanted freedom, but also be at the centre of mobilisation for freedom.  
Indeed it is noted   that the Kinyanga Hutu revolt was led by the former wage earners 
who had then become credible entrepreneurs in Rwanda.
300
 Linda Melvern informs us 
that the ideology of Hutu power with its objective of creating a ``pure Hutu nation`` was 
forged in the mines of Belgium Congo by those Hutu that went there as labourers.
301
 The 
policy of forced cash cropping of coffee led to the increased flow of money to the Hutu 
who were integrated into the cash economy through coffee growing and coffee selling. 
Though coffee growing was forcefully implemented, the Hutu were in position to get 
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money to educate their children which children were later to become the Hutu elites, who 
although initially segregated against by the colonialist when it came to employment, 
when the Belgians started perceiving the Tutsi as radicals due to incessant demands for 
independence; recourse was made to the educated Hutu to substitute the Tutsi chiefs.  
Also, although the church, throughout the colonial period, had favoured the Tutsi,   at the 
end of the Second World War, with the waning influence of the racial ideologies, the new 
breed of European priests in the Catholic Church of Rwanda started taking interest in the 
predicament of the majority Hutu believers. It is for that very reason that the catholic 
media became enthusiastic about the publication of the plight of the Hutu. Instructive of 
those media publications was the Church Kinyarwanda language pamphlet 
``Kinyamateka`` (literal translation: On the Laws or Of the Laws).
302
 It is the 
Kinyamateka, a somewhat newspaper that delineated and popularised the plight of the 
rural Rwandans, but specifically the Hutu. We are also informed that the European 
Catholic clergy in Rwanda reached to an extent of assisting clandestinely the Hutu elites 
in preparing manifestos and petitions to the United Nations.
303
 Melvern without 
circumlocution notes that it was a Belgian Priest that actually volunteered to write the 
Hutu manifesto.
304
 
Emphasis should also be made that the forceful inclusion of the Northern principalities 
during colonialism, areas that had hitherto maintained their independence from the 
Central Court of the antecedent of modern Rwanda, the Nyiginya Kingdom,  and the 
subsequent threat it posed to their economic security as their land was alienated, their 
personal and political security undermined as they became subservient to the Tutsi Chiefs 
who wielded a lot of authority and forcefully executed their duties meant invitation to 
radical political tendencies that had been subdued in the areas of central and southern 
Rwanda because of the kind of political socialisation that was done on annexed peoples 
as it was illustrated through the nature of the Nyiginya militaries that were very 
integrative.  
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So the areas of the north, annexed during colonialism were far from the inclusive nation 
that the Nyiginya political leadership had forged before colonialism.
305
 The ``Northern 
Hutu`` were owners of land (Bakonde) and some bonafide clients (Bagererwa) before 
they were subjugated by colonialism and put under the repressive rule of the Tutsi chiefs. 
They may have forgotten their kinsmen who perished as they opposed subjugation, but 
they did not forget the loss of their survival, that is land. Lemarchand, in reference to the 
problematic nature of Hutu from Northern Rwanda, noted that they are: 
Hardier and studier than most ordinary Hutu, the Kiga people of northern Rwanda 
have always been looked upon by their neighbours as a rebellious lot, fiercely 
individualistic and contemptuous of established authority.
306
 
It is observed that they put a fight against subjugation by the German and Tutsi-led 
southern Rwandan troops. It is said that it took several military campaigns by the German 
Schutztruppen for the period between 1910 and 1912 before the Bakiga (Hutu of the 
North) were subjugated. We are told that they as a result hated the Tutsi and their Hutu 
counterparts in the South.
 307
 The ``Northern Hutu`` became a force to reckon with in the 
waves of the structure of violence which reached peak in 1994; with the genocide against 
the Tutsi.  
It should be reiterated that in their agitation for independence, Hutu elites, who 
coincidentally came from the north, called for a somewhat liberation from a ``dual-
colonialism``, that of the Tutsi and the Belgians. Even when Kayibanda, a Hutu form 
Gitarama discriminated against the Hutu of the North, it is General Habyarimana, a Hutu 
from the North who executed a coup against him.  Inference can be made that, probably, 
if the Rwandan state had not been re-organised through the annexation of the areas of the 
north onto Rwanda which was under the control of the Abanyiginya before colonialism, 
or if their autonomy had been upheld by colonialism as preparations for independence 
were underway, the radicalism that came with agitations for independence of the Hutu 
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and the animosity towards the Tutsi may have been thwarted. To give credence to this 
kind of conclusion, Mamdani writes thus: 
…the real turning point in the history of political conflict and political violence 
was not colonialization at the turn of the century, or even the replacement of 
German by Belgian rule at the beginning of this century, but the re-organisation of 
the colonial state from 1926 to 1936.
308
 
Accordingly, the three factors, elucidated in the preceding paragraphs, acted in unison to 
coalesce the Hutu nationalism, a nationalism that was directed towards the Tutsi who had 
been constructed by colonial narratives as aliens that had imposed themselves onto the 
indigenous people of Rwanda; the Hutu and the Twa. It is also those very Tutsi that 
colonialism exempted from forced labour and for whom chief -hood had been reserved 
for during colonialism. It is that kind of favouritism that alienated the Tutsi from the 
Hutu, that when the Hutu ascended to political power they guarded their power 
metaphorically speaking at a sword`s end. A retrogressive journey to disaster in Rwanda 
had started; a disaster that would see visitations of group violence of the Hutu against the 
Tutsi; a common occurrence whenever the existence of the Hutu and their political gains 
were threatened.   
However, in line with the above, it should be mentioned that the 1959 Hutu revolution 
that had seen the rise of the Hutu elites into position of influence and the subsequent 
declaration of Rwanda as a republic was without violence except in reaction to the 
agitations for the restoration of the monarch and the Tutsi insurrection as seen in the 
activities of the enyekeezi (the cockroaches).
309
  Mamdani seems to suggest that a 
revolution is an event, which happens and then ends in a somewhat span of the moment, a 
conclusion that is problematic. A revolution, this study contends, is a process and that 
process entails several events which happen at different moments. The violence which 
occurred after the 1959 Hutu rise to power; symbolised by the overthrow of the monarch 
cannot be divorced from the revolution which saw the Hutu rise to power. The Post-
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colonial era was metaphorically another episode in that drama that perfectly fits into the 
realms of a Shakespearean tragedy. But even then, the start and the eventual unfolding of 
the Hutu ``democratic revolution of 1959`` was not without violence. It is violence that 
sealed each move towards the higher consolidation of the Hutu political rise. Gerald 
Pruner informs us that the murder of a Hutu Sub-Chief, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, who 
was a strong promoter of the PARMEHUTU party, allegedly slain by the youthful 
members of the Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandese National Union), UNAR;
310
 was 
the tipping point that started off the revolution of 1959, which in its ideological 
orientation was aimed at promoting the political power of the Hutu majority.  
The murder of Dominique was followed with a series of attacks and counter-murders 
targeting the Tutsi Chiefs and the members of UNAR. This violence was highly 
ethnicised that even the ordinary Tutsi put by Gerald Pruner as the ``petits Tutsi`` faced 
the wrath of the Hutu activists as their houses were burnt. The Mwami (read King) and 
the UNAR, we are told by Prunier, mobilised commandoes to revenge against the 
Hutu.
311
 A symphony of ethnic destruction was in the offing. So, when Mamdani tells us 
that violence was just a concomitant of the insurrections by the Tutsi that were directed to 
the Hutu elites on their rise to political dominance, then, he may be right only to the 
extent to which the violence was not or did not reach the extent of the blood baths that 
followed the month of November, 1959 reaching climax with the genocide of 1994 
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2.1.3 Post-Colonial Rwanda:  ``a walk in the night``. 
 
The point which this section makes is that: the post colonial state in Rwanda was 
structured in a way that was meant to promote the survival of the Hutu majority, in terms 
of access to human needs that guarantee human security and this was done at the expense 
of the Tutsi who had hitherto been the darling of the colonialist. It was a move towards 
addressing the historical injustices against the Hutu. To the Tutsi it was a somewhat 
reversal of fortune, and political points had to be literally scored through incursions into 
Rwanda against the Hutu regime of Habyarimana.  A process of conflict-continuous was 
still under-way with Human security concerns at the centre of the system of things. 
Retrospectively, the story of the structuring of violence in the Pre-colonial Rwanda ended 
with the emergence of Ubureetwa, a client-ship scheme on land that made the Hutu serfs 
on land for they had to offer their labour for their continued stay on the land of the chief. 
There was also the Ubuhake clients-ship which was related to cattle, but emphasis has 
been put on the Ubureetwa for it was very much related to the issue of land and its 
distribution, yet land was pivotal to the survival of the Banyarwanda; be they pastoralist 
or cultivators.  
The story of the colonial state in Rwanda was punctuated with sustenance of the 
Ubureetwa, in addition to other colonial agrarian schemes inter alia, forced crops, forced 
sales, and forced public labour, akazi, coupled with other taxation schemes. Ubureetwa in 
the pre-colonial times were imposed onto the Hutu by the court (the monarch), and the 
colonial policies though at first a creation of the Germans and later the Belgians, their 
implementation, which required ruthlessness, was in the hands of the central court, with 
the chiefs as the administrators of the policy prescriptions. It should also be emphasised 
that colonialism sustained the Tutsi leadership and institutionalised its monopoly over 
power through the use of the mythology of the superiority of the Tutsi people, who were 
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then constructed as the natural leaders of Rwanda, but constructed as an alien minority 
who had successfully imposed their political power onto the native majority; the Hutu.
312
 
The objective for the construction of such a mythology was generally political.  The 
colonialists thought that by sustaining the status-quo of Tutsi domination, as it was 
during the pre-colonial times, was to make their administration less costly and effective. 
They also managed to divide and rule the Rwandan society, and thwarted the wrath of the 
native which would have been unavoidable had they decided to directly execute their 
policies. The Tutsi were elevated to the level of the policy executioner, and even where 
traditionally a Hutu would rise to the chief hood, colonialism undid those prospects. As 
such, the burden of sustaining colonial interest literally lay on the Tutsi and the 
repercussion of implementing unpopular polices lay solely on the Tutsi; as the events that 
came at the end of colonialism indicated.  
The Tutsi were literally the intended sacrificial lamb at the altar of colonialism. The 
struggle for independence by the Hutu, at least for the MDR-PARMEHUTU or the 
Mouvement Democratique Rwandais/Patri du Mouvement et de l` Emancipation Hutu 
(translation: Rwandaise Democratic Movement/Party of the Movement and Hutu 
Emancipation) was much a struggle against the Tutsi than the Belgians, and actually the 
latter managed to continue with their divide and rule policy in preparation for a continued 
relations with Rwanda even after independence.  The Hutu Manifesto, the document that 
was cataloguing the independence demands of the Hutu demanded among other things; to 
free the Hutu from an: ``indigenous racial problem`` and the political, economic and 
social: ``monopoly which was held by one race, the Tutsi``.
313
 
Indeed the declaration which was referred to as ``Hutu Manifesto``, than ``Rwandan 
Manifesto`` depicted the extent of the racist vendetta between the Tutsi and the Hutu, and 
the divergences in the way the struggle for independence was perceived by the two 
groups; with the Tutsi looking at the struggle for independence as a way of getting rid of 
the Belgians and a return of the full central court control of the state of affairs in Rwanda; 
with the monarch even calling for national unity with a request to the colonial 
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government to ``… remove from the official documents the terms Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa``.
314
  This was a rather belated realisation of the danger that ethnic division posed to 
the legitimacy of the monarch, but a complete departure from the ´´double liberation of 
the Hutu``,  an ideology which entailed the independence of the Hutu from the alien 
Tutsi- cum -Belgian rule. 
315
 The Hutu, in their manifesto of 1957 were demanding for 
majority rule which meant doing away with the Tutsi oligarchy.
316
 The Belgians thus 
began favouring to the Hutu who were the majority and thus most likely to dominate the 
democratised political landscape. The Belgians were scheming ahead of time. 
The Belgians wanted a kind of independence that was: ``in line with (the) imperial 
notions of harmony of interests in postcolonial Africa``, and thus prudent for them to 
promote the ``moderate`` Hutu to be at the vanguard of the independent Rwanda.
317
 The 
promotion of the Hutu dominance was a result of the perception of the Tutsi elites as 
being inclined to communism,
318
 and the calculated sidelining of the Tutsi by the 
Belgians was manifested in the way the Belgian authorities countenanced the burning of 
Tutsi houses during the November 1959 revolution and the resultant arrests of more Tutsi 
than the Hutu, 919 Tutsi and 312 Hutu. To give topicality to his allegation that the 
Belgian authorities countenanced the 1959 revolution and its violent manifestations, 
Gerald Pruner quotes the Belgian Colonel Guy Logiest saying: 
Some among my assistants thought that I was wrong in being so partial against 
the Tutsi and that I was leading Rwanda on a road towards democratisation whose 
end was distant and uncertain
319
 
Aware of the democratic power configurations of the decolonisation process, which 
tended to favour the majority, the state capacity of the decolonising state in Rwanda was 
reconfigured in the favour of the Hutus. The structure of violence against the Tutsi 
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became more concretised and institutionalised.  It has been said that the racialisation of 
violence that punctuated the decolonisation process in Rwanda was unprecedented in the 
history of the decolonisation process.
320
 The body-politics of Rwanda changed drastically 
and indeed; yesterday friends became today`s enemies, and yesterday`s enemies became 
today`s friends, thus satisfying the logic of T.S. Eliot as precisely  captured in opening 
quotation given to this Chapter.  The Tutsi elites were discarded by the Belgians and even 
their influence within the Catholic Church was systematically reduced by the European 
priests.  It was a calculated move towards Hutu power, which Prunier would later put as 
``ethnic transfer of power``.  It was ``ethnic transfer of power`` with a new Belgian 
system of administration dubbed ´´bourgmestres`` and the changes were very swift; that 
of the two hundred twenty nine (229) communes; out of the 229 burgomasters, one 
hundred sixty (160) were members of the Hutu party (PARMEHUTU); with only 
nineteen Tutsi.
321
 It is that system of things that made Colonel Logiest, the Military 
leader
322
 of the colonial Rwanda to declare that: ``(T)he revolution (was) over``,
323
 and 
David and Catherine Newbury refers to the Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda as: ``…one of 
the few meaningful social transformations to accompany decolonialisation in Africa…. 
``
324
 But to what extent was such a revolution meaningful. Probably it was meaningful 
because over because even the Tutsi monarch was finally overthrown and replaced with a 
Hutu leadership. What was emerging was a move towards ``Hutu Power``
325
, and the 
instutionalisation of ethnic violence and state capacity was aligned in that manner as seen 
in the restructuring of the administrative set-up in favour of the Hutu. 
All the instruments of state-capacity were strategically reconfigured to reflect the 
political hegemony of the Hutu. It is noted that even the military as an instrument of state 
control was mostly staffed by the Hutu as the independence of Rwanda was drawing 
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nigh. Of the 650 native military guards, 85 percent were Hutu with only 15 percent 
Tutsi.
326
 This meant that the most important elements of the state infrastructure; the 
military and the bureaucracy were now in the hands of the Hutu thus guarantying their 
political dominance even after independence. A ``social revolution`` was now 
complete.
327
 The Tutsi elites lost all the privileges of power including the unfettered 
access to land and free labour. All the issues that were considered as the source of Tutsi 
privilege and sources of Hutu grievance were undone. The Ubureetwa and Ubuhake were 
abolished. In other words land relations changed that when the Tutsi exiles decided to 
start an insurrection in the quest for a return to power; it was not only met with a strong 
counter-insurrection from the Belgians and the Hutu elites, but the Tutsi who were in 
Rwanda became the victims of repression from the Hutu elites who were now at the 
centre of power. Tutsi property in some areas was confiscated and given to the Hutu that 
even when the United Nations called for a reconciliation of the warring factions; by 
issuing the December 1960 UN Resolutions number (No.) 1579 and 1580, the call was 
quickly dismissed as ``perfectly useless`` by Colonel Logiest, after all the trend of events 
were moving well in favour of the Belgian authorities.
328
  
The Hutu elites were determined to consolidate their power and they sternly resisted any 
attempt, either real or imagined against their power. Even the Tutsi who were 
reconciliatory enough to accept to be part of the coalition government which was formed 
at the eve of independence lost their lives in unclear circumstances.  The social, economic 
and political landscape of Rwanda was systematically tilted in the favour of the Hutu 
against the Tutsi. Indeed, nothing could be done to reconcile the Tutsi and the Hutu, and 
the United Nations Report of the United Nations Trusteeship Commission Report of 
March 1961 as quoted by Prunier perfectly predicted thus: 
``It is quite possible that someday we will witness violent reactions on the part of 
the Tutsi``.
329
 `` 
                                                          
326
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 2007, 124. 
327
  Melvern, A People Betrayed, 2009, 17, uses the phrase ``social revolution`` to depict the move by the 
Belgian authorities to replace Tutsi chiefs with Hutu chiefs in the administration of Rwanda.  
328
  Pruner,  The Rwandan Crisis, 1995, 53. 
329
 Ibid, 1995, 53. 
145 
 
Indeed, the period which immediately preceded the post-colonial period, entrenched 
political and social vengeance of the Hutu against the Tutsi and violence became part of 
the body-politics of the Rwandan state. The structure of violence was now clear, the 
inequity in the distribution of human needs like land; which guarantee human security, 
saw Rwanda going through a somewhat symphony of turmoil.    
Ethnicity, which was constructed by colonial agents, particularly the missionaries, was 
manipulated by the Hutu elites at the advent of independence and after. The Hutu 
peasants who had suffered the wrath of Tutsi chiefs enthusiastically joined the struggle 
and overwhelmingly voted at the margin of 70.4 percent for the Hutu PARMEHUTU 
Party in comparison to the 1.7 percent for UNAR, a monarch inclined party,   during the 
communal elections of 1960. This was a somewhat referendum against the monarch. 
They fervently voted against the monarch, and when the monarch was abolished on the 
28
th
 of January 1961, the news was enthusiastically received by the majority Hutu who 
gathered at the town of Gitarama.
330
  The Hutu peasants, their grievances, which Linda 
Melvern refers to as ``rural anger``,
331
 though genuine, they were manipulated by the 
Hutu elites who elevated them to the metaphysical level of ethnic grievances of the Hutu 
against the Tutsi elites.  But these grievances were not limited to only the Hutus, though 
the Ubureetwa were specifically targeting the Hutu communities. Their economic 
security which is a core aspect of the UNDP definition of Human Security, their food 
security, their personal security, among other securities were  undermined by the Tutsi 
elites of the Central Court who were serving their Belgian colonials. The Hutu may have 
forgotten the whipping that was subjected to them by the Tutsi chiefs as they enforced 
cash cropping and communal labour, but they could not forget the confiscation of their 
land, their primal existence by the Tutsi chiefs more so in the annexed areas of North-
western Rwanda. 
So, the independence struggles, and the struggles for power among the two warring 
groups; Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda appeared to suggest that the Hutu struggle for 
independence was more against the Tutsi elites than against the Belgians.  Memories of 
servitude that dated to pre-colonial times to colonial times were viewed as the evils which 
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the independence had to do away with. Land relations among the Hutu and Tutsi defined 
the trend of events for they had served to portray the superiority of the Tutsi and the 
inferiority of the Hutu. The revolution of 1959, guided by the famous Hutu manifesto, 
wanted to undo that scheme of things. Violence became a means of consolidating the 
political power of the Hutu. 
The preservation of the Hutu was high on the agenda of the Post-Colonial state in 
Rwanda. Indeed even the Hutu second Republic continued on the same agenda of 
liberation of the Hutu as far as his securities were concerned. The Tutsi had to fend for 
them-selves either by going to exile or keeping silent about matters of politics. Whenever 
Tutsi exiles tried to wage an insurrection against the Hutu elites in Rwanda, violence was 
unleashed onto the Tutsi in Rwanda as a way of threatening the insurgents.
332
 It is not a 
moment to isolate when we read that when the Tutsi insurrections; inyenzi, directly 
translated as cockroaches, attacked from Burundi, almost taking over Kigali on the 
December of 1963, the Kayibanda regime unleashed a considerable measure of 
repression against the Tutsi that approximately ten thousand (10,000) Tutsis were killed 
including almost a complete extermination of the Tutsi politicians who had remained in 
Rwanda.
333
 Other sources put at 25,000, the number of the Tutsi who died as a result of 
the violence which followed the attack on Rwanda by the Tutsi insurrectionists.
334
 We are 
told by Mamdani that there was an: ``enthusiastic popular participation`` with a call: 
``(We) are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about (it) is to paralyze the 
Tutsi. How? They must be killed``.
335
Accordingly, approximately 200,000 Tutsi left 
Rwanda within the four years after the 1959 revolution in the quest for a safe haven to 
escape the persecution and discrimination.
336
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Mobilisation for group violence was done against the backdrop of avoiding a return to the 
past, which entailed: denial of access to land, state employment, among others; and 
violence was not just political, but also ethnic in nature. The Hutu population was 
constantly mobilised by the Hutu elites against the Tutsi population; under the guise that 
reverting to Tutsi political power would mean a return to oppression reminiscent of the 
times of the monarchy.  Hutu mass fear of the return to the exploitation they had gone 
through during the days of the central court control, coupled with  the manipulation of 
that fear by the Hutu elite; saw the Hutu masses: ``…armed with spears and clubs, 
(where) a group of Hutu started to kill every Tutsi in sight--men, women and children``, 
when they heard on the radio that: ``…a Tutsi plot was under way to enslave them``, 
following the 14
th
 November attach of Kigali by the Tutsi insurrectionist from Burundi. 
337
   Nothing would have reconciled the Tutsi with the Hutu. It is no wonder therefore  
that  the L` Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse,  generally a Hutu party 
but with a promise to promote Rwanda nationalism, and  to reverse colonial political 
identities;
338
 did not gain much appeal among the majority Hutu whose interest was to 
completely do away with Tutsi dominance. This brings-in the refugee phenomenon in the 
historical nature of violence in Rwanda, for the Tutsi refugees as a result of the 1959 
revolution continuously waged attacks on the government and the government resorted to 
mobilising group violence against the resident Tutsis as a way of threatening the 
insurrectionists.  It is the fear of the same insurrectionist tendencies of the Tutsi, this 
study argues; which were strongly opposed militarily to the Hutu Habyarimana 
government that saw the 1994 genocide, again, as a way of scaring of the advancing 
Rwanda Patriotic Front. 
 A return to the insecurities of the Ubureetwa and Ubuhake and other forms of oppression 
was unthinkable and had to be resisted.  The human insecurities of the Hutu masses, 
owing to what they had gone through made: ``… the local population, (used) whatever 
arms (which)were available, mostly hoes and pangs, the long knife for cutting grass`` to 
mime and kill every Tutsi they came across. We are told that at Shingira, an area near 
Congo, many Tutsi women and their Children drowned themselves, committing suicide 
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in order to escape the painful death from Hutu mobs.
339
 Racial hatred was politicised, 
used as a measure of ensuring political survival for the regime.
340
 Had the regime 
concentrated on a development that would guarantee equal opportunities for all 
Rwandans, but at the same time concentrating on its military security, carnage may have 
been avoided. Weaknesses in the state-capacity of Rwanda during Kayibanda`s reign; in 
ensuring human and state security saw bouts of violence. Denis Vuillemin, a Belgian 
academic who was working with the UNESCO resigned his position in protest of the way 
the Belgians had countenanced the massacres and was later to comment as paraphrased 
by Melvern thus: ``Kayibanda`s regime was increasingly bigoted and racist``, he wrote: 
``the government, instead of organising development programmes, was doing nothing 
more than encouraging racial hatred. ``
341
 
Every Tutsi was portrayed as having been part of the historical injustices against the Hutu 
and therefore never secure unless the Hutu were secure in their enjoyment of the 
privileges that had come to them as a result of the downfall of the monarch.  Indeed, we 
are told that between October 1972 and February 1973, following the massive killings of 
the Hutu by the Tutsi regime in Burundi, observant committees which were known as 
Comites de Salut Publique, were formed by the authorities in Rwanda to monitor the 
ethnic quota policy in schools, University, Civil Service, and private sector; to ensure that 
most of the benefits accrued to the Hutu population. It was Hutu preservation and Tutsi 
destruction.
342
 Melvern informs us that at Butare, Hutu students had to form tribunals: 
``…to check the bloodiness of students to determine the `pure Hutu``, and later unleash 
torture with ``iron bars`` on the Tutsi students.
343
 
Meanwhile, whereas the state Capacity of the colonial state, at the dawn of independence 
in Rwanda; was geared towards political inclusion of the Hutu and the exclusion of the 
Tutsi, even after independence, the post-colonial Kayibanda government determinedly 
pushed for that agenda. All resources where marshalled and husbanded to creating an 
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administration that was tightly controlled and directed to promoting and conserving the 
political interests of the Hutu elites but ridding on the historical injustices which the Hutu 
masses dreaded during the days of Tutsi dominance.
344
 We are told that the Kayibanda 
regime had a measure of: ``deliberate remoteness, authoritarianism and secretiveness``.
345
 
The regime was also highly manipulative; playing one group against the other. The ex-
Nyakibanda seminarians were played against the Astrida graduates. The Gitarama 
clansmen of Kayibanda were played against Butare and Ruhengeri, and the Northern 
``abakonde`` were played against the so called ``Butare Mafia``. We are told that the 
President, Kayibanda who championed the downfall of a patrimonial monarchy became a 
neo-patron of a special kind; with all the powers to make appointments, from the highest 
position to the lowest position of administration in the land, and his patronage was 
punctuated with corruption, favouritism
346
 and a high level of a lopsided kind of ``ethnic 
arithmetic``, to borrow the Mazruiana semantics; that was in favour of mostly the Hutu of 
central Rwanda.  We are told that the Kayibanda years destroyed the monarchical order 
of the Tutsi, but to usher in the somewhat ``Central Rwanda Hutu monarchical order``, 
and Gerald Prunier finds it appropriate to refer to Kayibanda as the ´´mwami of the 
Hutu``;
347
 meaning the King of the Hutu.  
Even the judicial capacity, as a strand of state capacity of Rwanda during the reign of 
Kayibanda was tailored to political survival through manipulation of popular grievance 
which popular grievance obtained from human insecurities like unemployment. As such, 
whenever Kayibanda`s government was being threatened by the Hutu masses as it was 
with the criticism against him that he had failed to leave up to the promises of the 
revolution, as he  failed to  guarantee educational and employment opportunities for the 
Hutu, he resorted to exploiting the judicial capacity leverages of his position and passed a 
law decreeing the complete nationalisation of education institutions so that admissions,  
content;  what was being  taught and employment in the educational sector was controlled 
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by the government. Indeed following the mass murder of the Hutus in Burundi by the 
Tutsi dominated army in Burundi in 1970s; the Kayibanda regime, having been 
threatened that such a phenomenon may have had spill-over effects in Rwanda, he 
countenanced the blacklisting of the Tutsi students and the Tutsi in gainful employment 
by the Hutu students and lay youths, whose mobilisation against the Tutsi gained massive 
broadcast on Radio Rwanda, calling for the complete decimation of the Tutsi.
348
  
Violence against the Tutsi was administratively organised and executed. State capacity 
was directed to but one important goal: sustenance of Hutu power. However,  it is his 
attempt to play one group against another that consequently played against Kayibanda; a 
scuffle ensued between the Southern and Northern Hutu politicians and their gangs 
``vigilante committees``, that had hitherto engaged in terrorising the Tutsi minorities. 
Power was in the hands of the Southern Hutus and used to subject the Southern Hutus to 
social inequity.
349
  The Hutu factions started preying on each other; divided along south-
northern Hutu arithmetic.
350
  
As such the senior army commander, Juvenal Habyarimana, whom Melvern tells us was 
in charge of the anti-Tutsi campaign during Kayibanda`s regime; counting on the reliable 
support of his kinsmen from Northern Rwanda especially the  ``abakonde``, who had 
been marginalised for so long, staged a coup  against Kayibanda on the 5
th
 of July 
1973.
351
 Again; flawed state-capacity, that had concentrated on divide and rule, instead of 
forging national unity and development that would have ensured the survival concerns, 
human securities of all citizens,  undermined the existence of Kayibanda`s government. 
Improvidence on the side of government as regards employment and the means of 
production like land, coupled with a service delivery approach bloated with regionalism; 
with the Central Hutus reaping more saw the downfall of the Kayibanda regime in 
Rwanda. 
  As a way of mobilising the Hutu masses, Kayibanda`s northern Hutu adversaries instead 
of criticising him for regional discrimination, they ethicised their grievances against him, 
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criticising him of being lukewarm in his attitude towards the Tutsi, and his failure to 
guarantee the Hutu unfettered access schools, employment; issues generally related to 
economic insecurity.
352
 The economic insecurities of the Hutu masses more so those from 
Northern Rwanda who had been sidelined by the Kayibanda government in favour of 
those from the central region, and his failure to guarantee the unfettered access of the 
Hutu to education and employment, part of the promises of the 1959 revolution, were 
again manipulated by the Habyarimana clique to win mass support; something which 
made his coup d’état of   5 July 1973 a success.353 This outlines three important issues; 
that the youths were at the vanguard of executing racial violent reactions against the 
Tutsi, and enthusiastically supported the final coups d’état against Kayibanda, that  
Wherever the existence of Kayibanda`s regime was threatened internally by its 
improvidence to the people or externally by the Tutsi insurrectionists , recourse was made 
to racial gimmicks through increased marginalisation of the Tutsi or inciting the masses  
against the Tutsi as being responsible for  popular grievance like unemployment and lack 
of educational opportunities, and that human insecurity concerns, like lack of access to 
educational and employment opportunities were manipulated by Kayibanda`s opponents 
to mobilise the youth for political action against his government.    
  So, the  fear of losing the gains made  in access to human needs  like unfettered access 
to land and employment  that guarantee human security, which supposedly would  have 
come with a revert to Tutsi political control, made the Hutu masses, especially the youth, 
easy to manipulate by the Hutu elites; to join into the violent frenzy against the Tutsi. The 
Hutu elites were using the racialisation of the insecurities of the Hutu masses to mobilise 
for political support against their power competitors; the Tutsi.
354
  We are told that race
355
 
was a measure that was constantly invoked whenever the regime of Kayibanda was 
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threatened by economic, political, demographic and external challenges.
356
 It was a 
political tool than a political problem to the regime, and problematising it would have 
meant devising measures to thwarting ethnicity something that was not in the interest of 
the regime.   
Whereas the majority Hutu remained walloping in their poverty, the ``Rwandaise 
ideology`` that rotated on the philosophy of ``rubanda nyamwinshi`` (the great mass) as 
opposed to the ``inyenzi``, ``inkotanyi``, ``the minority Tutsi`` as encapsulated in the 
populist ``Hutu manifesto``; made the unsuspecting ordinary Hutu to become the: 
``battle-axe against a mixed body of Tutsi``.
357
  We are told that when the Tutsi 
insurrectionists made an attempt on overthrowing Kayibanda`s government from Burundi 
on November, 14, 1963, the administrative capacity of the state was tasked to mobilise 
the Hutu masses to unleash violence on the Tutsi.
358
 In the Southern prefectures, all the 
Prefects ordered the bourgmestres to mobilise and direct the peasants in how to 
decisively diminish the enemy: the Tutsis. Melvern asserts that the government Radio in 
Kigali broadcasted threatening messages of the eminent re-enslavement of the Hutu by 
the Tutsi. She writes thus: 
``The killing was done by the local population, using whatever arms were 
available, mostly hoes and the panga, the long knife for cutting grass``.
359
    
The Hutu masses were hoodwinked into thinking that even in poverty, fear and squalor, 
they were more dignified in their being part of the ``rubanda nyamwinshi``. They thus 
fell prey to the manipulation of the Hutu elites; who constantly mobilised them to prey on 
their Tutsi neighbours by burning their houses whenever the regime was threatened of a 
Tutsi insurrection.   
So, it is a contention of this study that the mobilisation of the Hutu masses to participate 
and countenance either the extermination of their Tutsi ``neighbours`` or to loot and 
destroy their property was a result of the regime mastering the art of diversionary ethnic 
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politics; reminding the Hutu masses that even in their suffering it was better than when 
they were being under the Tutsi persecutions, thus: 
President Kayibanda`s Rwanda was a land of virtue where prostitutes were 
punished, attendance at mass was high, and hard-working peasants toiled on the 
land without asking too many questions
360
 
The ordinary Hutu acquiescently followed their leadership as a guiding star.   The 
servitude of the Hutu during the time of the Tutsi monarch was a piece of history that was 
occasionally cited by the Hutu elites whenever they felt that their existence was 
threatened by a Tutsi insurrection. This system of things continued even after 
colonialism.  
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2.1.4 Post-1959 Revolutionary Rwanda: ``calamity has come on you my 
brethren and my brethren you deserved it``. 
It should be emphasised that ethnicity was not the problem in Rwanda, but rather the 
issues which made ethnicity problematic. Ethnicity may not have been important if the 
political, economic and social processes had not problematised it. Newbury and Newbury 
informs us of the two levels of ethnicity; as an identity and as a political force through 
which political mobilisation is done,  and that ethnic identity is a product of history, with 
ethnic categorisation varying overtime. Whereas ethnicity as an identity is a social 
construct, ethnicity as a political force is as a result of political fabrication. The 
relationship between ethnicity and the genocide in Rwanda was a result of ``political 
fabrication ``, ``ethnic policy into action``, a move devised by the Hutu power elite for 
political survival. The revolution of 1959 placed ethnicity within the framework of 
political mobilisation and the Habyarimana regime revisited the framework when its 
existence was threatened.
 361
   As such, the genocide cannot be attributed to just ``ethnic 
hatred``, but rather to the issues that made ethnic violence to look like an easy escape 
route.  
More often, the analysis of the Rwandan society starts with the genocide and the civil-
war that started in 1990, as if to suggest that in Rwanda, everything rotated on a 
somewhat genocide pivot. Figuratively, the pivot on which the genocide wheel rotated is 
more than just Hutu-Tutsi hatred for not all Hutus participated in the genocide. Catherine 
Newbury and David Newbury note that there has been a lot of stereotyping when it 
comes to Rwanda and Rwandans, with the mistakes of members of  the two ethnic  
groups being  extended to all members of those groups, Hutus as ``genocidaires`` and the 
Tutsis as ``ruthless power-seekers``.
362
  Many Tutsi were not concerned with power and 
indeed many Hutus did not only refuse to participate in the genocide, but went ahead to 
oppose it, hid and protected the Tutsi. Two stories suffice to show how some Hutus 
protected the Tutsi against persecution. Indeed some of them even lost their lives as they 
were branded ``Traitors``. The story of Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, a Hutu state prosecutor 
                                                          
361
 Newbury and Newbury, A Catholic Mass in Kigali, 1999, 313. 
362
 Ibid, 1999,  294. 
155 
 
in Habyarimana`s government who refused to prosecute the Tutsi who had been 
arbitrarily arrested in 1990
363
, and that of: 
``A Hutu man who had a shop near us (,) hid us in a house that he was 
constructing. He was wonderful. He hid us in his ceiling for 18 days (!). We never 
had to descend because he did everything for us (sic). ``
364
  
 What structured the violence that led to the genocide is what the study grapples with at 
this point; for: 
…. why extremist appeals found receptive audience, in particular contexts, if we 
are to understand the roots of these conflicts—and especially to understand the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, we need to take account of the 
underlying social, economic, and political conditions which interacted to create a 
volatile situation.  
365
 
This study focuses on human security and state capacity concerns and how they were part 
of complex genocide structure.  
Noteworthy is that all the issues that structured the violence that culminated into the 
genocide cannot be discussed within the confines of a single research agenda for they 
were as complex as the genocide itself. Many authors have wondered: Why did people 
participate? Catherine Newbury tries to summarise the answers to that question as: ``fear, 
greed, and propensity in this hierarchical society to follow administrative directives.``
366
  
The findings of Scott Straus as far as what made the execution of the genocide possible 
seems to resonate in various ways with what Catherine Newbury advances, though with a 
more touch of analytical breadth, but the issue of the meticulously organised 
administrative structure, with a clear hierarchy to allow a chain of command which 
lubricated the genocide; is central to Straus analysis of the genocide experience, that is 
Rwanda. Indeed, Scott observes that Rwanda`s administrative structure had five levels: 
the national government, the prefectures, the communes, the sectors, and cellules, and 
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sub-cellules, referred to as Nyumbakumi, translated as ``ten households, `` in some areas.
 
367
 This ensured the presence of the state even at the lowest and remotest level of the 
Rwandan society. It is no wonder therefore that commands about the execution of the 
killings which culminated into the genocide echoed from hill to hill. The administrative 
capacity to coordinate and execute the genocide was uncompromising, and that many 
were forced to kill by the machinery of the state. Mamdani writes thus: 
The administration forced Bahutu men to kill their Batutsi wives before they go to kill 
anyone else—to prove they were true interahamwe. One man tried to refuse. He was told 
that he must choose between the wife and himself. He then chose to save his own life. 
Another Muhutu man rebuked him for having killed his Mututsi wife. He was also killed. 
Kallisa – the man who was forced to kill his wife—is in jail. After killing his wife, he 
became a convert. He began to distribute grenades all round.
368
   
In retrospect, Kayibanda`s government fell on 5 July 1973. The failure to ensure the 
providence of human needs which would guarantee the meaningful survival of the Hutu 
was part of the mix of the reasons that saw the overthrow of his regime.  The revolution 
that saw the ascendancy of Kayibanda to power; though perceived as a majoritarian one, 
with popular appeal, its outcome, if analysed in the context of violence in Rwanda, has 
been a subject of debate. Mahmood Mamdani criticises those who dismiss the revolution 
as; just ethnic transfer of power arguing that the Kayibanda government would not have 
gained and retained political power with complete disregard of the concerns that the 
revolution stood for. He delineates some of the social achievements of the revolution and 
Kayibanda`s government; arguing that Ubureetwa (forced labour) was suspended, and 
Ibikingi, private pasturage land for the Tutsi elites, was distributed to the landless.
369
   
However, the achievements of the revolution notwithstanding, the Kayibanda regime 
politically radicalised racial differences between the Hutus and Tutsis by engaging in a 
somewhat ring fencing of all political positions for the Hutus. We are told that whereas 
the Tutsi were allowed to participate in all civil areas, like the church, business, 
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education, and government employment; political leadership positions remained a 
preserve for only the Hutus, who considered themselves the natives of Rwanda and the 
Tutsi as aliens.
370
  
Kayibanda also created regional divisions by politically and economically favouring the 
Hutu from the south and central Rwanda against the Hutus from the north.
371
  Whereas 
the radicalisation of racism was later to undermine the general stability of Rwanda, the 
regional biases undermined out lightly his regime. Accordingly, Habyarimana who had 
allegedly been at the vanguard of the repression of the Tutsi instituted a successful coup. 
The professed reasons for the execution of the coup d’état were social and economic; 
with a claim that Kayibanda had failed in his providence of jobs and education; as the 
revolution of 1959 had promised to the Hutus. Mamdani writes that there were many 
educated but unemployed Hutus and many had dropped out of primary schools as a result 
of lack of school fees.
372
  These are the reasons that Habyarimana´s coup d’état based-on 
to literally attracted the enthusiasm of the masses to support the coup.  
Plainly, employment, education and land are central to the survival of a human being and 
thus where they are not provided for; it constitutes a threat to the survival of the 
individual. If human security is precisely delineated as ``freedom from fear and want``, 
the unmet want for human needs translates into physical and psychological disorientation 
of the individual, which translates into fear and desolation. Such a scheme of things, 
more so those which affect the energetic youth, if well manipulated by political 
demagogues can be a recipe for massive popular violence. Mamdani writes that in 
Kayibanda`s Rwanda: 
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``… degree holders lacked employment, to which they no doubt felt entitled. The 
combination created a pool of agitators, ready to be tapped by an ambitious 
politician with a keen sense of fresh grievances. ``
373
 
Mamdani adds that it is because of such concerns that the general population of Rwanda, 
including the Tutsi; enthusiastically welcomed the Habyarimana coup d’état. The 
concerns can ably fit into economic security which points to the seven elements of 
Human security as succinctly delineated in the UNDP report of 1994. Catherine Newbury 
and David Newbury note that the reasons for the Habyarimana coup d’état and the 
popular support it was received with were more of economic insecurity than ``blind 
ethnic hatred``.  To them ethnicity was only used as a pretext.
374
 However the 
hypothetical assertion that the Tutsi welcomed the coup as a relief is farfetched because it 
is the same Mamdani that tells us that the coup was against the backdrop that 
Kayibanda`s government was being lukewarm on the exclusion of the Tutsi. So what was 
the Tutsi enthusiasm about? Probably, it is because Mamdani delineates how the 
somewhat caveat that was put on the participation of the Tutsi in politics was a little lifted 
during the Habyarimana reign to the extent of having a Tutsi Minister: Andre Katabarwa 
who was appointed as part of Habyarimana`s government as of June 1, 1974, and this 
was buttressed with the Tutsi in senior civil service positions and officer-ship in the 
army.   
It is insinuated that the April 1980 coup attempt by Major Theonaste Lizinde, who was 
the security chief of Habyarimana, who is said to have been the epitome of hatred for the 
Tutsi and  the in charge of security, was a result of the path to reconciliation of the Hutu 
and Tutsi which Habyarimana was taking.
375
 But this did not mean that exclusion had 
been done away with; because by October 1990, of the nineteen members of cabinet, only 
one was Tutsi, with only one ambassadorial position occupied by a Tutsi and with one 
Tutsi senior military officer and two Tutsi out of the sixteen members of the central 
committee of the ruling party, MRND. 
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 The Tutsi were completely excluded from local administration; with only one Tutsi 
prefect of Butare, and in the military there was a regulation prohibiting soldiers from 
marrying Tutsi women.
376
  However, at factual level, there are some contradictions 
between the figures which Mamdani gives and those that Prunier gives when it comes to 
the political exclusion of the Tutsi during Habyarimana`s reign. For instance, whereas 
Mamdani puts the number of Cabinet Ministers at nineteen, Prunier puts the number at 
between twenty-five and thirty. Also whereas Mamdani acknowledges that there was 
only one prefect in charge of Butare, Prunier tells us that there was none throughout the 
reign of Habyarimana. Probably they consulted different data sets, if not so, then, they are 
referring to different historical moments of Habyarimana`s reign; if we are to go by the 
years they mention in the paragraphs that contain their analysis of the exclusion of the 
Tutsi; Mamdani mentions ``of 1990`` and Prunier mentions ``till 1980``.
377
   
The seemingly glaring contradictions in facts notwithstanding, for they point to the same 
conclusion, inference can be made that the exclusion of the Tutsi from the core 
institutions of the state; the military and the local administration was later to serve as a 
somewhat conduit for the execution of the 1994 genocide. And even in central 
administration, one ministerial position was to say the least: meagre. So the functioning 
capacity of the state was exclusively reserved for the Hutu. Habyarimana`s reconciliation 
rhetoric was more for cosmetic public relations than for real national unity utility, and 
this explains why the violence which culminated into the genocide was well coordinated 
and executed for there was a unity of purpose. Indeed, the security services, the Service 
Central de Renseignements (SDR), maintained files of information about individual 
citizens under the policy code named: Service de Recherches Criminelles et de 
Documentation (SRCD).  The number of the spied on citizens is put at 44,000; majority 
of whom, we are told, were Tutsi. State capacity instead of thwarting and curtailing the 
structure of violence which subsequently led to the genocide; it instead entrenched and 
sustained that structure. It is therefore not surprising that the genocide of 1994 is written 
of; as one which was meticulously organised by the state agency.  
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The State-Capacity of Habyarimana`s government was meticulously organised to ensure 
tight control of society to maintain public order and the mobilisation of the masses. The 
Gendarmerie Nationale, a Police of a special kind, was instituted in 1976 and its principle 
role was to maintain public order, politically socialise people through civic education and 
engage in communal policing to monitor the people`s behaviour. The legislative capacity 
of Rwanda was also not reformed.  The colonial legacy of ethnicised identity cards was 
carried forward and strictly enforced through punishment of whoever attempted to 
change his classification from being a Twa, Tutsi or Hutu. One had to seek permission if 
he was to move from one prefecture of Rwanda to another. This kind of administrative 
capacity, we are told, portended the insecurity dilemma: the internal security challenges 
that preoccupied Habyarimana.
 378
 Though the state concerned itself with development, 
its pre-occupation with what would pass for regime security was overwhelming. Gerald 
Prunier observes that the way the administrative structure of Rwanda was organised when 
it came to the issues of residence, that citizens had their places of residence written on 
identity cards and that it was very hard for one to change residence,  looked like its: 
``Administrative control was probably the tightest in the world among non-communist 
countries``.
379
  It is this administrative infrastructure, constructed to thwart any kind of 
internal dissidence, which was later to systematically execute the genocide of 1994. 
However, it should be noted that the interests of Habyarimana and his associates in the 
execution of the coup were generally political. They wanted political power and the 
privileges that it came with, inter alia; unfettered access to state resources. The quest for 
political power was against the backdrop of the favouritism that was rife in Kayibanda`s 
government. Kayibanda was heavily criticised for favouring the Hutus from the central 
against the Hutus from the North, more so when it came to political appointment. But 
Habyarimana was not a progressive positive reformer when it came to favouritism either, 
save for the fact that throughout his reign, until the attack from the RPF in 1990, there 
was no politically motivated violence against the Tutsi. It is for this very reason that 
Mamdani notes that Habyarimana was revered as ``the protector of the Tutsi``.
380
 
Melvern quotes Habyarimana`s Radio message of 5 July, 1973 that: ``We can no longer 
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tolerate ethnic discrimination``, and that indeed the violence against the civilian Tutsis 
stopped.
381
 Gerald Prunier observes that unlike during the days of Kayibanda, during 
Habyarimana`s reign some Tutsi prospered in business and they remained in good terms 
with the government so long as they did not interfere with and in politics.
382
  This 
underscores the view that ethnic animosity was always resorted to whenever the Hutu 
elites felt that their power was being threatened by the Tutsi.  Indeed, the animosity 
between the Hutu of the North and the Hutu of the South was more pronounced during 
the reign of Habyarimana than the Tutsi-Hutu divide, but before the RPF attack. Indeed, 
when Major Theonaste Lizinde, from the south, attempted a coup against Habyarimana, 
the latter literally decimated all the revolutionaries from the south.
383
 It should however 
be  noted  that March 12 1990 the threat  to the power of  Habyarimana was not so much 
from the Tutsi, but rather from his own clan, the clan of his wife and  ``that of his 
`friends` from Ruhengeri``. 
384
  
State-capacity was aligned to the providence of human needs though in an iniquitous 
manner. A juxtaposition of Kayibanda`s regime with that of Habyarimana brings out 
sharp contrasts.  Importantly, Kayibanda concentrated on the politics of divide and rule 
which stretched from the complete exclusion of the Tutsi from politics to state 
providence bent on regional favouritism; with most of the political appointments 
favouring Kayibanda`s kinsmen from central Rwanda against the Hutus from the North. 
At this point in time the Tutsi had been completely alienated from political participation 
and political providence. So, inequity in distribution human needs could only be 
construed within the parameters of the Central versus Northern Hutus, than the Hutu-
Tutsi divide.  
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Habyarimana did relatively the reverse; concentrating on development, and supposedly 
relaxing on the exclusion of the Tutsi from politics.  We are told that whereas in 
Kayibanda`s Rwanda the Tutsi were treated as a race (alien group of people) who were 
supposed to leave politics to the natives, in Habyarimana`s Rwanda, they were treated as 
the minority ethnic group which was supposed to surrender its political fate to the 
majority ethnic group; the Hutu, and ethnic arithmetic, in terms of employment 
allocation, political appointments and educational opportunities, was applied in favour of 
the Hutu. Judicial and legal state capacity of Rwanda was structured in a way that 
enhanced the philosophy of ethnic arithmetic.  When it came to employment and 
education, Mamdani puts the ethnic arithmetic during Habyarimana`s reign as follows, 
we express it in the table below: 
Table: 2  
Ethnic Arithmetic in Habyarimana`s Rwanda 
Ethnic Arithmetic (%) THE 1985 LAW 
ON EDUCATION 
THE CIVIL SERVICE QUOTA 
SYSTEM  
HUTU 85% 60%(Northern Hutu) 
40% (Southern Hutu) 
TUTSI 10-15% 10% 
TWA 1% 
Note: The data used in the table above is provided by Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers, 2007, 139, Chapter Five: The Second Republic: Redefining Tutsi from race to 
Ethnicity. 
  It was to put it metaphorically: sheer relaxation of the noose because policies that were 
aimed at uplifting the human security standards of the Hutus were more rigorous in terms 
of implementation and monitoring. Mamdani contends that Habyarimana put the country 
on national reconciliation process, but the reconciliation was paradoxical, as it sought to 
give the Hutu a somewhat affirmative action in institutions that were considered to be 
historically Tutsi dominated. The logic was to supposedly put the Hutu at par with the 
Tutsi who had long been favoured. The state capacity, the ability of the state to plan and 
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execute policies that were aimed at the amelioration of the life of the Hutu was 
meticulously done with a goal to: ``…overcome historical socioeconomic disequilibria in 
Rwandan society``. 
385
  The justification for the policy orientation towards the favour of 
the Hutu was re-echoed by Premier Avocat-General Mubenzi while appearing before the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples´ Right;, mentioning that the quota system 
was meant to amend what had gone wrong as a result of the: ``history of ethnic 
inequities``
386
   
Whereas Kayibanda instituted exclusionist policies; he was lacking in terms of the ability 
to implement and monitor those policies. Indeed, it is for that inadequacy, which this 
study has particularly metaphorically put as: tightening the noose against the Tutsi; that 
many Hutus were disappointed with his commitment to the concerns of the 1959 
revolution.  
Also whereas Kayibanda favoured the Hutu of central and southern Rwanda, 
Habyarimana favoured the Hutus from the North; leading to an emergence of the 
``akazu``, a somewhat oligarchy which was dominating the affairs of Rwanda during his 
reign.
387
 But though Hutus from the North were favoured more than others, generally 
speaking, the Hutus as a whole ripped more in terms of access to state providence: 
employment and service provision like education. Mamdani observes that by mid-1980s; 
approximately a third of the eight-five central positions in Rwanda; in the army and 
security agencies were a preserve of the Hutu, not just from the North but from the 
Gisenyi prefecture where Habyarimana hailed.
388
  David Newbury and Catherine 
Newbury note how Gitarama and Butare prefectures, the political centres of the 
overthrown Kayibanda regime were marginalised by Habyarimana; that despite of having 
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20 percent of the total population of Rwanda, they were receiving only 1 percent of 
government funding.
389
 The state-capacity, the ability of the state to function, be it at 
social, political and economic level was buttressed to ensure the continued domination of 
power by the Hutus, more so the Hutus from the North and specifically the members of 
the ``Akazu``,
390
 and the continued marginalisation of the Tutsi.     
As far as development was concerned, Habyarimana´s commitment was quite 
monumental, and most development indicators went up during the first years of his 
administration. Mamdani quoting Filip Reyntjens, L` Afrique des Grands Lacs encrise: 
Rwanda, and Gerald Prunier, succinctly captures for us the astronomical strides that 
Rwanda`s state-capacity took as far as development was concerned. We are told that 
much as by 1976 Rwanda was metaphorically speaking: the sick man of the great lakes 
region when it came to economic development, by 1987 Rwanda had the lowest debt, 
lowest inflationary rate and the highest growth in the Gross National Product in the 
region. Dependence on subsistence agriculture generally went down from 80 percent in 
1962 to 48 percent in 1986 and the growth in the service sector stood at 31 percent from 
the 12 percent of 1962. There was high mortality rate and school attendance increased 
from 49.5 percent in 1978 to 61.8 percent in 1986.
391
  Catherine Newbury and David 
Newbury note that Habyarimana attained much in a number of sectors; roads, expansion 
of schools and health centres, embarked on reforestation programmes and focused on 
increasing agricultural production. 
392
  
Melvern notes that Rwanda had one of the best road network systems in Africa with a 
perfectly functioning post and telephone services, and that its electricity supply was 
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expanding.
393
 Development was also reflected in the observance of civil and political 
rights of the people that political executions had stopped since 1982 and there were few 
political prisoners.
394
  Melvern cites Professor Filip Reyntjens noting that at the fall of the 
1980s corruption was limited and she conjecturally states that human rights were 
observed.
395
 The Rwanda of Habyarimana was overly enthusiastic about development; so 
much so that all the agencies for governmentality were directed towards that; the 
Rwandan National Assembly/parliament, we are told was called the National Council for 
Development.
396
  This depicts that Rwanda`s development today is not a historically 
isolated case.     
Rwanda development processes attracted a measure of accolades and aid agencies were 
very enthusiastic when it came to working with Rwanda. Gerald Prunier notes how 
Belgium, as the main donor, Germany, the United States, Canada and Switzerland closely 
worked with the development enterprise of Rwanda because of its organization when it 
came to managing foreign aid.
397
 Donor agencies enthusiastically supported Rwanda`s 
infrastructural development with the European Development Fund aid  asphalting the 
road linking Rwanda to Burundi, the World Bank funding the road linking Rwanda to 
Uganda, Chinese aid funding the road linking Rwanda to Tanzania and the road linking 
Rwanda to Democratic Republic of Congo, then former Zaire, funded by the West 
German aid. Fortune was on the side of Rwanda that even food production per capita 
went up as a result of the expansion of land for cultivation as a result of particularly the 
abolition of feudalism on land by the revolution of 1959; where Tutsi chiefs owned large 
land for grazing (ibikingi), and this allowed those who hitherto had no land to gain access 
to land and engage in production.  Mamdani quotes L. Cambrezy estimates that by 1978, 
approximately 800, 000 of the 4.8 million people had been settled on land.
398
  
The providence of the human needs of the Hutus by the government was sacrosanct. 
Land as a central need was a central concern to the government of Habyarimana. Indeed, 
Habyarimana  continued  catering for the concerns of the 1959 revolution as part of his 
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reconciliation campaign which to Mamdani was translated into giving justice to the Hutu 
masses through a somewhat affirmative action by the government; through land 
reallocations to those who had been hitherto  marginalised by the Tutsi elites. The state 
tried to address the question of land which had historically seen waves of violence and 
counter violence between the Tutsis and the Hutus. But land is generally a non-renewable 
resource and any measure that was just aimed at creating more cultivable land was to 
prove futile as the population increased.  
However during Habyarimana`s time, Rwanda still had enough land for it could even 
afford the luxury of reserving 20 percent of its total land mass for parkland.
399
 It should 
be emphasised that land as a factor of production has never and will never be enough 
simply because those who own it can decide to own it in perpetuity, and it will never be 
without a proprietor, for even when land was transferred from the hands of the Tutsi 
elites, it was owned and distributed by the regime to its cohorts. But because the pressure 
on land threatens to translate into violent conflicts; then the solution has to be diabolic in 
nature: streamlining land distribution, and at the same time promoting alternative means 
of tapping survival. But   Habyarimana`s regime advocated continued work on land thus: 
First the population must get down to work—the government and myself (sic) 
want to emphasize the value of work on the land. Thus we shall devote each 
Saturday to tilling the soil with hoes in our hands. ``
400
 
 Habyarimana development infrastructure however had its problems and later its 
catastrophes. The critics of the ``Development Enterprise``; if we are to borrow the lingua 
of Peter Uvin, instructive of whom was Jean Rupiya, then a Professor of History at the 
National University of Rwanda, who wrote an article in 1985; noting that much as Kigali 
had grown significantly, roads paved and the transport system developed, the number of 
automobiles increased, the country able to procure enough gasoline, construction 
materials and food products, the rural masses were not ripping from the benefits of that 
development and to him this was a recipe for a social crisis. To Rupiya, the egalitarian 
values which the Revolution of 1959 had stood for had been neglected and therefore the 
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government had lost a claim over legitimacy for it had neglected the rural masses that 
were the backbone of the revolution.   
Outside the citizenry of Rwanda was Fernand Bezy, who made a critical economic 
analysis about the Rwandan development enterprise. He outlined that the development 
process was first forwarding the ``pauperisation of peasants`` who were surviving on an 
annual consumption per capita of less than USD 150. He recommend political reforms to 
thwart a lingering social crisis; calling for a  commitment to development programmes to 
ensure the food security of the rural dwellers, protection from merchant exploitation, and 
creation of employment and production of essential commodities through the 
establishment of many small, labour-intensive industries which were  distributed in the 
different regions of the country. 
401
  These were lonely voices, but indeed seemingly 
prophetic as they pointed at a development that could inadvertently lead to violence. The 
message pointed to the need to reorient the development infrastructure to ensuring the 
human security of the people. 
Also, the problem of land as a central pillar to the survival of the people was far from 
being resolved. We are told that the problem of overpopulation continued to diminish the 
available of land meant for food production. Catherine Newbury and David Newbury 
write that population density, in some areas, had superseded four hundred people per 
square kilometre with more than one thousand people per square mile. The land problem 
aggravated the problems which the youth were grappling with; with no land, no jobs, 
little education; their future was bleak. Their path to adulthood was also hijacked as the 
legal requirement for marriage was a house where the bride would leave,
402
 but build a 
house with what and on what? The social circumstances of the youth were a recipe for 
disaster, and their predicament became central to the structure of violence during the 
genocide.  
The problem of land was worsened by the visitations of droughts like that of the 1980s 
which led to the ``ruriganiza´´ famine which, we are told, killed approximately 300 
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people and sent many wandering in search for food. This was not helped by the self-
aggrandisement of the power elite who focused on land grabbing.  The agrarian 
international development projects meant for the populace ended up benefiting the power 
elites. The story of the Gishwati forest which was cleared to accommodate the exotic 
cattle project funded by the World Bank, with cattle bought from Europe, is instructive 
when it comes to illustrating how self-aggrandisement had taken the better of the power 
elites during the reign of Habyarimana. The proceeds from the project were siphoned by 
those whom Prunier refers to as, ``big men``.
403
   
It was becoming clear that Habyarimana`s development enterprise was benefiting the 
power elite than the ordinary people. Whereas the government report on the case of 
Gikongoro, the epicentre of the famine of 1989-1990, blamed the scarcity of land; where 
96 percent had farms of less than half a hectare, and 74 percent had less than one-quarter 
hectare, the people viewed the famine as an abnegation of the government`s 
responsibility to plan and manage disasters.
404
 The government was increasingly 
becoming alienated from its people. David Newbury and Catherine Newbury, quoting de 
Lame succinctly capture the general mood of the rural masses, many of whom were 
youthful at the height of economic insecurity. Noteworthy was the  general apathy when 
it came to participating in government meetings which were being  convened by the 
bourgmestre, people started dodging communal labour, many resorted to cutting trees for 
survival and the resentment of the rich ,Umukungu, became part of the societal 
relations.
405
  The development infrastructure was problematic and was a recipe for 
conflictual situations. 
Also, as Habyarimana`s development enterprise was being acknowledged, the 
marginalisation of the Tutsi was receiving little or no condemnation at all. What pointed 
to a cataclysmic outcome was the exclusion of the Tutsi refugees, whose quest for return 
to Rwanda was constantly met with demographic arguments; that Rwanda had 
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insufficient land that could not accommodate them.
406
 Of course, even among the 
refugees were those who had political ambitions and who for all intent and purpose 
exploited the legitimate concerns of the refugees to score political concerns.  
The number of Rwandan refugees, majorly Tutsi, who vacated Rwanda following the 
violence against the Tutsi between 1959 and 1964, 1972 and 1973; according to the 
United High Commission for Refugees, had grown to 336,000 by 1964 (?). Even Prunier 
becomes extremely conjectural in his attempt to reach an acceptable estimate of the 
number of refugees.
407
 Mushemeza quoting the Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Annual Report 1971 states that by December 1971, the total number of refugees 
in settlements in Uganda stood at 36,825 and at 35,260 for those outside the 
settlements.
408
 These numbers reflected the official record, but there are those who never 
assembled for registration. And in the context of Uganda, the fact that Banyarwanda had 
already settled in Uganda early on as economic migrants, at the time of his writing, 
Gerald Prunier, put the number of their descendants to approximately, 700,000 of the 
population of Uganda
409
, then, the number of Rwandan refugees at that time can only be 
a matter of perception index. 
Conjecturally, there should have been some refugees who were received by those 
families, the Rwandan migrants who had migrated to Uganda earlier than 1959, without 
having to go through the formalities of registration. It should be put forward that the 1995 
Constitution of Uganda recognises the Ugandans of Rwandan origin, known as the 
Banyarwanda, whom Gerald Prunier refers to as ``local Banyarwanda``, as one of the 
tribes of Uganda, not in reference to refugees but rather to those who found themselves in 
Uganda earlier on before the political crises that defined Rwanda`s history. Also 
historically, the people of Bufumbira in Uganda were historically part of Rwanda, only 
becoming ``Ugandanised`` by the 1910 Anglo-German agreement. So, this kind of 
demographic arrangement can make the quest for statistics when it comes to Rwandan 
refugees in Uganda quite problematic.  
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However, the quest for an acceptable estimated figure of refugees put aside; their plight 
required  a more focused committed policy action to tackle their predicament than a mere 
government declaration of July 1986; that Rwanda was not big enough to accommodate 
its citizens under physical and psychological duress.
410
 The plight of the Rwandan 
refugees, who were facing political persecution in Uganda as a result of their being 
identified with the National Resistance Army rebels of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni; who 
were against the government of Milton Obote, the then president of Uganda, and the 
political ramifications of the indifference of the Habyarimana when it came to forging a 
political solution to their predicament has been extensively discussed elsewhere.
411
 At 
this point, this study limits itself to identifying the inherent flaws within the development 
enterprise of Habyarimana that focused more on the emancipation of the Hutu and 
neglected the Tutsi in the name of correcting historical injustices against the Hutu.   
Emphasis should be made that some refugees constituted themselves into a militia to 
wage war against Habyarimana; they were determined to return home. Their resolve 
rotated on the human security of the Tutsi refugees who were in dire need of returning 
home, in the quest for a permanent place of abode that to them was central to their 
survival. Facing rejection from Uganda and denied entry into Rwanda as the boarder was 
sealed-off to more returnees on the pretext that Rwanda was small to accommodate them, 
many of those who were displaced from Uganda met their death in deplorable 
circumstances. For instance, of the thirty seven accounted for deaths, the distribution by 
cause of death was as follows: six(6) hung themselves, two (2)threw themselves into the 
river, one (1) was cut and thrown into the river, eight (8) drank poison, one (1) was old 
and left in the house to die, one (1) was beaten to death, cut up and thrown into the river, 
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three (3)were eaten by lions as they wandered, ten (10) were beaten to death, one (1) was 
burnt in the house, one (1) was shot and one was killed and his last figure cut off.
412
 
They were therefore resolute that: 
Gone are the days when, with our hands held out, we believed in a miracle, in a 
solution from outside. A more self-reliant outlook will restore our self-confidence 
(Gatsimbayi et al, 1987:4)…. Returning home for those refugees that have 
endured ``statelessness`` for almost 30 years is our priority. We will not be 
intimidated by attempts to batter us into submission by employing such tactics as 
blacklisting. Struggle for human rights has a price. By our efforts we are 
registering a willingness to pay the price (Shalita, 1998).
413
 
 Habyarimana used his development enterprise, among other things, to buffer his regime 
against such aggression. The state capacity of Rwanda was now marshalled to put a 
determined fight against the insurrections. It is said that before the scare that was  posed 
by the Rwanda Patriotic Army rebels- a group of refugees; who constituted themselves 
into an armed group, Habyarimana`s government showed little animosity against the 
Tutsi.
414
 This security dilemma, posed by the ``Tutsi diaspora communities``, as referred 
to by Mamdani or as ``the refugee warriors from Uganda`` as Rene Lemarchand refers to 
them, worsened the insecurity dilemma complex as it heightened the ethnicisation of the 
body politics, economics and society.
415
 The regime became intolerant when it came to 
rights of the Tutsi inside Rwanda.  This underscores the assertion made earlier that 
whenever the existence of the Hutu elites was threatened by the Tutsi insurrection, the 
quick way of scaring them was to unleash violence on their kinsmen inside Rwanda, and 
that the easiest way to mobilising the Hutu masses to rally behind the security of the 
regime; was to always brand any attack as an attack by those who wanted to return the 
Hutu to servitude.  
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Habyarimana, who had hitherto not found himself in such circumstances, was yet to fall 
into that somewhat historical escape route. The Tutsi militants justified their cause basing 
on the numerous refugees who were rendered stateless and the exclusion of the Tutsi 
from Rwandan politics. The desire to resettle the Rwandese refugees in exile was part of 
the RPF war manifesto.
416
 Indeed, part of the Protocols which comprised the 12 July 
1992 Arusha Ceasefire Agreement between the RPF and the Habyarimana government 
was the Protocol on Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of Displaced People
417
 
Both sides adopted historical injustice as a rallying cry.
418
 Earlier, before the violence of 
the 1990s had culminated into the genocide of the 1994, Commissioner Nguema of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples´ Rights had warned in one of his 
recommendations that: 
We would recommend to the Government authorities in Rwanda that whilst they 
work to ensure global equilibrium in the country they should work harder to 
resolve the problem. But in the past brought them division led to the last 
revolution in 1979 so there may not be a cyclical type of violence. If today 
violence is beneficial to one group, tomorrow it will be beneficent to the other. 
This brings about the infernal cycle of revolutions``.
419
 
Uguema`s recommendation was prophetic in nature. The RPF; a Tutsi dominated rebel 
group steadily progressed in its war against the Habyarimana; Hutu dominated 
government. Even when Habyarimana was ``forced`` to sign the Arusha Peace 
Agreement in August 1993, he was adamant in implementing its concerns. Indeed at the 
Regional summit of April, 6
th
, 2013, attend by The then President of Tanzania, Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi, Kenyan Vice President, George Saitoti, Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi 
and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, pressure was put on Habyarimana  to the effect 
that he honours the terms of the agreement. It is reported that Habyarimana appeared to 
be ``shaken`` by the rebuttals from his regional peers and was asked to by Museveni, who 
had accompanied him to the Airport, to ``honour his signature. A few hours later his 
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Presidential jet, the Falcon50, a gift from President Francois Mitterrand was gunned 
down as it approached the Kigali Airport at approximately 8:30pm killing Habyarimana 
and others,
420
 what followed was a state of anarchy.   In retaliation the Hutu extremists 
executed the highest level of violence—the genocide, against the Tutsi civilians in 
Rwanda.  
 Of course the Tutsi led RPF insurrection
421
 explain how Habyarimana, hitherto 
considered to be the ``protector of the Tutsi``
422
  later, of course with his associates, 
became the ``hunter of the Tutsi``. But his power, and that of those who inherited the 
reigns of the state upon his demise was already waning, the RPF insurrection 
compounded their fate. Circumstance and error of judgement were to determine how 
events unfolded in Rwanda. The threat of the advancing Rwanda Patriotic Front against 
the power of Habyarimana and his subsequent and indeed untimely death precipitated a 
calculated wave of violence by the Hutu against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The genocide 
became a survival strategy. A quick comment should be made that whereas it is the 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda who led the RPF incursions, the overthrow of the genocide 
regime created another ``new case load`` of refugees who also became a security concern 
to the new regime in Kigali.  How did the new regime handle the ``new refugee 
problem?`` The study focuses on the refugees who went to Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo) in the subsequent chapter to underscore how human security 
concerns, like the plight of the refugees who went to Congo after the genocide constituted 
a threat not only their survival but also to the survival of the Rwandan state which was 
just emerging from the ruins of a civil war that had seen a genocide.  
One important event within an array of issues areas which served to draw Habyarimana 
to the fate of Kayibanda, apart from the Tutsi led RPF insurrection, was that Rwanda 
embarked on a neoliberal economic agenda which saw an array of economic reforms. The 
neoliberal economic reforms, encapsulated into the structural adjustment agenda, saw the 
state withdrawing from the various spheres of providence for its population. The 
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Structural Adjustment Package demanded Rwanda to do away with coffee subsidies and 
also devalue its currency; among other conditionalities that went as far as suspending 
health care subsidies. Devaluation of the currency saw a fall in the nominal price of 
coffee, and it should be emphasised that coffee was central to the survival of Rwandans 
for many were coffee growers. Mamdani observes that returns from coffee fell from USD 
144 million in 1985 to USD 30 million in 1993.
423
 As coffee prices went down, the 
government started levying higher fees for provision of basic services, inter alia; health, 
primary education and water. Local governments also increased their levies.
424
 The 
French as the then guardian of the Habyarimana regime were apprehensive about the 
ramifications of the declining coffee prices as it was to worsen the already deepening 
social and economic crisis in Rwanda. This prompted the French, in 1990; to unfreeze 
500,000 Francs for food aid.
425
  
 Retrenchment and downsizing of government providence meant that many lost their jobs 
and access to social services that were hitherto subsidised by government. Melvern states 
that the state enterprises that were employing a considerable number of people ran 
bankrupt as health and education services were distorted, levels of child malnutrition and 
malaria incidences increased.
426
  Catherine Newbury and David Newbury note that as 
government introduced austerity measures, the gap between the rich and the poor was 
widening. The nation became economically stressed and this led to social tensions and 
fear.
427
  The human security of the people was hit in a multidimensional manner as the 
policies adopt out of the rubric of the structural adjustment programme served to curtail 
mainly the provision of basic needs by the government. The economic and food 
insecurity were the survival of the population. 
428
As the economic conditions worsened, 
Habyarimana`s government became increasingly apprehensive about its vulnerability to 
military threats. Indeed, Habyarimana, as early as April 1990, he was partitioning the 
government of France to provide him with armed ware, namely: repair or replacement of 
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primary radio, donation of secondary radio and anti-aircraft weapon system, and the 
replacement of the Nord Atlas which had been given by France in 1983.
429
 
Habyarimana, in his development policies may have come nearer to the excesses of the 
Tutsi monarch, than to what the 1959 revolution stood for.  Forced labour,  in the name of 
Umuganda; a form of community labour, almost a somewhat return to the Ubureetwa 
(forced labour) during the days of the monarch and colonialism;  was imposed onto the 
people, and it was not limited to public works but sometimes extending to private 
agrarian projects of the political elites of Habyarimana`s regime. The situation was not 
helped by the budgetary reduction of 40% that was operationalised by a reduction in 
social service provision. This was coupled with an array of tax regimes, ranging from 
umusanzu, water fees, and health tax to school dues. We are told that people were 
physically and psychologically disoriented. Meanwhile, as people were almost 
condemned to abject poverty; lacking even the requirement of a simple existence: salt, 
soap, decent clothings and a ``humble`` new hoe
430
 , those who were ``politically well-
connected`` lived in luxury, building villas as they profiteered from development projects 
meant for the rural poor.
431
 There seemed to be a somewhat reversal of fortune when it 
came to the human securities of the people and the security of the regime; a situation 
which was to be aggravated by external challenges.   
Inadvertently,  this economic downturn disillusioned the people that 300,000 coffee trees 
were uprooted by farmers due to decrease in the prices of the coffee beans, and this 
disillusionment was compounded by the RPF insurrection that was to directly shift the 
attention of the government from the predicament of its people to regime survival. 
Mamdani notes that the expenditure on the military increased from 1.9 percent in 1989 to 
7.8 percent of the GDP.
432
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It should be outlined that the Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR); very quickly expanded 
from 5,000 to 28,000 men from October 1990,
433
 with purchases of small and heavy 
weapons being got from France and later Egypt. It is noted that the first consignment of 
weapons from Egypt was worth USD 5.889 million, comprising of 60.000 grenades, two 
million rounds of ammunitions, 18,000 mortar bombs (82mm and 120mm), 4.200 assault 
rifles, rockets and rocket launchers. Those large consignments saw Rwanda becoming the 
third largest importer of weaponry, ranking third next to Nigeria and Angola.
434
 
However, it is the Human Rights Watch that put in a detailed manner the Rwanda 
government expenditure on arms in a quantitative measure. It notes as follows: that 
Rwanda reached a secret agreement with Egypt to deliver arms worth $6Million with $ 1 
Million to be repaid by delivering 615 tons of tea from the Mulindi tea plantation, with 
the rest to be paid in annual instalments up to 1996.  
Accordingly, fifty 60mm and twenty 82mm mortars, with ten thousand high-explosive 
mortar shells; six 122mm D-30 long-range artillery guns, with three thousand high 
explosive artillery shells; over six thousand high -explosive  shells for 120mm mortars; 
two thousand RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades; two thousand MAT-79 anti-personnel 
landmines; two hundred kilograms of plastic explosives; at least four hundred and fifty 
Egyptian-made Kalashnikov automatic rifles; and more than three million rounds of 
ammunition were delivered from Egypt.  
 South Africa supplied arms worth $5.9 Million: South African-made 5.56mm R-4 
automatic rifles, twenty thousand high-explosive grenades, 1.5 million rounds of 
ammunition, 7.62mm SS-77 machine guns, the 12.7mm (.50 calibre) Browning machine 
guns and one million rounds of ammunitions, seventy hand-held 40mm MGL grenade 
launchers with ten thousand grenades, one hundred 60mm M1 mortars and ten thousand 
M26 fragmentation grenades.  
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The Human Rights Watch also quotes the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
that imports in arms worth $20 million was got from China in 1989.
435
 It is no wonder 
therefore that hand grenades and other easy-to-Carry weapons took place in markets of 
food stuffs as if they were fruits and vegetables.
436
 Life in Rwanda remarkably became 
militarised that: 
``The country was flooded with weapons. Two beers (would) get you one 
grenade. 
437
 
  Meanwhile, the providence of the government, when it came to inter alia, education, 
health, employment, and subsidies for farmers for their economic security was waning; 
most especially as a result of the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes.
438
 The 
government had no time and resources to tackle such issues which were central to the 
survival of the population. Human security concerns had to be sacrificed at the altar of 
regime security, and state capacity had to be directed to political survival than to 
alleviating the economic problems of the people.
439
  However, the predicament of the 
people, like the unemployed; were later to be manipulated by the government of 
Habyarimana to rally the people behind its quest for survival. The discussion of this turn 
of events comes later.    
Political problems compounded the social- problematic effects of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. The state in Rwanda had to be naturally overwhelmed. Torn 
between a worsening social crisis and a determined armed insurrection from the RPA, the 
survival of the regime became primary. The Human Rights Watch quotes Habyarimana 
saying: 
Our economy was already ailing in 1990, and of course the war has not resolved 
anything. We signed agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, which we have of 
course been unable to honor, because we have had to purchase weapons and supplies. 
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Now we want to improve our macroeconomic outlook, but we have a serious shortage of 
currency.
440
 
The social crisis that accrued to the human insecurities of the people that entailed 
economic insecurities instead of being solved; it was manipulated for political ends. 
Ethnic propaganda became the quick route to be taken in order to mobilise the masses to 
participate in the violence against the enemy, and the enemy was defined by the regime 
as the Tutsi community. Newbury and Newbury note that the main theme that had 
pervaded earlier political crises; which was manipulation of ethnicity for political ends 
picked momentum as Habyarimana sought political escapism from his political problems. 
441
 Neglected provision of human needs that determine human security became central to 
structuring violence during the genocide. 
Habyarimana`s regime, at this point, looked at ethnicity not as a problem, but rather as a 
solution to the political problems of his regime. The Tutsi-Hutu historical animosity had 
to be exploited. Repression and murder of the Tutsi was almost elevated to a full time 
vocation of the unemployed youth. The Hutu masses were led blindly into the illusion 
that their survival would only be guaranteed by the complete decimation of the Tutsi.  
The regime reverted to a somewhat old-strait jacket; which is manipulation of ethnicity 
for political ends, for historically the tactic has been adopted whenever:  
…an intra-class power struggle among the Rwandan elites (occurred they), at 
various times manipulated and politicised ethnicity and/or regionalism, in order to 
divide the masses of the Rwandan population into personal or group power 
constituencies.
442
 
Indeed the population had reservations about the RPF; it made them make ``mental 
maps`` of the exploitative nature of the monarchical rule. The memory of the historical 
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injustice which they suffered during the monarch was seemingly reincarnated through the 
RPF`s invention and the Habyarimana regime exploited that fear to its advantage.  The 
fear of the people was diabolic in nature; fearing the repressive regime of Habyarimana 
and the return to the exploitation by the RPF was depicted by the regime as a move by the 
Tutsi return to the Hutus to the exploitative Tutsi monarchical rule.
443
 The French were 
also of the same view that the ascendance of the RPF to political power in Rwanda will 
culminate into the subjugation of the Hutu leading to a crisis of National Unity in 
Rwanda.
444
 Indeed when the first RPA incursion into Rwanda aborted, the French 
observed that the Rwandan Tutsis were disoriented that the military setback to the RPA 
had prevented the anticipated outcome of the RPA thwarting the mobilisation of the 
Hutus against the return to the Tutsi monarchy.
445
  French authorities were also very 
quick to anticipate the decimation of the Tutsi population (700,000) in the interior by the 
Hutus(7,000,000) as a result of the military success of the RPF in North East Rwanda 
which was a probable indication of the intentions of the RPA to, ``re-establish the Honi 
regime of the first Tutsi Kingdom``.
446
 Accordingly, the French were willing to extended 
military assistance to the Government of Habyarimana in a bid to thwart the domination 
of the Hutus by the Tutsi`s. A particular correspondence (which also captures the quick 
response of Mitterrand) of Admiral Jacques Laxande, the then Chief of French Defense 
Staff to the President of the French Republic partly read as follows: 
He (Habyarimana) was provided with ammunition during the early days of the 
crisis. A small package of rockets to arm his helicopters could now be useful if 
delivered to him (hand written note President Mitterrand: yes).
447
 
The French`s plan to extending support to the government of Habyarimana was later put 
at two levels; diplomatic and military. Within the diplomatic level was a scheme to 
threaten through warning President Museveni of Uganda who was believed to be the 
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guardian of the RPA
448
, although later the tactic to threaten Museveni proved futile and 
was replaced with persuasion as seen in the suggestion of the France to assist Museveni 
in his fight against the Islamist expansion at the Northern border of Uganda in exchange 
for his reigning on the RPF to stop their military aggression against Rwanda.
449
   The 
military level entailed extending ammunitions and military equipment, offering technical 
assistance essentially on artillery and putting one company of the French forces to be on 
alert ``at six oclock`` if need arises for the need for intervention to protect French 
citizens.
450
  Also by 1991 the French had set up the Detachment for Military Assistance 
and Instruction (DAMI) in the region of Ruhengeri for the continuous retraining of the 
officers and men of the Habyarimana military units in the region that was under serious 
incursions from the RPA.
451
  The interest of the French may not have been so much into 
protecting the government of Habyarimana but rather stopping an aggression, believed to 
have been a scheme by the Anglo-saxons to undermine the influence of the French in 
Rwanda. 
452
 However beneath the military and diplomatic support which France was 
extending to the Habyarimana regime was the desire for a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict.  To that effect Mitterrand informed Habyarimana thus:  
My country has not spared its efforts to find a peaceful solution. In this context, at 
the beginning of November I sent my Minister of Cooperation, Mr. Pelletier, on a 
goodwill mission to your country and to neighboring states worried about the 
problem of Rwandan refugees. As he stated and as I told you myself, a lasting 
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solution to this conflict will be found only through a negotiated settlement and 
general cooperation in a spirit of dialogue and openness.
453
 
The administrative, extractive and repressive capacity of the Rwandan state was 
committed thwarting the Tutsi problem against Hutu power. The death of the Tutsis was 
elevated to a level of a moral responsibility for every Hutu and there was no room for 
individual opinion. The state was watching on every Hutu in his execution of state orders.  
It is true that state apparatus was organised to guide the direction of the genocide. A 
French diplomatic correspondence alludes to a meeting which was attended by President 
Habyarimana, his two unnamed brothers-in-law, Casimir Bizimungu, Colonels Bagasora, 
Nsebgiyumwa, Serubuga and others, during which meeting Habyarimana ordered for the 
Tutsi massacres. The French intentionally refused to investigate the matter as the mission 
would have damaged the reputation of Habyarimana.
454
 Many scholars have delineated 
how the Hutus, even in the remotest parts of Rwanda joined en masse the execution of 
the series of murders. Habyarimana had built a generally centralised state for the firm 
control of the society that when he saw that his power was threatened, he resorted to the 
forces created for the security of his regime from all corners of Rwanda; to bulwark his 
power against the insurgents. At his service were the presidential guards, gendarmerie, 
the army and police, the Interahamwe, the burgomasters and other militia groups which 
were affiliates to the MRND Party. His state capacity, when the existence of the regime 
was threatened, was manifested through these callous institutions.
455
  
 A correspondence from Jean Carbonare to Mr. Bruno Delaye, the then Advisor to 
President Mitterrand of France, which was sent with amendments to the Report of the 
Mission on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda as of 1993 captured succinctly how the 
massacres of the Tutsis which were later to be classified as genocide were centrally 
organised. Quoting an informer, but then a prisoner in Kigali prison, the one Janvier 
Afrika, it is observed that killings were centrally planned and orders delivered to the 
below. A series of meetings which allegedly took place at ``the synagogue`` within the 
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home of Captain Simbikamgwa discussed the plan which guided the massacres of the 
Bagogwe (Tutsis). That these meetings were attended by Habyarimana Juvenal (the then 
President of Rwanda), Nzirorera Joseph, Segatawa Elie, Rwabukumba Seraphin, 
Serubuya Laurent, Major Nkundiye, Nsengiyumva Anatole, Zigiranyirazo Protais, 
Colonel Bagosora, Deputy Rucagu Boniface, Minister Bizimungu, Captain Simbikangwa, 
Mugesera Leone, Ngirumhaste Mathieu, Ndiwayezu, Habiyabere Joseph, Ntilivamunda 
Alphose, Madame Rushingabigwi Chantal, Doctor Liwimana, and others. The centre was 
to coordinate with regional coordinators of the scheme who were: Nzabagaraza Joseph 
for the prefecture of Ruhengeri, Bizimungu Come, Nzirorera Joseph, Bizimungu Casimir 
(the then minister of health) and the deputy of Ruhengeri, Rucacu Boniface to be 
incharge of Gisenyi. The operational plan is reported to have envisaged the establishment 
of the lists of the Bagogwes-Tutsis, seeking out support from the population, asking for 
help from the soldiers and obtaining assistance from the militias of the MRND and 
CDR.
456
 This depicts how the capacity of the then Rwandan government to plan and 
execute its functions concentrated on planning for the execution of the Tutsi. This was 
misuse of state capacity.  
The youth played a vanguard role during the violence that culminated into the genocide. 
But, what motivated the youths to join institutionalised violence schemes should have 
been beyond ´´ethnic struggle``. Indeed, lack of access to the means of survival like land 
and employment made them to become entangled into complex political process that 
problematised ethnicity. Johan Pottier particularly notes how before the earlier massacres 
of the Tutsi in areas of Kibungo and Bugesera which occurred in 1992 and 1993, many 
unemployed and landless youth had flocked into the area
457
 and were co-opted into the 
genocide structure. David Newbury and Catherine Newbury summaries their predicament 
as follows: 
Children sought income outside the home rather than working in parents` fields; 
young men and women found it increasingly difficult to acquire the requisite 
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resources needed to marry; and money, education, or salaried job (the path to 
social mobility) were beyond the reach of most. These conditions had significant 
political ramifications.
458
 
This was not helped by the burgeoning population in rural areas that could not allow 
them access to enough land for survival. Indeed the background information which was 
prepared for President Mitterrand in preparation for the visit of President Habyarimana to 
Paris which was scheduled start on Monday April 2
nd
 1990, it was indicated that the 
major problem of Rwanda at that time was the population of 7million inhabitants for 
26,000kilometers of territorial land, but again growing at a rate of 3.7 percent.
459
  It is the 
Hutu population which stood at 85 percent in comparison to the 15 percent population of 
the Tutsi that became the unsuspecting victims of the chicanery of the political elites. 
Melvern delineates that when the new Rwandan Constitution of 1991 legalised the 
formation of political parties, violence among members of different political parties 
became an integral element of the body politics. Parties started recruiting the idle youths 
to form gangs to unleash violence on the members of other parties. It is also said that the 
youth were part of the 95 percent rural population whom the restriction on movement 
based on residence stopped from seeking work from urban areas.
460
 In the quest for 
political power, the political parties were determined to manipulate the predicament of 
the majority youth. 
 It is no wonder therefore that the rural dwellers, of which were the youth, seemed to be 
cynical of the move to political pluralism. To them it was just for the benefit of those who 
wanted access to political power. That it had nothing to do with their poverty.
461
 This 
seems to suggest that the democracy of the political man may not be the same as the 
democracy of the common man. The political man looks at democracy as a process to 
political power. The common man looks at democracy as a way of holding government 
accountable to his security concerns as an individual and whether government guarantees 
those securities, inter alia; food, economic, political, environmental, and other personal 
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security concerns. Though not part of the major arguments of this study, it is worth 
noting that democracy that does not guarantee human security is but hot air.  But the 
youth were literally caught-up in the political pluralism saga of Rwanda.
462
     
Notorious of the youth gangs were the Interahamwe (literally meaning those who fight 
together) which Melvern refers to as ``the best organised`` which was aligned to the 
ruling party, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Development (MRND). It 
had membership in 146 communes of Rwanda to ensure that the families in communes 
were to be watched on by militia members. The cell was the basic unit of Rwanda`s 
political organisation; constituting between 30-50 families sitting at the same hill side and 
the leadership of the cells could receive orders from the centre and pass them to the 
below, the local population. It is through this infrastructure that ``old historical and 
ethnic`` motivations were maintained by the MRND using ``a cunning propaganda``. 
463
 
It is at the cell level the militia members kept a close watch on the Tutsi population 
during the massacres.  Well equipped to violently execute their functions with riffles for 
some members, bayonets and they were provided with combat shoes with improvised 
special clothes as uniforms. They had support from the gendarmerie, the Presidential 
Guard and from the National army. Automatic rifles and high calibre guns were provided 
to the militias and civilian authorities. The Human Rights basing on a document which 
was signed as ``SECRET``, reported in January 1994 that the government was planning 
to distribute one thousand, seven hundred, sixty guns to each administrative unit in but 
four communes, namely: Muvumba, Ngarama, Muhura and Bwisige.
464
 It was a terrorist 
outfit of a special kind, ready to unleash violence on whoever dared to criticise the 
government.
465
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It is the Interahamwe and the local administrative unit authorities that were at the 
vanguard of the violence that culminated into the genocide.  Its activities and membership 
was spread almost throughout the whole county that as Melvern observes, the 
Interahamwe had ``leadership at the most basic neighbourhood``.
466
 It is no wonder 
therefore that with the extent of their coercive power, any protest from rational 
neighbour, in opposition to the killings of the Tutsi during the genocide could be quickly 
be silenced at what this study metaphorically puts as: the sword`s end. Inference can also 
be made that it is the representativeness of the Interahamwe, almost in the whole area 
mass of Rwanda; that explains the extent of the genocide. The Interahamwe militia youth 
structured the violence that culminated into the genocide. The youth were victim to the 
wanton manipulation of the political elite.  
Marc Sommers writes that youth were resigned in their predicament which was defined 
by poverty and frustration, but only to be exploited by the government with threats and 
promise of rewards if they participated in the violence that culminated into the 
genocide.
467
  It is the majority of these youths--  interahamwe, that moved to Congo as 
political refugees together with ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) and started an 
insurrection against the new regime in Rwanda, which was and is still  at the centre of the 
threat to Rwanda`s state security.
468
 Instructive of the Hutu refugees insurrections was the 
one which was code named ``operation insecticide`` against the Inyenzi (Tutsi 
cockroaches).
469
  However, part of the refugees who went to Congo were civilians; 
majority of whom Hutus as indicated in the introduction to this study.  It is this state of 
affairs that informs the research agenda of this study in the subsequent chapters.  
Also state propaganda that concentrated on the manipulation of the insecurities of the 
people of which was the historical question of land, were blamed on the Tutsi.  State 
capacity converged with human insecurities in structuring violence during the genocide 
and it is that convergence that post-conflict reconstruction efforts had to focus on; 
aligning state-capacity to address the human insecurities that made easy the manipulation 
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of the masses by the political elites to participate in the violence that culminated into the 
genocide. There should have been a diversity of human insecurities that were of great 
concern to the individuals in Rwanda. Authors have alluded to several issues that can be 
put into the framework of human security, for instance; scarcity of land and 
unemployment.  However, exploring all the issues as a research agenda of this study will 
be like, to use the words of Arthur Koestler, ``giving a detailed description of an oriental 
carpet``, the study limits itself to the issues or an issue which threatened a resurgence of 
violence in post-conflict Rwanda. 
  Accordingly, this study focuses on the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo 
created as a result of the conflict which culminated into the genocide in Rwanda. As 
noted earlier, to the civilian refugees, their circumstances constituted a threat to their 
human security, inter alia; without health care, food, clean water, decent shelter, 
education, and personal security, their future was unbelievably bleak. But at another level 
were the Hutu extremists, who were prepared to undermine the existence of the new 
government in Rwanda using the Hutu refugee phenomenon as a facilitating factor, and 
this study dwells in detail on the Hutu refugee phenomenon in the subsequent chapters to 
underscore it central arguments. It is from these two variants of the Hutu refugee 
phenomenon in Eastern Congo that the study obtains its central question: How did the 
development in state-capacity during post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda address the 
refugee problem in Eastern Congo.  
The study problematises Rwanda`s development during post-conflict reconstruction in 
light the cardinal objective of post-conflict reconstruction, that is: avoiding a resurgence 
of violence, inquiring whether it  served to address the  human security effects of the 
conflict, majorly the refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo that threatened  a resurgence 
of violence  in Rwanda. For analytical density the study focuses on the extent to which 
state capacity acted to address the issue of the refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo.   
The study contends that the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo presented and 
continue to be a threat to the state security of Rwanda and a threat to the Human Security 
of refugees, and that neglect of the refugee concerns more so the civilians, who could be 
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and can be easily recruited into the ranks of the Hutu insurrections was and continues to 
be a potential cause for a resurgence of violence.  
In the next chapter, the study investigates the human security challenges which the 
refugees grappled with and how they were manipulated by the Hutu extremists to 
mobilise them into group violence against the government in Rwanda. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 ``Security dialectic``: The Hutu refugee phenomenon and the 
convergence of Human and State Security to cause a Resurgence of 
Violence in Rwanda. 
 
The question which this chapter addresses is as follows: how did the human security 
concerns lead to a resurgence of the structure of violence during post-conflict 
reconstruction in Rwanda, and did they also serve to undermine state-security?  
 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, large population 
movements, a category under which the refugee phenomenon lies constitute a threat to 
the security of both the individual and the state, and that it is the responsibility of the state 
to utilize its capacity to thwart the threats to the security of the individuals who constitute 
groups. To the report: 
 
Refugee movements and other forms of forced displacement provide a useful (if 
imprecise) barometer of human security and insecurity. As a rule, people do not 
abandon their homes and flee from their own country or community unless 
confronted with serious threats to their life or liberty. Flight is the ultimate 
survival strategy, the one employed when all other coping mechanisms have been 
exhausted.
470
 
 
Whereas the report outlines the conditions that lead to forced displacement, most 
importantly the failure of the state to meet its rights and obligations like the provision of 
personal and group security, it  does not explain how the refugee phenomenon culminate 
into  a somewhat web of insecurity to the state, specifically the sending state, and the 
implications of such a system of things on the general debate surrounding forging a 
security policy during post-conflict reconstruction situations.  Refugee situations are both 
a product of conflict and a cause of conflict; for within them are elements that harbor 
                                                          
470
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, State of the World Refugees: A Humanitarian 
Agenda, Chapter 1, safeguarding human security, 1997, http://www.unhcr.org/3eb7bbd04.pdf. 
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political objectives they seek to realize through violent means.
471
 This chapter builds on 
that empirical gap drawing on the case of the Hutu refugees, and how their predicament 
proved a threat not only to their survival but also to the survival of the Rwandan state.  
 
However, in light of Post-Conflict, this study contends that political realism requires 
reformation whenever it is to be applied as a modus operandi in the sustenance of state 
security in post-conflict situations of the Rwandan nature. On Rwanda, the study draws 
answers by particularly focusing on the Hutu-refugee phenomenon. The study sustains 
the view that where the problem of refugees and the problems of refugees that 
undermined their survival persist, the consequence is a somewhat cycle of violence and 
more massive migrations.
472
  The crisis of the Banyarwanda refugees and Banyarwanda 
migrants, which remains unresolved, and has metamorphosed across decades has seen 
``conflict-continuous situations``
473
 even at the present in the Great Lakes Region. But 
the study concentrates on the period in review (1994-2005).  It should be emphasized that 
Rwanda has been at the centre of massive migrations in the Great Lakes Region. David 
Newbury placed  them into four clusters with the first cluster constituting those who 
migrated from Rwanda as a result of pre-colonial expansionist wars, the second cluster 
consisting those who migrated as a result of colonial economic policies, the third cluster 
consisting those who were  a result of the decolonization violent scuffles mostly the 
violent outcome of the 1959 Hutu revolution, and the last category consisting the Hutu 
refugees who moved en masse out of Rwanda after the genocide of 1994, lead by the 
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members of the genocide regime.
474
 This chapter serves to delineate how the Hutu 
refugee phenomenon presented both a threat to the security of the individual—the 
individual refugees and to that of the Rwandan.  
 
This chapter also presents an empirical case for the notion of ``security dialectics`` as 
advanced by Pauline Kerr, in her paper: The evolving dialectic between state-centric and 
human-centric security. The concept of ``security dialectics`` negates the two extreme 
points that are presented by both the adherents of human security and the adherents of 
state security, with the former presenting the security of the individual as a somewhat 
``sacred primary referent object” (focus) for security and the latter sanctifying the state as 
the main referent object for security. Accordingly the notion of ``security dialectics`` 
suggest a somewhat metaphysical bridge between the two extremes, that they do 
communicate to each other and that they  more often than not mutually reinforce each 
other in both negative and positive ways.  The study, in this chapter, uses the concept as a 
way of grounding its arguments on the nature of the resurgence of violence in post-
conflict Rwanda.  
 
Therefore the central argument the chapter advances is that: human security concerns, 
particularly the refugee crisis in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) threatened 
and subsequently led to a resurgence of violence during the post-conflict reconstruction 
period in Rwanda. This resurgence of violence subsequently undermined the state 
security of not only the new regime, but also the security of the state that is Rwanda and 
its people.  Accordingly, the study analyses the ``New Case Load``
475
 of refugees that 
went to the former Zaire after violence of genocidal proportions of 1994; in relation to a 
resurgence of violence in post genocide Rwanda.  
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It is a major contention of this study that refugees constitute a threat to the security of the 
state largely because armed elements exploit and manipulate their predicament to recruit 
them into their ranks. This scheme of things has continuously structured the violence that 
has pervaded the history of the Great Lakes of Africa,
476
 as defined in the conceptual 
framework to this study (see Chapter 1). Armed elements within refugees, whom for the 
purpose of this study are going to be referred to as: refugee warriors, have either waged 
wars against countries of origin,
477
 as it has been with the Hutu warriors against Rwanda, 
or against their host country (Democratic Republic of Congo; former Zaire) as they have 
been used as mercenaries—soldiers of fortune in the internal political wrangles in the 
host state. It should be reiterated that this chapter primarily focuses on Rwanda and 
arguments on DRC come-in as a way of sustaining the arguments on Rwanda. The study 
reverts to this scheme of things later in the discussion.   
 
But first, the war in Rwanda was supposedly over but ``the underlying conflict`` was not. 
To the Rwanda Support Group, five issues were to menacingly continue to undermine the 
security of Rwanda unless solutions were sought after in a robust manner. The five issue 
areas highlighted were that: two million refugees (it should be noted that this figure has 
been variously put at one million five hundred forty thousand people), (remained) outside 
the country with hundreds of thousands more displaced internally, the exiled leadership 
of the ousted interim government and their supporters (considered) the new government 
unacceptable, extremist militias aligned with these forces (were) intimidating  refugees 
who (wanted to return) and (fermented) violence in camps, violent incidents (occurred) 
inside Rwanda, raising fears among refugees and displaced persons about their safety 
should they return home., and thus, overall political settlement and national reconciliation 
(were) distant goals.
478
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Accordingly the refugee phenomenon was a matter of urgency which had to be dealt with 
urgently if peace and development were to be restarted in Rwanda. How the phenomenon 
was dealt with is a question which this study addresses later.  
 
However, it needs emphasis that approximately one million five hundred forty thousand 
people who  became refugees; with  nine hundred in Eastern Zaire, one hundred forty 
thousand in Burundi, and five hundred thousand  in Tanzania, according to the United 
States Committee.
479
  These massive movements constituted the former politicians, the 
former officers and men of the FAR, the militias-particularly the Interahamwe, and the 
ordinary refugees.
480
 The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, quoting a report of 
November 1994 by the UNHCR special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, noted that; there 
were approximately  about one million two hundred thousand refugees in Zaire, five 
hundred eighty thousand in Tanzania, two hundred seventy in Burundi and ten thousand 
in Uganda.
481
 The massive movement of refugees to Zaire is reported to have started on 
the 13
th
 day of the month of July, 1994 when the Rwanda Patriotic Front took control of 
Ruhengeri, a town in Northwestern Rwanda, a predominantly Hutu locality. It is reported 
that on that very day approximately one (1) million refugees fled to Zaire at an 
approximated rate of 10,000-12,000 refugees per hour.
482
 Further, that on the eighteenth 
day of July, 1994, approximately 400,000 refugees flew into Kamanyola region of Zaire 
moving towards the Uvira plane; ironically exiting the French safe zone that was meant 
to avail them with a somewhat safe haven.
483
   
 
Accordingly, of all the approximated numbers of refugees given, Eastern Congo received 
the largest number (majority of whom were Hutus) that had ever been hosted by a single 
sovereign. The UNHCR statistics indicated that by the twenty ninth day of July, 1994, the 
estimated number of Hutu refugees in Zaire stood at 1.5 million with 850,000 in the 
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Goma camps, 314,000 in Bukavu areas
484
 with the rest scattered throughout the Kivu 
Region of Eastern Zaire. Later, but during the same month of July 1994, it was reported 
that there were 1.5 million refugees in Zaire; with one (1) million of these settling in 
Goma area and 500,000 in Bukavu and Uvira areas.
485
 The number of refugees in Zaire 
kept on fluctuating, but in an incremental format that later in July 1994 it was reported 
that around 600,000 refugees had fled Rwanda to Bukavu Zaire through the French 
created Safe Zone.
486
   
 
Further in August 1994 the UNHCR indicated that by the mid-day of the twelfth day of 
August, 1994, 5000 people had already entered Bukavu and that the rate of entry was at 
600 persons per hour. All these people were finding a safe route through the French Safe 
zone in Southwest Rwanda.
487
 The French ``safe humanitarian zone``
488
 became a 
somewhat conveyer belt that facilitated the continued movement of the mostly Hutu 
refugees into Zaire from Rwanda. But uniquely, these refugees were accompanied by the 
former militias, former Rwandan army officials and men, government officials, and 
police men. Dallaire, the Commander of UNAMIR had complained of the continued 
broadcasting of the genocidal Radio station: Milles Collines in the French safe zone; 
instilling fear in the people to flee Rwanda.  He is said to have criticized the plan which 
was hatched by the French to secure asylum in Senegal and other French speaking 
countries for the former leaders of the genocide regime.
489
  Apart from the Milles 
Collines Radio were other information outlets which one official of the Ministry of 
Defence of France, Mallet, referred to as ``bloody Hutu Radios``. These Radios 
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continued to broadcast but in the French safe zone territory.
490
 The presence of these 
remnants of the former Rwanda army and militias in the refugee camps meant that the 
onus was on Zaire—the host country to disarm them.491 They were many in Bukavu, but 
the government of Zaire was weak in terms of state capacity to undertake such a venture 
and therefore sought for international support. 
492
 Delineating the  infiltration of the 
genocidal elements into the bonafide refugees,  Howard Adelman, puts the number of the 
refugees who went to Congo Zaire at one million one hundred thousand, and that of 
these,  40,000 were part of the former Forces Armees Rwandaise (ex-FAR),  excluding 
the number of the former militias like the interahamwe. He notes that going by the 
figures of the UNHCR which put the number of Hutu refugees in Zaire at 1,250000, 
including those from Burundi, the number of those who were supposedly part of the 
genocide machinery was put within the range of one hundred fifty thousand to two 
hundred twenty five thousand.
493
   
 
The United States Department, African Affairs Division put the number of the ex-FAR at 
a strength of 16,000 to 22,000 persons, and that majority of them were in the west of 
Goma and had their guns.
494
  In November 1994, General Joseph Baril, the Military 
Advisor to the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, put the strength 
of the ex-FAR at a capacity of 20,000 men.
495
  But the presence of the armed elements 
within refugees presented a somewhat double-edged security complex; that the 
consolidation of all the armed elements with their weaponry which they carried along 
from Rwanda would pose, ``… a risk of destabilizing the new authorities in Kigali``, and 
that: `` In a more immediate sense, the force would also be used to intimidate refugees 
who wish to return to Rwanda``.
496
  This prophetic insight and sense of judgment was 
spot on, the two scenarios came to pass. 
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Since social science figures can be sometimes elusive, normally a matter of perception 
indices, a mere representation of what it ``vaguely is/was``, for even some refugees were 
never registered or known at all; given the fact that Eastern Congo had a resident  
Kinyarwanda speaking population, in which some refugees would have disguised 
themselves, this study does not pretend at stating with finality the number of refugees 
who literally flooded in the Eastern Congo from Rwanda in the aftermath of the conflict 
which culminated into the genocide of 1994.  Indeed, the attempts by the UNHCR to 
embark on the registration of refugees were met with violent threats from the militias.
497
  
 
Accordingly, figures concerning the number of Hutu refugees who went to Congo and 
elsewhere perceived as a subject of debate by this study. Even when the UNHCR 
organized a census for refugees in Goma area of Congo, groups of refugees violently 
protested the census for rumour had it that the intention was to infect them with a HIV.
498
 
It should be emphasized though in passing that HIV/AIDS is a both a Security threat to 
the state and to the individual.
499
 Whereas figures can be disputed, what cannot be 
disputed is that among the refugees were former members of the agencies which 
comprised the genocide machinery.  However, as a way of guiding the central thoughts of 
this chapter, the figures which were provided by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees give a glimpse into how the situation metamorphosed. 
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Table: 3 
Rwanda refugee population according to UNHCR (1993-1999) 
Country 
of 
asylum 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Burundi 245,500 278,100 153,000 720 2,000 2,000 1,300 
DR of 
Congo 
(ex-
Zaire) 
53,500 1,252,800 1,100,600 423,600 37,000 35,000 33,000 
Tanzania 51,900 626,200 548,000 20,000 410 4,800 20,100 
Uganda 97,000 97,000 6,500 11,200 12,200 7,500 8,000 
Total 447,900 2,254,100 1,808,100 455,520 51,610 49,300 62,400 
 
Note: The figures are as on 31 December of each given year.  
Adopted from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the 
World`s Refugees: The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath, Chapter 10, 2000, 250. 
 
From the figures in table above, it emerges clearly that Zaire, which until 1994 had a few 
Rwandan refugees, by December 1994, it had the largest number of Rwandan refugees 
within the Great Lakes Region, majority of whom were the Hutu refugees who moved 
out of Rwanda after the genocide of 1994 as a result of fear as it is explained but later in 
discussions. But a quick comment is that the reason to why majority went to Zaire than to 
Uganda, Tanzania or Burundi is given precisely by a former Hutu  in Kibumba, Zaire but 
now disguising himself as a Congolese of Rwandan origin, he intimated that: 
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 The RPF was attacking from Uganda and some areas of Burundi, and Tanzania 
would not be trusted easily. So, we drove most of the people to Zaire, a known 
ally of ours at that time (sic)).
500
 
Map of Democratic Republic of Congo indicating the location of Kibumbu (a)/ Study Village. 
 
 
 
That Zaire was their main ``ally`` and that they ``drove the people``, are word choices 
that depict the nature of politics which surrounded the massive movement of Hutu 
refugees into Eastern Congo, then Zaire.  Indeed Zaire was an ally to the genocidal 
regime and many Hutus were literally driven into exile by the elements of the former 
regime. Mamdani quoting a local catholic priest working with the Catholic Relief 
Services (CARITAS) noted that France had entered into an agreement with Mobutu not 
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to disarm the soldiers of the Habyarimana state… by the Congolese army.``501  Because 
Zaire was a key ally to the genocide regime in the region, camps in Zaire ended up 
hosting more refugee warriors, comprising of ousted government officials and militias, as 
camps in Tanzania and other countries in the region hosted mainly bonafide refugees,
502
 
with some infiltrations of warriors though. The reasons for this scheme of things are 
explained later. But for the sake of clarity, the chapter will refer to the former elements of 
the genocide regime as refugee warriors and the civilian refugees as bonafide refugees.  
Emphasis should be made that whereas the interest of the refugees warriors was to put a 
determined fight against the new regime in Kigali, undermine the security of the 
Rwandan state, with a coveted objective of recapturing power, the interest of the bonafide 
refugees, this chapter argues, were generally inclined to human security; related 
principally to fear and want due to unmet human needs, inter alia: food, medicine, shelter, 
a permanent place of abode, and personal security. But these human security related 
concerns of the bonafide refugees were manipulated by the refugee warriors to sustain 
their political schemes through violent means as it will be articulated later.   
 
Human security is precisely and variously put as ``freedom from fear and want`` and that 
it entails two cardinal aspects: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and 
repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life. 
A threat to human security ``can be a slow, silent process or an abrupt, loud emergency. 
``
503
 Absence of human needs are some of the indicators of a threat to human security, 
and the Hutu refugee crisis in Eastern DRC was a manifestation of human insecurity in 
all  its complexities. The study advances  that the absence of human needs saw the 
refugees grappling with a multiplicity of deficiencies as regards the means to the 
necessities for survival/ their continued existence, which is human security which starts 
with the security of the individual, and that refugee warriors in their quest to put a 
determined fight against the new RPF-led Government; manipulated the human 
insecurity of the bonafide refugees in order to recruit them into their ranks thus a 
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somewhat convergence of human security and state security. This study explains how the 
militarization of bonafide refugees to cause a threat to their country of origin was 
structured. This is because, whereas the plight of refugees is delineated when it comes to 
refugee studies; the theorization about how bonafide refugees particularly in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa are co-opted into military threats, still needs exposition.  The 
study argues that human security related issues, metaphorically speaking, are a main 
thread in the scheme of things that determine the militarization of ordinary refugees. So, 
this chapter attempts to empirically contribute to what Sarah Kenyon Lischer decried 
that: 
Despite the potential political and security risks posed by refugee situations, no 
theory exists to explain militarization of refugee populated areas. Thus, the states 
and agencies adversely affected do not have any systematic framework to guide 
the development of policy for coping with military activity or affects refugees.
504
 
 
Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner in their edited masterwork titled: `` Refugees as 
resources in War``, delineate the reasons that explain the manipulation of the refugees by 
the warring parties were: refugees are manipulated because the warriors want to have 
access to human and material resources as a way of sustaining their quest for political 
power, the support rendered to the refugee warriors by the external actors; host state, 
regional states and major powers also sustain the manipulation of bonafide refugees, a 
weak international refugee regime, with little effort to condemn and thwart the 
manipulation of refugees also sustains the practice, the political culture of the 
international community, particularly the United Nations Security Council and the world 
powers, treating refugee manipulation as a humanitarian than a security threat has also 
sustained the practice.
505
 
 
From the four reasons that are given, theorization is not elevated to the level of asking 
how and why the bonafide/ordinary refugees fall prey to the manipulation by refugee 
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warriors.  This study, at this point, should be seen as an attempt to explain the structure of 
bonafide refugee manipulation.  
 
At this point, in its inquiry, the study based on three data sets, primarily those covering 
the period in review (1994-2005), including but not limited to: published monographic 
academic works about Rwanda and reports of Humanitarian agencies, unpublished works 
and expert opinion, and archival records, particularly the diplomatic correspondences of 
the United States of America State Department which focused on Rwanda for the period 
in review.  
 
To further understand the plight of the refugees who went to Congo, evidence of their 
plight from the mentioned data sets was further cross-examined with a few focused 
interviews with identified but informative individuals who were actors in the Hutu 
refugee saga.  
 
As noted in the methodological section of this study, to guard against a retrospective bias, 
the study only employed the evidence of the informants only to the extent to which it 
either corroborates or contradicts the evidence gathered from documentary and archival 
records. As regards the nature of questions which were asked, the study used unstructured 
interviews, but with an interview guide to orient the trend of the inquiry. However, the 
tendency to change the phraseology of the questions basing on the subliminal signals of 
the informants which sometimes indicated discomfort with some questions would not be 
avoided. But generally the interviews were conducted in a more conversational manner as 
the respondents were allowed to digress from one line of thought to another so long as the 
key concerns/targets of the interviews were captured. 
First forward, in their predicament, the Hutu refugees in the Congo faced a number of 
threats to their survival (human insecurities) as a result of unmet human needs. The 
political elites (former members of the genocide regime) exploited the predicament of the 
refugees to mobilize, and cajole them into group violence against the new regime in 
Rwanda. 
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3.1.1 Hutu warriors profiteering from wretchedness: Manipulation of 
fear and want of the Bonafide Hutu refugees in Eastern 
Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
At this point the study analyses the challenges to the survival of the ordinary refugees 
that constituted human insecurities. These challenges are qualitatively analyzed using the 
data sets earlier mentioned in this chapter. Apart from delineating the challenges to the 
survival of ordinary refugees, the chapter also outlines how the refugee warriors 
manipulated the predicament of the ordinary refugees to instigate a resurgence of 
violence against Rwanda. 
 
First, merely being a refugee constitutes a human security challenge in itself. The very 
reason why refugees decide to flee their permanent place of abode, in the quest for a safe 
haven, is but excessive fear. The resolve to wander and the determination to surrender 
ones fate to the wilderness is a decision which one reaches at after being overwhelmed by 
fear. Sore put by unbearable conditions at home which may range from the necessity of 
avoiding ``physical harm, life threatening situations, or imprisonment``, they move in 
hope for a sanctuary.
506
 They survive on hope and the inevitability of providence for they 
are overwhelmed by fear; their security is threatened as individuals and as groups.   
 
 The Hutus in Rwanda feared but two things: 
 
First, the fear of probable revenge from the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front forces led 
to the swift movement of the Hutus out of Rwanda.  Cyprian Fisiy categorise this level of 
fear of the Hutu refugees at three levels; the presumption of guilt as a result of the 
perception that all Hutus participated in the genocide, the fear of arrest as a result of the 
presumption of guilt, and fear of blackmail as a result of disputes over property with 
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mostly the Tutsi returnees.
507
   To this effect, Claude Kayobokye, a returnee who settled 
in Nyabugogo Rwanda, intimated to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees that he fled to Mugunga Congo because he:  ``feared to be killed in reprisal 
massacres`` and that: ``Many, many people were sure the RPF were out to kill any Hutu 
they found so they fled``. 
508
 Also to substantiate this category of fear are the majority of 
the Hutu refugees who fled after the end of the genocide from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri 
where majority of the members of the genocide regime, specifically the ``akazu`` (ruling 
oligarchy), including Habyarimana and his wife Agathe, hailed from.
509
 This was a result 
of the activities of the clandestine radio stations which continued broadcasting 
propaganda pointing at a scheme by the RPF to decimate the Hutu population. 
510
 
Specifically, Radio Milles Collines continued broadcasting from an undisclosed location 
in the French safe zone calling on people to flee.
511
  
 
The situation was not helped by the reported cases of reprisals presided over by the RPF 
elements; a situation which Kagame, the then commander of the RPF and Minister of 
Defence, blamed on the ``new recruits``.
512
 Indeed the RPF had grown from 15,000 to 
30,000 by August 1994, bringing into its ranks ``new untrained and less disciplined army 
recruits``, something that made the maintenance of discipline in the ranks 
cumbersome.
513
 Also during his meeting with George Moose, the then Assistant 
Secretary of State in Charge of African Affairs, Rugenera, the then Prime Minister of 
Rwanda acknowledged the: ``deplorable incidents`` were reprisals against the Hutus were 
carried out and reported instances where repatriated Hutus who returned to claim their 
property were blackmailed as being guilty of the genocide by the Tutsi occupants in 
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Southeastern Rwanda.
514
  Even those who remained in Rwanda; many were subjected to 
arbitrary arrests, and Des Forges reported that a considerable number of Hutus were 
detained ``unofficially`` in ``shipping containers``, ``Private houses`` and ``military 
installations``. What was unbelievable to her was that almost 20 percent of those who 
were detained were assumedly innocent and that accusations obtained from property 
disputes. She decried the disappearance of particularly the Hutu elites and to her; the aura 
of fear was overwhelming.
 515
 This trend of events served to disorient even those who 
never wanted to seek refuge.   
 
Also the chaos in Kigali when the RPF took over the city, with the once disciplined 
members of the RPF descending on the city, looting and expropriating houses, threatened 
the Hutus.
516
 Thus the latter flew en masse for safety in the Internally Displaced People`s 
camp and then to the refugee camps. An interesting reportage of the way looting was 
executed came from the Embassy of the United States in Rwanda saying that, ``… the 
capital assets of Kigali and other towns have been ripped up, sold off and shipped to 
Uganda and Burundi``.
517
  The epitome of the fear among the Hutus were the revelations 
which were made by the Prime Minister of Rwanda in the Post-Genocide Government, 
Faustin Twagiramungu during his November 30
th
 1994, meeting with The Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Edward Moose and his Deputy, Das 
Bushnell. The details are graphic: that when the Rwanda Charge in Washington, Joseph 
Mutatoba excused himself and got out of the meeting, Twagiramungu ``opened up 
considerably`` (probably Twagiramungu feared opening up in Mutatoba`s presence); 
revealing an incident where an RPA soldier killed people and burnt their bodies beyond 
recognition as a way of hiding evidence. He also informed his hosts that he was also in 
deep fear but could not quit.
518
  Twagiramungu was a Hutu but working with the RPF 
government, and indeed his fear speaks volumes about the extent of the aura of fear that 
hovered over the Hutu community in Post-Genocide Rwanda.  
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Also the reportage of the attack of the Rwanda Patriotic Army Unit on Busaze camp 
which left 16 Hutu Internally Displaced People killed and 36 wounded as a result of shots 
and attacks using bayonets
519
; serves to illustrate the callous nature of some elements of 
the RPF led government when it came to dealings with the Hutu civilians. Unlike other 
reports of reprisal attacks onto the Hutus, this specific case was verified by the RPF 
authorities and the UNAMIR forces.  Indeed, four RPA officers, who were allegedly 
culpable, were arrested.
520
   This kind of fear as a result of the foolhardiness within the 
ranks of the RPF though may not have been institutionally sanctioned; it served to instill 
fear among the Hutu populations. They were scared and seeking refuge was the ultimate 
escape route. In that scheme of things; reconciliation seemed to be a farfetched wish, and 
in its report, the United States Delegation to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire concluded thus: 
 
The notion of communal rather than individual responsibility is more pronounced 
in many African Societies than in our own, (. The) ``sins of fathers`` are visited 
not only upon their sons but upon their brothers, sisters, cousins and so on.
521
 
 
Accordingly, whereas the finding of the Gersony Report,
522
 based on anecdotal evidence 
to incriminate the RPA as regards the revenge deaths against the Hutus,
523
 the revelations 
by the members of the RPF led government, and even Kagame`s insinuation that the 
revenge deaths could only be attributed to indiscipline of the ``new recruits``  attest to the 
extent of the violence against the Hutu; which created an aura of fear that prompted many 
to seek refuge in the neigbouring countries particularly Eastern Zaire.  
 
It should be clarified that the anecdotal nature of the Gersony report was unearthed by the 
parallel on-the ground investigation which was conducted by the United States Defense 
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Attaché (DATT) for 14 weeks. The parallel investigation found no hard evidence to 
ascertain the allegations of ``systematic killings`` of the Hutus by the RPF.
524
  However, 
it is Cable 0 111701Z Aug 94 from the USA Embassy in Bujumbura to the Office of the 
Secretary of State of the USA with subject: ``… Documenting atrocities Perpetrated or 
Permitted by the RPF Forces in Southern Rwanda and Burundi``, that gives the details of 
the extent of the reprisal attacks against the Hutus by the Tutsi elements. The details are 
as follows: Nzeyimana, 9 year old from Sake Commune, Mbuye Hill had a bullet wound 
in lower leg, and all his family was killed. Musabimana, Jean Damascene, 16 years, 
Birenga Commune, Ngaharana, witnessed ten persons with hands bound, thrown into a 
ditch and sprayed with bullets. Jean Damascene escaped during the night with a wound in 
his thigh. Masaka, Jeanne, 25 years, Gashora commune, Rweru Hill. Her husband was 
killed as well as a child of one month and another of 4 years; she sustained machete 
wounds in hamstrings. Uwamahoro, ten year old girl, commune Mugesera, Ierambo hill, 
received machete blows to the head. The boats of two Burundians ferrying people on the 
Kagera were destroyed by the Ikotanyi (Tutsis), who burned the entire hillside facing 
Kijakujuha (Burundi) so that fugitives could not hide. A Rwandan boy of 6 or 7 
accompanied by his father arrived in Ruzo on July 24. He had two machete wounds. The 
rest of the family (mother and children) were massacred in Rwanda. Also on July 25: A 
Burundi refugee arrived from Rwanda with serious bullet and machete wounds. The same 
day shots were heard from Rwanda and between   loam and 2pm the Red Cross in 
Mugano received several cases of wounds at Ruzo-Giteranyi, and on July 27: A Rwandan 
woman arrived at Ruzo with several machete wounds. Her five children were killed. July 
28: A Rwandan man arrived at Ruzo with a bullet wound in the temple. Mubaryonsaba, 
Vistina; 5 years old arrived at Ruzo from Shiryakabiri, Sake commune with a machete 
wound in the back of the neck. Her father, Jean-Baptiste Bazirahunyuka was killed, July 
29: Sentare Gaspari, a Rwandan refugee arrived at Ruzo from Ngaga, Gashora commune, 
with a bullet in his back, and  during the  week of July 25 to 30, in Tanzania: A visitor in 
a car passed a line of Rwandan refugees stretching 8kms toward Ngara-Benako. Always 
the same testimony: ``They`re killing us in Rwanda.  
 
                                                          
524
 See, 165572. 
206 
 
In addition to the preceding quoted reprisal cases, the same source reminds us of the June 
5 1994 murder of the Archbishop of Kigali, the Bishops of Byuma and Kabgayi; and the 
ten lay men by the RPF elements. We are also reminded of the less publicized April 26 
1994 murder of the Spanish Priest Joaquim Vallimajo and the 2 Rwandese Priests in 
Kageyo near Byumba.  
 
The UNHCR commenting about the reprisal attacks on the Hutu by the elements of the 
RPA alluded to a somewhat ``systematic policy`` by the RPF to exterminate the Hutus in 
the South and South East Rwanda in a bid to create a ``Tutsi Land`` --a somewhat 
territory for the Tutsi. Hard facts to elucidate this assertion are not given for even the 
figure of those who died, which was put 10,000, was a rough estimate. Also the fact that 
those who executed the reprisal attacks had ``two way radios`` is not evidence enough to 
ascertain the ``systematic policy``. Probably a voice interception of the radio messages 
would have been evidence enough.
525
 But ``systematic policy`` is just merely a matter of 
naming.  Whether ``systematic`` or not, the revenge killings of the Hutus took place.  
Even Kagame, the then most powerful individual within the ranks of the RPF 
acknowledged that: ``individual reprisals and even locally organized ones`` had taken 
place though were not sanctioned by the government.
526
 But be that as it may be, the 
reprisal attacks    undermined the efforts towards reconciliation and discouraged the 
return of refugees and encouraged  the continued flow of the refugees most especially 
those who were internally displaced but in the ``French safe zone`` in the southeast of 
Rwanda.  
 
These reprisal attacks served the interests of the elements of the former regime who based 
their propaganda on those reprisal incidents mentioned, among others; to hoodwink the 
masses into thinking that the only way to survive was by seeking refugee. Indeed, many 
Hutus trekked, figuratively speaking, bumpy roads in the bumpy quest for a sanctuary. 
Overwhelmed by fear; their options were limited but to seek refuge. So, the fear of 
reprisals by the Hutu refugees served the scheme of the former Hutu leaders who wanted 
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as many Hutus as possible in Eastern Congo if they were to make a claim at being a 
legitimate political voice.  
 
Secondly, the fear of the elements of the former regime; the Ex-FAR and the 
Interahamwe also increased the urge of fleeing among the Hutus.  Apart from 
manipulating the instances where RPF instigated fear among the Hutu masses, these 
elements Hutu elements used intimidation.  The ordinary Hutus were fearfully driven into 
Kivu region of Zaire as if they were herds of cattle.  Howard Adelman was more 
descriptive when he referred to the Hutu refugees warriors as ``criminal herdsmen``.
527
 
To this effect, Sylvestre Kamana (Remera) intimated to the UNHCR thus: `` The 
Interahamwe ordered me to flee or they would kill me! ``
528
That double edged fear; saw 
an approximation of around 2 million people exiting Rwanda.  
 
The RPF was fully aware of the danger that such a massive refugee flow could pose to 
the state, and Paul Kagame could not mince his words when he said: 
 
The Rwandase refugees have been my problem. The defense and security of my 
country have been my problem. I´ll deal with them at any cost, by any means that 
are available to me, with the best knowledge.
529
 
 
However, the agents of the former regime were enthusiastic about having as many 
Rwandans as possible in exile. The massive flow of refugees from Rwanda was to the 
UNHCR not a mere refugee phenomenon but rather: ``a strategic population withdraw by 
the defeated regime which wished to retain its control over large numbers of people and 
to establish a hostile military force on the country`s borders``.
530
 The fear for revenge and 
the propaganda of the former regime of an imminent revenge spree, served against the 
interest of the RPF to avoid gross refugee flows. Even some Hutus who had decided not 
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to flee, as a result actual attacks from their Tutsi neighbours, they ended up in exile. 
Leodegard Kagaba, who was still a refugee in Uganda by April, 22
nd
, 2013, lamented that 
he had decided not to flee Rwanda, but when his Tutsi neighbours attacked him and shot 
him in the belly, he ran a way becoming a refugee in the Nakivale refugee settlement in 
Uganda. He narrated that: ‘`I have many scars, even in my heart``, again: ``….The people 
who put those scars on me still leave freely in Rwanda``.  Mutabazi also ran away from 
Rwanda after serving his 16 years jail sentence because of genocide related crimes, and 
on release: ``everyone in my village saw me like an animal``, he  thus flew to Uganda. 
531
 
 
  Refugees moved en masse from Rwanda to Eastern Congo. The refugee warriors were 
determined to wage a decisive civil war against the new regime in Kigali using the camps 
in Congo as their bases.
532
 Bukavu was their centre of activity.
533
 Many of them had 
entered Zaire with their weapons.
534
  Some members of the international community were 
worried that some international actors would exploit this scheme of things to become 
accomplices in the attempt of the former Hutu leadership to destabilize Rwanda. Carson 
of the United States could not hide his sentiments thus: 
 
We should discourage stridently the French not to undermine the new RPF 
government and to actively discourage Mobutu from doing so. The presence of 
the Hutu militia in Zaire will be a temptation for the wicked minds.
535
 
 
However to General Dellaire of the UNAMIR, the worry of a resurgence of violence was 
even more pronounced. His point of contention was that the creation of large Hutu camps 
in Zaire and Tanzania would facilitate the emergence of guerillas, and that the French 
would be party to that scheme of things unless the refugees are encouraged to return 
home.
536
 However, General Dallaire`s misgiving about the French are not well 
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corroborated by his subsequent stance about the French operation in Rwanda.  It is 
reported he was full of praises of the ``operation Turquoise`` and how it had saved life.
537
 
So, one wonders what made him to think that the French would harbor ill intentions of 
using the Hutu refugees to destabilize Rwanda.  A telephone interview with the General 
would not be granted to the researcher, and indeed it is written clearly on his website that 
he does not grant personal interviews.  This study takes his change of attitude as an 
outcome of the subsequent events which he probably was referring to in his praise-
singing comments about the French operation.    
 
Be that as it was, the need was high, ``…not to allow the elements that have been moved 
to solidify into an organized group bent on invading Rwanda``.
538
 But the task was 
daunting for the international community and to the authorities in Kigali that by 
September 8
th
, 1994, signs of a resurgence of violence were visible that the United 
Nations Military Personnel spotted men in military fatigues with guns and supplies 
crossing into South West Rwanda from Burundi and Zaire.
539
  By 1995, the estimated 
human capacity of the refugee warriors had grown to 50,000 men.
540
  The largest 
concentration of the former Rwanda Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and the militias was, 
``…along the Goma-Bukavu axis``, and that the situation posed a great threat to the 
security of Rwanda and to international humanitarian efforts.
541
 
 
 Sadako Ogata decried the refugee camps in Bukavu as being ``highly political`` and that 
the bonafide refugee in-there were feeling increasingly insecure as a result of the 
militarization of the camps.
542
 Indeed it was reported by the Libreville Radio station that 
it is from Goma and Bukavu that the militias coordinated the movement of their troops 
even to other areas like Benaco camp in Tanzania where they wanted to create a ``a new 
army`` to bulwark their efforts at another frontier.
543
  Attesting to that determination are 
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the words of Col. Theoneste Bagasora during the interview which he had with Human 
Rights Watch. He affirmed that they were determined to: 
 
``Wage a war that will be long and full of dead people until the minority Tutsis 
are finished and completely out of the country``
544
 
 
The massive movement of refugees from Rwanda to Congo, accompanied by the 
Interahamwe and Ex-FAR officers and men
545
 legitimized the political activities of the 
latter. They even took over the control of refugee camps from the aid agencies and 
actually constituted a somewhat government in exile.  To Twagiramungu, the then Prime 
Minister of Rwanda after the genocide, camps constituted ``mini states`` and that 
receiving states had to ``dismantle them.
546
  
 
The French under the United Nations authorized ``Operation Turquoise``, were 
consciously or inadvertently accomplices in this scheme of things as they created a 
somewhat safe route in Southwest Rwanda that allowed the escape of the members of the 
former genocide army, bureaucracy and militias.
547
 It would have served justice better if 
the French had screened the fleeing leaders for future prosecution of genocidal crime 
upon the institution of the International Tribunal; whose formation they professed to 
support. But to the then Prime Minister of France, Edouard Balladur, it was that: 
 
``… we respect all UN Decisions`` `and will support their action but`, ``we will 
not be the police in this affair``, `to make arrests`.
548
 
 
Another incident which seemed to betray the humanitarian guise of the French 
``Operation Turquoise`` was the way the French troops demonised the Ethiopia battalion 
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(the ETHIOBATT)
549
 which were part of the United Nations Mission that replaced the 
French led mission. The initial interest of some French elements was to ensure that the 
French troops are replaced with troops from French speaking Africa countries. This 
explains the misgivings of the French as regards the Ethiopian troops for they had no 
historical ties with France thus under no moral obligation to serve the interests of France 
in this system of things. The French soldiers, ``…had actively told the populace that the 
Ethiopians all spoke English, were brought in to support the RPF/RPA, and were opposed 
to Hutus and the ex-GRF`` (sic).
550
 If the statement in quotation is to be inversely looked 
at, it seems to suggest that to the French, the mission was not for the sake of all the 
Banyarwanda but for the safety of the Hutus and elements of the former regime; 
otherwise why demonise troops whose membership could not even ably communicate in 
English.  It was reported that the Ethiopians could hardly communicate in English an 
issue that undermined their ability to communicate with the natives.
551
  It is no wonder 
therefore that as a result of the level of demonization of the Ethiopian troops by the 
French, as the French operation was coming to an end, 400,000 Hutus had to exit the 
French Zone en route South Kivu.
552
   
 
Also the failure of the French peacekeeper to reign on the extremist Radio stations that 
continued to operate clandestinely in the ``safe zone``, fueling continued movement of 
refugees in the ``Safe Zone`` betrays the supposedly humanitarian intentions of the 
operation.
553
  So, despite the praise which the operation received from humanitarian 
authorities like General Dellaire
554
 and the International community at large, the issues 
outlined above do not serve to show that the French operation was flawless. But what was 
even more suspect was the fact that the French had intervened militarily into Rwanda for 
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three phrases in a span of only four years. The spirit of interventionism exhibited by the 
French figuratively speaking; was taken in by the RPF with a grain of salt.
555
  
 
 The Zairian authorities also countenanced the activities of the ex-FAR and the 
interahamwe; allowing them to recruit, train and engage in political socialization 
activities within the camps. Camps were used for the indoctrination of the refugees by 
use of genocidal propaganda and revised history. The emphasis was on the complete 
annihilation of the Tutsi people; as the documents discovered at Mugunga camp in 1996 
revealed.
556
  Des Forges reported of ``moderates in camps becoming radicalized`` as the 
elements of ex-FAR published Newspapers and pamphlets. The hate propaganda 
materials were circulated in camps by the camps leadership which was generally made up 
of the elements of the former regime.
557
  Zairian military facilities were put at the service 
of the refugee warriors in a bid to facilitate their military advancement.
558
  
 
Consequently, Mugunga which was the centre of Hutu refugee warrior propaganda 
became a somewhat capital of the Hutu warriors. To this effect, Johan Pottier noted thus: 
 
Mugunga (Goma, Zaire), the second camp I worked in, is known as a ``safe 
haven`` for the defeated Forces Armees Rwandaises. Some 20,000 ex-FAR and 
their families now live in Mugunga. 
559
 
 
And to the alarm of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF): 
 
The instigators of the genocide (were taking control) of the camps in an 
increasing systematic way, and (blocking) the return of refugees…. They are free 
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to come and go between camps, and manipulate the refugees through controlling 
the flow of political information. 
560
  
 
Surprisingly though, at a certain point,  the authorities in Zaire, particularly the then 
Prime Minister Kengo; was floating the idea of facilitating the  secondary movement of 
the leaders of the former genocidal regime to third countries to seek asylum as a way of 
removing them from the areas near the border of Rwanda.
561
 Regards of the merits and 
demerits of the plan, by not mentioning the idea of screening them first so that those who 
were culpable of the genocide could be arrested in preparation for prosecution, his 
suggestion could either be construed or misconstrued as an attempt by Zaire to secure a 
safer haven for the genocidaires.  Indeed in his correspondence to Mr. Moose, Terence .P. 
McCulley, considering the idea of Zaire to move the leaders of the former regime to a 
third country, observed thus: 
 
The ex-FAR and IGOR ( former Interim Government of Rwanda) contains people 
guilty of genocide, and as we move forward with a War Crimes Tribunal for 
Rwanda, we need to consider that many of those we propose to relocate may be 
suspected war criminals. 
 
General Augustin Bizimungu,
562
 the chief of the Hutu refugee warriors even attempted to 
curve a sphere of influence from the Kivu region of Zaire to be used as the centre of his 
violent incursions into Rwanda.
563
  Worth noting is that historically the Kivu province of 
DRC has been a sanctuary for several Rwandan insurgents across two historical 
moments: post-colonial and post-1959 as discussed in the chapter preceding this. 
Accordingly to Mamdani: 
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``Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu has it that Kivu Province is where 
losers in Rwanda traditionally end up; and it is from Kivu that they prepare to 
return to power in Rwanda.``
564
 
 
Surely a sphere of influence for the Hutu warriors was curved out of Eastern Congo, that 
by September 2000 when the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda united with ex-FAR 
military command to form the  Forces Democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), 
Eastern Congo was tainted with FDLR influence as illustrated by the 2008 map below: 
 
Adopted Map 1: The Hutu Refugee Warrior sphere of influence in the Eastern 
Congo 
 
 
 
 
Map adopted from McGreal, The roots of war in eastern Congo, The Guardian, Friday 
16 May 2008, 00.29 BST, URL:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo .  
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Agreeably, camps, particularly the Goma camps, were later to be used as recruiting and 
training grounds for those who were to attack the frontiers of Rwanda in a bid to make 
Rwanda ungovernable for the Rwanda Patriotic Front. Camps also acted as armories for 
weapons.
565
  Young recruits were sourced from refugee camps. 
566
 Registration of those 
who were entering camps was put in the hands of those who were part of the genocide 
administrative infrastructure. The UNHCR either out of human resource constraints or 
sheer lack of security intelligence even grouped refugees according to their former 
communes in Rwanda; putting them under the supervision of their former leader—a 
bourgmestre. To that effect: 
Soldiers of the defeated Rwandan army retained both their cohension and many of 
their weapons and pitched tent just outside civilian camps. A common sight at the 
entrance to each camp in those days was a Mercedes saloon, still sporting 
Rwandan license plates, full (of) men in dark suits and sunglasses, handing huge 
piles of cash to young camp thugs (sic).
567
 
 
 This trend of events gave the elements of the former genocide regime a leverage to 
control the bonafide refugees and consequently manipulated them into joining their 
violent schemes.
568
 Indeed by August 1994, the ex-FAR (Forces Armees Rwandaise) and 
the interahamwe, and their new recruits from the bonafide refugees under the rebel 
movement, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR); had already embarked on a 
resurgence of violence against the new RPF government in Rwanda.
569
 Melvern notes 
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that USD 6.3 million had been budgeted for the ``Guerilla phase`` in arms and 
ammunitions, with the whole insurgence budgeted at USD 50 Million.
570
  This made the 
reconstruction of Rwanda from the ruins of the civil war that culminated into the 
genocide a process hard to fathom; dented by a resurgence of violence. The new 
Government in Rwanda was not only undermined by the criminal violence of executed 
by its soldiers against the Hutu people something that threatened the refugees from 
returning, but also the political violence which was presided over by refugee warriors in 
Eastern Zaire (now DRC).
571
   As regards to whether the Hutu warriors were recruiting 
from the refugee camps, a Former Intelligence Officer in the Uganda Peoples Defense 
Forces who preferred unanimity said the following during a personal interview: 
Because we were interested in the developments in Rwanda and Zaire, our 
intelligence system was very active on that front. We knew that the Hutu 
belligerents in Zaire were recruiting child soldiers from the refugee populations, 
abductions were the order of the day, and merciless killings were executed on 
those who refused to join. We used share this intelligence information with our 
allies, RPF
572
 
 
Also a veteran Lieutenant with the RPF who also preferred unanimity for he took the oath 
of secrecy informed the researcher that: 
… Our intelligence into what was going on in the camps in Eastern Congo was 
somehow negligent because of lack of experience and resources, but remember 
we were not alone in this endeavour. Our counterparts in Uganda were helpful. 
The shared with us information as regards the activities of the interahamwe in 
Zaire (sic). But even through our seemingly weak intelligence capacity, we knew 
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for sure that the genocidaires were recruiting from the refugee populations, 
training and arming them very quickly. It was a headache for us.
573
    
The location map of the informant is as follows: 
Map 2: Map of Rwanda (based on the old administrative map of Rwanda before 2006) 
indicating  the location of Nyarubuye Cell , Study Area, in Rwanda 
 
 
 
Further on the manipulation of the massive flow of Hutus into Zaire, they were held 
hostage by the elements of the former regime, putting them at the service of their violent 
schemes something that further undermined the already fragile security of the individual 
refugees.
574
 This negates the view that bonafide refugees countenanced the activities of 
the warriors as some scholars have alleged. Indeed, some refugees tried to escape, most 
especially in the night in a bid to return to Rwanda but clandestinely.  Militarization of 
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camps never meant the absence of those who did not participate in the genocide. Indeed 
majority of the refugees were to say the least of it: victims of circumstances.
575
 But 
determining circumstance is beyond the realms of the possible, and for that matter; the 
bonafide refugees, with little room to exercise their conscience, allowed a human shield 
to the refugee warriors who hid in refugee camps. The camps allowed the refugee 
warriors a congenial somewhat natural habitat for planning and execution of their rather 
wanton schemes.
576
  
 
However, beyond manipulation of the refugees was the belief even among some ordinary 
refugees that their stay in exile was meant to facilitate their re-organisation into a 
formidable force to oust the Tutsi dominated Government in Kigali in the future to 
restore the ``Hutu power`` glory. This negates the assertion that all refugees were literally 
driven into refuge by the former Hutu leadership. For some ordinary Hutus it was a 
strategy for re-organisation. To that effect, Johan de Smedt notes thus: 
 
Some adults told me it would be good to have as many children as fast as 
possible, to make up for all the people who had been killed (and so repeat the 
RPF`s success story: breed a Hutu army and take Rwanda by force). For this 
reason, they said, there should be no objection to so many young people getting 
married and having children.
577
 
 
Therefore, it is this system of things that make the militarization of the Hutu refugee 
camps in the former Zaire, now DRC a classical case of the refugee warrior 
                                                          
575
 Jacques Depelchin, General Report, Theme 4: African Research on Ethnicity and Conflicts: Responses, 
Codesria Conference on Academic Freedom, Social Research and Conflict Resolution in the Countries of 
the Great Lakes (mimeo, Arusha International Conference Centre, Arusha, Tanzania, 4-7 September 
1995):17. 
576
 See, James Turner Johnson, Maintaining the Protection of Non-Combatants, Journal of Peace Research, 
vol. 37, no.  4, 2000, pp. 421-448, Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi):437., 
Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Militarised Refugee Populations: Humanitarian Challenges in the Former 
Yugoslavia, Working Paper 5 (The Rosemarie Rogers Working Paper Series, August 1999) and., Stephen 
John Stedman, Fred Tanner,  eds., Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the abuse of human suffering 
(Brookings Inst Pr, June 2003), particularly Chapter one (1), and Chapter four (4) by Howard Adelman., 
and Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Refugees and the Spread of Civil War, International 
Organisation, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring, 2006), pp. 335-366. 
577
 Johan de Smedt, Child Marriages in Rwanda Refugee Camps, Journal of International African Institute, 
Vol. 68, No. 2 (1998), pp.211-237, Cambridge University Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1161279. 
219 
 
phenomenon.
578
  But the question remains: What made it easy for the elements of the 
former regime to mobilize in a manipulative manner the refugees into group violence?  
 
Sarah Kenyon Lischer, particularly sharply explains the militarization of the refugee 
camps in Eastern DRC. She delineates the nature of the political violence that the 
refugees engaged in against their motherland, Rwanda. She however leaves a somewhat 
scholarly gorge as she little does explain in detail the mechanisms through which the 
refugee warriors manipulated the bonafide refugees into joining the web violence which 
structured a resurgence of violence in Rwanda.
579
 Also, as an inherent flaw in her 
analysis, Kenyon bases on anecdotal evidence to give topicality to her rather hypothetical 
arguments. Drawing from other data sets, particularly the diplomatic correspondences of 
the United States of America on the Hutu refugee crisis, the study argues that the human 
security concerns of the refugees were manipulated by the refugee warriors to recruit 
them into the violent activities that marked a resurgence of violence in post-conflict 
Rwanda.  
 
Accordingly, if we are to go back to our treatment of the nature of the resurgence of 
violence in Rwanda, it needs emphasis that what began as a result of fear by the Hutu 
refugees was later to undermine the very security of the Rwandan state. By January 1995 
``Sketchy reports of border incursions… into Western Rwanda`` with the ex-FAR being 
outlined as being culpable were made.
580
 And the first incident of the beginning of a 
resurgence of violence was reported in the Cyangugu province of Rwanda where the 
RPA engaged in an armed exchange with the ex-FAR.
581
 Using camps in Congo as their 
rare bases for arms replenishment, training and recruitment, the Hutu refugee warriors
582
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carried out incursions into Rwanda with the first one code named Operation Insecticide, 
targeting Inyenzi (Tutsi cockroaches); with several attacks made by the refugee warriors 
in the Northwest and Southwest of Rwanda during the period 1995-1996.  
 
The second incursion code named, The First Operation Alleluia, started in October 1997, 
but this one targeted mostly the Congolese Tutsi refugees in Gisenyi, and it culminated 
into the Mudende Massacres. The Second Operation Alleluia which started in September 
1998 was focused on Goma and Gisenyi areas, and was followed by Operations Amen 
and Odyssey between June and July, 1999-2000, then the Operation Oracle du Seigneur 
between May to December 2001, with a number of battle fought inside Rwanda. 
Operations Trompete and Tabara  were launched in September and October 2003 from 
South Kivu, and the last major incursion code named Operation la Fronde, started in 
2004 and was vanquished in early 2005.
583
 It is these serialized operations by the Hutu 
refugee warriors that factually inform the period in review by the study that is (1994-
2005). A resurgence of violence made the reconstruction efforts hard a task; that by 
September 1996, war had resumed in Western Rwanda, and the Hutu warriors had 
enough military capacity even in the initial days of the resurgence of violence for they 
had entered into Eastern Congo with tons of light weapons, ``armored cars, field artillery, 
four operational helicopters and a light fixed wing attach``, and had troop capacity of 
approximately 50,000 men.
584
  
 
The refugee crisis culminated into a somewhat ``security dilemma complex`` which 
conflated the ``insecurity dilemma complexes``
585
 for the new regime in Rwanda.  
External forces were facilitating the resurgence of violence.  The prophetic insight of 
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Pierre Buyoya, the once President of Burundi, that the Rwandan refugee crisis was a 
‘time bomb`` came to pass.586 The situation was not just a refugee crisis gone riotous but 
rather a camouflage of an external-cum-international security threat. The refugee crisis 
was literally amplified by the continued logistical and moral support which the refugee 
warriors were receiving from some members of the government of Zaire (Now The 
Democratic Republic of Congo), who were particularly acting as somewhat conduits for 
arms to the refugee warriors from other external actors who were optimistic and 
opportunistic that continued incursions by the warriors would turn into a formidable force 
to undermine and consequently overthrow the RPF government. It should be noted that 
Zaire was making a claim of having disarmed the former Rwandan Military and militia 
elements to the level of eighty percent (80%) but the whereabouts of the arms were not 
known.
587
   The Human Rights Watch Report of May 1995 reported that the heavy 
weaponry, including: French-Made AML 60 and AML 90 armored cars, 120mm armored 
mortar carriers, anti aircraft guns, rocket launchers, howitzers, mortars and military 
trucks, which the ex-FAR sneaked with into Zaire; where being serviced and kept at 
Zaire military base but under the maintenance of the ex-FAR soldiers.
588
 This means that 
the ex-FAR were in control of these armories and could use them when need arose.  This 
left room for doubt that probably they were clandestinely handed back to the militias.  
 
To the external actors like France, the new regime in Kigali was destined to be short-
lived, and was considered to be illegitimate among many Rwandans.
589
 The Human 
Rights Watch notes that France, Zaire and South Africa directly supplied arms and 
facilitated the insurgents with military training.  Nationals of France are reported to have 
participated in the training and re-skilling of the former Rwanda army in exile and that 
the authorities in France were in the know as of these clandestine activities presided over 
by their nationals.
590
 UNAMIR intelligence and the UN and NGOs reports seemed to 
give currency to the allegations that the Government of France was arming the Hutu 
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militias in Goma.
591
 It is also reported that arms shipments from Eastern Europe and 
China were reaching the Hutu camps under the facilitation of the Government of Zaire 
and that Mobutu (the then President of Zaire) was au fait with the system of the 
activities.
592
 As far as arms deals for the Hutus were concerned the former Intelligence 
Officer of the UPDF had this to add: 
 
It was not just the French, links had been connected by the Hutus to USA and 
Russian firms who were dealing in arms in exchange for minerals in Eastern 
Congo were the Rwandan Hutu former leaders had joined in the timber, copper, 
Gold, Diamond and Uranium business. Former Hutu ministers who sought refuge 
in Congo already had their contacts in Europe and USA. They had money to 
sustain fire (meaning violence) against Kigali. In Uganda we knew through our 
informers in Eastern Congo (sic). We had infiltrated the Hutu ranks with 
informers because we knew that they threatened Rwanda and us. You remember 
the attack of the Interahamwe on the 14 tourists who had gone to visit the Bwindi 
National Park (in reference to the kidnapping of the 14 tourists of which 8 were 
killed when the interahamwe militias raided the Bwindi National Park in Uganda 
in 1999).
593
 
 
According to the International legal regime governing refugees, the onus is upon the host 
state to ensure the demilitarization of refugee camps. Tanzania was able to disarm the 
refugee warriors on entry into its territory and thwarted further refugee militarization,
594
 
most probably owing to it state capacity and not harbouring any political agenda. Zaire, 
owing largely to its political interests and the lack of state capacity to disarm the 
refugees,
595
 it did not only allow the senior Hutu refugees warriors free movement in 
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Zaire with Zairian military escorts, it also diplomatically defended them.
596
  Payne Lucas, 
the Co-Chair of the High Level Presidential Mission to Central Africa, while 
summarizing the report of his mission to Rwanda and Zaire, he  particularly decried the 
fact that  the armed forces of Zaire,  instead of bringing sanity in the camps, they became  
party to the insecurity in camps.
597
 They engaged in looting and shooting to scare way the 
victims of their machinations.
598
 The role of Zaire in this scheme of things fits into what 
Dennis McNamara, the UNHCR International Protection director, referred to as the 
``dramatization of the refugee problem`` as the refugee crisis was worsening.
599
 
 
Zaire private cargo companies were used to deliver arms shipments to the refugee 
warriors. Zaire Military officers acted as middle-men between the Hutu warriors and the 
arms dealers.  Nigerian arm traffickers were shipping arms into Goma,
600
 and it is 
unlikely that elements of the Zaire army were not accomplices. Zaire officials even 
assisted in the setting up of military-cum-civilian camps on the Zaire border with 
Rwanda; contrary to the ``ladder of options`` of the UNHCR concerning the security of 
refugees.
601
  Land was availed to the refugee warriors in North Kivu to set-up a military 
camp which disguised as a civilian camp and code named Lac Vert, and a military base 
was created at Bukavu-Pazi camp for the ex-FAR and the interahamwe militias. The 
disguising of military camps into civilian camps epitomized the manipulation of the 
rather humanitarian concern: refugees, to further political ends.  
 
In south Kivu, another military camp, code named Bilongue was secretly created to act as 
a training facility for ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, and small military camps in Uvira 
region of Zaire; co-existed with civilian camps in Kamanyola, Kanganiro, Lubarika, 
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Luvungi, and Luberizi.  A strategic camp was created on Idjwi Island in Lake Kivu for 
direct military incursions into Rwanda. The Provincial Government of the South Kivu 
region of Zaire (now DRC) was particularly very helpful to the former Hutu leadership 
and it ``vocally`` championed the Hutu cause. As such, South Kivu hosted a considerable 
number of the members of the former Hutu leadership including: The former President, 
Justice Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister. The argument was that their exile was a 
passing situation and that sooner than later they were to claim their leadership from the 
RPF.
602
  
 
The International Community, most especially the members of the UN. Security Council 
together with other United Nations agencies; were slow at reaching a solution to the 
problem of refugee warriors, thus leaving Rwanda with but one option: Self defense.
603
 
Even when Sadako Ogata, the then High Commissioner for refugees disclosed it to the 
United Nations Secretary General at the end of August 1994, proposing measures through 
which the problem of the militarization of camps would be addressed, of which was the 
creation of multilateral peace keeping force, as the Zairian authorities were weak and 
biased to address the problem; the Security Council remained indifferent to his 
proposal.
604
 
 
France particularly sustained the military survival of the former Rwanda genocide regime 
even in exile.  It is reported that a French Military training facility in the Central African 
Republic was used to facilitate continued military training for the refugee warriors.
605
  
France used Zaire  as a  somewhat proxy
606
 through which it continued to deliver military 
logistics to the Hutu refugee warriors, and Mobutu was fronted as peace maker in the 
region, but championing Francophonie interests.
607
 External actors for all intent and 
purpose aided a resurgence of violence in Rwanda, and this saw a somewhat convergence 
                                                          
602
 165577. 
603
 Adelman, The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire, 1997 .  
604
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World Refugees, The Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath, 2000,  251 
605
 Human Rights Watch, Rwanda/Zaire, Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the 
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide May 1995. 
606
 Gasarase, The Rwanda Conflict, 1995, 27. 
607
 See, Adelman, The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire, 1997. 
225 
 
of security threats leading to a security dilemma complex (due to the involvement of 
external actors)  and insecurity dilemma complex (because the section of the population 
in Rwanda, more so in Western Rwanda countenanced the activities of the Hutu 
insurrectionists)
608
 for Rwanda, and a regional security complex
609
 for other countries 
within the Great Lakes Region, a complex which  culminated into the ``African First 
World War`` as competently delineated by Gerald Prunier.
610
   
 
The Hutu refugees engaged in all the five levels of political violence as they are known: 
attacks between the sending state and the refugees, attacks between the receiving state 
and the refugees, ethnic or factional violence among the refugees, internal violence 
within the receiving state, and interstate war or unilateral intervention as delineated by 
Lischer.
611
 For the purpose of this study, the discourse obtains from the ``attacks between 
the sending state (Rwanda) and the refugees (Hutu refugees in Zaire) ``, in a bid to 
explain how human security issues served to fuel that level of violence   So, to the 
Rwandan state, the refugees were a security threat which had to be dealt with decisively; 
if a semblance of peace was to return to Rwanda.  
 
If human security is the absence of fear and the presence a negative indicator of human 
insecurity, then, the fear which led to what has been described as one of the largest 
refugee flow ever witnessed; later undermined the security of the Rwandan state, 
threatening a resurgence of violence to undermine the already fragile peace. This is a 
pointer to the convergence of human and state security, a somewhat ``security dialectics`` 
of a special kind. 
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The refugees, as earlier indicated feared revenge from the Tutsi and the wrath of the Ex-
FAR and the interahamwe if they refused to evacuate Rwanda. However, they also had to 
grapple with lack of freedom from want.  This lack of freedom from want was a result of 
lack of access to enough human needs, and this situation was also exploited by the 
refugee warriors who started using the access to the needs like food, medicine and water, 
as a somewhat chip to control the refugees in camps.  
 
With a doubt, the refugees in camps wanted food, and the Ex-FAR and the interahamwe 
tactfully took control of the camps, but mostly food distribution.
612
 Apart from using food 
to elicit loyalty, they also misappropriated it to feed the warriors who were in the direct 
line of duty in the incursions against Rwanda. This was because refugee warriors were at 
the helm of the activities of the UNHCR and the United Nations Security had not 
countenanced a military force to demilitarize the camps.
613
 The Human Rights Watch 
particularly verified that at Pazi and Lac Vert, military camps disguised as civilian 
refugee camps, the warriors kept children in order to hoodwink the International Non 
Government Organisations into continued   delivery of food supplies to them. Even in 
civilian camps, food distribution was hijacked by the warriors to elicit loyalty from the 
bonafide refugees.
614
  In Mugunga camp, WORLD VISION relied on prefecture 
leadership, who were often Hutu refugee warriors or their sympathizers; to distribute 
food until they rolled-out of the camp in mid-1995.
615
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Accordingly, many refugees went with less or no food leading to under-nutrition and 
malnutrition in the adults and children respectively.
616
 Daniel H. Waterman precisely put 
malnutrition among Children in some camps as follows: 
Table: 4 
Frequency of acute malnutrition in camps according to population surveys in children 
aged between 6-59 months. 
 
Camp  Date  Sample size  Percentage of Children 
 
 
Overall 
Percent with 
malnutrition  
(95% C1) Moderate 
Malnutrition  
Severe 
Malnutrition  
Katale Aug 4 567 16.6 6.5 23.1 
(18.3-28.7) 
Kibumba Aug 9 694 17.1 3.0 20.1 
(16.1-25.0) 
Mugunga  Aug 13 723 14.4 3.3 17.7 
(15.0-21.0) 
 
Moderate malnutrition= weight-for-height z score less than -2 but more than -3  
(Between 2 and 3 standard deviations below reference population mean): severe 
malnutrition= weight-for-height z score less than -3 or oedema. 
 
Adopted from: Daniel H. Waterman, Journey after Darkness: A study of Goma, Zaire in 
1994: Cholera and Clean Water (Appendix, Table 2) Capstone Project, 2004. 
 
Indeed, at the fall of October, 1996, the Spokesperson of United Nations Security 
Council, Sylvana Foa lamented of the overwhelming scarcity of food  noting that what 
was available was only enough to feed the refugees for a week.
617
  Children were the 
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worst affected by the food shortages leading to increase in cases of malnutrition.
618
 The 
scarcity of basic needs was overwhelming that according to the World Food Programme 
and the UNHCR, at least 600 tons of food and one million gallons of water per day were 
needed for refugees in the Goma areas.
619
 Hutu refugee warriors, even where there were 
real food shortages; they picked the opportunity by exploiting the inadequate flow of 
information from the aid agencies to sustain their propaganda saying that the food 
shortages were artificial shortages aimed at starving refugees to death.
620
  Indeed the very 
quick cost in terms of human security was ultimately death, with the UNHCR estimating 
that by 2006, one thousand people, majority of them refugees, were dying in Eastern 
Congo; each day and, some were starving to death, whereas others were succumbing to 
disease and violence in camps.
621
 Food shortages undermined the survival of the 
refugees, yet survival is the single most pillar of human security. But food shortages and 
food distribution as issues inclined to human security were later intertwined into state 
security concerns as food in its human simplicity was manipulated by the refugee 
warriors to serve their political objectives of holding at a ransom though, a considerable 
number of refugees in camps.  
 
It should be reiterated that by  using food as a way of controlling the refugees, the 
warriors were manipulating the necessity of human needs which guarantee human 
survival—human security; to legitimize and sustain their political objectives which were 
being pursued through violent means. The humanitarian agencies were deeply concerned 
that in their provision of relief, they were aiding insurgents who committed the genocide. 
International NGOs grappled with an ``ethical dilemma`` whether to cease their 
humanitarian, or to continue with relief but to the benefit of the insurgents.
622
 Doing the 
former would have meant condemning the innocent refugees to death.  Many NGOs 
threatened to pull out, and there were suggestions of withdrawing the provision of food in 
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order to ensure that refugees repatriate; a suggestion that Sadako Ogata of the UNHCR 
scoffed at as a measure that was against Humanitarian principles.
623
  
 
However,  two Ambassadors of the United States,  Inderfurth and Marrero partitioned 
Ambassador Albright to put to the United Nations High Commissioner, Mr. Sadako 
Ogata that, `` ...a large portion of the humanitarian assistance meant for Rwandan 
refugees(was) being siphoned off by middle-men``,
624
 the ``middle men`` were 
particularly the former Hutu leaders and militias, and to the Government of Rwanda this 
move strengthened the former Hutu leaders-turned into refugee warriors as they used 
food as a leverage to elicit loyalty from the civilian(bonafide) refugees.
625
   The 
International Rescue Committee particularly indicated in November 1994 that it was to 
withdraw its personnel from Goma refugee camps which were a den of former Hutu 
leadership and the genocide militias. Indeed on November 3
rd
 1994 in Nairobi, 15 NGOs 
of which were: International Rescue Committee (IRC), Médecins San Frontiers 
(Belgium, France, Holland), CARE (Canada, USA, UK, others), ARC, OXFAM UK, 
MDM, issued a statement in which they decried the appalling security situation in the 
refugee camps in the Eastern Zaire. They specified but five conditions which they 
deemed necessary for the effective provision of relief in the camps. The conditions were: 
separation of ring leaders (genocide ring leaders) from remaining refugees, removal of 
arms from camps, and establishment of adequate security for an independent registration, 
unimpeded delivery of assistance and ``freedom of choice`` for refugees to repatriate.
626
   
 
MSF (Belgium) subsequently pulled out of Kibumba camps as a result of the unceasing 
threats against its members of staff. 
627
 Food which is a sacrosanct necessity of life was 
being manipulated by the former Hutu leaders in their dire quest to maintain a firm grip 
on the refugee population in camps. The catastrophe of this scheme of things is 
particularly put graphically by the USA Cable to its concerned embassies with subject: 
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An overview of the Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire, whose details were partially as 
follows: 
 
The indirect food distribution confronts relief workers with a moral and ethical 
quandary. They have no way of ensuring that vulnerable populations in the camp, 
such as pregnant women and female headed households are getting their fair 
share. They have every reason to suspect, however, that the powerful and the 
unscrupulous—many of them closely connected to the Interim Government and 
the genocide… are appropriating the bulk of donated goods and reselling them on 
the burgeoning black market.
628
 
 
Being in charge of camps gave them the privilege of numbers to be used as a bargaining 
chip in anticipated future negotiations, and an opportunity to siphon humanitarian 
assistance for their use. The former Hutu leadership demanded control of the distribution 
of relief and any attempt by the aid agencies to remove control of relief from them was 
met with stiff resistance from the side of the former leadership a phenomenon which 
ended up interrupting the distribution of relief items.
629
 It was reported that when the 
UNCHR decided to provide the plastic sheeting directly to refugees, the Hutu leadership 
in camps protested strongly.
630
 
 
 Also, incidents where relief workers were threatened by ex-FAR soldiers and militias 
with hand grenades and machetes during the distribution of food and non-food items 
were often reported.
631
 The Head of ``Care Canada`` had to leave Goma after receiving 
death threats from the Hutu militias,
632
 and ``Care Canada`` subsequently pulled out of 
Katale camp.
633
  The UNHCR had to suspend registration of refugees as a result of 
threats against its staff by the militias.
634
 The failure of the registration exercise 
                                                          
628
 165577. 
629
 See, 165235, 165577. 
630
 165099. 
631
 See, 165106, 165244. 
632
 165236. 
633
 MSF, Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Repatriation virtually at standstill, Special Report, 
July, 20, 1995, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?=1467  
634
 See, 165242, 165577. 
231 
 
undermined the planning process of the UNHCR which was aimed at streamlining food 
distribution to put it at the family level; a measure which was aimed at minimizing the 
misappropriation of food and other relief items by the camp leaders.
635
  
 
The leadership of the UNHCR was specifically worried of the concomitants of the 
activities of the refugee warriors which had been and continued to be as follows; a 
reduced flow of spontaneous voluntary repatriation movement to Rwanda, candidates for 
return being intimidated or otherwise victimized, a diversion of sizeable amount of relief 
items to the benefit of ``leaders`` for other undeserving persons and to the detriment of 
needy genuine refugees, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children and the 
elderly, a disruption of the delivery  of assistance because of threats leveled against relief 
workers, a resistance to orderly registration of refugees in order to streamline the 
distribution system, and a persistent attempt by the leaders to control and take over the 
day-to-day running of the camps. 
636
 
 
The worriment of the UNHCR leadership was further corroborated by the United States 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell`s letter of 18
th 
October, 1994 to the Secretary of State of the United States, in which she decried the 
deteriorating security situation in the refugee camps in the Eastern part of Zaire. She 
noted that the crisis was not only undermining the lives of refugees but also a recipe for 
future violence by the militias against the government of Rwanda. To her such a scheme 
of things would inadvertently lead to, ``…an early preemptive strike against the ex-FAR 
by the RPA``.
637
 This pointed to the possible resurgence of violence which came to pass 
as this study brings it to bear, but later in the discussion. Bushnell`s sentiments point to 
the convergence of human and state security concerns along the continuum of the Hutu 
refugee saga.  Human security concerns as a result of the predicament of the bonafide 
refugees converged with the state security concerns as epitomized by the activities of the 
refugee warriors against Rwanda; to concomitantly lead to a resurgence of violence; a 
``security dialectic`` of a special kind was manifest in that historical saga whose effects 
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continue to shape and shake the scheme of the security architecture of not only political 
Rwanda, but also the political Great Lakes Region of the African continent as we know it 
in the present. But this study is in retrospect, further studies; by way of replicating this, 
may concentrate on the historicity of the present security architecture of the region, by 
drawing on the concerns of this study to fathom the security policies of the states in the 
region in their political present.   
 
However, it deserves reiteration and further delineation that the former Hutu leadership, 
for all intents and purposes, from the control of camps, they sought the benefits of being 
perceived as a legitimate political force, and to them this would legitimize their political 
schemes and their incursions into Rwanda.
638
  Indeed a semblance of legitimacy was 
somehow attained by the former leaders as foreign dignitaries gave them a platform to 
listen to their views whenever they visited camps. Instructive of this is the speech which 
Bagezaho J.M. Vianney, the Hutu leader of Kashusha camp on the outskirts of Bukavu 
made before the delegation which was led by the USA Defence Attaché. In that speech 
Vianney lambasted the Government of Rwanda for failing to honour its obligations 
according to the Arusha Peace Agreements and the Protocols. He noted that the refugee 
were not to return unless the concerns are dealt with to the letter.
639
 The former Hutu 
leaders believed that the strength of their legitimacy would subsequently be used to see 
an ``extensive power-sharing as a precondition for reconciliation and repatriation``.
640
  
Kagame, the then Vice President and Minister of Defence of Rwanda was particularly 
concerned that the former Hutu leaders were to manipulate the plight of the refugees 
whom they held hostage; to bargain for amnesty.
641
  That is why the new government in 
Kigali believed in a strategy which would ensure that refugees return home as a way of 
delegitimizing the actions of the elements of the former regime.  To that effect, in its 
report to the President of the United States, the United States Delegation to Rwanda, 
Burundi and Zaire observed thus: 
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The motivations of the former government leadership seem clear: as long as they 
can retain control of a sizeable portion of the Rwandan population outside the 
country, they will remain a viable force. Should they lose the refugee population, 
they would be nothing but criminals in exile.
642
 
 
With many refugees still in Congo; the security of Rwanda was threatened. This indicates 
that if refugees, in their lived experiences, faced human insecurities, and because their 
human insecurities were constantly manipulated by political schemers, then, a somewhat 
``security dialectic`` existed between human and state security, in the body politics of 
Rwanda during  post-conflict reconstruction and resources had to be husbanded and 
forces marshaled to thwart such a security threat. But the human insecurity burden on the 
refugees was overwhelming. 
 
Expectedly, refugees grappled with the burden of disease, more so water borne diseases 
of which Cholera was monumental as a result of poor sanitation in the camps were 
latrines were nonexistent and sewer mixed with the available fresh waters of Lake 
Kivu.
643
  The first case of Cholera was clinically identified in July 18 1994, but by 
August of the same year 62,000 new cases had been identified with an infection rate of 
7.3%-16% and fatality rates of 25%-50%. The rate of the infection; particularly the 
scientific probability was high that the camps, in Goma, Mugunga, Kibumba and Katale 
were entirely engulfed by the epidemic as a result of a cholera strain which  was 
identified as Vibrio Cholerae 01 El tor.
644
  Though with a touch of exaggeration Claude 
Kayobokye, in Nyabugogo-Kigali Rwanda, a returnee from Mugunga camp, commenting 
about cholera outbreak he said that: Mugunga was a terribly crowded place and people 
were dying of cholera like flies``.
645
   Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner estimated 
that before the intervention of the international aid agencies, the Cholera and dysentery 
outbreak had claimed more than 30,000 refugees.
646
 It was reported on July 19
th
, 1994 
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that approximately one refugee was dying per minute as a result of cholera, dehydration 
and exhaustion.
647
 Later on July 29
th
 1994, it was reported  that over 18,000 refugees had 
already succumbed to Cholera, hunger, exhaustion and dehydration, but Cholera 
accounted for most of these deaths with a rate of 3,000 dying per day in the Goma area, 
and that by that time an approximation of about 50,000-80,000 refugees were estimated 
to be infected with cholera.
648
   Anne Marie Huby of the Doctors without Borders is 
quoted by Adelman putting the number of those who succumbed to Cholera and 
dysentery at 50,000,
649
 a figured reechoed by Ray Wilkinson in 1997,
650
 and 
countenanced by Johan Pottier.
651
 The number of those who died as a result of the cholera 
epidemic is generally anecdotal for some died in their hiding without reaching the 
hospitals. But given the lethal nature of cholera; many died if we are to go by the survey 
which was done at Mugunga camp where it was reported that of the 62,000 diarrhoea 
cases which were clinically reported, 35,500 were positive of cholera and that of the 
47,500 clinically reported death, 23,800 were pathologically related to cholera.
652
   
 
The toll of disease related conditions was high on children. The Ndosha Children Camp 
which was housing about 3,000 Rwandan children grappled with the increased number of 
deaths as a result of cholera, malnutrition, dehydration, dysentery and pneumonia that 
one hundred nine children died in the camp during the week that preceded that of 
Tuesday, August 2, 1994.
653
 Scarcity of clean water and lack of enough access to 
medicines complicated the disaster.  Indeed the increased provision of clean water in the 
Goma Camps saw a steady decline in the rate of infection and deaths as a result of 
cholera. For instance, from the statistics presented by the UNHCR as of 29 July, 1994, 
the rate of deaths fell from 27 percent to 1.7 percent between the dates 23-27 July, 
1994.
654
 Whereas catering for the needs of such a large number of refugees was complex 
a task, the outbreak of cholera pushed the burden beyond manageable limits. The 
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international community was alarmed by the extent of the outbreak, and indeed relief 
efforts were forthcoming; that it was reported in August 4, 1994 that adequate provision 
of relief in terms of water, food and medicine had reduced by more than half the number 
of deaths from about 1,800 per day in the week that preceded that of fourth August to 
about 800 a day in the week of 4
th
 August.
655
  
 
Without a doubt, the cholera outbreak constituted a great human insecurity, but to be 
equally, manipulated by the warriors. To them any threat to the refugees was an 
opportunity for them to gain more legitimacy and control of the camps and their human 
occupants. 
 
The distribution of medicines was done under the supervision of the Hutu administrators 
in order for them to ensure that combatants, their family members and loyalists are 
treated first. At night when relief workers left the treatment centers, the Hutu warriors 
forced patients to vacate, and replaced them with their cohorts.
656
  This level of ``grave 
yard politics`` increased the influence of the Ex-FAR and interahamwe who wanted to 
remain as the legitimate voice of refugees and thus legitimize their violent political 
schemes against the regime in Kigali. This portended a security threat to Kigali, but with 
a human security dimension, a clear pointer to the ``security dialectics`` between human 
and state security. 
 
The personal security of the de-jure refugees as opposed to that of the de-facto 
refugees—refugee warriors was also constantly undermined by many factors but most 
importantly the xenophobic human agents in the Congo who viewed them as competitors 
when it came to land and a favoured lot as they had access to human needs like free food 
and medicines from aid agencies.
657
  It should be outlined that the animosity between the 
``indigenous`` Congolese ethnic groups and the descendants of the Rwandan migrants 
who earlier settled in Eastern Congo had led to a somewhat chain of conflicts, only to be 
intensified by the massive entry of the Hutu refugees from Rwanda in 1994 and that:  
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``The 1994 inflow of a million Rwandan Hutu refugees into the camps around 
Goma, North Kivu`s Provincial capital, (aggravated) local sensitivities about an 
emerging Banyarwanda majority``
658
 
 
Indeed by March 1995, sporadic ethnic violence had already started in Eastern Congo 
with 100 people being killed in the East of Masisi area in October 1994 with 
approximately 75,000 displaced. Also in the area of North West Kivu the Heretofore and 
Tembo ``indigenous tribes`` clashed with the Banyarwanda in the area including the Hutu 
refugees. In the areas of Ruthsuru, Mweso and Bibwe, the Nande people engaged in 
running battles with the Banyarwanda in those areas.
659
 So, the Hutu refugee crisis served 
to worsen even the conflictual situations in Eastern Zaire (now DRC). This undermined 
the existence of refugees who escaped violence but to find themselves in more violent 
situations. Their personal security was at stake, sore put by the appalling living 
conditions in camps, coercion by the former Hutu leaders and militias, and then the 
violent hatred from the natives. So, they looked up to the former Hutu leaders and 
militias for protection for the government of Zaire and the aid agencies could not 
guarantee their security. The former Hutu leaders won the loyalty of the Hutu bonafide 
refugees on the bait of protection from threats including that from the native tribes. To 
the former Hutu leaders and militias now-turned-into-refugee warriors this was a political 
point well scored for they wanted total control of the refugees as bait for recognition by 
both the Government of Rwanda and the International community.    
 
Also their personal freedom was undermined further by the actions of the warriors among 
them who demanded loyalty and any suspicion of sabotage would be punished. Men were 
killed over suspicion of disloyalty, and many were forced and cajoled into joining the 
activities of the warriors. Apart from delineating the urgency of a military solution to the 
refugee warrior problem in Eastern Zaire, the Dengui-Segui Report to the United Nations 
Secretary General delineated how the ordinary refugee were living in constant fear and at 
the mercy of their captors—the Hutu refugee warriors who would kill and maim anyone 
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who dared to oppose their edicts.
660
 To the warriors, the only way of ensuring the control 
of the de-jure refugees was to create an aura of fear in the camps by curtailing people´s 
freedom of movement.
661
 An attempt to repatriate oneself was forbidden and heavily 
punished, and would be construed as disloyalty. As regards how the personal security of 
the refugees was undermined by the violent schemes of the Hutu warriors in camps, one 
Hutu refugee who decide to engage in secondary movements from Zaire to Kyenjubu 
Estate, Kyaka, Kagera District of Tanzania who was only identified through his Hutu 
relative now a trader in Nyabugogo Market in Kigali City had this to say in Kinyarwanda, 
that: 
They used to force us to do raids with grenades and machetes on villages in 
Rwanda near the Congo border. They had whistles which they used to alert all 
those who had been selected to participate into night raids. If they found you 
sleeping in your hut, they burnt it (sic). They could wallop you in front of your 
wife and children. I participated in some raids. From Goma we used to go even as 
far as Gitarama. I had to run to Tanzania one night.  I was tired of forcing me to 
fight. I do not know how I survived, my wife managed to escape with the children 
a day before.  Now I fear going back to Rwanda because of my participation in 
the raids, but I would have loved to go back. Here I leave like a Tanzanian 
because people here resemble us; they are almost Banyarwanda but in Tanzanian 
territory.
662
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The location map of the informant is as follows: 
 
Map 3: Map of Tanzania indicating the location of Kyenjubu Estate, Study Area, in Tanzania 
 
 
The strict control of the refugees by the warriors saw the repatriation campaign by RPF 
government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees together with other 
agencies a fiasco. Even by October 1994 refugees were still flowing into Goma as a result 
of the intimidation campaign by the elements of the former regime that they were about 
to start violent incursions into Rwanda.
663
 In fear of violence; those who were intending 
to return to Rwanda stayed put and those who had remained in Rwanda continued to seek 
refuge. The RPF government wanted refugees to return home saying that those who were 
not guilty of the genocide had nothing to fear.
664
 The International Community believed 
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that the only way of solving the refugee crisis at its concomitant situations was to ensure 
the voluntary repatriation of refugees, and according to the Press Guidance of July 29
th
 
1994, sent to all the concerned embassies of the United States of America, the United 
States was to: 
… to continue to believe that the best way to resolve the Rwandan Refugee crisis 
is for the refugees to return home voluntarily as quickly as they can safely do so. 
Even with full scale deployment of all available resources, the International 
Community cannot meet the needs of over a million refugees crowded into a 
small corner of Zaire
665
  
 
But refugees were being held hostage
666
 in camps by the members of the former regime, 
and the outcome was the continued recruitment of warriors from the camps and training 
them in- there; in preparation for a full-blown civil-war.
667
  The elements of the former 
genocide regime had strong propaganda and intimidation machinery that warned refugees 
of the impeding arrests and massacres presided over by the RPF government if they 
return. It was also put to the refugees that those who dared to return would be persecuted 
if the Hutu return to power.
668
 Former military and militia members were at the centre of 
the execution of the intimidation and terror campaign against those who intended to 
repatriate.
669
  The ordinary refugees lived in ``perpetual fear`` which grossly undermined 
their decision making for even when condition were reportedly favourable for their return 
to Rwanda, they could not dare return for fear of the repercussions.
670
 An elusive mobile 
Radio Transmitter was reported in the refugee camps; humming propaganda, and warning 
the refugees of the dangers of returning Rwanda.
671
  Newspapers and pamphlets carrying 
extremist material also circulated in the camps.
672
  It is reported that an extremist 
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pamphlet authored by the former Justice Minister of Rwanda in the former Interim 
Government of Rwanda was on sale in the kiosks in the Bukavu Hutu refugee catchment 
area.
673
  The relief agencies reported finding bodies of people who were being killed in 
the night by suspected Hutu extremists as a way of threatening those who wanted to 
return.
674
  
 
It was reported that when one village elder started encouraging his people to return to 
Rwanda, he was killed in front of them by the militia leaders.  The former game warders 
who were being returned to Rwanda by the UNCHR to take on their duties; were pulled 
off the vehicles, beaten-up and many were imagined to have died in captivity.
675
  The 
young refugees who were volunteering as boy scouts; helping returning refugees to board 
transport in Katale camp were murdered the early October of 1994. 
676
 In November 
1994, near the International Rescue Committee`s hospital in Goma (Kibumba camp) 
returnees who had went back to the camps to report on the congenial conditions inside 
Rwanda for returnees; were beaten by the elements of the Hutu warriors.
677
  The Hutu 
refugee warriors were ruthless and uncompromising when it came to consolidating the 
number of refugees in the camps.  Control of refugee masses in camps were their ``last 
political card`` to justify the legitimacy of their demands and schemes.
678
  Peter Hansen, 
the United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency 
Relief Coordinator (1994-1996) put the situation of fear and anguish in the Hutu Zaire 
refugees camps as a, ``Totalitarian reign of terror``. 
679
 
 
However, even some events in Rwanda served to scare the returnees, and that efforts by 
the Government to create a congenial environment for the safe return of refugees lacked 
commitment. Cyprian F. Fisiy observes that the returnees and those who intended to 
return were overwhelmed by fear as a result of the: Presumption of guilt, fear of arrest, 
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and disputes over occupied property.
680
  Elements within the RPF unleashed violence 
against the Hutus to avenge the genocide.
681
 The massacre at Kibeho camp; Southwestern 
Rwanda in April 1995 served to scare the more those who had intentions of repatriating. 
The 32 page Manifesto released in November 1994, by Prime Minister Twagiramungu`s 
Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) highlighted the inherent flaws within the 
operations of the RPF- led government which served to undermine the reconciliation of 
the nation and thus creating a sense of mistrust in the government among the Hutu 
population. This trend of events consequently undermined even the return of refugees. 
The inherent weaknesses were: reprisals, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and detention 
of the accused in military (rather than prison) facilities and confiscation of property. The 
document also referred to atrocities which were and were being committed by the RPA 
troops as ``Double Genocide`` which had to be investigated.
682
  
 
Also when the RPA had of the infiltration of the Internally Displaced People`s Camps 
(IDP camps) with the Interahamwe, it used a somewhat earth scotched policy- burning 
the Musenge camp in Gikongoro prefecture causing but seven deaths.  It was also 
reported in March 1995 that one returnee was arrested per convoy as the UNHCR was 
repatriating refugees from Goma, Eastern Zaire to Rwanda.
683
 Arbitrary arrests were 
monumental that it was reported in April 1995 that approximately 1500 Hutus were being 
arrested on a weekly basis and put under deplorable detention conditions
684
. Indeed the 
number of those in detention centres had reached 30,000 by March 1995.
685
  This served 
to threaten the refugees who wanted to return to Rwanda and undermined to the 
reconciliation process.
686
 The UNHCR stopped facilitating repatriation after Musenge 
camp massacre.
687
  
 
                                                          
680
 Cyprian F. Fisiy, Of Journeys and Border Crossings: Return of Refugees, Identity, and Reconstruction 
in Rwanda, African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Apr., 1998), pp. 17-28, African Studies Association, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/524679, accessed: 03/06/2013 13:12.  
681
 165548. 
682
 165543. 
683
 166220. 
684
 166213. 
685
 166227. 
686
 165558. 
687
 UNHCR, The State of the World Refugees, The Rwandan Genocide and its aftermath: 2000, 255. 
242 
 
As a result many ordinary refugees preferred dying of cholera than returning to Rwanda 
to be killed by the RPF.
688
  Some NGOs also served to undermine the repatriation process 
as they tried to convince the UNCHR and UNAMIR officials not repatriate the refugees; 
arguing that they had the infrastructure to cater for the needs of refugees, and that in 
Rwanda such care for the refugees would not be forthcoming.  The NGOs were 
profiteering from the crisis and wanted to sustain the status quo.
689
 Meanwhile the crisis 
was worsening and  this constituted a continuous security threat to Rwanda as the 
warriors kept growing in their combative strength that a full blown resurgence of 
violence, a somewhat civil-war took place in Northern Rwanda as the warriors could 
easily replenish their ranks by recruiting from the ordinary refugees whose personal 
insecurity was manipulated.  
 
To discourage repatriation the more, terrorist activities by the Hutu warriors targeted 
mostly the repatriated Hutu refugees who had settled mostly in Northwestern Rwanda, 
and this increased the fear among those who had not yet returned that all was not well 
even in Rwanda, and Hutu refugees  were forcefully put into battle zones to act as human 
shields. Those who were hesitant to cooperate were mostly killed. 
690
  Indeed, it is not a 
moment to isolate when we read that when Rwanda adopted a military force strategy 
against the refugee warriors in 1996, ordinary refugees were assembled by the warriors 
around the Mugunga camp to act as buffers to the military counterinsurgency activities of 
the RPF. A ``carpet of bodies`` was later seen.
691
 Rwanda was looking up to the 
International community to intervene to stop refugee warrior incursions into its borders, 
but the call was least heeded.
692
 The human insecurity of the Hutus as a result of their 
refugee status was manipulated in a rather violently primitive manner by the former Hutu 
leaders in their quest for political survival and political power a trend of events that 
points to how human security concerns can converge with state security concerns to 
cause a resurgence of violence. The Hutu warrior phenomenon in all its intricacies posed 
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a military threat to Rwanda, but the sustenance of that threat obtained largely from the 
manipulation of the predicament of the bonafide refugees which border on human 
insecurities.  
 
Clearly, personal insecurity persisted that the refugees who could not handle the pressure 
engaged in secondary movements, escaping from camps under the control of warriors. 
They   moved either in the interior of Congo or to other countries like Tanzania and 
Uganda, for they could not easily return to Rwanda for fear of vengeance.  The refugees 
were fearful of the militias in the camps, and what awaited them on return to Rwanda—
fearing reprisal attacks and living in destituteness for they anticipated that they could not 
reclaim their property. Indeed, fifty thousand Tusti returnees from the refugee caseloads 
of 1950´s and 1960´s were reclaiming their land and homes contrary to the provisions of 
the Arusha Agreement that had speculated that land rights would only be restored to 
those who had left in the past 10 years before the signing of the agreement in August 4
th
, 
1994.
693
 This brought tension among the Hutus who remained and those who intended to 
return from the refugee camps.
694
 Some were too poor and tired to endure the long 
distance trek back to Rwanda.
695
  These factors served to militate against the return of the 
Hutu refugees to Rwanda. Concerns of personal security, property security were central 
in this scheme of things. To that effect, the international community, specifically the 
United States; a safe return by the refugees to Rwanda would partly be guaranteed by the 
attempts of the: 
 
``NGOs … to set up minimal humanitarian infrastructure which (could) offer 
returning population (with) personal security, food security and security of 
property as they (recommenced) their lives on Rwanda`s Thousand Hills.``
696
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Indeed the centrality of human security concerns was manifest in this refugee saga with 
all its complexities, and many refugees weighing the lesser evil decided to remain 
literally under the captivity of the Ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. It should be emphasized 
that because the camps provided shelter to most of the refugees; and guarantee 
providence of basic needs, the refugees, interested in a semblance of a permanent place of 
abode, against all odds,  remained and surrendered their fate and loyalty to the Ex-FAR 
and Interahamwe. They were organized into communes. The former Hutu leaders 
replicated the administrative structures that were present in Rwanda before the advent of 
the RPF. They organized refugees in prefectures, communes and sectors that in Kibumba 
camps eight of the ten Rwandan prefectures were replicated comprising of refugees from 
those areas with their leadership.
697
  
 
It should be noted that the camps of Kibumba and Katale which were north of Goma 
were notorious when it came to refugee control by the elements of the former regime. 
These camps comprised of refugees who came as groups from the Gisenyi area of 
Rwanda because when: ``… the Rwanda Interim Government in Gisenyi was falling, 
(and)whole neighbourhoods and villages, complete with local government structures 
arrived almost intact``.
698
 A neat system of administration, a somewhat government in 
exile which had been announced by 29
th
 November 1994 by the elements of the former 
regime, presided over matters of Hutu refugees and their encampments.
699
 It should be 
recalled that the entire civil-service; which comprised of 32,000 persons during the days 
of President Habyarimana, majority of which presided over the genocide, accompanied 
the refugees and tightly monitored them to avoid their return to Rwanda.
700
 The former 
army was reported to be intact in Zaire.
701
 Richard Orth notes that former commune 
leaders and military leaders were conscripted into the organization structure of camps, 
and they used the opportunity to continue levying taxes from the refugees who were 
working for the humanitarian agencies.
702
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The Hutu refugee warrior leadership had a cash economy that allowed them the capacity 
to sustain their activities, but this cash economy thrived on the refugee populations and 
the sustenance of that population through systematic fear and manipulation of their needs. 
In addition to the money, approximated at 17 billion Rwandese Francs; which the Hutu 
leadership looted from the Banks as they planned to exit Rwanda, was a shipment of 
20,000 tons of coffee with a value of approximately $50million dollars
703
 and 
government property like vehicles which they had looted from Rwanda on departure.  
Melvern writes that:  
 
``Anything that could be carried had been removed from Rwanda: corrugated-iron 
sheets, window frames, door handles. Whole factories were dismantled and taken 
into exile along with every working vehicle``
704
  
 
They also had an array of businesses from which enough revenue was collected, and had 
access to the money and to revenue which accrued to the Rwanda Government assets in 
foreign countries, including; Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire and the Netherlands.
705
 They used 
the delayed recognition of the legitimacy of the RPF led Government to continue 
benefiting from the assets of Rwanda.  They sold hoarded surpluses of relief supplies on 
black market as they over declared the number of refugees to relief agencies.  We are told 
that they operated a bus system within camps.
706
 The transport business system was 
facilitated by the large buses that had been donated by the Government of Japan to the 
Government of Rwanda.  The movements of the former Hutu leaders to Eastern Congo 
and around their strong hold in Goma was facilitated by the stolen United Nations 
vehicles, Government of Rwanda vehicles, stolen donor cars and stolen trucks.
707
  In 
other words they had enough logistical and financial capacity to continue exerting their 
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hegemony onto the refugee population.  As regards the money which they looted from 
the Banks in Rwanda, the United States embassy graphically put that the former Hutu 
leadership literally took, ``the Banks with them. State treasuries are virtually empty``.
708
 
Again it is the United States Embassy daily brief that succinctly put for us the nature of 
the cash economy that the former Hutu leadership presided over in refugee camps thus: 
 
A thriving commerce has grown up in the larger camps and between the camps 
and the local communities. Roadside vendors sell everything from relief goods to 
freshly-slaughtered beef to second hard shoes. An entrepreneur in the Kibumba 
camp makes cooking pots out of empty metal cooking-oil canisters, while an 
estimated 465 bar tenders sell beer in Red-light Districts of the Katale camp. 
Japanese-donated intercity buses commandeered by the FAR when they retreated 
from Rwanda now carry passengers between the North Kivu camps and Goma, 
presumably earning a tidy profit for their operations.
709
  
 
Theirs was a full government in exile with a semblance of a functioning economy. 
 
Indeed, whereas the RPF had won the war and was in charge of the Rwandan territory; 
the former Hutu leadership was also clinging onto the control of the Rwandan refugees 
by economically and politically profiteering from their predicament. The human security 
concerns of the refugees translated into the political survival catchment area of the former 
leaders-turned-refugee warriors who started plotting against the government of Rwanda;  
thus the convergence of human and state security;  a nexus of two security areas referred 
to as a ``security dialectic`` by this study.  
 
Also, because shelter is a basic need and camps guaranteed it, the control of the camps 
was not only of benefit when it came to supporting the claim for legitimacy by the Hutu 
warriors, but it also acted as a source of revenue through taxation. The Hutu refugees had 
to pay taxes to the warrior authorities.  The revenue was used for buying logistics to 
sustain their warrior activities. Camps were fortified so that repatriation became highly 
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improbable, and the strategy by the government of Rwanda to have all refugees 
repatriated, as a measure of guarantying security was undermined. The continued 
exploitation of the personal security and the general security of refugees continued to 
pose a threat to the security of the Rwandan state; a clear pointer to how human security 
concerns can concomitantly translate into state security concerns in countries emerging 
from violent conflicts. For Rwanda`s reconstruction to bare dividends it had to settle the 
refugee security threat of its frontiers. The issue of the refugee warriors served to 
undermine the stability of Rwanda that was necessary for kicking starting development 
oriented governance. The RPF led government was trying to marshal its forces and 
husband its meager resources; to forge a semblance of recognizable state capacity, but the 
logic was communicated in simple terms that for the government of Rwanda: 
 
To get security for its people and start up a viable economy, (it had to) deal with 
problems on its borders (for) two million refugees, who (are) yet to concede the 
Government`s victory, are destabilizing the whole region``.
710
  
 
Rwanda in its post-conflict situations was again caught in a fragile and fluid complex 
security situation that astronomically undermined its post-conflict reconstruction efforts 
for security as the cornerstone of development. The security complex which Rwanda had 
to grapple with obtained from the convergence of human security concerns with state 
security concerns dramatized in the refugee crisis that: 
 
Rwanda (found) itself surrounded by a constrictive belt of insecurity.  Hutu 
militias (were) able to launch frustration attacks from camps in Tanzania, 
Burundi, South and North Kivu.
711
 
 
From the catastrophe of the genocide, Rwanda had to grapple with the catastrophe of the 
convergence human insecurities and state insecurities, manifested in the refugee crisis 
which ironically was part of the outcomes of the end of the civil-war which culminated 
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into the genocide. A cycle of violence was in the offing as a result of the refugee 
warriors—ex-FAR, former leaders of government and Hutu militias. 
 
Accordingly, basing on the foregoing evidence from Rwanda, particularly during its post-
conflict reconstruction period, the study contends that a refugee phenomenon is generally 
a human security issue, but in instances where the predicament of refugees is manipulated 
to serve the interests of those who are interested in gaining and sustaining political 
objectives against, in the context of this study, their country of origin, then, the refugee 
phenomenon also becomes a threat to state security. This scheme of things epitomizes a 
somewhat ``security-dialectic``-- a metaphysical convergence of human security and state 
security along the continuum of a resurgence of violence in post-conflict situations. 
Addressing a refugee crisis which emerges as a concomitant of a conflict within the body 
politics of a given political entity thus becomes a matter of both human security and state 
security utility.  
 
So, the question emerges and it is addressed in the subsequent chapters that: How did the 
development in state capacity address the security threat that the refugee crisis posed to 
both the refugees and the security of Rwanda? 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 Developing State Capacity after Conflict: Towards the 
Rehabilitation of a Lame Leviathan. 
 
This Chapter obtains from the logic that state capacity is central to the post-conflict 
reconstruction process. The imperativeness of state capacity during post-conflict 
reconstruction is elucidated in the conceptual chapter of this study. Also, as elucidated in 
the conceptual Chapter of this study, there is a considerable debate as regards how 
government institutions should be organized as they approach development during post-
conflict reconstruction.   
 
By way of reiteration,  the recommended  approach to the reconstruction of the 
functionality of the state  has been generally a strict commitment to liberal peace;
712
 
which others have precisely put as liberal internationalism or the liberal internationalist 
paradigm which places great emphasis on democratic governance, economic reforms 
with a focus on marketisation-- a departure from state-led economization, security sector 
reforms with a focus demobilization and demilitarization of the different armed forces.
713
   
The liberal approach to post-conflict reconstruction stands in sharp contrast to other 
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approaches: neo-Marxism, Corporatist theory, and most importantly the state-centered 
approach (statist)
714
; with a government acting like a somewhat Hobbessian Leviathan as 
it embarks on development following State-led approach to matters of governance which 
leaves little room for political opposition, and where individual rights are either 
surrendered or hijacked by the state as a trade-off for development. To the liberal peace 
theorists or the liberal internationalists, the statist approach to matters of governance 
passes for authoritarian rule, and it is seen as a precursor to conflict-continuous situation. 
To them the focus should be put on ensuring people participation in matters of statecraft; 
through structures for the rule of law, civil-society institutions, electioneering including 
voter education, and the observance of the rights of all.
715
  
 
On the other side of the debate are those who argue that a rush to democratization poses 
the danger of literally driving countries in Post-Conflict situations back to manifestations 
of conflict; that is violence. They argue that elections need to be delayed until institutions 
of the state are built to handle the electoral process which requires orderliness. They add 
that Political Parties in Post Conflict situations serve to worsen ethnic, religious and other 
societal divisions as they consciously or inadvertently exploit such divisions.
716
  They 
contend that a haste move to implementing a liberal peace agenda as a standard approach 
to development in Post-Conflict Reconstruction situations obtains from the wrong 
assumption that a quick move to democratization is somewhat magic ingredient in the 
successful implementation of the post conflict reconstruction agenda of the state.  They 
castigate the logic that there can be a “one size fits-all” approach that can be applied to all 
situations during Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and to them a quick move to liberal peace 
and its forcible impositions seem to negate the fact that each conflict and the societies in 
post-conflict situations are unique; with the causes of conflicts and effects similar, but 
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differing in magnitude that; what worked for one state might not work effectively for the 
other. They argue against the way many donors and international organisations have 
adopted a standardised liberal approach; with a focus on economic and political 
liberalization as models to peace-building. They add that by erroneously imposing a haste 
liberalization agenda; countries emerging from conflict have been denied a chance to 
adopt specific and unique approaches to solve societal specific and unique challenges a 
situation that has perpetuated conflict recurrences.
717
 This side of the debate professes a 
somewhat statist-cum-liberal peace approach to conflict reconstruction situations.  
 
However, what is particularly intriguing is that their arguments are not clearly aligned to 
the assumptions of those that gave the statist approach its assumptions. They seem to 
argue for a somewhat metaphysical balance between liberalization and 
institutionalization, and quite clearly there arguments suggest institutionalization for 
liberalization. This study looks at such theorists as: Institutional Liberal Peace Theorists 
or statist-cum-liberal peace theorists. This is because their call cannot be dismissed as 
sheer statism; a call for authoritarianism, but rather call for functioning government 
institutions to guard liberalism from dwindling into the domain of the Anarchists who 
reject the state and government. Liberalism and its attendants like democracy and free 
market economics  have their excesses for they are not natural laws of social morality,
718
 
and therefore the need for a functioning regulator ``government`` and its institutions 
cannot be wished away. The practice of the tenets of liberal peace, like open contestation 
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of political power
719
 require principled compromises and periodic free and fair elections 
require clear rules of engagement and agents of pacification like the police sector to 
ensure the lawless that may emerge as a concomitant of intolerance among the 
competitors is contained.
720
 Governmentality is as important to the liberal peace 
arrangement as it is to any other form of political engagement. This study is also of 
contention that institutionalization cannot be without an agenda. They argue for a focus 
on instutionalisation before liberalization; they do subscribe to liberalization that is 
backed with a considerable measure of state capacity. They fear state failure which can 
be a concomitant of a rushed operationalisation of a liberal agenda at its two levels; 
economic liberalization and democratization as political liberalization.  
 
Their concern is that liberalization during post conflict reconstruction should not be seen 
as a move towards anarchy but rather a move to increased stability with functioning 
institutions of governance to ensure orderliness in society. 
721
 Indeed Boutrous Boutros-
Ghali; despite his unwavering belief in the sanctity of political liberalism—
democratisation as expounded in his: Agenda for Democratisation; he also believes in the 
urgency of institutions during post-conflict peace building, a belief that is   luminous in 
his suggestion for ensuring peace thus: 
 
Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to 
include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend 
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to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among 
people.  Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the 
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible 
destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for 
security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human 
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation.
722
 
Though in different historical moments and with a touch of liberalism they seem to 
mildly restate the imperativeness of Thomas Hobbes` ``Leviathan`` in times of crisis.
723
 
They seem to be reading from the scripts of modern statists like Lee Kuan Yew who 
believed that democracy is a spoiler of development in its infancy, and that development 
requires a political autocracy to serenely direct the course of development action.
724
  To 
them the challenges that Post-Conflict reconstruction situations pose to the state are 
similar to the problems of state-building in low income countries: grappling with the 
challenge of poor and weak institutions. It is suggested that these problems coupled with 
the risk of the resurgence of violence as a major challenge to Post-Conflict Countries 
may; not be ably addressed through democracy.
725
 This is because whereas those who 
promote democracy assert that it lowers the incentives for rebellion—the resurgence of 
conflict, to the contrary, it is asserted that democracy in post-conflictual situations 
constrains the technical possibilities of government repression; thus making the re-
occurrence of rebellion  easier.
726
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So, how does Rwanda fit into that system of things, and the logic of this Chapter is 
guided by the question: what was the nature of Rwanda`s development in state capacity 
during its post conflict reconstruction? 
 
The logic of this chapter is further guided by the following questions: How did the civil-
war which culminated into the genocide affect state-capacity? What reforms did Rwanda 
pursue to attain development in state capacity—what were the central focus areas? What 
was the outcome of the reforms which were undertaken to develop state capacity? What 
does Rwanda`s experience mean to the debate between the liberal peace theorist and 
those which this study has precisely put as the institutional liberal peace theorist or the 
statist-cum-liberal peace theorists? 
The major contribution of this chapter is two-fold: 
At the academic level, the chapter makes a furthering empirical case for either the view 
that post-conflict reconstruction processes are dependent on the ability of the government 
to execute its functions, and that it is imperative for efforts aimed at thwarting violence 
during  post-conflict reconstruction to begin with forging the enabling institutions of 
governance, or a direct focus on liberalisation process(democratisation and open-market 
economics) as a primary point of departure in post conflict reconstruction situations.  
At the policy level, this chapter makes a furthering policy case for the view that policy 
actions of both local and national actors during post-conflict reconstruction should 
urgently address the challenges to state capacity if a resurgence of violence is to be 
avoided in post-conflict reconstruction situations.  
Generally, the core functions of government have been put as; extractive, coercive and 
administrative—in relation to the provision of public goods, and the discussion of the 
state capacity of post-conflict-cum-genocide Rwanda Government is guided by the three 
functional areas; extractive, coercive, and administrative. In addition to other data sets 
from which the study generally obtains, at this point the study is also guided by Jonathan 
K. Hanson and Rachel Sigman`s mechanism of measuring state capacity.  They argue 
that whereas state capacity entails a measure of ingredients, the criteria has been 
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variously clustered under three indicators; extraction capacity which can be measured by 
the IMF`s Government Finance Statistics; coercive capacity which can be measured by  
the Political Terror Scale; and the Administrative capacity which is measured using the 
Transparency International, ``Weberianness`` Index, and the outcomes of public goods 
and service delivery depicted in the percentage number of children enrolled in primary 
school, infant mortality rates or literacy rates.
727
 These data bases are reviewed within the 
time scope of 1994-2005 with a view to present a consolidated survey of the progress or 
non progress of Rwanda`s state capacity.  The presentation and discussion of Rwanda`s 
state capacity is as follows: 
From the proceeding analysis of supporting and off-putting data drawn from Rwanda 
post-conflict reconstruction process, it emerges quite clearly that even in the 
operationalisation of a liberal agenda as a rubric to guide a country`s post-conflict phase, 
functioning state institutions are paramount. Indeed, this study contends that whereas a 
country can exist without pursuing a liberal agenda, a liberal agenda cannot be pursued 
without functioning state institutions. This makes a furthering empirical case for those 
who argue for institutionalisation before liberalisation. But even then, in the context of 
Rwanda, it emerges clearly that institutionalisation cannot be without an agenda, and the 
agenda can be a move towards liberalisation; and institutions built will reflect a move 
towards that agenda. In the context of Rwanda, institutionalisation reflected a move 
towards economic liberalisation—free market economics and democratisation which this 
study argues; was generally for the purpose of propaganda and gaining access to 
international finance. The cosmetic democratisation
728
 owes to the historical political 
circumstances of the country. To that effect, the detailed analysis is as follows: 
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4.1.1 Post-Genocide Rwanda:  ``Tout es a Faire``-- Everything Needs 
Doing; A lame Leviathan and international conditioning. 
 
Apart from claiming the lives of 951,018; as reported by the census which was conducted 
by the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government in December 2001,
729
  and seeing many 
into exile, the end of conflict-cum-genocide phenomenon in Rwanda saw a near to 
collapse of governmentality in Rwanda. It was a near to collapse because when the 
Rwanda Patriotic Army took over Kigali; a semblance of control in Rwanda was restored 
though with a measure of deficiencies.  
During the joint hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and the 
House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa on Rwanda and Burundi, April 5, 
1995, the then United States Special Coordinator on Rwanda, Townsend Friedman, in his 
statement, precisely put that, with the concomitants of the civil war and the subsequent 
genocide, by July 1994, Rwanda ceased to be a functional state. To him the concomitants 
of the civil-war which literally weighed down the state capacity of Rwanda were several, 
including; the death of at least 500,000, some two million Rwandans fled their country 
and another million were displaced inside Rwanda. Zaire was a host to over a million 
refugees; Tanzania to perhaps 500-600,000 and Burundi to over 200,000, the economy 
stopped as industry and farming came to a halt, most of the educated, doctors, lawyers, 
professionals had been killed or fled, the court system had only four out of 600 judges; 
majority had left the country, the government was without personnel, buildings and 
equipment, education halted in a country now bereft of teachers and school buildings, and 
health care collapsed with the destruction of hospitals, the death and departure of health 
care workers and the absence of medical supplies.
730
  
 The civil war which was punctuated with violence of a genocide character came to an 
end on the 18
th
 day of the month of July, the year of 1994 and the RPF-led government 
was inaugurated in Kigali on 19
th
 July, 1994.
731
 Literally, it should emphasised that on 
the to-do-list of the new Government were several issues but most importantly as 
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Kagame put them during his meeting with the members of the United Nations Security 
Council were: dispensing justice, the issue of refugees outside the country, reconstruction 
and creating an environment conducive to the return of refugees.
732
 
With the RPF at the helm of the functionality of government, the capacity of the RPF to 
function in three functional domains of state capacity; extraction, coercion and 
administrative capacity was to say the least of it variously encumbered. The state capacity 
the then new Rwandan Government was encumbered as result of the concomitants of the 
civil-war whose causes also obtained from the malfunctioning of the Habyarimana 
regime which had used state capacity to mobilise Hutu masses to participate in the 
massive slaughter of the Tutsis and Hutu moderates.  
First, the new Government in Rwanda had to grapple with a dearth of human resources to 
professionally run the government. Key Government ministries were understaffed and 
operated below capacity. Conversely, donors did not prioritise the civil-service.
733
 
Qualified public servants, those who were moderates were killed and those who were 
either indifferent or countenanced the genocide; were part of the massive movement of 
the Hutus to exile as a result of the fear of the probable vengeance of the Tutsi.
734
  During 
his visit, the Under-Secretary General of the United Nations Organisation for 
Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hansen was literally shocked by the level of state collapse; 
that the Health Ministry had only four employees.
735
 It is alleged that the judiciary 
remained with only six judges and ten lawyers, but without a single gendarme to enforce 
law and order. 
736
 However the allegation made by Melvern, in the sentence which 
precedes this about the judiciary was rendered an exaggeration when it was close 
examined with the data from the Ministry of Justice as of August 1997 which depicted 
that much as human resource levels considerably went down in the judiciary, it was not 
as bad, to put it literally, as the picture which Melvern painted.  Even in the case of the 
Gendarme, Melvern employs a touch of exaggeration when she says that not even one 
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remained. A cross examination of her allegation revealed that even as regards  civil-
policing which was supposed  to execute arrests and investigations for the judiciary; of 
the 500 pre-genocide human resource capacity, 50 percent returned to work.
737
 The fact 
that Melvern publishes her book in 2009, she would have factored in her analysis the 
logic of data sets provided by other researches to give topicality to her conclusions.  The 
data set which argues against Melvern`s claims is as follows: 
Table 5: showing the number of judicial personnel before, immediately after, and later 
during the aftermath of the genocide 
 Before April 1994 October 1994 August 1997 
Judges  
OMPs 
JPIs 
Registrars  
Secretaries  
Total 
Over 600 
87 
193 
214 
100 
1194 
244 
14 
39 
59 
28 
384 
740 
110 
270 
198 
63 
1381 
 
Adopted from: Stef Vandeginste, Justice for Rwanda and International Cooperation, 
Universiteit Antwerp, September 1997. Vandeginste uses data which was provided to him 
by the Rwandan Post Genocide Government which had taken stock of the inadequacies in 
the sector.  
Indeed going by the figures of October 1994; the judicial capacity of Rwanda was to say 
the least insufficient to start on the prosecution of the many who had participate in the 
massacres.
738
 The figures of 1997 owe to the donor aid that had started flowing into the 
reconstruction of the judicial sector, but those are three years after the genocide, which 
meant that in some, if not in all instances justice was delayed. 
739
 In the midst of 
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constrained capacity the legal/judicial system was urgent and the scope of its urgency 
was; trying and punishing or freeing most of the approximately 500 prisoners currently 
being held for participating in acts of violence during the civil war (the war crimes 
Tribunal will only prosecute a small fraction of these cases), resolving the property 
disputes that will arise (and those which had already arose) between returning ``new`` 
refugees and repatriating ``old`` refugees,  and dealing with the daily crime and violence 
endemic to any society.
740
  
The judicial challenges were aggravated by the lack of logistics like vehicles, 
communication equipment and stationery to run the judicial activities.  The conditions in 
detention centres were worse and prosecution was extremely encumbered. For instance 
the Central Prison of Kigali which was housing 1,500 prisoners by September 15, 1994 
and had only one prosecutor with five assistants. The number of prisoners had increased 
to 7,400 by January, 1995.
741
 The Ministry of Justice lacked the capacity to feed 
prisoners and relied on handouts from the World Food Programme.
742
  
Prisons were overcrowded and they operated in excess of their capacity. For instance, the 
number of prisoners in Kigali Prison rose to 700 by 8
th
 October, 1994, over and above its 
population in the previous two weeks. In Butare, the population in prisons increased from 
approximately 250 prisoners to more than 1,000. The government could not feed these 
prisoners, thanks to the provision made by the World Food Programme.
743
 The ability of 
the Rwandan justice sector to engage in through investigations and prosecution though 
wanting, the gravity of the work it was supposed to undertake was daunting. For instance 
it had to prosecute the approximately 100,000 people who had allegedly participated in 
the Genocide. Patrick Mazimpaka, the post-genocide Rwandan Minister of Youth 
Affairs, and a staunch ideologue of the RPF informed the Christian Science Monitor that 
of the 100,000 to be prosecuted, 50,000 were member of the former government 
administration, 20,000 members of the former Rwandan Army, and 30,000 former 
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members of the Hutu genocide militia groups.
744
 But even with willingness to deliver on 
the justice indicator as the international community unceasingly demanded; the 
Government of Rwanda was incapacitated not only in terms of human, but also financial 
resources.
745
  
In addition, as a result of looting by the members of the former regime, the national 
coffers were depleted. So, the new government was financially constrained, and without a 
starting point.  The new Government had to start ``From Zero``.
746
  As a result of looting, 
the liquidity of banks was depleted. This saw the ``black market`` emerging as the only 
financial system. 
747
 Reserves had been depleted of both foreign and local currencies.
748
  
Rwanda had to quickly mobilise resources to avoid state failure which would have 
culminated into turmoil, but to minimal success.  A dearth of financial resources 
undermined the ability of the new government to plan and execute its functions. The 
government had no money to pay health workers for instance the doctors and nurses who 
were quick to return for service, and that even the staff of the Civil Aviation Authority 
went without remuneration for some time. 
 The Government of Rwanda needed approximately USD 2 million to repair the public 
infrastructure and money to pay arrears.
749
 RPA Soldiers resorted to the primitive 
methods of tapping existence through ``banditry`` for the war had ended and still they 
were going without salary.
750
 This threatened an internal uprising even within the ranks 
of the RPA, 
751
and it threatened to turn Rwanda into a criminalised violent state of 
Somalia proportions.  The RPF led government was warned that such foolhardiness 
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within its ranks was to cost it even the little international reputation which it forged.
752
 
Indeed it was as a result of the increased tension in Rwanda  and Burundi as a result 
criminalised violence which this time pitted the Tutsi against the Hutu; that the 
authorities in Tanzania quickly made radical political suggestions owing to the extent to 
which the refugee crisis which Tanzania was shouldering that:   
These countries are not civilised, (and then), we have to tell them now; if they do 
not reform, Tanzania should take immediate military steps. (But,) If all fails, the 
government should review the 1883/84 Berlin Treaty at which whites divided 
Africa, where Tanganyika, Burundi and Rwanda were one country.
753
 
This study contends that these suggestions were farfetched and emotionally packed. The 
idea of annexing Rwanda to Tanzania as a solution to the bloodletting experiences of 
Rwanda was not only untenable, but also diplomatically rude given the circumstances 
under which Rwanda found itself at that point in time. But, understandably, Tanzania was 
a reflection of its being overwhelmed by the Rwandan refugee crisis. 
Noteworthy is that the ability of the new Rwandan government to administer the state, its 
administrative capacity as an element of state capacity; was grossly undermined as a 
result of abysmal levels of financial capacity. Even the basic requirements of a 
functioning bureaucracy like: offices chairs, desks, paper and telephone were generally 
lacking.
754
 It is not a moment to isolate when we read that government bureaucrats and 
Ministers had to go to the offices of UNAMIR to make official telephone calls and send 
faxes.
755
 It is also reported that the leadership of the Government of Rwanda had always 
to borrow the Presidential Jet of the President of Uganda whenever they were to make 
official visits. But what is telling enough is when we read that during his visit to Rwanda, 
the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter Hansen`s Office had to lend 
a type-writer to the Prime-Minister Twagiramungu`s office.
756
 The United States, on 
November 29
th
, 1994, by way of assisting the new Rwandan Government committed 
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USD 600,000 to procuring ``basic equipment for the ministries of justice and interior``.
757
 
The absurdity of war and genocide had translated into the absurdity of a resource 
encumbered government in the midst of post-conflict challenges.  Gerald Prunier 
graphically describes state of affairs after the civil-war-cum-genocide as follows: 
Most of the infrastructure had been brutally looted, with door and window frames 
removed, and electric switches pried from walls. Almost no vehicles were running 
order except RPF military ones, in towns running water and electricity did not 
work and more although the crops on the hills were ripe, nobody was there to pick 
them.
758
 
The multiplicity of the civil war-cum-genocide outcomes translated into a multiplicity of 
government functions to be executed but with a dearth of means.  With approximately 1.5 
million people internally displaced,
759
 food insecurity levels threatening deaths as a result 
of hunger, with absence of clean water threatening outbreaks of water borne diseases 
even among the internally displaced; the Government had no capacity to reconstruct the 
infrastructure of the country and provide the basic needs like water, health services and 
electricity to the people particularly the returnees.
760
  
With approximately 250,000 women widowed and approximately 100,000 children 
wandering without family care and contact; with the Hutu refugee warriors threatening a 
full-blown resurgence of violence from the hideouts in Eastern Zaire; with the total 
collapse of the health and educational infrastructure as a result of looting of drugs and 
equipment;
761
 and with the death and displacement of human resource who were manning 
these infrastructures, the new Government in Rwanda was overwhelmed by the tasks at 
hand. Also, the land tenure was topsy-turvy and had to be streamlined with a systematic 
system to establish ownership in the midst of several returnees from within and without 
Rwanda.
762
 The then Minister of Rehabilitation, Bihozanga acknowledged that in the 
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wake of the multitudes of returns; housing was becoming a major problem and the 
government had to take action.
763
 The demand for the Government to function was 
overwhelming and to the International community the RPF-led Government was: 
No longer a rebel movement, the new government of Rwanda (had to) assume the 
extensive- and expensive- responsibilities of administering a country recovering 
from war and trauma.  But the capacity was miniscule, (it needed a) range from 
human (professional staff in a variety of roles) to infrastructure (communications, 
electricity, water, financial) to mundane (type writers, computers, chairs and copy 
machines) 
764
 
Ironically, when Townsend Friedman, the United States Special Coordinator saw the 
confusion which was being generated by the lack of equipment, with government 
Ministers literally ``(forming up and fighting over) personnel, office space, equipment``, 
he concluded that ``bureaucrats (were) functioning, but do not so far translate into 
effective government``.
765
 His choice of words in conclusion of what the competition for 
resources within the administration of Rwanda meant was satirical than serious; a clear 
pointer to the absurdity of foreign aid in post-conflict reconstruction. It is a contention of 
this study that it would have been appropriate for him to conclude that such competition 
pointed to how the dearth of resources was undermining the functionality of the 
Government of Rwanda; thus the urgency of aiding its reconstruction. He opted for a 
caricatural portrayal of the situation; as if to suggest that the journey to the reconstruction 
was a funfair affair.  
Coherence in government is important for the systematic execution of government 
function, but the coherence of the Government of Rwanda was also wanting with several 
resignations and abscondment from duty not only by lower cadres but even Ministers. 
The crisis of confidence was high. For instance the Secretary of State at the Ministry of 
the Interior, Community Development and Rehabilitation, Beatrice Sebatwale Panda had 
to tender in her resignation while in Nairobi on 4
th
 December, 1998, and on January 2
nd
, 
1999, the Justice Minister Faustin Nteziryayo resigned his position under the pretext that 
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he was going for further studies at Duke University in the United States.  Indeed as early 
as December, 1994; the Prime Minister and Vice President, Twagiramungu and Paul 
Kagame respectively had started disagreeing publically more so when it came to the issue 
of national reconciliation. Twigaramungu blamed the RPA for its excesses which 
involved killing of civilians. To that effect, Twagiramungu`s party, the Democratic 
Republican Movement (MDR) authored a 32 page manifesto; released in November, 
1994 in which the RPF led government was variously criticised, but most importantly for 
executing a ``double genocide``.
766
   Kagame dismissed Twagiramungu`s assertions as 
``irresponsible``. The latter was relieved of his portfolio in August, 1995.
767
 Such public 
disagreements can partly be attributed to the military background and the inexperience of 
the then members of the Government of Rwanda in how to run a government during the 
early days of their governmentality.  As regards the inexperience and military attitude of 
the members of the new Government in Rwanda it was noted thus: 
``The entire Government of Rwanda (GOR) suffers from inexperience. In 
addition, the RPF/RPA operates from a straight forward military/ideological 
mindset. As political realities gradually temper, revolutionary zeal, we expect 
they will get better at dealing with the bigger world. For the most part we have 
found them a very bright and impressive lot``
768
 
Also Alphonse Marie Nkubito, the first post-genocide Minister of Justice, a Human 
Rights Defender, who during the civil war refused to prosecute the Tutsi who were being 
held by the Habyarimana government over charges of being accomplices to the rebel 
activities of the RPF,
769
 was relieved of his duties in October 1995; after protesting 
sharply the killing of innocent people which he blamed on the RPF led Government 
during a cabinet meeting.
770
 Pasteur Bizimungu, the first post-genocide Rwanda President 
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also resigned his position in March 2000 as he disagreed with the RPF led government 
policies which entailed a crackdown on dissidents. He was later imprisoned in 2004 for 
15 years
771
 but later to be pardoned by President Kagame in 2007. This level of friction 
between the Hutu moderates and the Tutsis in the RPF- led Government undermined 
national reconciliation which the so called ``broad based government`` was supposed to 
ensure. 
 Corruption scandals served to taint the image of the government with allegations of the 
emergence of the new akazu (ruling oligarchy) that was plundering the country. The 
members of the government were criticised for profiteering from the genocide as they 
amassed property through embezzlement, favouritism, illegal expropriation of land and 
privatising national assets at low market rates.
772
  
Another challenge to the coherence within the new Government was what was precisely 
put as the ``Tower of Babylon syndrome``; with  most of the Senior members of the new 
Government and of the RPF being Anglophones from Uganda; Kagame, Inyumba, 
Karemera, Mazimpaka, among others as opposed to Francophone members; those who 
survived the genocide and those from Burundi. This saw a rift within the ranks of the new 
Government. The language rift would  have been insignificant for the Kinyarwanda 
language acted as a uniting language but the linguistic differences reflected serious 
ideological differences; with the Anglophones having a vision of a unified Rwanda with 
the belief in the notion of the ``Banyarwanda people``. This attitude was opposed to the 
Tutsi dominance-ideology of the French speaking Tutsis some of whom were genocide 
survivors in Rwanda and others from areas of Congo, and Burundi; where bloodletting 
ethnic violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu also took place. The Francophone Tutsis 
never shared the belief of a ``Banyarwanda People``, and they also tended to radicalise 
the stance of the new Government towards the Hutus.
773
   The RPF-Government was 
challenged when it came to maintaining coherence and confidence among the people and 
within its ranks.  
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The government lacked enough coercive power to enforce law and order particularly in 
villages. It had no functioning police apparatus to enforce law and order and assist the 
judiciary in conducting investigations.
774
 Even the only existing form of coercion, the 
RPA, was not experienced in matters of civil policing. This also partly obtained from lack 
of a basic pay for the RPA elements; particularly the new recruits who lacked the 
revolutionary discipline of the original force, and thus resorted to criminality as a way of 
tapping survival. The RPA elements also resorted to grabbing property instead of 
protecting the bonafide owners, and some Tutsis procured their services of coercion 
particularly guns for the service of the highest civilian bidder interested in executing a 
revenge killing. 
775
  The Government lacked the resources to pay and later feed the RPA.  
It also lacked the resource to train and later pay the civilian police agents.
776
 Even the 
weaponry of the former government which would have been added onto the stock which 
the RPF owned was taken to exile by the elements of the former regime.
777
 
 So, the RPF did not also benefit from the logistical benefits of a surrendering vanquished 
army as the Hutu army had the privilege of carrying its weapons to exile.  It is also 
reported that of the approximately 500 members of the civil police, who were working 
with the judiciary to execute arrests during the pre-civil war-cum genocide period, only 
less than 50 percent returned to duty.
778
  A semblance of a criminal state was emerging in 
Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, but the Government had no functioning 
criminal investigation system
779
; for the RPF-led Government was encumbered at almost 
all the indicators of state capacity. To ensure security more so in the rural areas; there 
was a need to set-up civil police units and local administration units to be at the vanguard 
of law and order, but the money to use in the undertaking of such administrative action 
was not available and foreign aid was not forthcoming.
780
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It should be emphasised that an indifferent international community that was slow to aid 
the RPF government proven a menace to the ability of the new Government to function. 
Even though the Rwanda Operational Support Group comprised a number of actors, and 
that they were very enthusiastic to be associated with the reconstruction of Rwanda; aid, 
more so bilateral aid was not forthcoming when it came to matters of state reconstruction. 
The level of enthusiasm of the membership of the Rwanda Operation Group can be 
determined basing on the attendance list of the Geneva January 17
th
, 1995 meeting.  The 
attendance was as follows: 
Table 6: Attendance List of the Tuesday, January 17, 1995 Rwanda Operational Support 
Group Meeting at Geneva Switzerland 
Country  No. of those who 
attended  
Belgium 8 
Canada 4 
France 4 
Germany 5 
Japan 5 
Netherlands 4 
Spain 5 
Sweden 3 
Tunisia  2 
United Kingdom 3 
USA 14 
European Commission 2 
OAU 2 
Special Representative of the Secretary General to Rwanda 1 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2 
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 3 
UNCHR 1 
UNHCR 3 
268 
 
UNDP 1 
WFP 2 
United Nations Children Fund 2 
WHO 2 
United Nations Department for Political Affairs 1 
International Committee of the Red Cross 1 
 
Source: File 166079, ZAF, Rwanda Operational Support Group: US mission, Geneva, 
Switzerland,Tuesday,January171995:AttendanceList,http://www.state.gov/documents/or
ganisation/166079.  
Though enthusiastic in being associated with the recovery of Rwanda, the international 
actors were not swift in aiding the reconstruction of the elements of Rwanda`s state 
capacity.  With a shattered economy and massive displacement of people, with the almost 
total collapse of the public infrastructure; schools and hospitals, Rwanda urgently needed 
economic assistance.
781
  
The Government of Rwanda needed foreign assistance to revivify the country`s physical 
infrastructure and social service provision.
782
 With France undermining the credibility of 
new Government through an orchestrated deliberate campaign to ensure that the 
international institutions do not channel assistance to the new government;
783
 the new 
Government had to grapple with a measure of international conditionalities which it had 
to fulfil for it to fully access foreign aid. For instance, in the early period of its 
reconstruction, the conditions which United States of America gave to Rwanda if it were 
to access assistance were as follows: allowing UNAMIR radio to operate immediately 
and broadcast conciliatory messages; creating a process for settlement of land disputes as 
a matter of high priority; enter into public and genuine discussions with moderate 
elements of the ex-FAR and former Rwandan government to establish cooperation in the 
conduct of tribunal effort and political reconciliation and military integration, and 
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allowing unimpeded access to UNAMIR and human rights monitors.
784
  Also The 
Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even when it was aware of how refugees were 
being held hostage by refugee warriors in Zaire; it insisted and particularly wanted the 
GOR, ``…to be pressed to provide concrete information on how and when reconciliation 
and refugee return. ``
785
 However, the Government of Rwanda lacked even the capacity 
to put in place the favourable conditions like civil-policing for the security of the 
returnees. Forthcoming international assistance would have furthered state capacity to 
that effect.
786
 
However, even in their indifference which was juxtaposed with the imposition of 
conditionalities, the International community was particularly incoherent in how it 
envisioned the future of Rwanda; with the French preferring a focus on the internal 
political arrangement of the country, but with the USA preferring a focus on the issue of 
the repatriation of refugees. This scuffle was manifested in the debate which emerged 
between the French and the Americans as regards the agenda and the venue of the 
Rwandan conference. The French preferred an international venue and a discussion of the 
internal political arrangement of Rwanda, but the Americans preferred limiting the 
agenda of the conference to only refugee concerns.
787
 The major interest of the French 
was to ensure that the new Government in Rwanda was forced to undertake political 
reforms like the inclusion of the Hutus in Government and the commitment to undertake 
negotiations with the elements of the genocide regime, many of whom were in Congo. 
The United States insisted on tackling the refugee crisis first and then political concerns 
later. The letter of Cameron R. Hume to Ambassador Albright was blunt enough when it 
came to the agenda of the Rwanda Conference of 1994. He wrote: 
´´We would not be in favour of a French proposal to refer to the refugee 
conference ``in the context`` of the political conference. We think the refugee 
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conference needs to deal with concrete tangible steps and not get bogged down, at 
this point in theories. ``
788
 
 It is reported that France even  tried to ``block aid``  by way of vetoing ``special credits 
for nearly USD 200 Million
789
 from the European  Union for the reconstruction of 
Rwanda; arguing that the RPF had to be investigated for the atrocities it committed 
``during and after the genocide``.  United States was apprehensive that France might 
exploit the Hutu refugee crisis in Eastern Congo to undermine the new Government in 
Kigali.
790
  Individual citizens of France and Belgium even tried to undermine the 
investigations into what transpired during the genocide. Judge Goldstone who was 
selected to lead the investigations is said to have wondered why he was accosted by:  
`` … serious historians and professors from Universities, particularly from 
Belgium and France` who wanted to tell him that stories of genocide were 
untrue.``.   
Also, though already encumbered by a dearth of financial resources, the World Bank 
required that the new Government repays USD 4.5 Million in arrears before it could 
access the USD 140 Million which had been budgeted for the reconstruction of 
Rwanda.
791
 The arrears built over in the World Bank were to grow to USD 7.5 million by 
early 1995
792
; a matter which would have added a burden to the new but incapacitated 
Government.   The International community had literally failed to stop the genocide and 
it literally engaged into ``arm-twisting`` and ``dilly-dallying`` even when it came to 
aiding the efforts to aid the reconstruction of Rwanda. It was only after a lot of 
international relations, punctuated with a lot of conditionalities that aid started flowing to 
Rwanda.  It should however be remembered that Rwanda had no diplomatic 
representation in most of the foreign capitals for the period which immediately preceded 
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the genocide for it had no resources. This meant that Rwanda would not engage the 
international community at a full high level diplomatic representation.
793
 
Indeed, it was in June 1995, when the Government of Rwanda had been financially 
constrained for more than six months, that Belgium, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United States serviced the debt repayments of Rwanda to the World 
Bank at a tune of U.S. $ 9.5 Million in June 1995 and the Bank approved the US$ 50 
million as emergency credit to Rwanda at the end of June 1995. An emergency grant was 
coming almost a year after the genocide. Even the United States which was the first 
International power to recognise the new Government in Kigali continued to use its 
humanitarian assistance as a leverage to make sure that the RPF forms an all inclusive 
government and put in place conditions favourable for the return of refugees like, the 
observance of human rights.
794
 But such demands where figuratively speaking; like 
putting the cart before the horse for even the observance of human rights require a 
functioning state with the police, judiciary and  other apparatuses which Rwanda was not 
having even at a theoretical level. So Rwanda had to function without functioning 
capabilities.   
Mention should be made that the international community and particularly the USA was 
aware of the threat of a resurgence of violence which was being posed by the Hutu 
refugee warriors in Congo and it knew that the coercive capacity of Rwanda, in this case 
the logistical strength of the RPA, was wanting. The United States however maintained 
its support for the retention of the United Nations Arms Embargo on Rwanda; yet the 
RPF had a mandate to protect its territory and its people. The Permanent Representative 
of Rwanda at the United Nations, Ambassador Bakuramutsa had reasoned to the Deputy 
Representative of the United States to the United Nations Security Council, Ambassador 
Inderfurth, during their meeting on 1
st
 March, 1995, that the lifting of the embargo was 
not meant to ensure that the Rwandan Army was well dressed but rather to allow the 
procurement of arms for the defence of Rwanda. He noted that the rejection of the lifting 
of the arms on Rwanda was being construed as a punishment to the Government of 
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Rwanda. 
795
 The French and Russians in support of the retention of the embargo down 
played as ``small-scale`` the threat posed by the violent incursions into Rwanda by the 
refugee warriors, though USA was quick to add that military recruitment and arms build-
ups in refugee camps would translate the ``small scale`` into major incursions.
796
  This 
mandate required a logistically strong military; for military capacity is a central element 
of state capacity. It is no wonder, therefore that the refugee warriors found it easy to wage 
incursions into the frontiers of Rwanda; after all to the USA: 
Practically, the Government of Rwanda (did not) need the embargo lifted to 
defend itself or to avoid another genocide and they have got a lot better things to 
do with their money. This does not mean that the time may not come when 
moving to lift the embargo would be appropriate; we could even use it as a 
leverage``
797
 
The choice of words in the quotation above, with ``does not mean that time may not 
come`` and then ``could even use it as a leverage`` depicts the extent to which USA was 
determined to set the agenda of the reconstruction of Rwanda even if it meant using the 
chicanery of its diplomacy employing its privileges of power. So, the Government of 
Rwanda, in its inexperience in international diplomacy, it had to grapple with somewhat 
disguised diplomatic rudeness, trickery and deceit seen in the delay tactics of the actors; 
using the challenges to the new Government as leverage to elicit concessions from it. 
This approach though it made the new Government of Rwanda to adjust its policies to 
ensure a ``broad based government`` and allowed human rights observers into Rwanda, it 
however undermined the moderate stance of some of the elements of the RPF who 
thought that the International Community was more concerned with the plight of the 
Hutus than the plight of the survivors of the genocide. As such, in some instances 
measures adopted to ensure the observance of human rights by the government of 
Rwanda were generally cosmetic, meant for international diplomacy but for no public 
policy implication.  The resignation of some Hutu moderates from the RPF-led 
Government on allegation of dishonest on the side of the RPF government, yet inclusive 
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politics allows room for divergence in opinion, is the most telling of how the 
achievement of a broad based government appeared to be short of inclusive politics but a 
design for propaganda and mobilisation of international aid. Figuratively speaking, if we 
are to adopt the Chinua Achebe metaphor it can be said that:  since hunters had learnt to 
shoot without perching, birds hard also learned to fly without perching. The new 
Government of Rwanda was also learning the gimmicks of international diplomacy; 
deceit and trickery in a bid to gain access to aid. 
 Even when the new Government appealed for assistance to sustain the daily running of 
Radio Rwanda as a way of reaching out to the people, the United States of America 
which had hitherto presented itself as the willing ally to the new Government was 
hesitant to aid directly the operations of the Radio beyond the supply of fuel. The USA 
feared being identified with the propaganda message which would come out on the waves 
of the Rwandan National broadcaster.
798
  The new Government was increasingly 
frustrated for even when it formed an all inclusive government ``a broad based 
government``, and the moderates from the MRND refused to join,
799
 the international 
community continued to use aid as a leverage to force the new Government to co-opt 
political groups particularly those comprising of the Hutus.
800
 This poor response to 
aiding Rwanda undermined the efforts of the government to embark on crucial 
reconstruction sectors like the justice and security sector.  
Though humanitarian aid continued flowing, bilateral aid directly to the Government of 
Rwanda took time to start flowing; save for the assistance which came from the Federal 
Government of Germany. The Federal Government of Germany was swift in coming to 
the assistance of the Rwandan Government. For instance on 19
th
 September, 1994, the 
Government of Germany resumed its bilateral assistance to Rwanda through a Press 
Statement which was made by the State Secretary for Economic Development and 
Cooperation, Hans-Peter Repnik immediately after their meeting with the President of 
Rwanda, Bizimungu; which Hans had together with  Kinkel the then German Foreign 
Minister.  In a press release German committed itself to unfreeze all the Development 
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Assistance Funds at the tune of approximately 70-90million Deutsche Mark. This amount 
had been frozen at the beginning of the civil war in Rwanda. The money was made 
available for development and reconstruction programmes in Rwanda. Germany also 
pledged to lobby the European Union on behalf of Rwanda to resume economic 
cooperation for the reconstruction of the country.  
Germany also put aside 246 million DM (160 million USD) of which 78 million DM 
came from the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Non-
emergency Aid to Developing nations` Fund, and was meant for the reconstruction of 
Rwanda for the year 1994. Indeed Germany provided a somewhat ``Marshal Fund`` for 
Rwanda as President Bizimungu had requested. Though Germany was cognizant of the 
need for the Government of Rwanda to ensure observance of human rights, its intention 
in providing funds for the reconstruction of Rwanda in a swift manner obtained from the 
logic that: Rwanda needed a government able to take on the challenge of creating a 
peaceful environment in which the country could be reconstructed.
801
 Germany 
understood quite clearly the imperativeness of a functioning government in streamlining 
the process of reconstruction. That logic had eluded many an international actor for the 
liberal agenda of democratisation which had been reduced to a ``broad based 
government`` as a measure of reconciliation, had been elevated to a level of a political 
imperative which had to be adopted by the new Government of Rwanda if it was to be 
aided to reconstruct the institutions of government which are central to a functioning 
polity.   
Conversely, when aid started flowing in, particularly from the World Bank, 
conditionalities were also abound, with the Government being required to strictly adhered 
to neo-liberal rubric provided under the Structural Adjustment Programme; a move to 
privatisation, deregulation of financial markets and the private sector, and a complete 
withdrawal of subsidies on social service provision. The SAPs led to cataclysmic 
outcomes in many countries particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
802
 and it should be 
remembered that neo-liberalism under the SAPs were part of the issues which structured 
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the violence which culminated into the genocide, this is discussed earlier in Chapter 2 of 
this study.
803
 The Post-Genocide Government was also required to adopt that kind of 
economic script if it were to continue receiving financial assistance from the neo-liberal 
institutions but most importantly the Breton Woods institutions. Rwanda was emerging 
from a conflict of genocidal proportions and this placed a requirement for investment in 
social safety nets, but that was anathema to the rubric of the SAPs. However, the negative 
outcomes of improvidence which Rwanda would have suffered as a result of ``rolling 
back the state`` in the midst of a population in dire need of social services were offset by 
the providence of human needs by the humanitarian agencies which were operating in 
Rwanda.  
 The international conditionalities which were devoid of circumstantial considerations 
undermined the reconstruction of the state in Rwanda.  However, even besides the neo-
liberal economic rubric which Rwanda had to follow to the letter, the demand for national 
reconciliation as a condition sternly put on the new Government of Rwanda if it were to 
access foreign assistance
804
 also seemed to be farfetched even to the international 
community itself. As it was literally pushing Rwanda to embark on national 
reconciliation, the international community hardly knew what it would entail. The 
naivety of the international community was put by Townsend Friedman in a simple 
measure as follows:   
National reconciliation is Rwanda`s biggest political problem and we collectively 
are facing (sic) the fact that we don`t know how to resolve it. Last week`s 
coordination Roundtable at UNDP elicited many ideas, but no one seemed 
convinced that this is a task the international community knows how to take on. 
We simply don`t know how to move ahead on National reconciliation, and need 
to consider whether it is an issue foreigners are qualified to take on.
805
 
That level of naivety  which was exhibited by  the international community as regards 
what was supposed to be done in Rwanda translated into unnecessary delays in the aiding 
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of the reconstruction of Rwanda  as time passed as meeting—brainstorming sessions 
went on in the good offices of the international actors in the different capitals of the 
world. This delay served to disorient the enthusiasm of the new Government in 
performing its duties. It threatened the very national reconciliation which it sought to 
attain. To this effect, Townsend Friedman reported that: 
I am reminded of Presidential Counsellor Marigande`s comment to me two weeks 
ago that unless the achievements of the Government are recognised and 
encouraged by concrete assistance, hardliners will be tempted to push for a ``Go-
it-alone`` program that satisfies their own ambitions. Moderates, both Tutsi and 
Hutu, appear now to be engaged in a struggle over the policy future of Rwanda 
with the ``Never Againers`` who see permanent Tutsi hegemony as the only 
guarantee against the future genocide.
806
  
But the logic of the international community was to delay aid in the name of using it as a 
leverage to literally push the Government of Rwanda to countenance the liberal political 
reforms which were being recommended by the international actors, and high on the 
agenda was national reconciliation. National reconciliation requires a measure of state 
capacity which Rwanda lacked primarily in form of judicial capacity.  
Despite the delay and the conditionalities, some international actors had a broad agenda 
as regards the recovery of Rwanda. For instance, the United States policy objectives with 
regard to Rwanda were but six and the USA committed its assistance to realising them. 
They included: facilitation of refugee return and national reconciliation and to this effect 
the United States provided USD 9 million to aid the restoration of public service 
provision infrastructure. It also provided USD 2.5 million to assist Rwanda in the 
repayment of the arrears of Rwanda to the World Bank so that the country can access the 
USD 50 million in emergency credit from the Bank, and USD 250 million was allotted to 
projects; facilitation of efforts aimed at maintaining stability and building confidence, and 
to this effect, the USA provided logistical support to facilitate the deployment of an 
``expanded contingent of over 5,500 UN Peacekeepers``. It also allotted USD 750,000 to 
facilitate the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitors of whom 60 of the 
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planned for 147 had arrived in Rwanda at the fall of 1994; facilitation of measures which 
were aimed at ensuring accountability for the Genocide, and to this effect the United 
States of America co-sponsored the United Nations Security Council Resolution for the 
authorisation of the formation of Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal. It also provided 
personnel to assist in the work of the tribunal, particularly in investigation and allotted 
USD 1 million to facilitate the work of the tribunal; the United States also facilitated the 
promotion and respect of human rights, facilitated the enhancement of the security of the 
refugee camps and allotted approximately USD 250 million in Humanitarian assistance to 
refugees, and coordinated and mobilised the international community to aid the 
reconstruction of Rwanda. 
807
  
The USA was determined to reconcile its foreign policy with the fact that they had done  
little to avoid the Genocide, and part of the scheme to re-write the history of their 
influence in Rwanda was through ensuring  that they played a pivotal role in the 
reconstruction of Rwanda. Indeed the commitment of the United States to the 
reconstruction of Rwanda was pictorially enormous as depicted by the representation 
during the meeting of the Rwanda Operation Support Group, which they had dubbed as 
the ``Friends of Rwanda. At the Geneva Meeting of January 17, 1995, as indicated in 
table 1 of this Chapter; the representation of USA stood at 14 members in comparison to 
Belgium which had only 8 representatives but to be the second in the number of 
representation.
808
 USA ensured had the privilege of numbers and therefore had the 
privilege to determine the trend of events. It should be mentioned that the focus of the 
USA was not limited to the issues that directly manifest political liberalism in Rwanda 
but also on building the institutions to enable a functioning polity as seen in USD 9 
million which was meant to aid the public service. As such even in placing an array of 
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conditionalities on Rwanda to embark, in an expedited manner, on political liberalism, 
the USA was cognizant of the imperativeness of institutionalisation.  
Another catastrophe which Rwanda had to grapple with during its post-conflict 
reconstruction period was that of a disillusioned and divided population with children 
traumatised with what they witnessed. With approximately 250,000 widowed, 100,000 
children left alone and in fright; the new Government was challenged in how to bring 
back the enthusiasm among the Banyarwanda who were, in the aftermath of the genocide,  
divided into ``victims, survivors, returnees and perpetrators``.  Raped women were 
grappling with psychological shocks of siring unwanted children.
809
  The legitimacy of 
the government had to be asserted at two levels: the level of the Tutsi returnees, and that 
of the survivors of the civil war and genocide; majority of them had lost confidence in a 
peaceful future. The Hutu people would not easily trust the new Government, and the 
government was generally ``suspicious`` of those who were affiliated to the defeated 
regime. The country was divided; with a social and political crisis of confidence 
manifested in the lack of trust among the people, and between the people and their 
government.
810
 Indeed, the new Government `s capacity to provide for the population was 
infinitesimal that the refugees were being well catered for than the people inside Rwanda 
which made General Dallaire, the commander of the UNAMIR to complain that the act 
of feeding refugees than feeding those in Rwanda was counterproductive, and that, ``It 
just (created) future problems``.
811
  A psychologically disoriented population cannot be 
productive for development after conflict. So, the new Government had to reconstruct 
the; government infrastructure, its image and the population.  
So, considering the foregone analysis it suffices to note that whereas to the logic of those 
who argue for institutionalisation before democratisation during post-conflict 
reconstruction the state capacity is sacrosanct for the success of a the democratisation 
agenda during reconstruction, in the context of Rwanda the International Community was 
pushing for democratisation as a leverage for international assistance for 
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institutionalisation.  From the experience of Rwanda this system of things led but to one 
important phenomenon; the radicalisation of the Tutsi elements who thought that the 
international community was promoting the interests of the Hutu who to them were guilty 
of the genocide. It led to a delay in the reconciliation process that was, given the 
sentiments which led to the genocide and the nature of the genocide itself, to be 
understandably an arduous process. It also led to a delay in the assertion of the control of 
the new Government of Rwanda as far as law and order was concerned and this saw a 
measure of civil disorder but most importantly that which accrued to the indiscipline of 
the officers and men of the RPA who resorted to procuring their tools of coercion to the 
highest bidder targeting to execute a murder as a way of ensuring vengeance.  
Accordingly, the push for the conformity of the new Government of Rwanda to 
particularly political liberalism during the immediate aftermath of the genocide came 
with increased civil disorder an indication of how costly it can be when the international 
community pegs international finance for reconstruction onto an adoption of the liberal 
agenda. This gives credence to the imperativeness of institutionalisation for liberalisation 
during post conflict reconstruction.  Delay in aiding institutionalisation leads to delay in 
the move towards liberalisation. This is a hypothesis which emerges from the experience 
of Rwanda during reconstruction and it is further sustained and tested in the following 
treatment. 
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4.1.2 Post-Genocide Rwanda: ``Rehabilitating the Lame Leviathan`` 
 
To revamp the capacity of the state to function, the RPF- led government adopted a 
number of initiatives which were directed at ensuring a progressive improvement in the 
functioning of the government in the three functional areas, reiterated as; extraction, 
coercion, and administrative. At the Rwanda Round Table Conference of January 18-19, 
1995, the Government of Rwanda committed itself to ensuring the return of Rwandese 
refugees, consolidation of security within the country, re-organisation of the judiciary, 
continuation of the process of democratisation as encapsulated in the Arusha Peace 
Accord, respect for fundamental freedoms, settlement of disputes over ownership, 
establishment of local government, formation of national army, national reconciliation, 
and committing persons suspected of genocide to courts of law.  
As far as the economy was concerned, the Rwandan Government committed itself to 
ensuring operationalisation of the structural adjustment programme framework by 
implementing the privatisation policy, downsizing of the public service and adopting 
custom rates that do not reflect protectionism.
812
 The promise on downsizing seemed to 
be literally far-fetched for the bureaucracy was understaffed. However, a close look at 
what the new Government promised to attain reflects a liberal agenda. The mention of 
``democratisation``, ``respect of fundamental freedom`` and then a commitment to the 
``Structural Adjustment Programme`` point but to a liberal peace derived agenda in 
guiding the reconstruction process of Rwanda. But it deserves mention that the mention 
of ``re-organisation of the judiciary``, ``establishment local government`` and a ``national 
Army`` clearly point to the imperativeness of institutionalisation—which is precisely 
developing state capacity. The mentioning of ``security`` as part of the agenda of the 
reconstruction framework point but to the survival of the state which may be pejoratively 
put as ``regime`` security if it is done for the survival of the ruling elite than for the 
benefit of the state and all its components (territory, population and government).  
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First forward, it should be outlined that priority during reconstruction was put on the 
Justice sector for it was central to national reconciliation and it was acknowledged as a 
priority well conceived as it was to usher in a ``secure environment`` in which other 
reconstruction processes like social and economic reconstruction were to take place
813
; 
given the circumstances which surrounded the reconstruction process in Rwanda—the 
genocide. The donor community also believed in the sanctity of reviving the justice 
sector as an entry point into the reconstruction of the Rwandan state.
814
 It should be 
added that much as the donor community perceived national reconciliation as a cardinal 
attribute of Rwanda`s recovery, the primary emphasis was put on enabling the justice 
sector as part of the administrative capacity of the new government of Rwanda as an 
avenue, a somewhat engine to facilitating the  realisation of national reconciliation. So 
the point was not a straight focus on reconciliation as a political governance concern but 
rather to facilitating state capacity to be in position to facilitate an important governance 
issue. Indeed, a weak justice sector would have translated into a weak judicial apparatus 
thus a fragile reconstruction process. As it will be indentified later in the discussion; 
where political governance issues were put before institutionalisation concerns the 
process to reconstruction was undermined.  
As regards extraction, the new Government of Rwanda set up institutions for 
streamlining revenue collection and planning for the revenue collected. It also put in 
place enabling laws for a market economy. The sustainability of Rwanda`s state capacity 
during its post conflict reconstruction was to depend on the ability of the new 
Government to collect revenue. Even with a multiplicity of donor assistance the new 
Government needed the capacity to collect taxes to supplement foreign assistance and 
prepare for the transition period that is normally punctuated with a reduction in 
emergence aid during the reconstruction period. This was also a conditionality from the 
International Financial Institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund; which demanded extractive capacity, depicted in the existence of 
mechanisms to ensure revenue collection and monitor the utilisation of development 
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assistance as a guarantee for the frugal utilisation of aid  and future repayment 
capabilities.  
In a bid to reform the extraction and expenditure sectors of government the Government 
of Rwanda undertook a series of Revenue and expenditure management measures with a 
view to ensure increase in revenue collection and frugality in its utilisation. These 
measures largely obtained from a neo-liberal economic agenda, a rubric provided by the 
Breton Woods with emphasis on ensuring the taxation as a way of increasing the revenue 
of the state. Interestingly though, this was done under increased poverty levels. The tables 
below succinctly put the measures which were put in place: 
Table. 7: Rwanda: Revenue Measures for 1998 
 
  
Revenue 
impact 
in % of 
GDP 
Implementation 
date 
 
Tax measures introduced in the second half of 1997 (full-year impact) 
(i) Introduction of ad valorem rates and increase in excise taxes on 
soft drinks (35 percent), beer (60 percent), liquor, wine, and 
cigarettes (70 percent), and petroleum products (25 percent) 
+0.4 July 1997 
(October 1997 
for petroleum) 
Tax measures introduced with 1998 budget 
(ii) Increase in sales tax (ICHA) from 10 to 15 percent and 
broadening of its coverage 
+0.5 Feb. 1998 
(iii) Decrease in maximum personal and company income tax rates 
(from 50 to 40 percent) 
-0.6 Jan. 1997 
(iv) Reduction in maximum tariff rate (from 60 to 40 percent) and 
average tariff rate (from 25 to about 21 percent) 
-0.4 Jan. 1998 
 
Revenue administration measures 
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(v) Reduction in under-invoicing through use of pre-shipment 
inspection, measures to reduce fraud, monitoring of petroleum 
imports and transit trade, elimination of unjustified exemptions for 
NGOs/diplomats, and reduction in exemptions through a system 
of tax credits for public investment-related imports 
+0.4 1998 
(vi) Operationalisation of the Rwanda Revenue Authority (including a 
strong large enterprise unit, and introduction of a taxpayer 
identification number for all enterprises) and application of a 4 
percent turnover tax on enterprises with turnover of less than RF 
100 million (4,000 enterprises to be covered in 1998) 
+0.3 1998 
(vii) Collection by the budget of debt service on retroceded debt and 
dividends from public enterprises 
+0.1 1998 
Autonomous changes in 1998 
(viii) Lower coffee export tax proceeds related to projected lower coffee 
prices 
-0.3   
Total revenue effort +0.4 
percent 
of GDP 
(to 10.7 percent 
of GDP) 
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Table 8: Rwanda: Expenditure Management Measures for 1998/99 
 
  Implementation 
date 
 
(i) Closely monitor the new decentralization of expenditure management Ongoing 
(ii) Improve budgetary management through enhanced cash forecasting and 
monitoring 
1998 
(iii) Commence computerization of budget and treasury management (with 
technical assistance from AfDB) 
1998 
(iv) Strengthen the integration of recurrent and development budgets to 
improve budget prioritization (with technical assistance from the World 
Bank) 
1998 
(v) Commence development and introduction of a system of public accounts 1998 
(v) Promulgate an organic budget law December 1998 
(v) Transfer ministries' bank accounts to the treasury account with the NBR End-1998 
(v)            Incorporate all extra-budgetary accounts into the national budget 1998 
(i) Establish a strengthened central tender board Mid-1998 
(x) Establish an Auditor General's office Early 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table one (1) and two (2), adopted from: IMF Letter of Intent of the Government 
of Rwanda which describes the Policies that Rwanda Intends to Implement in the Context 
of its Request for Financial Support from the IMF, Kigali, June 4, 1998, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/060498.htm#memo   
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The idea was to prepare Rwanda for a fully operational market economy, and whereas 
this connoted liberalism, the point of departure was institutionalisation. Accordingly, the 
new Government embarked on an arduous process of reforming the extractive capacity of 
Rwanda. Instructive of the institutions which were focused on to enable extraction were; 
the National Bank of Rwanda and the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). 
The Rwanda Revenue Authority was put in place to enable the extractive capacity of the 
new Government of Rwanda. Hitherto the administration and accountability on revenue 
collection was a function of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, but by 
Law no. 15/97 of 18
th
 November 1997, the Rwanda Revenue Authority was formed with 
an objective to streamline the collection of taxes for the development of the country.
815
  
Given the multiplicity of functions which the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development was supposed to execute, with a duty to coordinate the development 
recovery of Rwanda, indeed, the creation of an autonomous body to foresee the extractive 
functions of government was important.  Making the RRA operational was punctuated 
with several challenges particularly the problem of skilled human resource which made 
the operationalisation of the whole organisational structure problematic, and the problem 
of a narrow tax base which made revenue targets hard to attain.
816
 But the measures 
captured in Table one (2) of this Chapter depict the reforms which the government 
undertook to overcome the challenges in the extraction sector. The expenditure 
management measures captured in Table two (3) were meant to ensure that Revenue 
collected and other non revenue financial resources like foreign aid are utilised 
appropriately. 
The National Bank of Rwanda was strengthened and its independence deepened by the 
Central Bank Law of mid-1997.
817
 This was meant to allow it to play a central role in 
streamlining the monetary policy of Rwanda, ensure timely reporting of monetary status 
reports of the country to the International Financial Institutions; particularly the IMF,  as 
a conditionality for continued access to the lending facility of the institution. The 
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National Bank was also tasked to ensure the regulation of the foreign exchange market to 
curtail the shocks which would emerge from the increased flow of aid on the liquidity 
levels of the economy.
818
  
Indeed, by September, 2005, the National Bank of Rwanda had put in place several 
monetary policy instruments to ensure the effective management and regulation of the 
monetary sector. The instruments are categorised under; Rules based instruments, 
market-based instruments and liquidity forecasting framework. These included but not 
limited to; rules-Based Instruments, reserve requirements; which stood at 8 percent in 
2005, of the unremunerated deposits with NRB, and denominated in local currency for 
local currency denominationed deposits and in US Dollar for foreign currency deposits, 
refinance Standing Facility; with Banks allowed to borrow on demand from the NBR 
against collateral in the form of high quality commercial paper at a punitive rate which 
stood at 12.5 percent in 2005, deposit Standing Facility; with Banks allowed to place 
funds overnight within the NBR at a rate below market rates which stood at 5 percent, 
market-Based Instruments, weekly deposit or credit auction; an instrument to 
inject/withdraw liquidity using multiple price auctions (``appel d`offers``) of 7-day 
maturing (at times 14 days). This measure was meant to ensure the injection/withdrawal 
of liquidity in money markets as a way of curtailing inflation. The NBR was mandated to 
announce the maximum/minimum rate for its deposit/credit auction as a monetary policy, 
primary Issuance of t-bills for monetary policy purposes. The NBR was supposed to 
auction t-bills to absorb liquidity for a period longer than 7-14 days (typically 4 weeks). 
The auction (multiple price tenders) took place at the same time as sales of t-bills to 
finance the budget, foreign exchange auctions; as a mechanism which was adopted 
basing on the structure of Rwanda`s balance of payments—with a current account deficit 
which was financed by official foreign assistance. This was done through weekly auction 
sales of foreign exchange to authorised banks, and the liquidity Forecasting Framework; 
was also created and it was based on the projection of bank liquidity for the 10-day 
period ahead and performance in meeting base money and net International Target 
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decisions made for the mix of sales of t-bills for monetary policy purposes, NRB 
deposit/credit auctions, and NBR foreign exchange auctions.
819
 
These monetary policies, among other reforms precisely documented in the IMF 
documents, facilitated Rwanda to gain the confidence of the International Financial 
Institutions whose major interest was to be certain of a fully functioning a monetary 
control system to ascertain Rwanda`s ability to receive and consume foreign financial 
assistance with sufficient ability and capacity.  
The two institutions in the narrative above are not exhaustive of the array of institutions 
which were put in place and those which were reformed with the aim of ensuring an 
extractive and financial management sector. However they do suffice to show how 
institutionalisation was very primary to the reconstruction process in Rwanda for even 
access to foreign aid from the International Financial Institutions required a guarantee of 
a functioning monetary and a financial acquisition(tax extraction) and a planning system 
epitomised in the strengthening of the operations of the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development in Rwanda, the National Bank of Rwanda and the creation of the 
Rwanda National Revenue Authority.  
At this point the study summaries all the structural reforms which were undertake 
between1995-2005; as a way of aligning the Rwanda state to the International Standards 
which were also conditionalities for access to financial assistance from the Structural 
Adjustment Facility of the International Monetary Fund. An array of these, as it will be 
seen in table preceding this, were largely liberal in approach; a matter which depicts how 
Rwanda`s reconstruction of state capacity was generally directed to the purpose of 
accessing international finance as a result of the financial constraints that came with the 
end of the civil-war.  Also, they serve to underscore that even in a completely liberal 
oriented reconstruction agenda instutionalisation is sacrosanct; as an array of these 
reforms are regulatory frameworks and functionary agencies; two important aspects of 
institutionalisation. They are presented in a tabular format as follows: 
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Table 9: Key Structural Economic Reforms undertaken in Rwanda during the period 
1995-2005 
Money and Banking  
1997 New Central Bank law adopted  
2001 Introduction of weekly foreign exchange actions  
2002 Full Audits of three Commercial Banks  
2002 First external audits of the NBR 
 
Exchange and Trade Relations  
1995-99 Reduction in maximum tariff rate from 100 percent to 25 percent 
1997     Export surrender requirement eliminated  
1998    Article VIII accepted    
1999    Export taxes eliminated; NTBs removed  
2002    80 percent reciprocal reduction in COMESA tariff. 
2004    Entry into COMESA FTA 
 
Fiscal Policy and Management  
1997 Revised direct tax code introduced  
1997 Rwanda Revenue Authority established  
1998 Establishment of the Office of the Auditor General  
2000 Computerised tax data management (ASYCUDA) introduced  
2001VAT introduced  
2002TAX code revised  
2004 Organic Budget law approved 
 
Privatisation  
1998 sale of Petro Rwanda Assets 
2000 Establishment of Private Sector Federation 
2001 Liberalisation of telecommunication Sector 
2003 Private Management of electric utility  
2004 sale of BCR, BACAR 
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Other  
1998 Demobilisation and reintegration Program beings  
1999 Adoption of Rwanda Investment Act 
2000 Adoption of Revised Internal Trade Act 
2002 Establishment of Public Utilities Regulatory Agency 
2003 Adoption of a new constitution  
 
Adopted from: IMF, Rwanda:2004 Article IV Consultation Staff Report; Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive 
Director for Rwanda, IMF Country Report No. 04/382, December, 2004. 
International Financial standards were adhered to by the Rwanda extraction institutions 
and financial planning institutions. The statistics and comments from the IMF indicated a 
considerable measure of progress which Rwanda had made as far as financial reporting 
was concerned.  For instance, Rwanda had made considerable progress in ensuring that 
proper statistics for internal (state) economic control and planning and for external 
(International Financial Monitoring) system for monitoring compliance to international 
standards were generated and transmitted. Instructive of these adherences to statistical 
international financial procedures included that: 
It was reported that real data was transmitted regularly to the International Finance 
Statistics (IFS) for publication. These statistics included the statistics generated by the 
Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) 
on national accounts although it was reported that the validity of the data generated was 
generally weak as a result of the lack of skilled human resources and material resources 
to facilitate data collection. It was equally reported that these inadequacies in data 
collection were reported to have led to ``uncertainties regarding the composition of 
GDP``.
820
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 The inadequacies of the Statistics Directorate of the MINECOFIN, the study contends 
that they were compensated for by the actions of the NBR which was reported in 2004 to 
have put in place an improved Consumer Price Index (CPI). By 2004, the NBR had 
addressed problems regarding regional and consumption basket coverage and it as a 
result covered 438 goods for which a total sample of more than 25,000 was observed in 
Kigali (weighted 77 percent) and in provincial towns.
821
 More statistics which were 
reported, not regularly though, included; data on revenue and expenditure (with delays of 
3-4 weeks) generated by the flash-reporting unit of MINECOFIN.
822
 
On the monetary statistics, the balance sheet of the NBR was transmitted to the African 
Department of the IMF on a weekly basis with a lag of one week; with the consolidated 
balance sheet of Commercial Banks and Monetary Survey being transmitted on a 
monthly basis. However, on the balance sheet payments statistics, inconsistencies 
between data provided by the NBR and that recorded by the Customs authorities were 
glaring. And some trade went unreported, and there was scanty of information when it 
came to invisible transactions, but to be attributed to lack of skilled personnel.
823
Other 
monetary statistics which were being reported to STA and IFS included annual balance of 
payments and quarterly import and export data including the methodology notes which 
described the approach used to compile data for balance of payments statistics. Also data 
bases on external public debt were maintained by both the MINECOFIN and the NBR. 
824
 
Indeed, the successes of Rwanda in putting in place the institutional infrastructure to 
enable economic liberalisation- free market economy saw a considerable flow of foreign 
assistance from both multilateral and unilateral agencies. Rwanda consistently scored 
high on financial and monetary reporting. The issue was not the implementation of an 
economic liberal agenda, but rather putting in place a liberal institutional arrangement as 
an indicator of how the economy was to function. It is those institutional indicators, 
depicted by the nature of state capacity attained to enable the workings of a liberal 
economy that saw Rwanda benefiting from the flow of international finance for its 
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reconstruction.  For instance a result of Rwanda`s compliance to the reporting criteria on 
economic performance of the IMF, Rwanda was granted eligibility to withdraw an 
amount said to be equivalent to SDR 0.37 million (about USD 0.86 million) for the fourth 
round, bringing the total of the amount disbursed under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility arrangement to about SDR 2.86 million (about USD 4.3 million) since its 
approval in August 12
th
, 2002.
825
  
However, the gain for the new Government may not have been directly in increased 
economic liberalisation, but rather in the primary benefits it comes with; particularly the 
unfettered access to financial assistance from the Breton Woods which Rwanda urgently 
needed given the dearth of financial resources it grappled with during the aftermath of the 
conflict. So, the example in the paragraphs preceding this suffices to show how Rwanda 
was committed to making adjustments to international standards in order to access aid as 
a way of facilitating its economic growth and development during the reconstruction 
period. However, at the centre of this compliance to international standards was an array 
of state institutions a matter that underscores the sanctity of institutionalisation during the 
reconstruction period.  
Systematic planning was enhanced and instruments of monitoring and evaluation of 
economic progress were adopted. Producers, consumers and other indices were 
developed and the mechanisms to collecting, analysing and storage of data for future use 
were devised. Further reforms were also undertaken to ensure the reconstruction of other 
units of state capacity, and the discussion is as follows: 
As regards the function of coercion, Rwanda embarked on security sector reforms with a 
goal to professionalise its military and police sector.  The RPF was reformed with an 
agenda to promote unity among the people, ensure peace and stability. Its ideology was 
also streamlined to reflect both ``soft`` and ``hard power`` elements.
826
 The RPF thus 
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embarked on a modernisation agenda with a view to acquire modern weaponry and 
training. However, it also became an integral element of the modernisation process of 
Rwanda in terms of development and improving on the livelihood of the people. Also by 
the year 2000, 30,000 and more ex-FAR members and members of the militia groups had 
been re-integrated into the National Army,
827
 and given training to orient their ideology 
from the genocide ideology to non-racist military ideology.  The reformed security sector 
of Rwanda after 1994 was as follows: 
Table 10: Illustrating the Security Sector Reforms undertaken by the Government for the 
period 1995-2009 
Outline of the Security Sector Institution/Agency  Mandate/Function  
 
Rwandan Defence Forces  Immediately after the 1994 genocide, the 
responsibility for maintaining national security 
rested solely in the hands of the armed wing of the 
RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army. Now, the 
Rwandan Defence Forces—largely made up of 
former RPA soldiers—are responsible for the 
defense of the country's territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty (Mironko and Rurangwa, 2007: 
216)  
Rwandan National Police (RNP)  Established by Law No. 09/2000 of June 16, 2000, 
after the Government of National Unity decided to 
combine the former Gendarmerie Nationale, which 
was under the Ministry of Defense, with the former 
Communal Police under the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Judicial Police under the Ministry of 
Justice (Kigali City, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
culture, language, legends and myths, fashions and customs. The RPF was supposed to be the custodian of 
the security of these two elements of power.  
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Criminal Investigation Department (CID)  Responsible for coordinating criminal investigation 
activities. It is comprised of six individual units, 
each with its own special tasks: Criminal 
Investigations and Scientific Police (C.I.S.P), Anti-
Narcotics Unit (A.N.U), Economic and Financial 
Crimes (EFU), Interpol, Criminal Records Office 
(C.R.O) and Administrative Unit (RNP, 2009a).  
Provincial Judicial Police  Coordinates and supervises criminal investigations 
by judicial police officers (RNP, 2009a).  
INTERPOL  Also known as the National Central Bureau (NCB), 
it links the Rwandan National Police to the Interpol 
General Secretariat in Lyon France and National 
police forces of other member states of Interpol. It is 
responsible for combating trans-national organized 
crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
crimes against women and children, cyber crimes, 
money laundering, terrorism, stolen or forged travel 
documents, motor-vehicle theft, etc. (RNP, 2009c).  
East African Police Chief’s Committee (EAPCCO)  Ten East African member countries cooperate for 
the purpose of security and capacity building (BIG, 
2007). 
 
Adopted from: Rwanda: Country Profile, Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, CIGI, 
http://www.ssrresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/country-profile-Rwanda-
April-7pdf  
It is on these Security Sector Reforms that Judicial Reforms; which are discussed in the 
subsequent part of this chapter were added as a way of enhancing the administrative 
function of Rwanda with a goal to move towards higher levels of political liberalism.  
Also the donor agencies were of great help at this level. However the desire of the 
authorities to realise but most importantly the stability concerns of the new Government 
which they had forged was a major driving force to a committed operationalisation of the 
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reforms for they were presented as conditionalities to the Rwandan government if it were 
to be guaranteed aid. 
Thus, as regards the administrative function of state capacity, a number of reforms were 
undertaken to revamp the public service of Rwanda. Instructive, for the effective 
administration of the state, a new constitution was promulgated in 2003 with a mission to 
ensure peace and stability in Rwanda. One of the most sacrosanct attributes of the new 
Constitution was Article 152 which provided for the establishment of the Gacaca 
Courts
828
 and the National Service for the monitoring and evaluation of the activities of 
these courts as part of the Post-Genocide Judicial infrastructure.  The discussion of the 
efficacy of the Gacaca courts as agencies of justice whose work was inaugurated on the 
18
th
 of June, 2002 by President Kagame;
829
 has been ably discussed in both scholarly and 
commissioned research by international and local civil-society actors.  This study alludes 
to some of them of those studies in the discussion, but for this study, it suffices to say that 
the Gacaca courts initiative was one the mechanisms through which the new Government 
of Rwanda sought to administer justice.  
Without the Gacaca courts,  it is said;  that it would have taken approximately one 
hundred years (100) for the normal court process in Rwanda to bring all the culprits to 
justice.
830
 Indeed at the time of the closure of the Gacaca tribunals’ sessions on 18th June, 
2012, the 12,100 Gacaca tribunals at the grassroots had tried two million people with 65 
percent of those convicted of genocide related crimes.
831
  However, the Human Rights 
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Watch in its report which appraised the activities of the Gacaca system, the incipient 
flaws of the system were delineated as follows: restrictions of the accused`s ability to 
mount an effective defence; possible miscarriages of justice due to using largely 
untrained judges; trumped-up charges some based on the Rwandan Government`s wish to 
silence critics. But the same report was quick in acknowledging the achievements of the 
tribunals noting that the Gacaca Court system had seen: ``swift trials with popular 
participation, a reduction in the prison population, a better understanding of what 
happened in 1994`` helped with locating bodies of victims and thwarted ``a possible 
easing of ethnic tensions``.
832
 As a result of its findings, the Human Right Watch Report 
was inundated with criticism particularly its methodology. The Dutch Ambassador to 
Rwanda, Frans Makken, was particularly irked by the small sample of only 350 cases that 
the report based on to make conclusions on the efficacy of the Gacaca tribunals out of the 
two million trials. Frans Makken irritation was quite understandable given the fact that 
the Netherlands Government was the major funder of the Gacaca experience,
833
 and the 
Netherlands had been seconded by the International Community particularly the USA to 
guide the process of political reconciliation in Rwanda.
834
 But even a sample of 350 cases 
out of two million cases is inconceivable in appraising a project of Gacaca nature.   
Part of the reconciliation administrative infrastructure was the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission an agency whose creation was enabled by the Arusha 
Accords of 1993, and later empowered by Article 178 of the Constitution of Rwanda of 
2003 and the Law No. 3/99 Setting up the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission of 12
th
 March, 1999
835
, and Law No. 35/2002 Modifying and 
Complementing Law No. 3/99 of 14
th
 November, 2002.
836
 The mandate of the 
Commission entailed, preparing and coordinating the national Programme for the 
                                                          
832
 See, Aljazeera, Rwanda Closes `gacaca` genocide courts, 19 June 2012. Also see, HRW, Justice 
Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda`s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, May 2011 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webcover.0.pdf, accessed: 13:31 hours, 
09/12/2013. 
833
 Magnus Mazimpaka, Human Rights Watch under scrutiny over controversial Gacaca Report, The 
Independent, Saturday, 11 June 2011, 09:37, http://www.independent.co.ug/news/regional-news/4269-
human-rghts-watchunderscrutiny-overcontroversial-gacaca-report, accessed: 13:36hrs, 09/12/2013. 
834
 166270. 
835
  Rwanda Laws, Law No. 3/99 Setting up the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of 12
th
 
March, 1999. 
836
 Rwanda Laws, Law No. 35/2002 Modifying and Complementing Law No. 3/99 of 14
th
 November, 2002. 
296 
 
promotion of national unity and reconciliation, putting in place and developing ways and 
means to restore and consolidate unity and reconciliation among Rwandans, educating 
and mobilising the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation, 
carrying out research, organising debates, disseminating ideas and making publications 
relating to peace, national unity and reconciliation, making proposals on measures that 
can eradicate divisions among Rwandans and to reinforce national unity and 
reconciliation, denouncing and fighting against acts, writing and utterances which are 
intend to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia, and making an 
annual report and such other reports as may be necessary on the situation of national 
unity and reconciliation. 
837
 
Among the tangible outputs of the National Reconciliation Commission was the National 
Reconciliation Barometer which was a culmination of an intensive study which was  
funded by the UNDP and DFID which gathered information on the perception of the 
Rwandans as regards; political culture, human security, citizenship  and identity,  
understanding the past, transition justice, and  social cohension. This study was important 
to the extent to which it was going to guide future efforts by the Rwandan government to 
thwart a resurgence of violence of genocide character. Among the policy 
recommendations was; that inequality between the rich and the poor was fuelling 
divisionism in today`s Rwanda, the feeling that though ethnicity was banned, 31.5 
percent of the respondents reported that ethnic discrimination was manifest, and 30.5 
percent reported that Rwandans still ``judge`` each other basing on ``ethnic stereotype``, 
the Political parties where still thriving on ethnicity in their activities, that 40 percent of 
the respondents reported that since the end of the genocide, the problem of access to 
Rwanda and housing worsened, and  that some citizens feel that they do not have a clear 
leverage to participate in public policy making and other decisions to influence 
government action. 
838
 
Equally important, still on the work of the National Reconciliation Commission of 
Rwanda, was the survey which it conducted to ascertain the level of social cohesion in 
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Rwanda. The survey highlighted the challenges of Rwanda when it came to realising 
national reconciliation and gaps in the provision of human needs which guarantee human 
security.  Indeed, in the National Reconciliation Barometer report, human security to 
which this study gives a substantial analysis but within the context of thwarting a 
resurgence of violence during reconstruction was presented as a concomitant of the 
providence of human needs; a relationship which this study underscored in its conceptual 
chapter.  
The challenges and opportunities which were unravelled by the social cohension survey, 
which pass for a somewhat Human Security Score Card for Rwanda, conducted between 
June and September 2007, in all the 416 administrative units of Rwanda with 9,980 
respondents, are depicted by the following results.
839
: 
The report highlighted that social cohesion was still problematic in Rwanda with 58 
percent of the respondents believing that it was ``naïve to trust others`` but with 97 
percent believing that the government was committed to ameliorating their lives which 
was a coup for the state capacity of Rwanda for trust of the citizens in their government is 
an important source of legitimacy. As a result between 70 percent and 85 percent 
acknowledged the efficacy of the decentralisation process; a mechanism adopted by the 
Rwandan government to ensure people participation in decision making and bringing 
service provision closer to the people. And whereas 91 percent of the people 
acknowledged citizen participation in decision making; only 47 percent reported to have 
participated in decision making and this pointed to the need of sensitizing the public on 
the importance of citizen participation in government decision making process which 
decentralisation allows.  
The low level of participation in decision making as part of the objectives of 
decentralisation of government functions was equally reported when it came to 
participation in associations and civil society activities; with respondents reporting only 
participation in local saving and credit groups (41 percent of respondents belonged to one 
in 2007) and 27 percent belonging to spiritual organisations by 2007 and only 3 to 7 
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percent reporting membership in cultural or sports associations, community user 
committees, local charitable organisations. No reportage was done on membership to 
political civil-societies that engage in rights activism probably owing to the government 
attitude towards these organisations that has been generally reported as anti-political 
activitism.  The  low levels of  participation of the citizens in others levels of civil-
societies can only be explained to the general apathy that people developed in social 
groupings  for the genocide was partly accelerated by community groupings. 
As regards issues which guarantee human survival of which land is cardinal in Rwanda, 
the survey found out that the percentage of the landless was fluctuating at an average of 
12 percent and that many respondents were in favour of land reforms, with 62 percent 
against bequeathing ancestral land to one’s children, 59 percent advocating regrouping of 
land to be under a single tenure system, 64 percent agreeing that dependency on 
agriculture was no longer viable. This reveals how aware and sensitive the citizens were 
when it came to addressing the issues which literally fuelled the genocide.  Land was part 
of the genocide saga as earlier explained in chapter two of this study and the citizens 
trusted in the government in solving the land related problems.  
When it came to the plight of women, the survey reported that 59 percent of the women 
in comparison to 53 percent of the men headed families classified themselves as being 
poor. Those women also reported lack of access to land and that those who owned and 
cultivated land reported access to fewer plots in comparison to men. Also fewer women 
(16 percent) reported active participation in public affairs in comparison to 28 percent of 
men. Little participation of women in ``economic self-help groups`` was also reported.  
This meant that whereas the civil-war which culminated into the genocide left many 
women widowed, women empowerment was a challenge which the government had to 
grapple with if it was to uplift the general living standards of women in Rwanda.  
On the regional trends as regards social-economic wellbeing, inequality was reported 
with the Southern Province, owing to the extent to which it was hit by the genocide, 
reporting high levels of poverty in comparison to the North, the East and the Kigali 
provinces.  90 percent of the respondents in the South self-reported themselves as being 
poor in comparison to the self-reported levels of the Eastern and Northern Province 
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which stood at 61 percent and 56 percent respectively. In the Kigali province,   poverty 
self reporting levels stood at only 17 percent below the poverty line. It should be 
remembered that regional disparities in income distribution were part of the genocide 
saga and with the disparities which were reported the government of Rwanda had a task 
of how to reduce on regional disparities as a mechanism to ensuring sustainable peace 
and development. 
When it came to issues of justice, with particular focus on the: Effectiveness of the 
Gacaca in Adjudicating Crimes of Genocide , 98 percent of the general population, 96 
percent of the survivors, 83 percent of the prisoners believed in the effectiveness of the 
Gacaca judicial system. 95 percent of the general population and 75 percent of the 
prisoners believed in the efficacy of the Gacaca system in eradicating ``the culture of 
impunity``. 
However, whereas 92 percent of the general population had trust in the inyangamugayo 
(respected Banyarwanda elders) who presided over the proceeding of the tribunals, 69 
percent of the survivors and 32 percent of the prisoners expressed mistrust in the elders.  
On witness testimonies, it was reported that two thirds of the population believed that 
witness accounts on both prosecution and defence sides were untrustable. 83 percent of 
the prisoners expressed disbelief in the truthfulness of persecution witness accounts and 
77 percent of the survivors had disbelief in defence witness accounts.  
Equally important was the responses of 80 percent of the survivors that the genocidal 
ideology were still living on in Rwanda and that defense witness were underplaying the 
extent of crimes of genocide.  
Still on the challenges to reconciliation and cohesion, 76 percent of the survivors 
expressed their misgiving that ``gacaca aggravates tension between families`` ``and that 
(63 percent of the respondents believed that) families of those found guilty will always 
feel resentful`` an argument that is rejected by 63 percent of the prisoners, but to agree 
that testimonies during Gacaca hearings aggravated tension. This also depicted the 
challenge of ensuring justice in an emotionally disoriented setting of Rwandan nature.  
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On insecurity and fear of retribution, 82 percent of the survivors and 54 percent of the 
prisoners felt threaten during the proceedings of the Gacaca tribunals. This pointed to the 
quick capitulation among the culprits as a result of fear and the falsification of the 
prosecution witness evidence as a way of ensuring that there is little or no room for the 
culprit to escape conviction.  This undermined the efficacy of the Gacaca Courts as 
mechanism to dispersing justice to both the victims, survivors and perpetrators of 
violence which culminated into the genocide.  
So, whereas the results of the social cohension survey revealed much as regards the 
challenges which Rwanda faced as regards its reconciliation process, the results were also 
indicative of the contribution of the National Reconciliation Commission to the recovery 
of Rwanda as it conducted surveys which provided empirical evidence  to guide in the 
government in the planning and execution of its core functions with a view to addressing 
the issues that might have led to structuring future violence. These results pointed to 
problematic nature of Rwanda`s reconciliation process and the uncertainty of its future 
with reconciliation.  The trust in the Gacaca process was low in both the victims and 
convicts of the genocide crimes. This indicates that as Rwanda pursued justice, and 
reconciliation was either neglected or undermined by the institutional arrangement of 
justice. The Gacaca was more inclined to Justice than a balancing of it with 
reconciliation, and since this study limits it scope for the period 1994-2005, an inquiry 
into the extent to which Rwanda has progressed on the concerns of the social cohension 
survey of 2007  as a way tracking progress as a measure to ensure the aversion of a future 
catastrophe in Rwanda by way of recommendation at this point; it should be undertake, 
and the elements of the survey can be extend to other post-conflict areas as a way of 
measuring the progress of those societies on the social index which is important for the 
promotion of human security.  
Another important agency as far as playing an oversight role as regards the activities of 
Government of Rwanda is the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman 
is provided for by The Rwanda Constitution of 2003, with amendments through 2010, 
Chapter VII of Title VIII. In its functions it is enabled by the Law establishing the 
Organisation and Functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman (Law No. 25/2003 of 15
th
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August, 2003).
840
  According to Article: 182 (Amendment no.04 of 17/06/2010) of the 
Rwanda Constitution of 2003, the core functions of the Office of the Ombudsman are, 
acting as a link between the citizen and public and private institutions, preventing and 
fighting against injustice, corruption and other related offences in public and private 
administration, receiving and examining, in the aforementioned context, complaints from 
individuals and independent associations against the acts of public officials or organs, 
and private institutions and to mobilise these officials and institutions in order to find 
solutions to such complaints if they are well founded, and receiving the faithful 
declaration of assets of the; the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, the 
Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Supreme Court, the Prime 
Minister, the other members of the Cabinet, Senators and the Deputies, Generals and high 
ranking officers of the Rwanda Defence Forces, Commissioners and high ranking officers 
of the National Police, Leaders of the National Security Service, Leaders of Local 
administrative entities with legal personality, Judges by profession and prosecutors by 
profession and judicial officers, those in charge of receiving, managing and controlling 
the public finance and property, those responsible for public tenders in central 
administration, commissions and specialized public institutions, local administration, 
public institutions with private management, institutions in which government holds 
shares, state owned projects and officials of those institutions, those in charge of taxes 
and revenues, and other civil servants or other servants that are connected with public 
finance and property as well as those whose activities could lead to corruption and related 
practices as the law may determine.
841
   
Research on the efficacy of this institution has been scanty save for the World Bank 
commissioned study by Dan Barnes. In that study it was found out that reportage of 
complaints was generally representative of all the regions of the country by 2010  with 
Western standing at between 200 and 250 cases, Eastern at 300, Southern standing at 
between 200 and 250, Northern at 200 and Kigali City at 500 and 550 owing to its higher 
population.  It was also observed that reportage of corruption related cases had been 
steadily increasing since 2005 from an average of 40 index cases to 120 index cases in 
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2009. However the report also reported a measure of inadequacies in the work of the 
ombudsman in Rwanda. It cited that in 2008, the Declaration of Assets Unit had received 
4,929 declarations but could only verify 5 percent of that declaration by use of random 
and targeted selection. Also whereas the Office of the Ombudsman was in position to 
resolve 84 percent of the complaints received in 2008, a subset of complaints against 
government agencies was not responded to; nine (9) against the Ministry of Defense, six 
(6) against the Ministry of Justice,  eleven (11) against Kigali City and four (4) against 
the Ministry of Trade.  
Those inadequacies are explained by the challenges the Office faced. With an operational 
staff capacity of forty seven (47) employees by 2010, with budgetary constraints that saw 
the salaries of its staff being lower at least for some time in comparison to the salaries of 
employees of other government agencies, the agency could not  execute it functions with 
expected efficiency.  Also the fact that its budget approval is part of the wider framework 
of government priorities and that its approval is supposed to be done by parliament and 
allocation done by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; subjects the Office of 
the Ombudsman to unnecessary political pressure and political lobbying something that 
impacts on its administrative, regulatory, investigative and enforcement capacity.
842
  
But it suffices to say that in is post-conflict reconstruction phase which culminated into 
the promulgation of the constitution of 2003 and other enabling laws, issues of 
accountability and transparency in the execution of government business were also part 
of myriad of issues that were considered to streamline the state capacity of post conflict 
Rwanda.   
Also related to issues of social justice and social equity, key elements in the relationship 
of that state and its people, are the issues of human rights. The reconstructed state in 
Rwanda put in place the National Commission of Human Rights. The commission whose 
functions are precisely provided by Article 177 of the Constitution of Rwanda of 2003 
and enabled in its activities by Law No. 4/99 establishing the National Human Rights 
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Commission of 12
th
 March, 1999
843
 as Amended by Law 37/2002 Modifying and 
Complementing the Law No. 4/99 of 31
st
 December, 2002,
844
 and Law No. 04/99 of 
12/03/1999
845
. The constitution puts the a number of tasks into the docket of the 
commission including; educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to 
human rights, examining the violations of human rights committed on Rwandan territory 
by State organs, public officials using their duties as cover, by organizations and by 
individuals, carrying out investigations of human rights abuses in Rwanda and filing 
complaints in respect thereof with the competent courts, and preparing and disseminating 
an annual and other reports as may be necessary on the situation of human rights in 
Rwanda;
846
 
However, the fact that in the year 2002, when the Chair of the Commission Gasana 
Ndoba`s contract expired it was not renewed by the government, allegedly as a result of 
the Commission Report of 2001 that was seen by the government as being overly critical 
of the human rights performance of the state agencies as a result of  torture, unexplained 
disappearances, and the unexplained role of the military in matters of human rights 
abuse,
847
 depicts how politically  an unfettered was the work of the Human Rights 
Commission. This incident did not augur well for the future oversight role of the 
commission when it came to holding government to account when it came to the 
observance of human rights.  
Equally central to the furthering of social justice and social equity is the work of the 
Judiciary. The judiciary as outlined earlier was left, to say the least, topsy-turvy by the 
genocide. Accordingly, its reformation during the reconstruction period was urgent as 
part of the reconstruction of the enabling institutions of state capacity in Rwanda.  The 
Constitution of Rwanda of 2003 under Chapter 5 provides for the Judiciary, with Section 
1 delineating the `` General Provisions`` of the Judiciary. The judiciary structure was 
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restructured to include ordinary and specialized courts as follows; Ordinary Courts, 
Supreme Court, the High Court of the Republic, the High Instance Tribunals and, Grass-
root tribunals; Specialized Courts like the Gacaca Courts and Military Courts 
848
 
The mandate of the Supreme Court is provided for under Article 145, and it entails; 
hearing appeals against decisions of the High Court of the Republic and the Military High 
Court rendered in their first or appellate degrees as provided for by the law, ensuring that 
Courts act in accordance with the law, coordinating and supervising their activities,  
hearing petitions on the constitutionality of organic laws, laws, decree-laws and 
International treaties and agreements, resolving upon request, disputes relating to powers 
arising between different state organs, hearing election petitions relating to referendum, 
presidential and legislative elections, trying in the first and last instance criminal cases 
against the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Supreme Court and the Prime Minister, 
administering the oath of office taken by the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister before assumption of their duties, trying the President of the Republic on 
charges of high treason or grave and deliberate violation of the Constitution. In such case, 
the decision to file charges against the President of the Republic with the Supreme Court 
shall be taken through a vote of both Chambers of Parliament meeting in joint session, by 
a two-thirds majority vote of members of each Chamber, declaring vacant of office of the 
President of the Republic in case of the President’s death, resignation or conviction and 
sentence for high treason or grave and deliberate violation of the Constitution, and  on 
matters relating to the organisation of the judiciary, the Supreme Court may propose to 
the Government a bill of any nature amending existing law in public interest, and to 
provide authentic interpretation of custom which is unwritten and in respect of which the 
written law is silent. 
849
 
In its functions, the Supreme Court is enabled by the several Organic Laws, including; 
Organic Law Modifying the Law of February 23, 1963 Concerning the Organisation of 
the Supreme Court (Law No. 23/2000 of 11/10/2000), Organic Law Modifying the 
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Organic Law No. 07/96 of June 6, 1996 on the Organisations and Functioning and 
Competence of the Supreme Court (Law No. 21/2000 of 11/10/2000), and Organic Law 
Establishing the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Law 
No. 01/2004 of 29/01/2004.
850
  
The mandate of the High Court is provided for under Article 149 to include; jurisdiction 
to try in the first instance certain serious offences committed in Rwanda as well as some 
offences committed outside Rwanda as specified by the law, hearing in the first instance 
cases relating to the violation of Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Constitution committed by 
political organizations, and  jurisdiction to hear in the first instance certain cases 
involving administrative law, political organizations, elections and such other cases as an 
organic law may determine, and it also hears, as a court of last instance, appeals against 
decisions of lower courts as determined by law.
851
 
At the time of writing, Rwanda had four chambers of the High Court, including Chamber 
of Nyanza, Chamber of Rusizi, Chamber of Rwamagana, and Chamber of Musanze 
Also are the Provincial Courts and the Court of the City of Kigali which are provided for 
under Article 150 and enabled by several Organic Laws, including; Organic Law 
Modifying and Completing the Decree-Law No. 09/80 of July 7, 1980 on the 
Organisation and Judicial Competence of Courts (Law No. 22/2000 of 11/10/2000), 
Organic Law Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of Courts (Law 
No. 07/2004 of 25/04/2004).
852
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The Grass-root tribunals are provided for under Article 151 established at each District, 
Town and Municipality in Rwanda.  
The Gacaca Courts and the National Service for the Follow-up of their Activities; are 
specialized courts provided for by Article 152 of the Constitution of Rwanda of 2003, 
with a mandate to try and judge cases and crimes against persons accused of the crime of 
genocide and crimes against humanity.  
The Military Courts comprising of the Military Tribunal and Military Court are provided 
for under Article 154 and Article 155 respectively. The Military Tribunals are supposed 
to try, ``… in the first instance all offences committed by military personnel irrespective 
of their rank.`` And the Military High Court provided for by Article 155 is mandate to, 
``…try in the first instance, all offences which constitute a threat to national security and 
murder committed by soldiers irrespective of rank. Decisions of this Court can be 
appealed at the Supreme Court.  
To facilitate the judicial system, the National Assembly of Rwanda was steadfast in 
formulating and adopting legislation to streamline the administration of justice. Some of 
the legislations which were adopted have been already mentioned in our discussion of the 
nature of the judicial system adopted in the aftermath of the genocide, but it suffices to 
state the core legislations which were adopted immediately after the end of the conflict.  
They include; the Organic Law on the Organisation of prosecutions for offences 
constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity since 1 October 1990 
became operational on the 1
st
 of September 1996. This legislation specified the categories 
of those accused of genocide crimes; genocide organizers, supervisors and offenders of 
property. It also provided for the notion of confession and plea as instances which attract 
reduction in the gravity of the punishment, the law relating to provisional modifications 
to the Criminal Procedure Code which became operational on 15
th
 December 1996, but 
applying to the issues which occurred starting on 6 April 1994. This legislation was 
meant to streamline genocide related arrests and detentions which had been earlier 
executed by the government. The excesses of this legislation were outlined that someone 
could be legally detained for more than six months without trial (for instance from 1
st
 
December 1997 to 14 July 1998). Whereas this law allowed the government enough time 
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to execute arrests, detain the culprits for as much as time would allow gathering evidence 
for prosecution.  But it was against the cardinal principles of natural justice that are put in 
a simple measure that: Justice delayed is justice denied. 
Equally important was the adoption of the Loi Organique portant organization 
fonctionnement et competences du Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature, and the Organic 
Law relating to the organization, working and competence of the Supreme Court, by the 
National Assembly on March and June 1996 respectively. This was meant to ensure that 
the operations of the ordinary courts are streamlined with clear terms of reference in their 
administration of justice.  
On the 15
th
 of April 1997, a Law establishing a bar in Rwanda was Gazatted and a bar 
was established on the 30
th
 day of August 1997 with 44 graduate lawyers who were 
Rwandans admitted to it, together with other ``corps of judicial defenders`` without a 
University degree but permitted to give legal representation to offenders appearing before 
tribunal courts. 
853
 
To assist the victims of the genocide, The National Assembly passed the Law No.2/1998 
Establishing a national Assistance Fund for Needy Victims of Genocide and massacres 
committed in Rwanda Between 1
st
 October 1990 and 31
st
 December 1994. It should be 
noted that as much as this law came into force on 1
st
 February 1998, it had been effective 
from 1
st
 January 1997. Article I of this legislation provides for the category of the people 
who are supposed to benefit from this fund as: ``… the needy victims of the genocide and 
massacres committed in Rwanda between October 1
st
 , 1990 and December 31
st
, 1994``, 
and the Chapter III, Article 12 provides for the source of the ``Fund Assets`` to include; 
the State allocates annually to the fund an amount equal to 5% of the State's ordinary 
budget ,money legally got from forsaken properties, donations, indemnification from 
abroad to Rwanda because of the genocide and massacres, the money equivalent to 2% of 
indemnification related to genocide and massacres without prejudice to the 4% usually 
put in the public treasury, however, any salary earner puts as least 100 Rwandan francs in 
the Fund annually. Every Rwandan citizen aged 18 puts at least 1% of his or her annual 
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salary, every nonprofit making organisation operating in Rwanda puts in the Fund at least 
10.000 Rwandan francs annually, people carrying out liberal profession shall put 
annually 50.000 Frw in the national assistance fund, every registered businessman shall 
put annually at least 10.000 Frw for retailer, 50.000 Frw for wholesaler, 100.000 Frw for 
manufacturers, importers and international transporters. 
Also apart from limited companies which put at least 20.000 Frw each year, any public 
establishment, parastatal establishment, commercial company other than limited company 
(collective named company, limited partnership company, company with limited 
liability) puts at least 100.000 Frw each year. 
It also stated that in case there is a risk of having a situation of cumulative dues provided 
in points 9 and 10 of the present article, the company shall only put the contribution 
determined in point 10, all other legal fund-raising means capable to enhance the 
resources of the Fund shall be used with respect to law, and interest produced by sums 
paid into the Fund.
854
 
It should however be noted that the criteria for determining who to benefit from the Fund 
was not clearly streamlined for all people were affected by the genocide in one way or the 
other; including the Hutus who faced violence from the avenging Tutsi population that 
went on even after 1994. The mandate of the fund would have been extended forward to 
cover even the victims of the after effects of the genocide like the victims of property 
confiscation by the Tutsi returnees from Burundi and Uganda.  Those who were affiliated 
to the RPF either naively or out of sheer impunity thought that their membership was a 
guarantee to unfettered access to property which belonged to either those still in refuge or 
those who had returned.
855
 They literally took the law into their own hands.  Justice was 
not supposed to cater for only the known victims of the genocide—the Tutsis. Even the 
Hutus who innocently suffered instances of revenge from the Tutsi deserved justice in all 
its post-conflict manifestations in Rwanda.  It is as a result of those loopholes within the 
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body-justice that the Hutus started perceiving the nature of justice in Rwanda as generally 
a ``victors justice`` and the judiciary was perceived by the Hutus as predominantly 
Tutsi.
856
  
Indeed it was reported that the RPF soldiers who were party to the massacres at Kibeho, 
Kanama, Muramba, and elsewhere were handed lighter convictions for just ``acts of 
indiscipline`` even when lives were lost. Also when Lt. Col. Ibingira was convicted for 
his involvement in the Kibeho massacre, it was reported that he continued to execute his 
routine functions as a military officer.
857
 In all these instances justice was seen not be 
done, and this undermined Rwanda`s journey to the reconciliation of the victors and 
vanquished, yet it was within the means of the victors to ensure reconciliation in all its 
complexities. 
 The situation was not helped by the alleged ``Tustification`` of the justice sector as a 
result of the suspension on 24
th
 March, 1998 and subsequent dismissal of 6 Hutu Judges 
who were sitting on the Bench of the Cour de Cassation and the Council of State. This 
did not augur well for the future of justice in Rwanda as an avenue for reconciliation. 
Nepotism was identified even in the Judiciary that by 1998, of the four Presidents of the 
Courts of Appeal, three were said to be of Tutsi origin. Public executions threatened 
people and allegations of intimidation of witnesses were rife.
858
 The security of the 
individual continued to be under threat and some Human Rights advocates freed to exile.  
In 1998, Innocent Niyonagira and Augustine Bizirema; human rights advocates in post-
genocide Rwanda, are reported to have fled to exile.  
Abductions and disappearances of those who were suspected of being sympathetic to the 
Hutu rebels were not rare occurrences.  Group punishments were visited onto 
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communities thought to be in support of the Hutu insurgents by way of mass killings,
859
 
as it was reported in Remera were people from Nyakabanda district of Kigali where 
people who were perceived to be sympathetic to the rebels were put in containers and 
literally suffocated to death.
860
  All this served to undermine the credibility of even the 
reformed judicial sector and the legitimacy of the Rwandan Government among the 
people was affected. The provision of justice as a public good in Rwanda was punctuated 
with inherent flaws which were a reflection of the very conditions that set the stage for 
the violence which culminated into the genocide. Genocidal tendencies in Africa had 
been attributed to the loss of legitimacy by governments that engage ``The Narcissism of 
minor difference`` by visiting group punishment onto ``other`` groups in a bid to sustain 
their forceful imposition of their will onto all. 
861
 
Another weakness in the legislations, particularly the Organic Law on genocide trials, 
was the absence of the provision for pro bono services for genocide offenders. This 
meant that poor offenders who could not procure the services of the then available 44 
Rwandan Lawyers and 5 judicial officers had to defend themselves without professional 
legal advice. Indeed it is for that reason that many prisoners failed to understand the 
meaning of the ``Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure``. Data provided as of September 
1997 indicated that 38% of defendants with lawyers had confessed in comparison to only 
5% of those that had no professional legal representation. 
862
 Thanks to the assistance of 
Attorneys without Borders (Avocats sans Frontieres) from mainly Belgium and Western 
African countries, 48 percent of the defendants had legal representation for the period 
April-June 1997.
863
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Even with those glaring weakness in the body-judiciary of Rwanda, it should be added 
that the powers of the presidency were also central to the restoration of in Rwanda. For 
instance a Presidential Decree of January 2003 granted provisional release of 19,556 
prisoners. These prisoners had come out of the Eastern Congo in 2003 and had been 
members of the ex-FAR, FDLR, FAC and the Mayi Mayi. More prisoners were released 
under the Presidential Pardon; 4,000 of those who were sick, and those who were 
between the ages of 14-18 during the genocide. Also in February 2003, approximately 
25,000 prisoners were released in line with the Presidential Decree of February 2003.
864
 
It should be underscored that whereas the government came up with the necessary 
legislation to enable the functioning of the judiciary, the international community was 
also central to addressing the operational challenges to the judiciary, which included, as 
earlier mentioned: Human resource, judicial skills and material resources. Whereas there 
was an array of actors in reconstruction of the sector; the table in appendix 1, though not 
exhaustive, provides the extent of international assistance to the judicial sector.  
Also, in addition to the above, it is noted that the UNHCR provided training to policemen 
and prosecutors
865
 as a way of aiding the Rwanda justice and security sector as a move 
towards facilitating reconciliation which required the observance of justice. The 
reconstruction of the Judicial System of Rwanda was informed by the catastrophe of the 
genocide as a concomitant of the civil-war which ended in 1994.  
The discussion of the institutional mechanism which Rwanda forged during it post-
conflict reconstruction underscores the imperativeness of institutionalisation even when 
the general agenda for post-conflict reconstruction is focused on attaining a polity aligned 
to the liberal peace agenda with a focus on democratisation and a free market economy.  
What emerges out clearly is though the government of Rwanda was denied aid in the 
immediate aftermath of the genocide, when aid started flowing the focus was not directly 
on the implementation of a liberal agenda like organisation elections, but rather on 
building institutions to enable the operationalisation of a liberal peace framework.  As 
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much as aid was withheld by the international community as Rwanda was short of 
fulfilling the liberal conditionalities, so was the move towards higher levels of liberalism 
like dispensation of justice for judicial capacity was lacking. Institutionalisation enables a 
liberal agenda and without functioning government institutions a liberal agenda may 
appear a farfetched normality.   
Accordingly, at this point, the study examines the meaning of the strides which Rwanda 
made in state capacity during its post-conflict reconstruction along the indicators of state 
capacity; extractive capacity, coercive and administrative capacity. The presentation and 
discussion is as follows: 
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4.1.3 Rwanda, Gains in State Capacity: A measurement. 
 
The strides which Rwanda made during its post-genocide period were captured succinctly 
by Francis Deng when he remarked thus: 
 I have been back to Rwanda and the difference that the government has made 
during this period was absolutely striking. You saw a country that seems to be 
back to itself, a country that seems to be developing remarkably. Policies and 
laws that guarantee equal opportunities for men and women, accordingly to the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have resulted 
in Rwanda holding a world record of women parliamentarians—56.3 percent, just 
ahead of Sweden at 46.4 percent. Official records show that this year the economy 
should grow by 7 to 8 percent, up from 5.5 percent in 2009.
866
 
It should noted that as a result of the efforts which were undertaken in the rehabilitation 
of state capacity in Rwanda, indicators as regards the extractive, coercive and 
administrative capacity of the Rwandan Government were progressively incremental. It is 
said that by 1997 the Rwandan state was fully functional with local and national 
administrative structure fully operational. The educational system was restored, 
communal police trained and deployed, roads repaired and new ones built, telephone 
system fully functional and the tax collection apparatus fully in place with the courts 
functioning properly.
867
 However, this section seeks to answer the question: what was the 
nature of the gains which were made in the state capacities of Rwanda of Rwanda as a 
result of the reforms which were undertaken to reconstruct the enabling institutions of 
state capacity in post-conflict Rwanda? What is the meaning of these gains in the context 
of Rwanda`s state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction?   
The treatment is as follows: 
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As regards extractive capacity, the International Monetary Fund; Government Finance 
Statistics indicated progress. The economic indicators of Rwanda indicated progress 
thanks to the creation of the Rwanda Revenue Authorities and the reforms which were 
undertaken in the functioning of the National Bank of Rwanda.  Accordingly there were a 
steady increase in the amount of refugee which was collected from; direct taxes, taxes on 
goods and services, taxes on international trade and non tax revenue.  The graphical 
display of the outcome is as follows: 
Graph 1 
 
 
There was also steady increase in the amount of International Finance which was 
extending to Rwanda during its post-conflict period. The flow of particularly 
international finance is an indication of the progress which Rwanda consistently made as 
regards to adhering to conditions for access to international finance which included a 
clear framework for regular financial reporting. It should also be emphasised Rwanda`s 
progress in putting in place institutions for increased political liberalisation as envisaged 
in its yielding to international demands of forging a ``broad based government`` and an 
attempt at putting in place measures and institutions for the observance of human rights 
and promotion of reconciliation, inadequate as they have been widely discussed, made 
the international community to progressively offer assistance to the Rwandan 
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governance.  Graph No.2 depicts consolidated increased levels of international grants 
which were extending to Rwanda in an incremental manner. Grants as part of the revenue 
of the Government of Rwanda steadily increased as follows: 
Graph No. 2 
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff 
Country Report No. 98/115, 1998:4. IMF, Rwanda: Statistical Annex, January 2001, IMF 
Country Report No. 01/30, 2001:3a.  IMF, Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, December 2004, IMF Country Report No. 04/383, 2004:6. 
 Resources where made available in order to increase the providence of government to its 
people; with increase in the provision of social services as depicted by the increase in 
state expenditure on social services as indicated in Graph No.3.  If providence on the side 
of Government is an indicator of state capacity; then Rwanda made steady gains on that 
indicator as depicted in the increased expenditure on social services 
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Graph No. 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff 
Country Report No. 98/115, 1998:19. IMF, Rwanda: Statistical Annex, January 2001, 
IMF Country Report No. 01/30, 2000:17.  IMF, Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, December 2004, IMF Country Report No. 04/383, 2004:94. (The expenditure 
is indicated in Rwanda Francs). 
 The financial assistance, to supplement the revenue of government also meant additional 
resources for the execution of government functions like territorial security through 
increased military expenditure. Indeed the percentage of defense expenditure on GDP 
steadily increased; an indication that Rwanda was engaging in the development of its 
military capacity in preparation for existing and probable threats to its national security. 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP Dyadic Data Set V.-2013; indicate that 
between 1996 to 2002,
868
 Rwanda grappled with a conflict continuous situation as a result 
of the incursions of the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) and later the  
Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda.(FDLR)  The increased expenditure on 
the defence is illustrated as follows: 
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Graph No.4 
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff 
Country Report No. 98/115, 1998. IMF, Rwanda: Statistical Annex, January 2001, IMF 
Country Report No. 01/30, 2000. IMF, Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 
December 2004, IMF Country Report No. 04/383, 2004.(The expenditure is indicated in 
Rwanda Francs). 
However, the defense expenditure was high in comparison to the expenditure on social 
services, owing to the continued threat that the Hutu refugee warriors posed to Rwanda, 
an indication of defence expenditure can offset the provision of social services. Indeed 
even during the days of Habyarimana; as defence expenditure increased so was a 
decrease in the providence of social services by the government. Sometimes increased 
expenditure on defence, which concomitantly leads to build-ups in the military capacity 
of the state is perceived as a somewhat Alfa and omega when it comes to determining 
state capabilities, but as illustrated in Chapter 2 of this study, improvidence of human 
needs on the side of the Government of Rwanda during its pre-coloniality, coloniality, 
post-coloniality, and post-genocide, historical moments, saw the emergence of conflictual 
situations. High levels of state capacity in one indicator may be offset by low levels in 
other indicators of state capacity thus leading to conflictual situations yet state capacity is 
supposed to thwart conflicts. So during post-conflict reconstruction, the resurgence of 
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violence which threatened the new government as a result of the Hutu refugee warriors in 
Eastern Congo saw the expenditure on defence surpassing that on social services, and 
indication of how human security—which is guaranteed by the providence of human 
needs can be off-put by the demands of state security that is military capacity. Though 
military capacity is also important to human security, the fact in the concept of Rwanda it 
was oriented towards an existential threat to territorial security depicts a preoccupation 
with state security.   The illustration is as follows: 
Graph No.  5 
 
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff 
Country Report No. 98/115, 1998. IMF, Rwanda: Statistical Annex, January 2001, IMF 
Country Report No. 01/30, 2000. IMF, Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 
December 2004, IMF Country Report No. 04/383, 2004. 
But as the threat was waning the expenditure on defence relatively went down and a 
move towards high levels of democratisation was manifest as Rwanda adopted its Post-
Genocide Constitution in 2003. High levels of expenditure on defence reflect a fragile 
peace which undermines service provision and the move towards higher levels of 
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democratisation. The improvement in the security of the country facilitates increase in 
state expenditure on social services which are central to the human needs of the people 
and the abundance of human needs translate into increased human security.  
The increased expenditure on defense led to increased coercive capacity and this 
concomitantly led to improvement in the indicators for internal violence as depicted by 
the World Governance Indicators on the aggregate of Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence.
869
 
However, improvement in coercive power came with commensurate political terror 
unleashed on population though it continued waning as threats to internal and external 
security decreased. This point to the view that the more a state faces a resurgence of 
violence, the more political terror it unleashes on the population. Indeed, Rwanda went 
down on the political terror scale as more stability was being attained. More confidence 
was gained by the government as its legitimacy among the people was not only being 
sustained by a strong coercive capacity presence of the state but also the increased 
providence of the state.  The illustration is as follows: 
Graph 6: Rwanda on the Political Terror Scale  
 
Data Source: Political Terror Scale (PTS), Rwanda, PTS Scores: 1996-2003. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?region=Africa&country=Rwanda  
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Though with an array of actors in the provision of social services, particularly the 
international humanitarian and relief agencies, also, the expenditure of government on as 
regards, provision of social services indicators went high and other indicators were 
positive. Internationally accolades were forthcoming to this effect; with Rwanda being 
presented as the epitome of commitment and reliability when it came to reconstruction 
state performance after conflict.  
It emerges from the preceding analysis that enabling the ability of the government to 
spend, be it on infrastructural development, social service delivery, national security 
issues; is central to state capacity during post conflict reconstruction. Thus this study 
furthers that the ability of the state to spend is a central indicator of the extent of state 
capacity even in post conflict reconstruction situations. As such this study argues that the 
ability of the state/government to spend, regardless of the nature of the priority areas can 
be an appropriate indicator of the capacity of that government during post conflict 
reconstruction.  The state in Rwanda progressively spent on an array of issue areas, 
including but not limited to: General Public Services, Defense, Social Services, Health, 
Economic Services, Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing, Energy and Public Works, 
Transport and communications, Interest payment on Public debt.
870
 The expenditure of 
the Government of Rwanda steadily increased across its post conflict reconstruction 
phase as follows: 
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Graph No. 7 
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund, Rwanda: Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff 
Country Report No. 98/115, 1998:19. IMF, Rwanda: Statistical Annex, January 2001, 
IMF Country Report No. 01/30, 2000:17.  IMF, Rwanda: Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, December 2004, IMF Country Report No. 04/383, 2004:94. 
Going by the logic of the preceding analysis; the progress of the functionality of a 
government during post conflict reconstruction can be measured therefore as a function 
of its level of expenditure. Rwanda literally clamoured for foreign financial assistance in 
the quest for attaining a certain level of financial capacity to enable its expenditure.  
Also, from the Rwandan experience, a furthering empirical case is made by this Chapter 
to the effect that liberalisation should be preceded by institutionalisation. The study also 
argues that instutionalisation ought not to be confused with a move towards statism, but 
rather as a move towards higher levels of government capability as institutions are forged 
for studied liberalisation. The Rwandan experience presents two extraordinary scenarios: 
one,   that during its post-conflict reconstruction, the new government was fully aware 
that a move towards liberalisation was a necessary condition for accessing 
internationalised financial assistance and gaining political legitimacy. Economic liberal 
reforms were undertaken and consolidated. This is because a sound economy did not only 
guarantee access to international finance but  also guaranteed improvement in the 
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capacity of the new government to thwart particularly the security threat from the Hutu 
refugee warriors.   
However, democratic reforms, as the political strand of liberalisation were hesitantly 
undertaken, precisely for propagandist reasons; as the new regime was fearful that 
democratisation would undermine the move towards regime stability. The essayist, 
Arthur Koestler, teaches us that achievement may not be backed with modesty more so if 
is exploited by political propaganda and for the purpose of collecting funds. Rwanda 
democratisation process during its post-conflict reconstruction and the achievement made 
fits in those words. But all in all Rwanda made considerable progress in state capacity, 
and at this point the study problematises the gains which were made. 
So, the question emerges: How did the delineated gains in state capacity address the Hutu 
refugee crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo that threatened a resurgence of 
violence in Rwanda, and what does the outcome mean to the Human Security-State 
Security debate. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 Rwanda`s development in State Capacity and addressing a 
convergence of Human and State Security at the causative level of 
the resurgence of violence: The manifestation of the ``boomerang 
effect`` during post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
``In theory there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is`` 
Albert Einstein 
The central question that this chapter answers is as follows: How did the development in 
Rwanda’s state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction serve to address the human 
security concerns that threatened and subsequently led to resurgence of violence?  The 
interrogating specific questions which guided the analysis of either supporting or off-
putting evidence on Rwanda as regards its state capacity were: In what ways did the 
Rwanda Government use its development in state capacity to address the resurgence of 
violence which accrued to the Hutu refugee crisis in Eastern Congo during its post-
conflict reconstruction phase?  And what are/were the implications of the security policy 
choices which were made to address the resurgence of violence on the debate concerning 
Human Security and State Security? 
Cumulatively, this chapter adds onto the logic of the preceding chapters that can be 
summarised as follows:  that inadequate state capacity leads to violence, and adequate 
state capacity can thwart the occurrence of violence. Further, that human security and 
state security related concerns converge to lead to a resurgence of violence during post-
conflict reconstruction situations. That development in state capacity is central to 
curtailing a resurgence of violence during post conflict reconstruction. 
As elucidated in Chapter three (3) of this study, human security challenges converged 
with state security concerns to lead to a resurgence of violence. This means that at the 
theoretical and conceptual level, during post conflict situations of the Rwandan kind, the 
two security areas communicated to each other; contrary to the assertion that they 
contradict each other. It also emerges quite clearly that Rwanda forged a considerable 
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level of state capacity, manifested in the widely acknowledged institutional development 
attained during its post-conflict reconstruction.  
However, at this point, using supporting empirical evidence from data sets on the 
Rwandan Refugee Crisis; the study examines how the Rwandan Government addressed 
the Hutu refugee crisis in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which 
was Congo then.  
But at the theory level, it emerges clearly from the Rwandan experience that the 
contradiction between the two contending security areas, that is, Human and State 
Security, accrues to the policy choices made to address the threats which emerge as a 
result of the communication between these two security areas during post-conflict 
situations to lead to a resurgence of violence in post-conflict reconstruction situations.  
So whereas the two security areas converge at the conceptual level; at the policy 
implementation level,  in the context of post conflict reconstruction, the communication 
between the two security areas is generally problematic, owing to the circumstantial 
challenges that punctuate the reconstruction period; particularly the refugee-warrior 
phenomenon. This means that whereas at analytical level, the so called ``security 
dialectic`` is positive, at the security policy making and implementation, in the context of 
post-conflict reconstruction of the Rwandan nature, the ``security dialectic`` is negative, 
and the ``boomerang effect``
871
 become the outcome of the security policy choices made. 
As the focus is put on state security, human security is encumbered and vice versa.  As 
such the tension between human security and state security during post conflict 
reconstruction situations becomes more of a problem of policy implementation than a 
theoretical jigsaw puzzle.   
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5.1.1 The nature of the problem, The International failed Human 
Security, ``what about the Canadian approach and the politics of 
what is in it for me? `` 
The international community was demanding that the New Government in Rwanda puts 
in place an environment favourable for the return of refugees, but Rwanda had no 
resources to cater for them in terms of provision of social services and thwarting the 
security concerns that might have accrued from their return. Indeed when Pasteur 
Bizimungu, the first President of post-genocide, met with Germany Foreign Minister, 
Kinkel on September 19
th
 1994, he requested Germany to: ``play a path-breaking role 
among donors by establishing a type of marshal plan for Rwanda``, so that  Rwanda 
could  be in position to facilitate for the return of refugees; a request to which the 
Germany Secretary for economic development and cooperation, Hans-Peter Repnik 
reacted to during his meeting with Bizimungu; declaring that Germany was ready to 
release the approximately DM 70-90 million that had been frozen at the beginning of the 
Rwandan war.
872
  As such, with a dearth of resource constraints; the new Government of 
Rwanda was hesitant to allow the massive return of refugees who had been infiltrated 
with belligerents. Indeed, at the UNDP Round Table of January 1995 in Geneva, Prime 
Minister Twagiramungu informed the delegates that: ``we want the refugees to come 
back home but we must create conditions to receive them``.
873
  Clearly, to the Rwandan 
authorities, the massive return of refugees would place onto the Government of Rwanda 
human security demands; as it had to provide for the basic needs of refuges like food and 
shelter. It was also to place onto the new government state security demands; as it had to 
ward-off the incursions by the militants who would have used the return as an 
opportunity wage their incursions from inside.  However, at the same time, the new 
government was cognizant of the danger of having large populations of Rwandan 
refugees in the Congo.
874
 
 It should be remembered that the RPF was an outcome of the long stay of the Tutsi 
refugees in countries like Uganda. So, time came when the government felt that having 
the refugees return to Rwanda would allow it the opportunity to pre-empt future 
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incursions, and probably deal decisively with the internal violence that was and actually 
accrued to the return of the Hutu refugees. As such, the government of Rwanda 
diplomatically procrastinated the return of refugees, but the strategy was not to have them 
return, but rather to literally buy time to build the capacity of the Rwandan state to cater 
for the needs of the returnees, but most importantly to be in position to ward-off the 
security threat which was anticipated to out of their return.  
Indeed, dealing with the Interahamwe had been a top priority on the agenda of the post-
genocide Rwandan government as early as October 1994; as indicated by the Ngarukiye 
during his maiden meeting with the Unites States Government officials in his capacity as 
the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations.
875
 It is no surprise 
therefore that when the government of Rwanda gained a semblance of internal control by 
1996, it moved to implement its strategy of having refugees return from Congo. The 
capacity had been attained to receive them if they voluntarily repatriated, but also 
capacity was available to militarily enforce their return. This discourse about Rwanda fits 
well into the framework of Alex Braithwaite on the imperativeness of state capacity in 
warding-off internal and external challenges to the security of the state.  His thesis is that 
the steady progress of the state along the Theda Skocpol factors of a capable state, 
namely: sovereign authority, financial resources, loyal and skilled officials, stable 
administrative military control and authority and institutional mechanisms to employ 
resources; is central to the capacity of the state to: 
 ``…block and/or peacefully absorb the artifacts of civil conflict that threaten to 
spill across international boundaries (and) these include flows of refugees of war, 
weapons and illicit material smuggled across borders and the physical actions of 
the war itself``.
876
 
The logic of Braithwaite suffice to indicate why Rwanda despite the initial International 
pressure for it to allow and facilitate the return of refugees from Eastern Congo; the 
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Rwandan authorities adamantly refused the quick return of the Hutu refugees but to 
forcefully execute the return from late 1996.  
Clearly, as indicated in the chapter preceding this; Rwanda had gained a considerable 
measure of state capacity if we are to go by the institutionalisation gains that had been 
made just in the first two years of its post-conflict phase. Indeed, friends and foes 
acknowledged the milestones which Rwanda had made in quickest span though. 
Reyntjens  did not mince words in his glaring criticism of the post-genocide Rwandan 
government human rights record, but to acknowledge the progress which had been made 
towards institutionalisation in Rwanda that: 
(…) Continuity if visible (was) not just in exercise of power, but also in the nature 
of the state. An ancient state tradition plays an undeniable role here: a mere two 
years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state has been 
rebuilt. Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom, territorial, military 
and security structures were in place, the judicial system was re-established; tax 
revenues were collected and spent. The regime was able in a short time to 
establish total control over the state and society…. While many countries tend 
towards state collapse, the Rwandan state has reaffirmed itself vigorously
877
 
Certainly as indicated in the chapter preceding this, Rwanda`s expenditure steadily 
increased in the years after the genocide, and the percentage expenditure of GDP on 
defence increased steadily, and from the same treatment it was determined that 
expenditure can be an appropriate indicator of state capacity.  That logic rhymes well 
with the logic of Stein Sundstol Eriksen who presented Rwanda`s military strength in 
terms of military expenditure by quoting SIPRI 2003 yearbook which indicated that for 
10 years Rwanda military expenditure averaged between 4% and 5% of the GDP.
878
 
However, contrary to his assertion that defence expenditure of Rwanda did not increase 
substantially during the war, a review of the time series data provided by the International 
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Monetary Fund indicated that actually expenditure on defence steadily increased during 
the years of particularly the first Congo War which was directed at annihilating the Hutu 
refugee warrior threat. The expenditure on defence increased from 14.7 billion Rwanda 
Francs in 1995, to 22.6 in 1996, 24.3 in 1997 and then literally skyrocketed to 27.2 at the 
beginning of the Second Congo War; reaching 36 billion Rwanda Francs in 2002 at the 
semblance of the end of the Second Congo War. 
879
 
Accordingly, Rwanda`s military expenditure indicated the readiness of its state capacity 
to thwart both internalised and internationalised security threats, or a convergence of the 
two security threat areas as manifested in the Hutu refugee warriors who were waging 
incursions into Rwanda. It has also been concluded that Rwanda`s military exploits in the 
Congo; particularly the first Congo war which culminated into the overthrow of Mobutu 
depicted Rwanda as a state with formidable military capacity for it did not only manage 
to destroy the Hutu refugee militarised camps but it also managed to preside over the 
overthrow of Mobutu, albeit at a heavy human cost.
880
  
It should be underscored  that the international pressure on Rwanda was high; demanding 
that Rwanda put in place a political environment congenial for the return of refugees; if it 
was to access foreign assistance for its reconstruction. Indeed, as early as August 1994 
the pressure on Rwanda to undertake reforms which would facilitate the return of 
refugees had already gained currency. For instance, George Moose, the then (1994) 
Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of African Affairs, in his confidential letter of 
August 17
th
 1994 to the Secretary of State of the United States; he did not hide his 
conviction that the USA need: 
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…to continue pressing the Rwandan government to create conditions that will 
encourage refugee return, including broadening of the government`s 
political/ethnic base and respecting human rights.
881
 
Also, when President Pasteur Bizimungu, the then President of Rwanda met Anthony 
Lake, the then USA National Security advisor to President Clinton, and tabled the 
requests for financial assistance to facilitate the new government to function normally, it 
was put to him that the USA was willing to assist but would be interested in seeing 
Rwanda taking firm efforts to ensure observance of human rights, putting in place a 
broad based government and dialoguing with the Hutu leaders in control of the refugee 
camps in Zaire. 
882
 Even when the Minister of Rehabilitation, Bihozagara, meet with the 
USA official, Staffdel Peel in September 1994, despite Bihozagara illustration that in 
Rwanda it was: ``Tout est a Faire``--``everything needs doing``; it was put to him that 
donors were only willing to release assistance to the Rwandan government if it took 
actions to ensure observance of human rights, return of refugees and management 
practices.
883
  Almost the same ``benchmarks`` were again put to President Bizimungu 
when he met the Deputy Secretary of State of the United state, Talbott in October 
1994.
884
 Also in preparation for a meeting between a United States officer, Charge, 
Robert Whitehead and two Rwandan Patriotic Front Senior Officers; Karemera and 
Inyumba, the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, Arlene Render sent to 
Whitehead captured the additional points issues which had to be put to the duo. One those 
issues were the issue of the steps taken by the government of Rwanda to ensure the return 
of refugees.
885
 And during the preparation for the meeting of Kagame with the then 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, which was scheduled for 
December 13, 1994, Arlene Render sent to Moose on December 9, 1994; a document on 
the possible :``talking points``; in which it was clearly indicated that if Kagame advances 
a request for USA assistance in the lifting of the UN Arm Embargo, and for the $ 2.5 
million to help Rwanda  to repay its arrears to the World Bank in order for  it to access 
the reconstruction fund, several issues had to be put to him particularly that of  Hutu 
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refugee repatriation. 
886
   However, these scenarios pass for ``diplomatic arm-twisting`` 
for USA knew the challenges which the new government was facing.  
Indeed, as early as August 1994 the US Government was cognizant of the security 
challenges which the prompt return of refugees would have posed to the security of the 
new RPF government as it would have heightened the internal disorder that was not 
unusual in Rwanda at that point in time.
887
 The US Government was also aware of the 
fact that the return of refugees was not solely dependent on the security situation inside 
Rwanda, but rather also on the will of the Hutu leaders in the camps who were holding 
the civilian refugees hostage. To that effect, a cable of August 1994; sent from the USA 
mission in Geneva to ten USA mission including: Kinshasa, Kampala, Nairobi, 
Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, Paris, London, Brussels, and Rome, partly read 
as follows: 
The problems of Rwanda will continue, and we should deceive ourselves into 
thinking that repatriation of the two million (?) refugees will take place quickly; 
we caution about raising public expectations in the US.
888
 
Meanwhile Rwanda was increasingly getting frustrated by the west hobnobbing with the 
issues of integrating the members of the former genocidal regime into the new 
government. But the new Government was resolute in its refusal not to negotiate with the 
former Rwanda government leaders who presided over the genocide.  The Rwanda 
Government had a list of 220 ``ring leaders`` who had to be punished for the genocide 
crimes they were party to.
889
 This stance which was adopted by the Rwandan government 
towards the members of the former regime ruled out the so called ``Belgian plan`-- where 
the government of Rwanda had to enter into negotiations with the ex-FAR and the 
members of the former government who were hiding in Zaire.
890
  
However, the new Rwandan government had a semblance of a broad outlook; comprising 
of the Hutus, and indeed the first Prime Minister of the Post-genocide Rwanda was a 
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Hutu; Faustin Twagiramungu.  It is Twagiramungu who did not hide his disappointment 
during his meeting with Prudence Bushnell in 1994, the then Assistant Secretary of State 
of the United States. When confronted with the question of how far Rwanda had moved 
with the question of integrating the members of the former regime as part of the 
``benchmarks`` which the USA had given to Rwanda if it was to access financial 
assistance; Twagiramungu bitterly asked: ``what more did the Western nations want? 
``
891
 Also when the same ``benchmarks`` were put to him in December 1994 by Peter 
Tarnoff, the then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the government of 
Clinton, Twagiramungu responding to questions raised on the issues of refugees, he 
sternly noted that; they were outside the jurisdiction of the Government of Rwanda, and 
thus asserted that it is the responsibility of the receiving state to maintain security in the 
camps. He added that if the receiving state lack capacity to manage the refugees, the 
international community had to come in and assist. He emphasised that camps had to be 
demilitarised through the separation of militias from the genuine refugees, and to him the 
former leaders had to be: ``Told to behave``.
892
  
Despite what this study particularly refers to as ``diplomatic arm-twisting``, the reality of 
Rwanda was known to the United States for when the Assistant Secretary of State Moose 
met with his French and Belgian counterparts on 30
th
 September, 1994 it was reported 
that: 
``Moose underlined the destitution of the Kigali Government, and noted that 
creating conditions for a return of the refugees would be impossible in the 
absence of basic structures of government and a judicial system.``
893
 
 However, given the known intransigence of the Kigali regime at that time (as partly 
reflected in coarseness of Prime Minister Twagiramungu) no amount of diplomatic 
pressure would have forced it to allow a massive return of refugees had it not weighed its 
capacity to contain the negative outcomes. Also, during the meeting of December 13, 
1994 of Kagame (then Minister of Defence and Vice President) with George Moose, the 
then United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Prudence 
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Bushnell, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Kagame, 
when asked about the extent to which Rwanda had moved in its facilitation for the return 
of refugees, he was blunt saying that first things should be dealt with first when it came to 
issues of refugees. His formula was simple and he challenged the international 
community to: take control of the camps away from the ex-FAR and militias and separate 
them from the refugees; with intimidation ended, those who wished to return to Rwanda 
were free to do so. To Kagame the International community also had to  separate, identify 
and deal with those few who had to be brought to justice; and that once the main evil 
doers were identified and brought to justice, then, his government was to  consider what 
to do about the peasants and other little guys who were forced or incited to kill.
894
  
So with such a firm stance, it was highly improbable that the Rwandan Government 
would have accepted an impromptu return of refugees had it not been for the considerable 
level of state capacity which it had attained by 1996. The new Government had 
strategically weighed it security fears as early as July 1994; for it was reported that the 
RPF leaders were apprehensive of any move which would have led to random refugee 
repatriation which was most likely to spark a guerrilla war particularly in North West 
Rwanda
895
. Indeed, Kagame had earlier in December, 1994; informed the Security 
Council that the Government of Rwanda wanted refugees to return, but was still soliciting 
for the means to facilitate their return and resettlement.
896
 When the means became 
available; the Rwandan government was prepared to have them repatriated at all costs for 
they knew the danger of having large Rwandan refugee populations in the 
neighbourhood.    
Accordingly,  the Kigali government was able to contain an insurgency  which was a 
concomitant of the 1996-1997 attack on refugee camps in Eastern Zaire;  that took place 
in the North West prefectures of Rwanda as a result of the infiltration of the refugee 
warriors (the ex-FAR and Interahamwe) among the massive groups of returnees. This 
seems to justify the earlier reported reservations which the new Rwandan Government 
had as far as random repatriation of refugees was concerned. A rebellion under the 
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umbrella organisation of Rwanda Liberation Army (ALIR) destabilised the interior of 
Rwanda as it affected areas of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and north of Kibuye, Gitarama, rural 
Kigali and the west of Byumba; displacing more than 100,000 people.  
Led by Hutu Colonels; Mugemanyi, Rwarakabiye and Nkundiye, the insurgents also 
embarked on a propaganda campaign with a newspaper, Umucengezi—``The Saviour``, 
but to be disabled by the military strength of the RPA that saw the death of Colonel 
Nkundiye with his 200 fighters at the battle of Giciye and later Colonel Mugemanyi was 
reportedly killed in Nyarutovu in August 1998.
897
  Although the insurgence was lethal as 
it destabilised areas of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. Indeed by late 1997, the 
insurgents had been defeated.
898
 By the end of 1998 the whole territory of Rwanda had 
been generally pacified from internalised state security threats,
899
 but at a great human 
security cost for many unarmed civilians were killed in the course of the war; partly as 
collateral damage and some were just persecuted by the RPA forces which thought that 
they were allied to the rebels, and others were killed by the Hutu militias who thought 
that they had been compromised by the RPA forces. Many also died of disease and 
starvation. The study does not delve into the predicament of refugees that returned for 
theirs had it complexities that require a detailed treatment than what this contextualised 
study can offer.
900
   
The change of the mind of the RPA to embark on addressing the Hutu refugee 
phenomenon in Eastern Congo was also informed by the very history of the RPA; that 
refugee populations can be a perennial security threat. The RPA emerged from the Tutsi 
refugee communities  particularly in Uganda, and the circumstances under which the 
RPA emerged were briefly as follows: That the Rwanda Patriotic Army, that waged the 
war against the Government of Habyarimana in the 1990s, a war that culminated into the 
genocide, comprised of the Tutsi refugees who left Rwanda in the 1950s and 1960s 
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following the ethnic persecution of Tutsi that was a concomitant of the 1959 Hutu 
Revolution that led to the overthrow of the Tutsi monarch. It is a section of this ``first 
case load of refugees`` most especially those who were in Uganda that mobilised other 
Tutsi compatriots from near and afar areas like Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Kenya 
among other countries; to join arms in the quest for a return home, after all Habyarimana 
had consistently resisted their return saying that Rwanda was small as he sarcastically 
stated one time that: ‘if the glass of water is full; where can I put the rest of the water? 
´´
901
.  
Indeed, it should be recalled that the war which the Tutsi waged in the 1990s was first led 
by Fred Rwigyema and upon his death he was succeeded by Paul Kagame. Emphasis 
should also be made that majority of the original officers and men of the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front were part of the National Resistance Movement of Yoweri Museveni; 
which waged a five year protracted guerrilla movement which ousted the so called 
military junta government of Tito Okello and Basilio Okelo in Uganda. It is reported that 
of the 16,000 fighters of the NRA of Museveni, half were Banyarwanda migrants. It is a 
fact that Fred Rwegyema was the first Deputy Minister of Defence in Museveni`s 
government which was formed in 1986 immediately after the war, and Kagame was a 
Senior Military Intelligence Officer in the same government. So the Kigali Government; 
with Kagame at its helm, though the first president in post-genocide Rwanda was Pasteur 
Bizimungu, it of Kagame that it has been variously said; that he, at that point of time, 
wielded a lot of power to make decisions, and he knew the danger of having Hutu refugee 
populations in the jungles of Zaire for so long.
902
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Noteworthy, the refugee warriors had already started their violent incursions into 
Rwanda; a matter that warranted a pre-emption strategy if Rwanda`s national security 
was to be guaranteed.  The refugee warriors from Zaire who were using the refugee 
camps for recruitment to replenish their ranks had to be dealt with in a more decisive 
manner, and for that matter, as early as 5
th
 October 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, the 
former commander of the UNAMIR in Rwanda, warned that Hutu militias were 
preparing for spirited offensives using the tactic of ``cross-border raids`` which was to 
become a ``broad based`` military operation after mobilising for enough support.
903
  So, 
to Rwanda the logic was to: have the refugees returning home first; deny the refugee 
warriors recruits, and second; deny international community at least one reason for not 
extending aid to Rwanda.  
The act of denying Rwanda substantial amounts of aid can be understood using the 
metaphysical lenses of the international framework that the liberal democratic 
governments of the west normally adopt as part of the strategy to have refugees returning 
to their country of origin. The logic entails influencing the internal political conditions of 
the country of origin to normalise the conditions leading to the flight of people and to 
facilitate the return of those who fled. 
904
 As such the Government of Rwanda was 
determined to have the refugees return, but the bonafide refugees were held hostage by 
the refugee warriors. As noted earlier in Chapter three; the refugee warriors struggled to 
maintain a firm grip onto the refugees for many reasons, but most importantly as a way of 
legitimising their activities.   
Whereas international law provides that the responsibility to protect and pacify refugees 
lies with the host government,
905
 the host state, which was Zaire in the context of this 
study, was weak and unwilling to address the issue of the refugee –held- hostage 
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phenomenon.  The International Community was also under the illusion that Zaire would 
handle, albeit with international assistance, the refugee crisis.
906
 Zaire instead facilitated, 
as it was noted in Chapter three, the activities of the refugee warriors. The Mobutu 
regime was also loyal to its friendship with its former allies; the former leaders of the 
genocide Rwandan regime.
907
  In early 1995, Mobutu`s government reinforced the 
armament of the Hutu refugee warriors (ex-FAR and the interahamwe) a matter which is 
said to have prompted the United Nations Security Council to lift the arms embargo on 
Rwanda on 16
th
 August 1995;
908
 thus setting a stage for the military incursions of 
Rwanda into the Congo in her quest to dismantle the militarised camps.  Indeed, Kagame, 
the then Defence Minister and Vice President of Rwanda, had as earlier as January 1995 
requested for the lifting of the United Nations Arms embargo. This was  as a result of the 
fact the International Community, particularly the United States wanted to use it as a 
leverage, a somewhat bait,  to push for  their agenda for reconstruction;  which entailed 
reconciliation between the government of Rwanda and the leaders of the former interim 
Rwandan government/genocide regime in Rwanda.
909
  
It was also in the interest of Mobutu`s international relations to have the refugees within 
his sphere of control for it gave him the international clout that had for long withered. It 
should be remembered that in the 1990s, Mobutu`s political relevance had waned so 
much so that the French, his erstwhile allies, denied him a visa to Paris. It was only in 
mid 1995, when Mobutu realised that his continued friendly gestures to the Hutu 
militants where becoming detrimental to his regime security; that he fidgeted to enforce 
the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees. To that effect, at the fall of 1996, the Foreign 
Minister in the then Mobutu`s government, Kititwa Tumansi, informed the United 
Nations General Assembly that, ``Zaire (was) always prepared to cooperate with Rwanda 
and Burundi to ensure the voluntary and dignified return of refugees. `` And that, ``Zaire 
(would) never accept the defacto transformation of its territory to a Hutu-land, (and) 
those who (were) thinking of that should forget it`` He added that, ``Zaire does not accept 
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and (would) never again accept to serve as a scapegoat for any one (and) will defend by 
all means the security of its population and its borders.``
910
  The rhetoric would not be 
believed and reflected a rather belated realisation on the side of the Zaire government that 
refugees did not only pose a security threat  to their country of origin but also to their host 
country.  
Also, the move of Mobutu`s government to repatriate refugees was inundated with a lot 
of criticism from the humanitarian agencies particularly Medicins San Frontiers that 
reasoned that the conditions in Rwanda would not favour return; for vengeance and 
persecution of the Hutu coupled with a weak judicial system were characteristic of post 
conflict Rwanda.
911
  Mobutu`s regime was undermined by the security concerns that 
come with a persisting refugee presence and the militarisation of refugee camps.
912
 But 
little could he extricate himself easily from the complexity of the situation. The military 
capacity of the armed forces of Mobutu could not easily disarm the battled hardened Hutu 
warriors who were politically well organised to a semblance of a ``state-in-exile``
913
; a 
terminology that is not far from how the first Prime Minster Twagiramungu of Post-
genocide Rwanda referred to the Hutu refugee camps tendency in Zaire as ``mini 
states``.
914
   
Indeed, apart from being indiscipline, which was partly exhibited in the looting spree of 
camps by the Zairian forces particularly on the weekend of November 25-27, 1994;
915
 the 
Zairian army was also not motivated to function for they even had grievances over salary 
payments.
916
 The state capacity of the Zaire state could not also thwart the militarisation 
of Hutu refugee camps the way Tanzania had managed to do so. And for that matter, as 
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earlier as September 1994, the government of Zaire had asked the United Nations and the 
United States to offer assistance in the relocation of the members of the former Rwandan 
army and government officials away from the refugee camps, and it had been suggested 
that the Ex-FAR troops and former government officials be relocated near the Ugandan 
border.
917
 This suggestion may have led to the abortion of the idea of relocation for it 
would have led to the undermining of the security of Uganda and thus complicating the 
already fragile security architecture of the region.  As such, the general weaknesses of the 
Zairian state served the Hutu warriors a congenial environment for political mobilisation 
for the destabilisation of Rwanda.
918
  
To put it more bluntly; Mobutu`s government had long collapsed to be in position to 
contain the Hutu militarised refugee situation in the Kivu, the Eastern part of the territory 
of Zaire. Even political cohension that is central to the functionality of government was 
also lacking as the lift between Prime Minister Kengo and President Mobutu--``the 
guide``; as reported on January 16 1995 served to undermine the performance of the 
government. Mobutu`s politics of divisionism; pitted Kengo against Tshisekedi, who was 
another opposition figure in Zaire, to undermine the former`s government. The objective 
was to institute a somewhat coup d’état against Kengo who was a favourite of the USA 
and its European allies.
919
  
Also, the government of Zaire lacked sovereign control to contain violent situations 
within its borders and it also lacked the capacity to bulwark its territory from being used 
as a somewhat launching pad for dissident activities against other countries had long 
warned. Precisely, its state capacity was wanting;
920
 with an army that was disoriented 
and divided along the logic of tribalism. Indiscipline was high into the ranks that the 
military ceased to be a professional body but rather a pack of armed thugs and rapists; 
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gangs raping nuns and engaging in petty theft like stealing beer.
921
 Relief workers were 
convinced that though Zaire was responsible for ensuring the safety of refugees and 
humanitarian workers; its armed forces were not up to the task for they were poorly-
trained and suffering from low morale as they sometimes went without a month`s ``paltry 
salary``.
922
  David Newbury narrates how the Mobutu Zaire state had steadily collapsed 
as a result of the politics of divisionism which he had decided to adopt as his modus 
operandi by setting one tribe against the other as a method of political control a matter 
that impacted negatively on the political cohesion of the Zairian state.
923
 The collapse of 
the Congo state under Mobutu, Thomas Turner observes, created a somewhat ``vacuum`` 
which was exploited by the belligerents who were against Rwanda and Uganda. As a 
result the two countries deemed it rational to oust Mobutu and replace him with a friendly 
power in the names of Laurent Desire Kabila.
924
  It is this kind of context that made 
Rwanda`s security policy choices a somewhat puzzle.  
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Whereas Edward Mogire advances that: State Security and refugee security are not and 
should not be mutually exclusive basing on the context of Kenya and Tanzania;
925
 the 
answer may not ably lie in conceptualisation but rather in policy situational shrewdness. 
This is because even where the host state is weak to contain the militarisation of refugee 
situations; the phenomenon may not only undermine the security of the host state, but 
also that of the state of origin as it was with the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern 
Zaire.  And as a result a security threat may not accrue directly from the refugees but also 
from the state of origin that may launch pre-emptive strikes on the host state as a way of 
disabling the military capacity of the refugees something that may undermine the security 
of the host state. This indicates that policy practice may require the suspension of 
refugees by the host state as a way of conserving its national security as it was with 
Tanzania when it enforced the repatriation of Hutu refugees to Rwanda
926
 , as a strategy 
that was seen as an attempt to pre-empt the Zairian experience. It was reported that 
460,000 of the 540,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania had returned to Rwanda from 
Tanzania by 29
th
 December, 1996 before the deadline of Tuesday 31
st
 December, 1996 
which the Tanzanian authorities had given for the return of all Rwanda refugees in 
Tanzania.
927
 Earlier, 235,000 Hutu refugees from Karagwe camp were seen approaching 
the Ugandan boarder on 14
th
 December, 1996 with 559 crossing the Kagera River on a 
private canoe to Uganda.
928
  It should be noted that some of the refugees who were 
expelled from Tanzania made secondary movements to Uganda and this further 
complicated their predicament as they had to grapple with starvation and the outbreak of 
dysentery.
929
 Uganda also threatened to deny them asylum,
930
and Amnesty International 
made an appeal to the Ugandan authorities not to force the beleaguered  refugees from 
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Tanzania  back to Rwanda.
931
 The appeal by Amnesty International was sustained by 
foreign diplomats particularly the then Germany Envoy to Uganda, Mr. Christian 
Nakonz.
932
 On the numbers, it was reported that 2000 Hutu refugees had entered Uganda 
from Karagwe camp in Tanzania to Orukinga camp in Bukanga in Mbarara by 14
th
 
December, 1996,
933
  37 had reached Masaka District, Uganda by 21
st
 December,
934
 1996, 
3,081 had been reportedly granted temporary refugee status in the Oruchinga Refugee 
Camp in Mbarara District, Uganda by 27
th
 December, 1996.
935
 In addition, 200 had 
reached Uganda by 24
th
 October, 2000,
936
  340 by 24
th
 July, 1999,
937
 1000 by 20
th
 
September, 1999,
938
 800 by 21
st
 August, 1999.
939
 Also, 15,000 Rwanda Hutus, most of 
them Hutu fled Karagwe Northern Tanzania had entered Uganda by 02
nd
 January, 
2001,
940
 100 by November 4
th
, 2001.
941
 
 So, conceptualisation may not dictate the mutuality of two security areas but rather 
circumstance, and this Chapter outlines how Rwanda`s choice of a military policy option 
in reaction to the Hutu refugees depicted clearly that in practice state security and refugee 
security (which this study looks at as a strand of human security) may be frictional in 
their relationship and that conceptual-non–mutual-, exclusivity of the two security areas 
may not hold at all times and situations. 
So, in the midst of a weak and unwilling host state to demilitarise refugees,
942
 the onus 
was on the international community to solve the militarised Hutu refugee problem that 
was becoming a security threat of regional proportions. The International Community 
knew as early as July 1994; that Zaire would not be in position to disarm the 15,000 
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armed Hutus who were reportedly in refugee camps.
943
 The Government of Zaire was not 
even straight forward in its attempt to disarm the Hutu refugee armed elements for even 
its claims that 80 percent of FAR had been disarmed could not be verified as the 
whereabouts of the weapons confiscated remained a mystery.
944
 So relying on Zaire for 
the disarmament of the refugee warriors was to say the least of it an illusion.  Indeed as 
early as September 1994, the United States of America delegation to Rwanda, Burundi 
and Zaire (August 26-31, 1994) had proposed and noted thus: 
``Moreover, the Zairos military is in such disarray, from payment of salaries to 
discipline within the ranks, and that it is unclear what an effective enforcement 
presence would require. How far the United States is willing to go to support a 
positive Zairos role must be squarely faced and decided upon at the top levels of 
our government. Like many policy decisions, it may necessitate choosing the 
lesser evils. A non-Zairos peace keeping force, operating under the UN authority 
may be necessary and should be considered as well. ``
945
 
The Co-Chair of the delegation, C. Payne Lucas dismissed the Armed Forces of Zaire as 
indiscipline and  another member of the delegation, Todd Ulmer, dismissed the Zairian 
forces as ``part of the problem, not part of the solution``. 
946
Also, Ambassador Terence P. 
McCulley the then in -charge of Central African Affairs at the States Department of  
USA acknowledged Zaire`s failure to demilitarise the Hutu refugee populations and how 
Zaire had partition the international community for assistance. To that effect he noted 
thus: 
``Security in the camps, disarming ex-FAR and relocation of former Rwanda 
government officials and military are all interrelated but the problems may best be 
managed by treating the questions separately. The Zairians have put issues on the 
table which may require bilateral and multilateral solutions, and which 
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incorporate the related issues of arrest and detention of suspected war 
criminals.``
947
 
Although Zaire was said to  have had a hidden agenda of securing a safe escape route for 
the former Rwandan leaders to exile, as the Ambassador insinuated when he said that, 
``The ultimate goal is to engineer the exit of the former officials to third countries where 
they might find asylum``,
948
 the International community, particularly the United States 
wanted a guarantee to the effect  that those who were allegedly guilty of violating 
International Humanitarian Law would be available for prosecution under the 
International Crime Tribunal for Rwanda.
949
 This particular incidence presented an 
opportunity for the international community to intervene for Zaire would not have 
protested any intervention as an infringement on its territorial integrity. And the fact that 
Prime Minister Kengo of Zaire had also requested the USA and the UN to assist in the 
disarmament of the former Rwandan army and the militias in preparation to resettle them 
far from the Rwandan borderline
950
 belied the cynicism that the USA exhibited of the 
request of Zaire.  
The request by Zaire, without reading more into it, depicted that; albeit the sympathises  
which Zaire had for the former Hutu leadership, given the security threat the refugee 
warriors posed to Zaire as the new Rwandan Government was contemplating a military 
intervention into Eastern Zaire a matter that would have undermined the security of Zaire 
as it eventually emerged, Zaire was interested in having the former Rwandan army 
disarmed and relocated and this would have paved way for the return of the bonafide 
refugees who were being held at a somewhat political ransom. To the United States the 
puzzle was how to assist Zaire in handling the refugee burden without supporting Mobutu 
in his political schemes which were aimed at rehabilitating his political stand in Zaire and 
in the international sphere.
951
 Even the Deputy Prime Minister of Zaire, Kamanda had 
extended the same request to the UNCHR on 6 October, 1994 during the UNCHR 
Executive committee meeting; calling for international assistance for maintenance of law 
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and order in the camps.
952
 The UNHCR would only rely on the good will of world 
powers like USA in supporting such initiatives. But the United States if we are to go by 
the reasoning of Ambassador McCulley was also puzzled and noncommittal noting:  
``Disarming and relocating the FAR brings us back to the difficult issue of who 
will do the deed. Clearly the Zairians cannot, and the United States will not. ``
953
 
Indeed, recommendations on the disarmament and relocation of the Hutu refugee 
warriors remained almost at the level of wishful thinking and good intentions. But to say 
the least; the International community was dilly-dallying when it came to addressing the 
refugee crisis.
954
 Solutions towards disarmament and relocation of refugees were not 
forthcoming for several reasons, and they are extracted directly from the thoughts of 
Ambassador McCulley that: 
The prospects for success in convincing a third country to send its troops to both disarm 
and move the FAR, and assist the Zairians with security in the refugee camps seem 
dubious at the best. The Moroccan example is not encouraging, and although we may 
wish to approach a third county (such as Israel or France) to provide troops to disarm and 
relocate the ex-FAR, there may be few who would be willing to take on the job. The ex-
FAR remains (remained) armed (albeit lightly) with command structured intact, and 
although a well-disciplined third country force could likely disarm and control the ex-
FAR, the risk of confrontation might deter any nation from committing troops. 
 
He Additionally noted that, such an action would ensure that the third country`s troops 
would be widely perceived as a party to the conflict by the Hutu refugees in Zaire. Using 
such troops would be to provide security in the camps or to control the relocated ex-FAR 
would be problematic under these circumstances, and that the government of Zaire`s 
current request for the UN and US assistance is likely an attempt to resolve the major and 
debilitating domestic crisis and at the same time obtain international legitimacy to bolster 
the Prime Minister against Mobutu. 
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He outlined Mobutu`s agenda is unclear at this point, and we should be careful to ensure 
that whatever solution we support, does not work to end Mobutu`s isolation. While 
Mobutu`s tacit approval will be required to deploy a bilateral or multilateral force to 
Zaire, we should continue to work with the government of Prime Minster Kengo, and that 
bolstering Kengo and disarming and relocating the ex-FAR and separating the Hutu 
extremists’ leadership from the larger refugee population remain the objectives of US 
policy; tangible support to the former and a rapid solution to the latter remain 
problematic. 
955
 
What was central to the recommendations of the UNCHR as regards the measures to 
ensure the pacification of the camps was the issue of a multilateral police force to support 
the Zairian security forces.
956
 But the attitude of major actors, depicted by the thoughts of 
Ambassador McCulley enumerated above, bordered on a semblance of indifference and 
politicking, and can partly be explained as having been a result of the Hutu refugee 
catastrophe not directly falling into the logic of why liberal democratic government take 
refugee generating situations with a measure of importance. It is alleged that liberal 
democracies: that also happen to have the privilege of economic plenty and political 
power, tend to perceive a refugee crisis as worthy a concern if it has ramifications on: 
their integrity, well being, financial capacity and political and social stability of their 
country.
957
 The memorandum which Timothy E. Wirth, then Under Secretary of State for 
Global Affairs, sent in 1994 to the Secretary of State was revealing of the little interest 
that international actors particularly the United States had in Rwanda and the predicament 
of refugees. He questioned that: 
``How do we explain to the American Tax Payer that to date we have spent nearly 
$500million in refugee assistance in a country (referring to Rwanda) of 
unexplained and inexplicable violence, where we have no apparent strategic or 
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economic interests, and where the prospects for the short term and the long term 
are dim at best.``
958
 
 The Hutu refugee crisis, though it was internationally recognised as a catastrophe, it was 
far from affecting the peace of those with a measure of what Sophie Bessis refers to as 
the: “Privileges of Power``.  But addressing the Hutu refugee saga required the efforts of 
the international community. Indeed as early as September 1994, General Dallaire, the 
former UNAMIR force commander, during his meeting with troop contributors; he 
suggested that UNAMIR be given the mandate to enter the refugee camps in Zaire, 
ensure security and pacify the Rwanda western borderline with Zaire. He added that the 
operations would require ``overwhelming force; by identifying and segregating those`` 
who were intimidating refugees. He advised that transportation would be provided to 
transport the refugees back, but the International community had to come to the aid of 
Rwanda for its general reconstruction. Of specific importance here is Dallaire`s allusion 
to the invocation of the Chapter VII measures to address the refugee crisis in Zaire.
959
 
Also Laurie Shestack, the then African Adviser to United States Mission to the United 
Nations ,  during  a meeting in October 1994, with the United Nations Officials, he  
called for an intervention under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It was 
reported that: 
He (had) stressed that separation would be difficult. Control of camps was the last 
political card of the hardliners who otherwise had only bluster about an imminent 
invasion left in their quiver (sic). He felt that ``short sharp`` Chapter 7 operation 
of 3-6months duration was the only solution and he feared that it would be 
violent.
960
 
The idea of adopting measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Organisation 
Charter was retaliated during the 20
th
 October 1994 interagency meeting during which a 
number of measures were discussed with regard to thwarting an impending 
``unconventional guerrilla activity by militia and ex-FAR or an explosion in the refugee 
camps``. Part of this was the pre-emptive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
                                                          
958
 165245. 
959
 165349. 
960
 165301. 
347 
 
The same scheme was referred for discussion during the meeting of the interagency team 
with United Nations Under- Secretary General, Kofi Annan on October 25
th
 1994, but 
with no concrete outcome; except that the security situation was reviewed.
961
 Even when 
a plan for the demilitarisation and relocation of refugees was finally reached at Geneva in 
October 1994 by the Joint UN/Government of Zaire Commission; coming up with 
recommendations in regard to how the scheme was to unfold; nothing materialised. The 
commission had recommended that 50000 people of whom 20000 were former Rwandan 
soldiers were to be moved to three camps in Equatorial, Shaba and Kivu provinces and 
one battalion was to be deployed to ensure security in the new camps. The camps were to 
ensure the removal of armed refugees from the Rwandan border and subsequently ensure 
disarmament. The programme was budgeted at USD 6 million.
962
 This scheme also 
turned a chimera. Also the meticulous rubric of the Principal Committee Discussion 
Paper by the United States Interagency team which was focusing on the security in 
Rwanda refugee camps remained at the level of wishful thinking. The discussion paper of 
10.28.1994 had suggested six possible options to addressing the security crisis in Hutu 
refugee camps. The options were as follows: 
Option one: A two-phased operation to establish temporary safe areas inside the Zairian 
camps (modified ``bubble concept``). This was to entail measures under Chapter VI 
mission and would have required 3000-5000 mechanised, well equipped, well trained 
troops for up to 30 months. The first phase of this option was to entail the establishment 
of temporary safe zones for civilians within the camp, segregating armed military/militia. 
The UN force was to facilitate the return of refugees to Rwanda and provide protection 
for humanitarian operations. In addition the UN was to support the training by private 
contractors or UNCIVPOL of Zairian police or untainted Rwanda gendarmerie to take 
over camps security in Phase II, once the battalion moved to the next camp. The second 
phase of option I was to entail a single motorized company of UN troops and would 
remain behind with the newly trained local police force until each safe area was closed. A 
vital prerequisite for the success of this phase was to ensure favourable conditions for the 
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return of refugees by the Rwandan government which would require access of the Hutu 
refugees to their land, and a commitment to political reconciliation. 
Option two: This was to entail the invocation of Chapter VII mission for the UN force to 
remove forcefully former Rwanda Government officials, soldiers and militias from the 
camps into the interior of Zaire. This mission would have required 10,000 to 12,000 
extremely capable troops able to fight the ex-FAR and the militia who would have 
resisted the separation from civilian population. 
Option three: This option was to be similar to the mission suggested in Option two, 
except that this was to be conducted by one or more countries forming a multilateral 
force countenanced but not under the auspices of the UN, as it was in Haiti or the 
operation Turquoise of the French in Rwanda 1994. It was indicated that the UN was 
favouring this option but highly in doubt whether any country was willing to offer troops. 
Option four: dubbed: ``Doing nothing`` and that this was to have serious ramifications 
more so that the Non Governmental Organisations were most likely to pull out of camps 
an situation that would have led to the deterioration of camp security, and the 
international community would have been inundated with criticism. 
 
Option five: this was to entail provision of daylight security to protect humanitarian 
agencies worker and ensure the food reaches the innocent civilians, but this option was 
not going to contribute to the ending of the civil-war for food was to continue being used 
by the Hutu warriors. 
 
And option six was to entail the provision of daylight security and the piloting of efforts 
to create temporary safe areas inside one or two camps. This option was dubbed the 
``hybrid``, but it required a commitment from Rwanda that repatriation of refugees was to 
be facilitated by the authorities in Rwanda. Accordingly, the international community, 
under this option, had to weigh the military and political implications of this option. 
963
  
All the six options remained at the level of blue-print, and none was operationalised to a 
logical conclusion; despite the fact that United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Sadako Ogata called a meeting on October 31 to present the proposed security package to 
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the donors with a component of an international police force to assist the Zairian forces in 
the maintenance of security in camps.
964
 Whereas the spirit behind the drafting of the 
Discussion Paper was to ensure that Rwandan innocent refugees are not betrayed by the 
inaction of the International community; this spirit never materialised.
965
 Indeed when the 
US Interagency team meet with the United Nations Under Secretary General, Kofi Annan 
in November 1994 to discuss the content of the discussion paper, whereas he was 
receptive of the content, he presented what appeared to be a moderation of its contents by 
presenting a version of the option of the United Nations when it came to addressing the 
security in refugee camps. Whereas he countenanced an operation under Chapter VI with 
1-2 battalions, he added that the force was not to separate former soldiers and officers 
from the common pool of refugees. He noted that the UN had also thought of the idea of 
an operation under Chapter VII but to realise how unrealistic it was going to be with due 
regard to size and scope. He delineated other options by the United Nations outlining; 
training  and the equipping of the Zairian officers  under a somewhat Chapter VI kind of 
operation, training Zairian troops bilaterally in conjunction with the UNHCR, training the 
Hutu who were ``not-so-dirty`` to provide security in camps, offering humanitarian 
security under Chapter VI as a way of securing humanitarian aid workers in the course of 
their duties, and underscored that the options were not mutually exclusive, but were all 
geared towards ensuring the security in camps.
966
  
Annan`s proposals, appropriate as they may have been; served to show the extent to 
which the international community was moving in a rather rotational manner in its 
attempt to solve the security crisis in refugee camps. Also Annan`s mention that the 
operational force under a Chapter VI  mandate was not to ensure the separation of 
soldiers and former Rwanda government officers from refugees depicted that  the options 
of the United Nations were far from addressing the root cause of the crisis; that is the 
issue of militarising and politicising camps.  The impact of the indecisiveness of the 
international community on the Human Security of the civilian Hutu refugees was grave; 
as it is discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter. In the details of the 
complexities of the Hutu refugee saga, it seems the international community preferred the 
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fourth option: Doing Nothing. International diplomacy which involves a measure of 
bargaining, lobbying and blackmail unfolded in a manner that served to aggravate the 
crisis.
967
  Indeed by January 31 1995, if we are to go by the Memorandum of the then 
Minister-Counsellor for Political Affairs at the US mission to the United Nations, 
Cameron R. Hume to Ambassador Albright with subject: Security Council Informals on 
Rwandese Refugee camps, Tuesday, January 31 10:00am, it can be concluded that no 
concrete steps had been made towards the creation of a peacekeeping mission for Eastern 
Zaire to contain the security crisis in refugee camps. Hume partly wrote: 
The attached Report of the SYG on security in the Rwandese refugee camps 
informs the council (Security Council) that since peacekeeping efforts in the 
refugee camps at this time do not appear feasible, due to a lack of willing troop 
contributors, UNHCR will follow up with the government of Zaire on 
arrangements to enhance security in the camps.
968
 
It should be underscored that the hegemonic bickering between the USA and France over 
the modalities of having a peace keeping force to demilitarise the camps undermined 
international progress on dealing with the refugee crisis. An international community that 
had spent around USD 1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps found 
it difficult to fund the disarmament of refugee warriors as the discussion for sending a 
peacekeeping force were delayed by funding modalities.
969
  Any peace keeping mission 
championed by the French in the refugee hosting areas was viewed with a considerable 
measure of cynicism on the side of the USA. The USA   was fully aware of not only the 
sympathy that France had for the Hutu militants, but also the French political manoeuvres 
during the Rwandan genocide.  Instructive of the French manoeuvres during the genocide 
is when they claimed that all the refugees who were going through the French control 
territory of South Western Rwanda during the Operation Turquoise Mission in the 
aftermath of the genocide; had been disarmed, yet the members of the former Rwandan 
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army are said to have moved to Zaire through the French controlled area of Rwanda with 
military heavy weapons like tanks.
970
  
So, generally, the Americans were cynical of the French when it came to matters of 
Rwanda. Indeed the World Vision Relief and Development Inc., reaffirmed on 17 March, 
1995, the rumour which had been earlier circulated in February 1995
971
 and later on 16 
March 1995
972
; to the effect that French nationals had started retraining the ex-FAR, and 
advising the former Hutu government officials who were hiding in Eastern Zaire.  It was 
noted that the authorities in Paris were in the know of such manoeuvres, and this had led 
to increased violent incursions by the refugee warriors into Rwanda.
973
 The French had 
earlier on, as of August 1994, maintained their presence in Goma- a hub of the Hutu 
warriors, with a fleet of 450 men..
974
 Militarisation of the refugee camps in Goma went 
on despite the French troop presence. This raises a particular question: Why were the 
French there, yet they were not pacifying the camps?   
USA was the defender of the interests of the Kigali regime in the wake of the political 
manoeuvres of the French who were equally cynical of the increased Anglo-Saxonian 
influence in the French dominions.
975
 An incidence which is instructive of the bickering 
between the French and the Americans as far as the future of Rwanda was concerned is 
when the two countries disagreed over the nature of an International Conference on 
Rwanda. Whereas the Americans wanted the conference to focus solely on the ``refugee 
problem``, and to be hosted in Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi in the Central African 
Region; the French wanted the conference to be hosted in ``international site`` for 
instance New York, Geneva or Addis, and that it should also focus on the internal 
political issues of Rwanda.
976
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Another incidence is when the French were completely opposed to the idea of even 
partially lifting the arms embargo which had been placed on the Government of Rwanda 
during the genocide.  Indeed during the 7 March, 1995 Security Council session it is 
Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth that countered the arguments of the French which had 
been supported by the Russians and United Kingdom; noting that the Rwandan 
Government request to the Security Council to lift the arms embargo was being informed 
by the incursions of the Hutu refugee warriors into Rwanda and the military training 
sessions that had been reported to be taking place in the refugee camps. The French had 
reasoned that the lifting of the arms embargo was to threaten the refugees, the more, from 
repatriating.
977
 It should be recalled that the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the 
United Nations, Ambassador, Bakuramutsa confined in Ambassador Inderfurth during 
the meeting of 1 March 1995; that the Security Council had been unfair to Rwanda and 
that the decision not to grant Rwanda the right to procure guns was a punishment on 
Rwanda and it was destined to undermine the security of Rwanda.
978
  
Accordingly, the International politicking translated into international indecisiveness in 
the midst of a worsening catastrophe.  Indecisiveness and lack of commitment to progress 
served to disorient the authorities in Rwanda who were concerned of the extent to which 
the refugee crisis in Zaire was undermining; majorly the security of Rwanda and the 
stability of the new government. But although the International community was also far 
from addressing the crisis, conversely, the new government in Rwanda was increasing 
under diplomatic pressure to address the refugee crisis that was outside its jurisdiction. 
It should be remembered from Chapter 1 of this study that the Canadian variant of 
Human Security sanctifies International intervention as a means to protecting and 
promoting human security. The variant goes: that where states fail to ensure the human 
security of the people; the onus is always on the international community to use all means 
including military force to extricate the people from abuse. Whereas the International 
community failed to heed to the call of General Dallaire to send more troops to Rwanda 
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to avert the genocide;
979
 it also failed to send troops to Zaire to ensure that the human 
security of the refugees was secured in a complex security situation that pitied the Hutu 
militants against the Kigali government. Even the Security Council that has the mandate 
of sanctioning the military interventions of the United Nations was non committal when 
it came to issue of demilitarising the refugee camps in Zaire. During the discussion of the 
Secretary-General`s Progress report on the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda, UNAMIR (S/1994/1133) the outcome was sheer  rhetoric with no serious 
intentions to address the problem. In his memorandum of 10/12/1994 to Ambassador 
Albright, Cameron Hume summarised the outcome of the United Nations Security 
discussions of the Secretary General`s report as follows: 
The Security Council notes the view expressed in the report that the most 
effective way of ensuring the safety of the refugees and their freedom to return to 
Rwanda would be separation of Political leaders, former RGF soldiers and 
militias from the rest of the refugees population and looks forward to receiving a 
further report from the Secretary-General on this issue, as soon as possible, based 
inter alia on the findings of the United Nations team participating in Joint 
Zairian/United Nations Working Group.
980
 
The red-tape tendencies of the bureaucracy of the United Nations led to delay in reaching 
a concrete measure to addressing the militarisation of refugee camps, and partly owing to 
international political realism, a decisive international action on a human security 
catastrophe was delayed and Rwanda’s security was increasingly at stake with incursions 
by rebels into its territory increasing. If the Canadian approach to guarding human 
security through international military interventions was to be the answer to this scheme 
of things; plainly, it appeared to be far from the realms of the possible. The approach was 
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not and is not impervious to the politics of international action that obtains from interest, 
and to put it more candidly: The politics of what is in it for me.  Indeed by 13 February, 
1995, the United Nations had approached 60+ countries to provide peace keeping forces 
to ensure security in refugee camps, but to no avail.  As such the UN had ruled out the 
option of a multilateral peace keeping mission, and Zairian forces remained the only 
available option their weaknesses notwithstanding.
981
  
It is only Japan that had earlier informed the United Nations on 13 September, 1994 that 
it was willing to send Japanese military units to Zaire and Tanzania to assist in the 
management of humanitarian services,
982
 but the issue of demilitarisation of camps, 
which was urgently needed for the smooth repatriation of refugees; was not part of the 
Japanese military agenda.  However, besides the agenda related issues, Japan`s offer of 
its military to serve a humanitarian purpose depicts its belief in the philosophy of human 
security concerns that can also be part of the activities which the military can undertake 
beyond national/state security.  
Surprisingly, although by 16 March 1995, the first contingent of 100 Zairian troops had 
already arrived in Goma on 11 February, 1995,
983
 the UNHCR was still literally fidgeting 
on how it was going to build a contingent of 50 international supervisors and 1500 
Zairian officers to ensure law and order and to escort the repatriating refugees to the 
border. The mathematics was problematic: 1500 officers to more than one million 
refugees.
984
 But at least, at another front; Rwanda`s quest for foreign assistance for the 
reconstruction of government capacity to function, progress was being made and indeed, 
it was reported again on March 16 1995 that donors had disbursed the 20% of the USD 
587 million pledges which had been made at the Round Table meeting of January 
1995.
985
  
Conversely, on the issue of Hutu refugee warriors, the mandate of the Zairian forces 
together with the international supervisors did not include the separation of the armed 
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from the civilian refugees after all the force operated below capacity.
986
 But the 
International community, despite its failure to reach at a concrete plan of action as 
regards the security of refugees, it continued to demand that Rwanda facilitates refugee 
return that were clearly under the control of the Hutu refugee warriors. By January 24 
1995, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belgium was still of the view that: 
``… the GOR will have to be pressed to provide concrete information on the how 
and when reconciliation and return of refugees. ``
987
 
Even when the arms embargo on Rwanda was lifted  so that it could  embark on measures 
to improve  its internal security, the international community, particularly the United 
Nations demanded that the lifting of the embargo be based on ``Quid Pro Quo``; that the 
Rwandan Government had to countenance the activities of UNAMIR. These activities 
included repatriation of the internally displaced people to their homes. It should be 
outlined that whereas the embargo was instituted against the Habyarimana regime, it was 
extended to the new Government as if it was initially meant for it.
988
  The outcome of the 
international community stance was that it radicalised the new Rwandan government as 
Tutsi extremists got ground to justify their attitude towards the inclusion of the Hutus in 
the new government for the international community which seemed to be literally 
pushing the new government onto a somewhat diplomatic wall was investing in the 
feeding of the Hutu refugees of whom were the refugee warriors in Eastern Zaire.  
Many issues were at play as far as the refugee crisis was concerned. The Hutu refugee 
crisis had also become a regional security complex which was not only undermining the 
security of Rwanda and Zaire, but also neigbouring countries like Uganda and Tanzania. 
Uganda was particularly concerned that the Hutu refugee warriors in the Zaire would 
forge an alliance with the belligerents against Uganda, the Allied Democratic Forces 
(ADF); who had also found sanctuary in the forests of Eastern Congo. Zaire`s Mobutu 
would not either be trusted by Uganda to keep the belligerents at bay. Indeed the town of 
Goma and its vicinity that housed majority of the Hutu refugee camps was/is located 
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approximately 70 kilometres from Uganda,
989
 and this was a strategic challenge to the 
Uganda security architecture.  This system of things fit particularly well into the logic of 
Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch explanation of how refugee situation from 
one country can lead to the spread of civil wars even to other countries. To them refugee 
flows can facilitate elicit movement of arms, expand the social networks of rebels, alter 
ethnic balance with hitherto established hegemonic multi-ethnic alliances , undermine the 
economic progress of the host country and the economic emancipation of its people and 
can act to bulwark the capacity of internal opposition in the host state to execute political 
actions.
990
  
Therefore the fears of Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania, though Tanzania managed the 
Hutu refugee situation with a measure of success in demilitarisation of camps, but to later 
repatriate in December 1996; the majority of the 540,000 which it was hosting them 
arguably in fear of facing the fate of Mobutu`s Zaire;
991
 where Rwanda attacked refugee 
camps and subsequently overthrew the government of Mobutu, were not unfounded. 
Indeed as early as September 1994 it was reported by the Libreville Radio Station that 
ex-FAR forces had clandestinely left Zaire to Tanzania to form a new army there. Earlier 
reports had indicated the presence of uniformed and armed ex-FAR from Goma in 
Benaco Tanzania. Tanzania government and the residents of those areas where the 
Interahamwe had infiltrated were apprehensive of a possible confrontation between the 
RPA and the interahamwe militias.
992
   Zaire particularly suffered the catastrophe of 
hosting highly militarised refugees as Rwanda, in its quest to stabilise its territory; 
literally took the war to its neighbour, in the Eastern Congo. Rwanda dismantled the Hutu 
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militarised refugee camps and mobilised the Zaire opposition groups into a formidable 
force which consequently overthrew Mobutu`s government. The Hutu refugee 
phenomenon in Eastern Congo also aggravated the ethnic tensions in the Kivu region of 
Zaire as the refugees aligned themselves with the native Hutu communities to fight other 
native communities like the Hunde over land and later presided over the killings of a 
good many Congolese of Tutsi origin in Uvira areas.
993
 Indeed, it is Zaire that epitomises 
how refugee situations can undermine the security of the host state with disastrous 
outcomes.  
 Uganda also viewed the new Government in Rwanda as an ally that had to be helped to 
get out of this somewhat security quagmire. Rwanda was determined to put a determined 
fight against the security threat that the Hutu refugee crisis posed. Uganda, though not the 
focus of the treatment which this study gives at this point, was part of the capability 
equation that Rwanda had in its quest for a final solution to the security threat which the 
Hutu refugee phenomenon posed.
994
  The argument was: if the international community 
has failed to solve the crisis; it was now up to the Government in Rwanda to extricate 
itself from the security threat which had a security and insecurity-dilemma complexion. 
To Rwanda the objective was clear: curtailing a resurgence of violence which was 
destined to undermine its post-conflict reconstruction processes. So, the question 
emerges: which kind of security policy orientation was pursued and what does it mean 
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when it comes to explaining and understanding the tension between human security and 
state security in post conflict reconstruction situations?  
It was mentioned in the conceptual chapter of this study that addressing human security 
and state security threats is a matter of prioritising policy objectives and that picking on 
what to address first is a matter of decision making shrewdness; obtaining from the logic 
of: higher security threat and lesser security threat. But the Hutu refugee crisis placed 
human security and state security at the same level along the continuum of security 
threats. The two security areas were reinforcing each other in a cataclysmic manner. It 
was a manifestation of the absurdity of conflict in all its complexities; the Hutu refugee 
crisis was as a result of the conflict in Rwanda and it was now causing a resurgence of 
conflict in Rwanda leading to further human and state insecurity complexes.  
Accordingly, the burden of thwarting the crisis became a security policy burden to 
Rwanda. Indeed as early as 23 May 1995, reports of Rwanda`s intentions to execute pre-
emptive strikes against the Hutu refugee warriors in Eastern Zaire had gained currency.
995
 
Rwanda`s approach to finding a solution to the refugee crisis   attested but to one thing: 
that Human Security and State Security conflict with each other when it comes to 
choosing the policy orientation along the ladder of security policy options. In the context 
of Rwanda, the Human security area was affected by the security policy options which 
were chosen to address the security threats which emerged as a result of the convergence 
of the two securities along the continuum of security threats which threatened a 
resurgence of violence in a post-conflict state.   The act of choosing an appropriate 
element from Samuel Huntington’s elements of security policy: to address the 
convergence of human and state security threats becomes a complex process that can 
only be precisely put using the analogy  of the snake in the cooking pot; an analogy  in 
the Luganda language from the East African region. One former Rwandan Patriotic Army 
officer, and a one time member of the Uganda People`s Defence Forces(very fluent in 
Luganda and Kinyarwanda given his Ugandan background) who was part of the 
Rwandan  intelligence in Zaire in 1995 narrated the analogical story; to give a more 
                                                          
995
 166254. 
359 
 
graphical tone to his understanding of the Hutu refugee saga in Rwanda. Briefly, the story 
went as follows:   
A man found a snake in his cooking pot and he thought of hitting it. To hit the 
snake meant that he was going to equally smash his cooking pot and therefore 
have nothing to use to cook his food which was important to his survival. But 
even living the snake into the pot would not help either; for he would not cook 
food together with the snake. He decisively hit the snake and smashed the pot.
996
 
So, solving the refugee crisis presented to Rwanda, the new Government of Rwanda with 
a practical dilemma of the ``snake in the cooking pot`` proportions.  Within the camps 
``pots`` were the needed content: bonafide refugees and the not needed content: the 
refugee warriors, the ``snakes``. Killing the snakes meant not sparing the pots and the 
needed content. The choice was to dismantle the camps ``pots`` and destroy the refugee 
warriors, ‘snakes`, but even the needed content, the bonafide refugees who  required 
protection  were never spared for the methods chosen were not selective and little  
respecter of the survival of the bonafide refugees.     
Emphasis should be made that in addressing the violence which accrue to the 
convergence of human security and state security; the question of higher and lesser evil 
becomes hard to fathom; thus the tension between human and state security at the level of 
policy implementation. Drawing from primary sources: archival material, reports of 
international organisations, reports of the government of Rwanda, documentaries, record 
of interviews, Newspapers; secondary sources: books, journal articles, and academic 
theses, the study, at this point examines the course of policy action that Rwanda took and 
its implication on the debate concerning human security and state security. 
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5.1.2 Sacrificing human security for the realisation of state security: 
``something more sinister`` 
As if to dramatise the historical estrangement between the Hutu and the Tutsi, Mamdani 
observed thus: 
The world of Hutu and Tutsi had become like the world of the rat and the cat. For 
the rat, there is no animal more dangerous than a cat. And for the cat, there is no 
animal more delicious than the cat. (Mahmood Mamdani, 2002). 
This system of things means/meant that the Rwanda Patriotic Front government in, which 
majorly comprise (d) of the Tutsi had to ensure that the Hutu refugee warrior problem in 
the Eastern Democratic Republic Congo, then Zaire, had to be decisively dealt with. 
It should be emphasised that despite the incessant demands by Rwanda, international 
humanitarian agencies, the UNHCR, the International Federation of Human Rights 
(FIDH) and the Human Rights Watch, among others, no viable mechanism was adopted 
by the international community to thwart the security challenge which the militarised 
camps posed to the security of Rwanda and to that of the refugees (Refugee Security-
cum-human security). The several options which the United Nations severally presented 
to the Security Council were dismissed as financially untenable and practically 
unviable.
997
 Rwanda was convinced that the providence from the international 
community as regards giving a solution to the Hutu refugee crisis was not forthcoming. 
The incursions in Rwanda by the Hutu refugee warriors from Congo were gaining 
momentum; threatening a protracted civil-war.
998
 By 1996, Rwanda was grappling with 
intensified Hutu militants incursions, and Kagame alerted the leadership of particularly 
the United States that it was to act on the threat if the international community had failed 
to act.
999
 The Hutu refugee camps under the watch of International Humanitarian 
                                                          
997
 See, Human Rights Watch, What Kabila is hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, Vol. 9, No. 
5 (A), October, 1997. 
998
 See, Filip Reyntjens, Briefing: The Second Congo War: More than a Remake, African Affairs, Vol. 98, 
No. 391 (Apr., 1999), pp.241-250, Oxford University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/723629, accessed: 
05/02/2014 12:36.  Also see, Human Rights Watch, What is Kabila Hiding, 1997. 
999
 Human Rights Watch, What is Kabila Hiding, 1997. 
361 
 
agencies were becoming highly militarised, and the government of Mobutu would not be 
trusted in alleviating the problem.  
Meanwhile violent incursions into Rwanda by refugee warriors where becoming regular, 
and attacks on the Tutsi Congolese; known as the Banyamulenge in the South Kivu area 
of Eastern Congo were not uncommon, and 
1000
 the new government in Kigali felt 
obliged to protect their cousins, the Banyamulenge people
1001
 in Eastern Zaire who were 
being preyed on since early 1995: by the armed forces of Mobutu, the indigenous Hutu 
and the Hutu refugee warriors in the areas of Itombwe highlands in the Uvira region.
1002
 
Many Congolese Tutsis sought refuge in Uganda to escape persecution in Eastern Congo, 
and it was reported that by 22
nd
 May, 1996, 2000 Zairian/Congo Tutsis were reported to 
have crossed into Kisoro, South-Western Uganda.
1003
  Mamdani notes that the Genocide 
in Rwanda of 1994 reconfigured the tendencies of the Rwandan state that it was 
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discharged with the duty of protecting the Tutsi wherever they were.
1004
 The massacres of 
the Tutsi of the North and South Kivu in late 1995 which were crowned by the Mudende 
massacres of December 1995
1005
; highlighted the predicament of the Tutsi Congolese in 
the midst of violent Hutu refugee warriors and other violent Hutu Congolese native 
groups.
1006
  
 The Hutu refugee camps were strategically located almost in the immediate 
neighbourhood of Rwanda with Zaire. This made incursions to be executed in a quick 
and robust manner. ``Commando operations`` were made by the refugees warriors; 
undermining the security of particularly the Western Prefectures of Rwanda. 
1007
 The 
camps were also located near to the centre of activity in Eastern Congo: near the towns of 
Goma in North Kivu, Bukavu and Uvira in South Kivu;
1008
 which the United States 
Ambassador Terence P. McCulley (who was in Charge of the Central Africa Affairs in 
the States Department at the time of the beginning of the Hutu refugee crisis) referred to 
as the ``Goma-Bukavu axis``.
1009
This made easy for the authorities presiding over these 
camps (as it was earlier noted that the authorities were largely the former members of the 
genocide government in Rwanda and the militias) to access weapons from arms dealers.    
Meanwhile few refugees were returning despite the continuous plea by the international 
community—particularly the UNHCR, and the government of Rwanda; that Rwanda was 
ready for their return. Though still overwhelmed by the fear of revenge; what 
complicated their return was the fact that they were being held hostage by the Hutu 
refugee warriors.
1010
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The refugees were still being held hostage
1011
 by the Hutu militias and the ex-FAR for the 
reasons articulated in Chapter 3 of this study. Breaking the hostage-ring of the refugee 
warriors onto the civilian refugees was a policy puzzle, and Kagame was of the view that 
it was necessary to identify the ``Hostage`` takers and separate them from civilian 
refugee populations if the return of the latter was to be ensured.
1012
 Indeed as earlier as 
September 1994 Kagame was of the conviction that force was the only measure which 
was supposed to be applied if the civilian refugees were to be fled from their armed 
captors.
1013
 Granted is the view that the insecurity in Rwanda, where elements within the 
RPA and the Tutsi population persecuted the Hutus, stopped the Hutu refugees from 
repatriating.  However, the intimidation of the refugees by the exiled Hutu extremist 
leaders and their military and militias undermined the more against refugee return to 
Rwanda.
1014
   
It should be emphasised that even though theorisation about addressing the refugee 
warrior phenomenon is limited to the imperativeness a capable host state to disarm the 
refugee militants. The conditions were different for the militarised refugee phenomenon 
in a host country, Zaire, which was generally weak in all aspects of statehood. Policy 
precedents as regards the questions: How do you disarm the militants? Are they willing to 
be disarmed peacefully? If not willing to disarm peacefully, how do you disarm them by 
force with little collateral damage? Military solutions to refugee problems in the 
international domain are normally addressed by the concerned powerful countries; by 
militarily disabling the military capacity of the culpable state responsible for military and 
political machinations that lead to refugee generating situations. As earlier noted all the 
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options which the International community was looking at had an element of a militarised 
mission and as earlier as November 1994 it had been noted that: 
…, the International Organisation, and much less the Zairian authorities have 
never had control over the camps. Former officials in the Rwandan Government 
and military have always held real power. The former Rwandan interim 
government has lost the war, the government, and the territory; their hold over the 
refugee population remain(s) their last claim to power. There is no indication that 
they will willingly relinquish that control.
1015
 
This pointed to an imperative of use of military force to literally liberate the civilian 
refugees from their refugee warrior captors. 
Indeed, it is allegedly theorised that the military and political manoeuvres of the 
aggressive state leading to refugee situation are normally manifested in ethnic cleansing, 
genocide and harsh occupation. The punishments by the concerned states against the 
aggressor state usually range from aerial bombings, creation of safe zones, and 
enforcement of peace through military campaigns to a full scale war against the 
aggressor.  Population bombardments are also countenanced; if that is what it takes to 
force the aggressor to realise the imperativeness of peace. This rubric was used during the 
military campaigns against Nazi-Germany, and Saddam Hussein`s Baath Party Iraq in 
protection of the Kurds populations. But these methods can only work out when the 
aggressor can be targeted and the victim isolated.
1016
  For the Hutu refugee phenomenon 
in Zaire, the context was different; refugees were mingled with the aggressors; who 
through their machinations designed for political propaganda, held the refugees in 
bondage.  Accordingly, Rwanda applied punitive military actions to a complex refugee 
situation, where bonafide refugees where intermingled with refugee warriors; the 
outcome was a disaster. 
However,  in the midst of those complexities, the Rwanda Patriotic Front led Government 
had two obligations: securing the frontiers of Rwanda from the incursions of the Hutu 
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refugee warrior, and protecting their Congo Tutsi cousins from the wanton  violence of 
the Hutu warrior refugees, the Congolese Hutus and the armed forces of Mobutu`s Zaire. 
The latter reason was used to disguise the former.
1017
 To the Rwandan authorities, sanity 
would never prevail in Rwanda when the militarised Hutu refugee camps were still intact. 
Eastern Congo refugee camps had not only to be pacified, but also be dismantled for the 
peace of Rwanda to prevail.  
Early on, on  October 22 1994,  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  Prudence Bushnell  
had written to the Secretary of State indicating that the ex-FAR threat to Rwandan 
security had increasingly become overwhelming; that Rwanda would sooner than later 
engage in pre-emptive strikes. Bushnell summarised the security situations as follows: 
In Goma, the ex-Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) has moved many of its troops to 
locations further west. Troop(s) presence is less noticeable in Tanzania; some ex-
FAR troop(s) have moved from Goma down to Bukavu. Indications are mounting 
that ex-FAR command structures are intact and troops are training and/or 
preparing for some sort of move against Rwanda. While an all-out attack is 
unlikely the ex-FAR is believed to have the capability to conduct unconventional 
military activity to which the RPA is expected to respond forcefully. A pre-
emptive strike by the RPA cannot be ruled out. 
Indeed, as earlier as October 18
th
 1994, if we are to go by the cable which was sent from 
the USA Embassy in Rome, Kagame was particularly determined to attack the camps at 
the earliest opportunity.
1018
 He was however constantly dissuaded by the new Rwandan 
allies from the political west: the United States of America, The Netherlands and United 
Kingdom;
1019
which Growing pejoratively referred to as the ``fan-club of sympathetic 
nations`` for to him they blindly supported Kagame despite his excesses when it came to 
                                                          
1017
 See, Mahmood Mamdani, African States, Citizenship and War: A case-study, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944- ), Vol.78, No.3 (Jul., 2002), pp.493-506, Willey, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095887, accessed: 05/02/2014 12:59. Also see, Michael Deibert, Congo: 
Between Hope and Despair, World Policy Journal 2008 25:63, DOI:10.1162/wopj.2008.25.2.63, 
http://wpj.sagepub.com/content/25/2/63.citation.  Also see, Human Right Watch, 1997, for a treatment of 
how what started as a Banyamulenge revolt in October 1996 when an order was passed and operationalised 
by the Deputy Governor of South Kivu, Lwasi Ngaba Lwabangi to the effect that on 7 October, 1996 
Banyamulenge were required to leave Zaire within one week. 
1018
 165247. 
1019
  Reyntjens, The Great African War, 2009. Also see, Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years on,  2004. 
366 
 
observance of human rights.
1020
  They were suffering from the ``guilt complex`` for 
having failed to stop the genocide and thus allowed a considerable measure of policy 
latitude to the RPF led government when it came addressing its security concerns.
1021
 
To that effect, events during the build up to late 1996 however pointed to the resoluteness 
of Rwanda to put a determined fight against the Hutu refugee warrior phenomenon in the 
Congo. First, that President Kagame of Rwanda informed his western allies that his 
intelligence had picked clues indicating that the ex-FAR and other Hutu militias were 
planning heavy incursions into Rwanda from Goma and Bukavu areas of Eastern Congo. 
Two, that it was suspect of  Rwanda to refuse to sign the Non-Aggressive pact of the 
Central African States during the Yaoundé summit of 8 to 10
th
 July 1996. Three, that the 
build up to Rwanda`s high intentions to attack Zaire coincided with the lifting of the arms 
embargo by the UN Security Council on 1
st
 September, 1996, an embargo that had been 
put on Rwanda during the genocide period of 1994,
1022
 a matter which reflected the 
willingness of the Rwandan Western allies to allow Rwanda to bolster its security 
apparatus, a matter that  explains why Rwanda`s military incursions into Zaire were 
``mildly criticised`` by the United   as put by Desire Baloubi.
1023
 Fourth, the whistle 
blowing communiqué of 17
th
 June 1996 by the Rwandan refugee organisation, the 
Reassemblement pour la Democratie et le Retour des Refugies (RPR) which indicated 
that military build-ups by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were being made in preparation 
for attacks on refugees camps; as Uganda tested the readiness of the Congo forces by 
attacking Bunangana township and Rwanda raided Kibumba refugee camp on 26 June.  
And fifth, it was also reported that by June 1996, Rwanda was training the Banyamulenge 
rebels using the territory of Burundi probably to disguise its intentions and that around 
700-800 Rwandan soldiers withdrew from the ranks of the Rwandan army entering South 
Kivu. 
1024
 Though Rwanda continuously denied its intentions, the build-ups to the 
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eventual war that was to see refugee camps overran and dismantled were as assertive and 
determined as the words of Kagame in his interview with the Journalist Francois Misser 
that: 
“If another war must be waged, we shall fight in a different fashion, elsewhere. 
We are prepared. We are ready to fight any war and we shall contain it along the 
border with Zaire``.
1025
 
To the government of Rwanda, the ``satisficing`` security policy option was to attack the 
refugee camps, engage in battles with the refugee warriors as civilian refugees are forced 
to return home. From 1996 to 1997, Rwanda decisively pursued a military solution to the 
pacification of its Eastern border with Zaire. Indeed by the mid-1997, camps had been 
dismantled, and Hutu militants sent into disarray. The capacity of the militants to 
mobilise from Eastern Zaire had been generally vanquished. The study focuses itself on 
this period (1996-1997)
1026
; for the plan was focused principally on the refugee warriors 
though it later   became elaborate, going beyond a mere annihilation of the Hutu refugee 
threat to overthrowing their patron Mobutu,  done in the name of thwarting a genocide 
against the Banyamulenge.
1027
  
However the cardinal objective of extinguishing the Hutu militant threat from the 
political security map of Rwanda was primary, and the strategy to realising it was 
elaborate. Briefly, the strategy was to: forge an alliance with the opposition against 
Mobutu`s government, wage a civil-war against the government of Mobutu; disguised as 
an uprising by the Congo native opposition military elements in Eastern Congo, fight 
Mobutu as you advance onto the Hutu refugee camps to destroy the warriors, and force 
the refugees to return home.  
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It should be emphasised that the primary logic of the first Congo war (1996-1997) was 
the quest by Rwanda to secure its Western border with Congo from the incursions of the 
refugee warriors who were hiding in the Hutu refugee camps in Eastern Congo. The logic 
extended to overthrowing Mobutu and it is principally the entry of Angola into the war 
architectural map that changed the logic of the war; from the logic of the pacification of 
the Eastern Congo refugee camps to the logic of overthrowing Mobutu, who was seen as 
the patron of the Hutu warriors.  But predominantly  to the original logic of the war was 
manifest as the Rwandan forces and the Congo allies, in their military engagements, they 
moved  along  the pathways of the Hutu refugees who were moving westwards into 
Congo as they  annihilated them.
1028
Mamdani writes that their move forward was like 
that of ``molten lava`` from a volcano; scorching any living organism it come across.
1029
    
However, the Rwandan logic of the Congo war was also coupled with the security 
interests of other actors.  For instance Angola was  worried of the unceasing support 
which Mobutu was giving to the Savimbi UNITA rebels and it would have been  safer to 
away with  Mobutu, and needless to mention that the first Congo war campaign was 
generally driven by the logic of a somewhat security dilemma by Uganda, Rwanda, 
1030
Burundi and to an extent Angola.
1031
 For Uganda it was the security concern of the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), to Rwanda it was the ex-FAR and the interahamwe 
militias, and to Burundi it was the (CNDD-FDD) rebels; all hiding in Eastern Congo and 
finding a political patron in the government of Mobutu.  The subsequent campaigns were 
apparently driven by the logic of mercantilism, and have been variously described as 
economic war manoeuvres.  
The economic logic of the subsequent wars which started in 1998 has been a central 
thesis to a number of scholarly writings. A great analytical service, and it is summarised 
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briefly herein, has been done to this episode (1998--) in the history of the war-stricken 
Congo. Phoebe N Okowa discusses the legalistic dimension of invasion of Congo by 
Rwanda and Uganda and the resource exploitation that formed the logic of the 
invasion.
1032
  John F. Clark in a volume which he edits, places the Congo wars within the 
analytical framework of global political economy, noting how the exploitation of Congo 
and the war-technologic manifested a global economic greed and a capitalistic conspiracy 
of a special kind. It is noted that the involvement of imperial regional governments like 
Uganda and Rwanda on one side and Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad Sudan on the other, 
coupled the catastrophe of the silence of the global power like the United States and the 
bankrolling of the war machinery by the multinationals who continued to buy the elicit 
minerals on black-market; all formed the malignant logic of the Second Congo War and 
its episodes of carnage in all its complexities.
1033
  
Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, also sustain the discourse of how Congo 
security crises were fuelled by foreign economic interests. Stephen Jackson particularly 
explains the Congo crisis in light of a conspiracy to exploit Congo resources by other 
countries particularly Rwanda, Uganda; with multinationals and foreign powers through 
sustenance of conflicts and criminality in the Kivu region of Congo Zaire. Jackson further 
provides a little briefly the impact of the exploitation on the psychology of the Congo 
natives. This is portrayed quite clearly by his selection of the Christmas summon of the 
then Bishop of Bukavu, Msgr. Kataliko, thus: 
``The Congolese People are obliged to resist, because our riches are being looted 
by foreign powers with the complexity of a Congolese elite``
1034
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  Indeed the Bishop was referring to other countries that were benefiting from the wealth 
of Congo at the expense of the Congolese. It is this scheme of things that  Ola Olsson and 
Heather Congdon Fors put as war-mongering in a predatory manner; bordering on greed 
which was manifested in the seeking of natural resource rents by countries in the region 
particularly Uganda and Rwanda that initially had genuine grievances accruing to Hutu 
refugee warriors in the camps of Kivu in Eastern Congo;
1035
a logical conclusion that is 
also sustained by Christopher R. Cook in his precise account of how economic interests, 
which were manifested in the quest for minerals particularly diamonds, informed the 
logic of the second Congo War though the media underreported such issues.
1036
  The 
analysis of Olsson and others obtains from Paul Collier`s rather popular theorisation 
about conflict as a result of greed and grievance, and Johan Pottier is not pretentious in 
his assertion that the apparent causes of the civil war in Rwanda and it extension in Zaire, 
that were reduced to ethnicity, were just a scapegoat of the underlying reasons which to 
him lay in ``the modern struggles for power and wealth``.
1037
 It is Pottier`s treatment that 
brings out clearly the logic of the political- economic nature of the Rwandan and Congo 
catastrophe to bear.  
Still on the summary of the analysis of causes of the subsequent Congo wars, Mwesigwa 
Baregu gives a historical treatment to the Congo Wars noting how the territory of Congo 
has been a victim to the imperialistic-cum-mercantilist schemes of foreigners; a 
phenomenon dating to the Belgium rule of the Leopold Congo, and to him Congo wars 
were just continuity-continuous phenomena in the plunder of a nation.
1038
   
 It is Fillip Reyntjens who explains the logic of the Congo wars in specific reference to 
Rwanda. He notes that the security dilemma of Rwanda as a result of Hutu refugee 
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warriors culminated into the strategy ´´plunder`` of Congo resources by Rwanda,
1039
 a 
thesis which he had earlier alluded to briefly   in 1999.
1040
 Rwanda figures in mineral 
production went high in the wake of the second Congo war.
1041
 And Stein Sundstol 
Eriksen delineates the extent to which Rwanda profiteered from its subsequent military 
involvement in Congo beyond the 1996-1997 clear cut campaign against the Hutu 
refugee warriors. He notes that a complete withdraw of Rwanda both in influence and 
presence in Congo would have impacted rather astronomically on its income, and 
therefore it was economically prudent for Rwanda to maintain its presence after all as 
President Kagame allegedly observed that earlier military campaigns were self 
financing,
1042
 as a way of pointing to the economies of scale that came with the 
exploitation of the natural resources of Congo.   
The International Crisis Group in reference to the exploitation of the resources of Congo 
by an array of actors observed that: ``You never Finish Eating the meat of an elephant``, 
a title it gave to chapter IV of that particular report.
1043
 And if inference can be made; the 
interests of Rwanda in Congo after the first invasion that was generally meant to literally 
weed-out the Hutu refugee warriors; were generally mercantilist. They were aimed at the 
acquisition of ``power and plenty``
1044
 using military power to gain economic power and 
subsequently enjoy the mutually reinforcing nature of the two levels of power.  
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So Rwanda`s second involvement in the Congo obtained much from the logic of 
economic nationalism. To Gilpin the central logic of economic nationalism is that: 
economic activities are and should be subordinated to the goal of state building and the 
interests of the state.
1045
 The Rwandan state was cognizant of that logic.  But for the sake 
of conceptual density this chapter limits itself to the logic of the first Congo war, and 
particularly on the extent to which the logic of conserving state security gave way to the 
logic of sacrificing refugee security as an extension of the heuristic definition of human 
security.   
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5.1.3 The Logic of Sacrificing Human Security at the altar of State 
Security: The enduring nature of political realism. 
Accordingly, the war started in late 1996 and at first it was disguised as an uprising by 
the Banyamulenge people who were being persecuted by the Congolese authorities and 
constantly attacked by the Hutu refugees and the Congo native Hutus.
1046
 Rwanda had to 
disguise its violent entry into Congo because direct incursions would have meant an 
abuse of the international norm of sovereign integrity.
1047
 The decision of Rwanda to 
disguise the war as a Congo native affair was generally belied by the logic of the war 
tactics. What was more telling of the role which Rwanda had played in the scheme to 
overthrow Mobutu as a nationalistic concern that was meant to overshadow the 
extermination of the Hutu warrior refugee threat was the fact that at the end of the war, 
James Kabarebe, a Colonel in the Rwandan army, and the Minister of Defence at the time 
of writing this Chapter, became the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Congo.
1048
 The 
Human Rights Watch reported that Kabarebe, accordingly to the USA Embassy in 
Kinshasa, was perceived as the ``most powerful commander in Congo and a principal 
strategist during the seven months war``. 
1049
 Indeed, it is Kabarebe, the then Commander 
of Army Operations in Rwanda, 1994-1997, that mobilised the different Congolese 
opposition groups to come together to wage a war against Mobutu. Commenting about 
how he brought the Congolese opposition groups together, Kaberebe observed: 
Amongst themselves they didn`t know each other, so at least for the first time, 
someone from Rwanda had to help to make them meet. I introduced each of them 
and I introduced the agenda which was the liberation of Zaire and the war against 
Mobutu. They were happy. I think they were happy to meet (sic).
1050
 
Indeed Deogracias Bugera the then leader of the then Democratic Alliance of Peoples 
(Alliance Democratique des peuples, ADP) a Tutsi opposition group which became an 
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integral part of the Alliance des Forces Democratiqiues Pour La Liberation du Congo, 
AFDL, observed that before the meeting which took place in Kabarebe`s office, the 
former had never met Kabila who became the overall Spokesperson and leader of the 
AFDL. In his words: 
That day in James Kabarebe`s office. I arrived with my team of ADP and later 
there was a military jeep that arrived with two men first. It was Kabila. It was the 
first time I saw him physically. I saw a man who was wearing sandals and an old 
man who seemed to limp with a shaved head and I said to myself: `This is him, 
Kabila`
1051
  
So, Rwanda instigated an insecurity dilemma to execute a security dilemma scheme. 
Indeed, the war began as a Banyamulenge attempt for self defence, and later formalised 
as a nationalistic struggle than a tribal endeavour as other Congo opposition elements 
were brought onto board. An Alliance of Democratic Congo Forces (Alliance des Forces 
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo, AFDL)was forged  as an amalgamation of 
the People`s Revolutionary Party (Parti de la Revolution populaire (PRP) headed by 
Laurent Desire Kabila, National Resistance Council for Democracy (Conseil national de 
resistance pour la democratie, CNRD), Lumumbist guerrilla groups which were being led 
by Andre Kisase Ngandu, Democratic Alliance of Peoples (Alliance Democratique des 
peuples, ADP) a Tutsi opposition group which was being led by Deogratias Bugera, and 
the Revolutionary Movement for Liberation of Zaire (Movement Revolutionnaire pour la 
liberation du Zaire, MRLZ) an amalgamation of the Shi and other small groups in South 
Kivu region with Masasu Nindaga at the helm. 
1052
 However Simba Sallie Kayunga part 
from indicating that that the Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
was formed on 18
th
 October 1996 at Lamera, South Kivu; he also adds more groups onto 
the list of the armed groups which comprised the ADFL to include the Hunde and 
Ngilima Mai Mai of North Kivu who were part of the 1960s nationalist and Marxist 
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guerrilla struggles of Patrice Lumumba who was later succeeded by Pierre Mulele, the 
deserters of the Forces Armee Zairos (FAZ) and the Gendarmerie, the local recruits form 
rebel held areas and the former Katangese soldiers who had fled to Angola when their 
struggle for the secession of Katanga aborted.
1053
  A Rwandan affair was given a 
watermark of a generally Congo affair.  
Indeed, it is Kabarebe, the Rwanda Commander that informed Kabila about the takeover 
of Kinshasa. In his words, he remembered that: 
(He) I called Kabira on his statellite phone. I told him we had captured. He said 
`You`re sure? ` He was very excited. He laughed, he was very happy. I said 
`everything is finished. You can come`. He repeated ``you`re sure? Are you 
sure?``.
1054
 
Also, President Paul Kagame is reported to have stated in July 1997, without 
circumlocution, that Rwanda planned and executed the rebellion against Mobutu but to 
give it a Congolese nationalistic orientation; Rwanda literally co-opted the Congo 
opposition groups which were opposed to Mobutu.
1055
 Kayumba Nyamwasa, the then 
Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army revealed that: 
The whole issue was to bring all these Congolese who had come from different 
background and find a way to band them together. So, we put them together to 
organise a political movement able to articulate a program and even justify the 
war that was going on in Congo.
1056
 
 Kabarebe, the Rwandan Military Officer who commanded the forces which overthrew 
Mobutu was precise in articulating the pivotal role which Rwanda played in the first 
Congo war. He articulated that:  
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Rwanda provided the bulk of troops that enabled the conquest of Zaire. But other 
countries in the region also did a lot to help Kabila conquer the country and seize 
power. So on the day of the inauguration they were all there to physically show 
their support for the new President.
1057
 
 But the logic of the first Congo is particularly put succinctly by the United Nations 
Secretary General`s Investigative Team into violations of human rights in the DRC 
during the war. The report partly reads: 
There was in effect a convergence of two conflicts both of which were essentially 
internal- one between the AFDL and government of Zaire, the other pitting the 
Government of Rwanda against remnants of former armed forces of Rwanda and 
the allied armed political militia the Interahamwe, taking place largely in the 
territory of a neigbouring state. The two conflicts were closely intertwined with 
the forces of AFDL and Rwandan army in particular, often acting as a single 
force.
1058
 
So, whereas the war indicated the convergence of the state securities, although in 
different dimensions (Rwanda securing its state security from the Hutu refugee warriors, 
but at the expense of the security of the Zairian state led then by Mobutu), the war, in its 
outcomes, indicated a somewhat divergence of state security and human security along 
the continuum of policy options to secure the state of Rwanda. But towards Zaire, the war 
indicated a convergence of human and state security along the continuum of the causes of 
war; for the mix of Hutu refugees, the former Hutu soldiers and former government 
officials; served to fuel the aggression of the Rwandan Government against refugee 
warriors, which attacks, sought to dismantle the camps subsequently leading to an 
onslaught against the Mobutu regime in Zaire. 
Besides the capitulation of Kagame on the leadership role which Rwanda played in the 
overthrow of Mobutu; there are other leading- lines which point to the near fact that the 
Congo of 1996-1997, was for all intent and purpose a Rwandan affair.  Filip Reyntjens 
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breaks the 1996-1997 war periods into two categorical phases: the first phase which 
entailed the attacks on Camps; which he puts into the period of autumn 1996, and the 
second phase which he puts in spring 1997.
1059
 But the objective was extinguishing the 
Hutu refugee warrior phenomenon from the security map of Rwanda, or at least to 
substantially undermine its strength.  For instance the strategic movement of the forces 
was generally aligned to the core objective of Rwanda to pacify its Eastern Frontier with 
Zaire by destroying the Hutu refugee encampments. The war meticulously traversed the 
line of the location of the refugee camps, and incursions inside Congo also moved in 
accordance to the secondary movement of refugees who had escaped from the destroyed 
camps at the periphery of Eastern Congo-Rwandan border as they moved westwards into 
the interior of Congo and further into the countries sitting at the western borderline of 
Zaire. 
Architecturally, the Refugee camps were situated in the areas around Goma, Bukavu and 
Uvira. In the Goma area, some camps were situated along the road running North of 
Ruthsuru, and these were the refugee camps of Kibumba, Kahindo, and that of   Katale. 
Others were situated along the road which was running west from Goma to the Town of 
Sake, and these were the Mugunga camps which hosted approximately 22,000 ex-FAR 
soldiers, and that of Kituku were several refugees. The UNHCR refugees map clearly 
indicates the location of refugee camps and Hutu refugees as follows: 
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 Adopted Map 4: Map indicating the movement of Rwandan Refugees in the 
aftermath of the genocide 
 
In Bukavu area there were twenty six sites on which smaller camps sat along the three 
roads; one running to the North, the second running to the South East in the direction of 
Uvira town and the third running to the South West of Buvaku. In Bukavu were 
particularly the camps of Panzi which was sitting a few kilometres South East of Bukavu 
and Bulonge which was 100 kilometres to the Southwest of Bukavu. These two 
encampments were hosting approximately 11,000 ex-FAR soldiers.  It was Bukavu which 
was hosting the majority of the self-exiled elites of the former interim genocide 
government of Rwanda. It was reported that even the former President together with his 
ministers had settled in Bukavu areas given the fact that the Provincial government of 
Bukavu was ``vocally supportive of the Hutu cause``. Indeed the former Justice Minister 
was publishing his anti-RPF pamphlet and it was on sale in the kiosks of the Bukavu 
Township.  
Although the militias prevented the UNHCR from registering the refugees in the camps, 
by November 1994, it had been estimated by the UNHCR officials that 815,000 refugees 
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were in the Goma area with 740,000 in the designated encampments; 330,000 refugees 
were in the camps around Bukavu, and that the Uvira camps hosted most Burundian 
refugees.
1060
 Therefore it was not by accident that the war of 1996-1997 in Congo 
strategically traversed all the camp areas before it proceeded elsewhere. The logic of the 
war was informed by the need to dislodge the refugee warriors from camps and force the 
civilian refugees to repatriate to Rwanda. 
Accordingly, the tactic was to dismantle the camps, force refugees to return to Rwanda 
and follow those who refuse to return until they are exterminated. As such the first town 
to be taken over by the ``Banyamulenge`` was Uvira of South Kivu and within its vicinity 
were a number of refugee camps.
1061
  When Uvira fell on 28th October, Bukavu fell on 
30
th
 October 1996, and camps within the vicinity of the two areas were systematically 
attacked.  Camps around Uvira were attacked on 21
st
 October 1996; forcing the Hutu 
refugees form Burundi and Rwanda to flee. The Bukavu camps were attacked from 
Rwanda during the period of 25
th
 and 26
th 
October1996.Starting 21
st
 October, 1996, 
camps around the North of Goma were systematically attacked starting with Kibumba 
refugee camp on 21
st
 October, Kahindo on 23
rd
 October, Katale on 26
th
 October, and 
Mugunga, a camp which was hosting approximately 600,000 refugees and acting as a 
reception centre for the refugees who were vacating the violence in other camps, was 
attacked at the of end October, 1996.  
Masisi and Butembo fell to Rwanda and the allied forces on 20
th
 and 27 November 
respectively. The Uganda People`s Defence Forces captured Bunia on the Christmas Day 
of 1996. This saw the creation of buffer zones covering the Ugandan, Burundian and 
Rwandan borderline; for 800 kilometres in length and 100 Kilometres in the depth of 
Congo Zaire.
1062
  But after the capture of Bukavu; the war moved north and west wards 
taking the direction of the refugees who engaged in secondary movements. Massacres 
occurred at Shanje camps in Goma; Shabunda camps between December 1996 and 
January 1997; at Tingi Tingi between February 28 and March 1; Kisangani area during 
late March; Equateur Province, particularly the Wendji-Mbandaka Massacre of 13
th
 May 
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1997, and the forces subsequently entered into Kinshasa on the night of Wednesday 14 
May 1997 and on Friday 16
th
 May 1997, Mobutu left the country.
1063
 This depicts that the 
logic of the war was informed by the need to extinguish not just the Hutu military threat 
but even the Hutu refugee threat; for the civilian refugees where perceived as potential 
members and future combatants. 
So the direction of the war, that was at first denied by Rwanda as a purely Congo affairs, 
was following the path-of-the-camps and inference can be made that the war followed the 
logic of disabling the core pillar of the Hutu militants, that is to say: the refugee camps. 
Refugee camps in the context of the Hutu refugee warriors were the ``critical nodes`´ or 
the ``Centers of gravity`` which had to be dismantled for Rwanda had adopted the logic 
of a military approach to the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo. 
1064
 But 
whereas no one would have imagined the ``punitive bombing`` of ``critical nodes`` 
during the genocide in Rwanda; for the victims and the assailants were mingled
1065
, in the 
same regard nobody would have imagined the bombing of camps as a mechanism of 
disabling the Hutu refugee warriors as the aggressors and the civilian refugees were 
mingled. The choice of the frame of action by Rwanda depicted the conflicting nature of 
human security concerns and state security concerns along the continuum of thwarting a 
resurgence of violence in post-conflict situations. The study delineates how human 
security concerns were undermined by Rwanda and its allies in the quest for greater state 
security.  
Systematically, even after dismantling the camps, the direction of the war shifted 
westwards in the direction of the secondary movement of the refugees. Indeed when the 
Rwandan forces together with its Congolese allies attacked camps around Goma in the 
middle of November; leading to the dismantling of camps, there was a massive return of 
refugees to Rwanda, approximated at around 500000 to 700,000 refugees, just within 
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four days: between 15
th
 to 19
th
 November.
1066
 Amnesty International put the number of 
refugees who returned to Rwanda at approximately 700,000 by November 1996.
1067
 The 
Human Rights Watch puts the number at approximately 600,000.
1068
 So, the 500,000-
700000 figure of Kisangani is instructive to summarise the range in which the majority of 
the approximations fell. It should be mentioned earlier enough that during the initial 
attacks on the refugee camps which led to the massive return to Rwanda, many civilian or 
bonafide refugees were killed, first as collateral damage as the ex-FAR and the 
Interahamwe engaged the Rwandan forces and that Congolese allies, and second as a 
result of the killings by the ex-FAR meant to stop the refugees from returning to 
Rwanda.
1069
 
The logic of the subsequent attacks on refugees who continued moving westwards should 
be understood within the context of the declaration which Rwanda made  to the effect 
that majority of the refugees had returned to Rwanda and that the need for international 
humanitarian intervention had been overtaken by events; a matter which led to the 
rescinding, in December, 1996, of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1080 
(1996) which had approved humanitarian intervention by the Security Council which had 
been taken on 15
th
 November, 1996.
1070
 But even if the intervention was to stand; the 
guidelines which had been adopted by the UN Security Council on November, 1996 to 
guide the operations of the Canadian-led multinational force; were not clear on the modus 
operandi of demilitarising the camps, after all United States and Canada had started 
categorically that the mandate of the intervention would not include the separation of 
Hutu refugee warriors from genuine refugees, the civilians.
1071
 The mandate of the force 
was to be expressly humanitarian as follows: 
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(The United Nations Security Council)Welcomes the offers made by Member 
States, in consultation with the States concerned in the region, concerning the 
establishment for humanitarian purposes of a temporary multinational force to 
facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective 
delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid to alleviate the 
immediate suffering of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern 
Zaire, and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as the voluntary return 
of displaced persons, and invites other interested States to offer to participate in 
these  efforts.
1072
 
 Earlier, on 22
nd
 October 1996, as Rwanda and its Congolese allies unleashed military 
attacks onto the refugee camps around Bukavu and Uvira; the Rwandan Foreign Ministry 
released a communiqué calling on the refugees to return to Rwanda in order to survive 
the vagaries of war. The call was also reiterated on 22
nd
 October, 1996, by Sadako Ogata 
the then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and it was aired on Radio 
stations. Phyllis Oakley, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Refugee migrations in 
the United States government was in support of the move of ceasing humanitarian 
assistance to refugees with an objective of forcing their return.
1073
  United States is said to 
have provided key political support to Rwanda authorities in their attempt to literally 
uproot the Hutu refugee military threat. It was observed that the US-Military provided 
training and assistance to the Rwandan forces during their incursions onto the Congo 
territory. It is reported that Paul Kagame, the then Defence Minister and Vice President 
of Rwanda acknowledged in July 1997 that the United States and the United Nations 
officials were in the know of the plans of Rwanda to invade the then Zaire; with an 
objective to dismantle the refugee camps and annihilate the Hutu refugee warriors (the 
ex-FAR and the Interahamwe). It was reported in The People, a Ugandan News Paper 
basing on a press release from the Spokesman of the Rally for the Return of Refugees and 
Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) that the Pentagon and British intelligence services had 
seen and approved the plan for the violent attacks on the Hutu refugee camps which had 
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been scheduled to start in June 1996, but to reschedule the implementation when the plan 
leaked.
1074
 The Newspaper was not rebuked for blackmail although it was operating in 
Uganda, a country which was then a strong ally to Rwanda. USA consistently denied that 
it was in the know of the invasion, but only to be betrayed by the denouncing of the 
Rwanda invasion by the USA Embassy in Kinshasa in January 1997. The USA was also 
literally lukewarm in its condemnation of the abuses of human rights in Eastern Zaire 
during the war, and that, allegedly though; the USA forces were spotted from time to 
time during the course of the war in Zaire as they offered training instruction to RPA 
forces. It was also reported that USA forces were usually cited in Zaire during the period 
November 1996 and August 1997. That they were equally seen in the villages of 
Walikale and Kanyabagonga in North Kivu on July 23 and July 24, 1997, and were seen 
in August 1997 in the areas of the Rwenzori side of Congo accompanying Ugandan 
soldiers. The USA soldiers wherever they were cited; they were in military uniforms and 
carrying the USA insignia. 
1075
  As France and Spain proposed a multinational force to 
contain the massacre of refugees in early November 1996, and later in March 1997, other 
members of the international community particularly the United Nations officials were 
cynical of the intentions of France. It is  also reported that senior ranking officers; 
namely; Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation, Reginald Moreels; 
European Union Humanitarian Commissioner, Emma Bonino and UN and OAU Special 
Envoy Ambassador Mahmoud Sahnoun denounced the massacres but their 
denouncements were of no consequence.
1076
 
During a field visit to Rwanda, the researcher decided to put the question of the 
involvement of the Americans in the Rwandan scheme of the attack on refugee camps 
and the final onslaught on the Mobutu regime. A former RPA Lieutenant , who served in 
Congo (1996-2001) now a petty businessman in Nyabugogo suburbs of Kigali, who was 
identified by the researcher through a Banking officer who had his file on the business 
loan financial obligation he had with that particular bank,  was frank when he said  that:  
                                                          
1074
 The People, Too little, too late for Rwanda refugees, May 07, 1997. 
1075
 Human Rights Watch, What Kabira is Hiding, 1997. 
1076
 Human Rights Watch, What Kabira is Hiding, 1997. 
384 
 
Do you think Rwanda would have been in position to fight a ``giant war`` in 
Zaire? Americans funded us, even with backed food! You see, I used to see them 
sometimes with our commanders, and please do not quote me, and if it were not 
for my friend (the banker) I wouldn`t be talking to you!  But it worked out, we 
defeated the Interahamwe, and the rest is history.
1077
  
The location map of the informant is as follows: 
Map 5: Map of Rwanda indicating the location of Nyabugogo Village/Market, Study Area, in 
Rwanda. 
 
 
 
A Ugandan military officer who also served in the Zaire during the first and second 
Congo war as an intelligence officer was straight:  
The Americans were our accomplices, first, because they were concerned about 
our security (the Allied Democratic Forces threat to Uganda), but they equally 
hated Mobutu and through us they vanquished him. And for your information, 
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Congo is so “juicy”; any serious international actor would have positioned 
himself in the manner in which the Americans did. You have heard of the notion 
of sharing the spoils of war!
 1078
 
That put aside, Rwanda subsequently declared all the refugees who had not returned from 
the Congo as part of the interahamwe militia and therefore fit for persecution and 
execution,
1079
and this logic was given topicality by the words of the then Ambassador of 
United Sates in Kigali, Gribin, who without hesitation; informed the International 
Humanitarian agencies which had partitioned, asking  him to strengthen diplomatic 
efforts to make Rwanda countenance to the pleas of the agencies to have access to the 
refugees who were fleeing the attacks on the refugee camps. His message was blunt:  
Stop feeding the killers`´ adding that ``if we do not well will be trading the 
children in Tingi Tingi against the children who will be killed and orphaned in 
Rwanda(sic).
1080
    
Indeed Lemarchand observes that it is in Tingi Tingi that major massacres of refugees 
occurred in Congo Zaire.
1081
 It was not just forgotten but rather ignored by both 
Ambassador Gribin, and the Rwandan authorities that refugees were still being held 
hostage. It was stated that those Hutu refugees who continued moving west wards were 
escaping justice for the genocide crimes which they committed in 1994. They were 
therefore considered to be the ``legitimate targets``
1082
 for the persecution which was 
unleashed onto them by the Allied Forces with Rwanda at the helm of the alliance.  As a 
result many refugees died, and although no agreement has been reached as regards the 
exact number of those who perished for many remained unaccounted for; this study takes 
the estimates of the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies which put the refugee 
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deaths at 200,000.
1083
 It was an error of judgment on the side of the international 
community, particularly the USA, not to condemn the massacre which were no respecter 
of even the bonafide refugees This scheme of things fitted clearly into what would have 
passed as a fallacy on the side of the USA as the violence was simplistically interpreted 
as the United States Committee to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire noted thus: 
The notion of communal rather than individual responsibility is more pronounced 
in many African societies than in our own. ``Sins of fathers`` are visited not only 
upon their sons, but upon their brother, sisters, cousins and so on.
1084
 
The refugees who moved westwards in fear of persecution if they returned to Rwanda for 
it had been impressed upon them by the extremists leaders in the camps that the RPF was 
anti-all- Hutu; suffered the tragic violence which was visited onto them by the Rwandan 
forces and the Congolese allies. All those refugees were now taken to be communally 
responsible for the genocide in Rwanda and had to be communally punished. Though not 
all were militants—there were mostly children and women, but  among them were the 
Hutu armed elements who accompanied what the Human Rights Watch dubbed as 
``organised caravans``.
1085
 
Accordingly, the war progressed along that techno-logic as the refugees were pursued, 
violently persecuted and violently pacified. As the war progressed also the hunting-down 
of refugees who had not returned to Rwanda progressed in quite that manner. The study 
later sketches the progress of the war in line with the path of the Hutu refugee 
movements, how visitations of violence onto moving refugee communities were executed 
and the meaning of such a scheme of things on the debate surrounding the central 
concepts of this study, that is, human security, state capacity, post-conflict reconstruction 
and their related concerns. The question was no longer on the continued survival of the 
refugees, their human security, but rather on the survival of the security of the Rwandan 
territory, its inhabitants, and its government.  The tension between human security and 
state security was manifest at this point in the post-conflict phase of Rwanda along the 
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continuum of security policy options. Indeed academic conference resolutions of the 
nature:  A dialogue should be established with the refugees so as to distinguish between 
true refugees and government soldiers. That neighbouring countries should be called 
upon to cooperate in this process. And that greater attention, efforts and resources should 
be devoted to the monitoring of human rights violations;
1086
 could hardly sound 
pragmatic to the Rwandan authorities. Rwanda was determined to ``neutralise`` the Hutu 
refugee warrior threat.
1087
  
But whereas the military strategies and tactics which were adopted by the government of 
Rwanda in its quest for state security served to undermine further the already undermined 
security of the refugees, it served the state security imperative which the government of 
Rwanda quested for. For the Hutu refugees, Congo was never to be a safe haven but 
rather a place for further torment thus defeating the logic of seeking for refugee which 
obtains from the assumption that as refugees flee violence in their home;: a safe haven 
comes with reaching another territory
1088
.  To the Hutu refugees it became continuously, 
if we are to go with the symbolism of the titles of some monographs which have been 
written about the predicament of the Hutu refugees and their quest for a safe place of 
abode, ``From the frying pan into the fire`` and their suffering generally ``unfinished 
business?`` grappling with ``One disaster after another`` from the ``Chaos in the Camps`` 
to the ``Diamonds and the Genocide`` and the quest to ``Surviving the Slaughter`` in the 
midst a replication of ``The Shallow Graves of Rwanda`` in ``The Clones of ``Mr. Kurtz: 
Violence, war and plunder in the DRC``; 
1089
 The policy outcomes were positive to state 
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security, and indeed by the end of 1996, Rwanda had pacified the Eastern Congo border 
as all Hutu refugee camps were destroyed. Approximately between 500000 to 700000 
refugees had returned to Rwanda between 15
th
 and 19
th
 November 1996. However a 
considerable number, approximated at 500000 to 600000,
1090
 made secondary movement 
westwards into Zaire; again under the double   fear of what awaited them on return to 
Rwanda, and the fact that their masters, the Hutu militants, could not let them return. The 
UNHCR reported to have repatriated an additional 234,000 to Rwanda between 
December 1996 to June 1997, and that an additional 52,600 Rwandan refugees had been 
located, by July 1997, in DRC, Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo and 
others in Angola. This left the number of those who were unaccounted standing at 
213,000;
1091
 this seems to contradict, or make assertions indicating that about 600,000 
refugees to have died during the war to appear as mere exaggerations. The refugees who 
made secondary movements, majority of them, remained held hostage by the Hutu 
militants.   
What complicated the predicament of refugees was that even when the militants could no 
longer subject their control onto the refugees as they were overwhelmed by the strength 
of the Rwanda army and its allies; the Rwandan forces, having reached a conclusion that 
those who failed to return to Rwanda in the initial days of the military campaign were 
Hutu militants, violence was indiscriminately unleashed onto the wandering Hutu 
refugees. It was extermination elevated to a level of a military tactic. The violence against 
the Hutu refugees by Rwanda and its allies has been variously described as genocide of a 
special kind, but genocide is a rather legalistic term with international judicial 
connotations. This study reduces the definition of the violence which took place to: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.ioc.sagepub.com/content/30/1/138.; Alex de Waal, Unfinished Business, index on censorship 
1999 28:182, DOI:10.1177/03642209902800610, http://www.iocsagepub.com/content/28/6/182; 
Mwesigwa Baregu, The Clones of ``Mr. Kurtz``: Violence, war and Plunder in the DRC, Afr.J.Polit.sci 
(2002), Vol 7 No.2.; Howard Adelman, Chaos in the Camps, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2002 58:88, 
DOI:10.2968/058006017, http://www.bos.sagepub.com/content/58/6/88. ;Christopher R. Cook, Diamonds 
and Genocide: American, British, and French Press Coverage of the second Congo War, SAGE Open 
2013: DOI:10.1177/2158244013495051, http://www.sgo.sagepub.com/content/3/3/2158244013495051.  
1090
 No source is certain of the exact number of those who returned and those who remained. As an 
operational figure, this chapter bases on the approximations of Kisangani N.F. Emizet, 2000 who used 
ranges of 500000 to 700000 for those who returned, and 500000 to 600000 for those who returned. These 
ranges where reached at after comparing different data sources thus his usage of rounded numbers.  
1091
 UNHCR, Public Information Fact Sheet, July 2, 1997. 
389 
 
Politicide, though Posen teaches us that politicide gives way to genocide.
1092
 This chapter 
refrains from the usage of the term genocide in reference to the carnage of the Hutu 
refugee communities in Eastern Congo basing on the logic of Mahmood Mamdani that 
genocide obtains from the ``politics of naming``: that an authority should decree a 
massive death as genocide and sometimes interests and hegemonic tendencies are at play 
for that is why whereas the carnage in Darfur was quickly declared a Genocide, the 
killings in Iraq despite of the sharp parallels with those in Darfur were not referred to as 
such.
1093
   The reduction of all Hutu refugees to militants subjected their human security 
to the mechanics of state security, for the central approach to guarding state security is 
military.  
A military strategy, however, can sometimes be employed in the quest of conserving 
human security, but in the context of Rwanda, given the fact that refugees were being 
pursued in a ruthless manner, that passes for persecution; human security was literally 
sacrificed at the altar of state security. Rwanda`s military campaign against the Hutu 
refugee phenomenon, which was causing a resurgence of violence was ruthless, 
determined and uncompromising. It was no respecter of the dignity of the bonafide 
refugees. It epitomised the extent to which threats to the state security of a state emerging 
from conflict can make the traditional conceptualisation of security an enduring security 
philosophy, and human security a semblance of a luxury that can wait.   
The pre-occupation of the Rwandan authorities was on the threat the Hutu refugee 
warriors posed to the security of the Rwandan territory and the stability of the RPF led 
government. Within the war master plan of Rwanda in Zaire the Hutu civilian refugees 
were not an important factors in the somewhat algebra of the security architecture which 
the new Rwandan Government envisaged as an outcome of the war. The issue was Hutu 
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refugee warriors. Kagame, during an interview which he had with the Washington Post in 
July 1997, he was categorical of what the core goals of the war were: dismantle the 
camps, destroy the structure of the Hutu army and the militias unit in and around the 
camps, bring the Hutu combatants back to Rwanda and decisively deal with them from 
within or scatter them, and the third objective was to topple Mobutu.
1094
 It should be 
noted that securing the civilian refugees was not part of the choice of words which 
Kagame employed in that interview, but rather ``Hutu combatants`` to be brought to 
Rwanda. So, the Hutu refugee saga was perceived not as a human security phenomenon, 
or at least a human security- cum -state security phenomenon, but rather as a state 
security threat that had to be dealt with using the military; which is the traditional 
guarantor of state security in its very traditional sense.  The method employed as a result 
of the perception of the Hutu refugee phenomenon by the Rwandan state as precisely put 
by Kagame was in sharp contradiction to the promotion and preservation of refugee 
security which is part and parcel of the heuristic definition of Human Security.  
The strategy was the complete military annihilation of the Hutu refugee warriors but it 
culminated into destruction of the Hutu refugee communities for the tactics adopted were 
lethal to the human security of the refugees. These tactics included the following: earth 
scotched policy, sealing off supply lines of humanitarian agencies to refugees, 
indiscriminate shooting, torture, sealing off of escape routes, and massacres.  
At this point the study examines how the military tactics, which were adopted to fulfil the 
strategy of the Government of Rwanda, undermined the human security of the refugees 
and thus a manifestation of the tension between human security and state security at the 
level of security policy implementation. The study indicates that it was Rwanda and its 
allies that carried out the attacks on refugees in the camps as a measure that was aimed at 
dislodging the Hutu militants. It has been variously noted that the witnesses to the 
massacres of the refugees indicated that the leaders of the executioners of the massacres 
were speaking Kinyarwanda, English or Kiswahili an indication of the RPA involvement 
for majority of its top leadership had grown up in Anglo-Uganda and the language of the 
military in Uganda is generally Kiswahili. It was further asserted that the Kinyarwanda 
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speakers among the AFDL forces are said to have been interested in the question: 
``Where are the refugees``,, whenever they met the Congolese natives.
1095
 These attest 
that those who pursued the refugees were either RPA forces or the 
Banyamulenge/Congolese Tutsis. This was cross examined during the focused group 
discussion which the researcher had with four Hutu ``migrants`` in Uganda, Sitabaale, 
Nangabo,  Wakiso, District who used their family ties in Tanzania to escape the carnage 
in Zaire during the 1996/1997 war, but later to continue to Uganda when Tanzania 
expelled most of them between 1996 and 1997. They volunteered holding a discussion 
with the researcher on the request of the Local Council Chairman of the area who had 
found for them work on farms. Responding to the question: Who was killing the Hutu 
refugees? One retorted: ``The Tutsi``.  Another added, albeit grinning inanely: ``they 
resembled you (the researcher) ``-- in reference to his relatively brown colour and angular 
physical features that are similar to those of the Tutsi who came from Uganda).
1096
 This 
pointed to the logic that to some Hutu refugees who escaped the carnage in Zaire, the 
Tutsi were culpable of the violence that was unleashed onto the refugees. Refugees were 
the central target of the ADFL forces as outlined by one particular incidence: that when 
the forces arrived in Mbandaka Zaire they demanded a resident to shout in Lingala, the 
native language of the Congolese people in that area, ordering them to literally take cover 
on the ground, those who never understood the instructions, majority of them refugees in 
the crowd, remained standing and they were ``shelled`` with bullets.
1097
 Indeed it is at 
Mbandaka that ADFL soldiers indicated that their chief mission was to annihilate 
refugees than to overthrow Mobutu.
1098
  This and other incidences which have been ably 
delineated in several publications serve to show the callousness with which the refugees 
were killed. 
1099
 
The location map of the focus group discussion is as follows: 
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Map 6: Map of Uganda  indicating the location Sitabaale Village, Nangabo, Wakiso District of 
Uganda (focus group, study area). 
 
The military of Rwanda together with its functionaries within the ranks of the rebels who 
were fighting Mobutu employed the tactic of earth scotched policy. Briefly, the earth 
scotched policy is a term used to refer to a situation where military forces employ 
bushing burning/or the burning of the overgrowth as a way of clearing land of the natural 
habitats of rebels like overgrown forests. This becomes indiscriminate burning of a 
special kind as the fire is lit without consideration to presence of human inhabitants, and 
wildlife. Rwanda and its allies applied the tactic on refugee camps.   The measure was 
also aimed at destroying refugee camps in a robust manner so that refugees are denied a 
place of abode thus prompting then to return. But the attacks on camps were more than 
bush-burning; but rather camps were bombarded without regard to the lives of the 
civilian refugees who had been held hostage by the Hutu militants. Instructive of this was 
the Kibumba refugee camps in North Kivu which was attacked using mortars and heavy 
393 
 
machine guns.
1100
 The Kibumba camp is said to have been shelled for one week in late 
October 1996; sending the camps residents into disarray.
1101
 At the end of October, 
Mugunga camp in Goma area was heavily shelled leading to the death of civilian 
refugees and armed Hutu militias since the camp was the most populated and the most 
militarised with several Hutu militia elements.
1102
This passes for a semblance of a 
scotched earth for the mortars landed onto the refugees` places of abode, burning the 
encampments and forcing the refugees to free. A camp hospital in Kibumba camp was 
burnt and more than 200,000 refugees fled Northwards in the direction of Goma. It was 
reported that the attacks were executed by the 7
th
 Battalion of the Tutsi-led Rwandan 
army that had crossed into Zaire on Saturday 26 1996.
1103
  
The sealing off of the supply lines of humanitarian agencies to refugees was also adopted 
as a measure of denying refugees food and other necessities of life like medicine. This 
was geared towards prompting them to return to Rwanda. But the Human Rights Watch 
noted that the act of blocking humanitarian assistance was full of vengeance as a result of 
the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda.
1104
 This move was also seen as a way of denying the 
refugee warriors food supplies which they were misappropriating from the refugee camps 
to feed the belligerents. The food supplies were also used by the refugee warriors as a 
way of controlling the refugees. Accordingly, the Rwanda Patriotic Army and its 
Congolese armed allies blocked roads that were leading to the camps and the areas where 
the refugees had relocated during their secondary movement in escape of the violence 
which was unleashed onto the camps by Rwanda and its allies. The measure of blocking 
access to refugee locations was further adopted to conceal the killing and torture of the 
refugees from the humanitarian agencies workers, and this subsequently denied the 
refugees humanitarian supplies that would have ensured their continued survival.  
The tactic of denying humanitarian agencies access to refugee locations resulted into the 
starvation of the refugees who engaged in secondary movement.  For instance during the 
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Bukavu attacks on camps, the area was restricted to humanitarian agencies.
1105
 Ubundu 
was declared a no-go area to humanitarian agencies and they were  denied access to 
Goma by November, 1996- Amnesty International reported on 23
rd
 April 1997 that 
approximately 80,000 refugees had made several encampments in the South of the city of 
Kisangani, the Capital of the Haut-Zaire region were grappling with disease, starvation 
and exhaustion.
1106
   South Kisangani starting with Biaro and later Kasese were declared 
closed to humanitarian agencies in April 1997 and in Bukavu access was limited to an 
area of a radius of 30km. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutrous-Ghali is 
said to have referred to the situation as ``genocide of the Hutu by starvation`` and Kofi 
Annan is said to have reiterated after six months that: `` ….The killing (of Hutu refugees) 
(was) done by hunger``.
1107
 The UN Investigative team report noted that the refugees 
from the Bukavu camps who had converged at Hombo grappled with lack of food, water 
or shelter and because of sanitary inadequacies, mortality ranged from 480 to 960 deaths 
per day.
1108
 Majority of them had fled from Eastern Congo in ``Escape of Violence`` if 
we are to use to language of Zolberg.  
Also as part of the scheme to ensure that humanitarian assistance does not reach the 
refugees, the AFDL adopted the strategy of sabotaging of humanitarian agencies` 
activities. For instance in the AFDL controlled areas, the AFDL soldiers stopped proving 
security to humanitarian agencies` workers, and this subsequently led to the looting of 
humanitarian supplies by mostly Zairian civilians; as AFDL forces looked on. At a 
singled out incidence, on 18
th
 April 1997, in a move which is said to have been aimed at 
sabotaging the humanitarian work of the UNCHR, 60,000 litres of fuel reserves were 
siphoned by the AFDL in Goma town, and on the same day 120 tons of humanitarian 
supplies being transported to camps was looted under the watch of the AFDL. More 
looting of humanitarian supplies was reported at Kasese, and at one incidence the AFDL 
is reported to have threatened to close the Kisangani airport to humanitarian traffic.   This 
concomitantly undermined the survival of refugees; more so that of the vulnerable groups 
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like: children, women, the elderly and the sick. Survival is synonymous with human 
security, and therefore, by aggravating the food insecurity of the refugees; state security 
was standing in sharp contrast to the agenda of human security. During the focused group 
discussion which the researcher held with the Hutu refugees in Wakiso Uganda; when 
asked the problems which they experienced during what they referred to as the ``Great 
War in Congo``, one stood up, and with watery eyes he narrated their ordeal said: 
“We were starving. Nobody was helping us with food. We were left for the dead 
and animals to eat us. We were deeply in fear. The Tutsi boys were hunting us 
down.”1109  
The choice of words ``deeply in fear`` points to the definition of human security and that 
``nobody was helping us…`` indicates that even the ``Ambulance chasers``, the 
humanitarian agencies were not present to provide for the refugees and that ``Tutsi boys 
were hunting us down``, indicates the wanton nature of the killings of refugees which 
Rwandan forces executed in Zaire. Accordingly, Human security was under attack from 
the quest for state security. 
Mention should also be made that the Rwanda Patriotic Army used human needs as a 
tactic to ensnare the escaping refugees into violent deaths, and  it should be remembered, 
it is a central contention of this study that human needs guarantee human security. Note 
that some of the refugees who made secondary movements found safe havens into the 
dark forests of the Congo. To get them out of their hiding the Rwandan forces together 
with allies made announcements calling on refugees to get out of their hiding so that they 
could access humanitarian supplies particularly food.
1110
 At times humanitarian agencies 
would be given permission to locate the whereabouts of the refugees and after identifying 
the location, the allied forces would then deny the humanitarian agencies access to the 
refugee areas identified. Often those who got out of their hiding as a result of the 
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encouragement of the humanitarian workers were massacred.
1111
 This strategy was 
referred to as ``bait and kill``.
1112
 Instructive of the massacres of this nature is when the 
AFDL rebels disguised themselves as Red Cross workers, wearing red arm bands they 
called the refugees out of the Mbandaka forest so that they can receive humanitarian 
assistance, those who heeded to the call were massacred. Again near Mbandaka, when 
humanitarian workers encouraged a group of 30 refugees who were hiding in Wendji 
forest to come out for assistance, AFDL soldiers who were travelling on a truck 
massacred them.
1113
 Sometimes the forces hoodwinked humanitarian agency workers to 
volunteer information on whereabouts of refugees so that they could be offered 
protection, but only to indiscriminately unleash violence onto the refugees.
1114
 The 
general practice however was that the AFDL always literally planted intelligence officers 
into the ranks of the humanitarian agencies. The intelligence officers would be disguised 
as facilitators of the activities of the humanitarian agencies. The intelligence officers 
would inform the AFDL, whenever they eavesdropped the briefs, of the humanitarian 
agencies about the whereabouts of refugees.
1115
  It is reported that it is Mare Kazindu a 
``facilitator`` that is said to have facilitated the massacre of refugees along the axes of 
Bukavu-Walikale, Bukavu-Kalonge and Bukavu-Shabunda. This tactic is said to have 
prompted the UNHCR to suspend the location of refugees in their hiding.
1116
  
Noteworthy is that indiscriminate shooting was also another military tactic which was 
employed by the RPA and its allies to thwart the Hutu refugee warrior phenomenon in 
Zaire. This tactic sometimes culminated into massacres of even the bonafide refugees.. 
This was a  the Rwandan military together with its Congolese allies could not easily 
decipher the refugee warriors from the bonafide ones, and a clear strategy was not 
devised to separate the bonafide from the refugee warriors. Camps were indiscriminately 
hit by artillery like heavy bombs leading to several bonafide refugee causalities. For 
instance, on Sunday 14
th
 October 1996, Runingo refugee camp which was located about 
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20 kilometres from Uvira town was shelled with mortars and automatic rifles without due 
consideration to the civilian refugees who were resident there.
1117
 In Mugunga camps, 
unarmed refugees were captured and killed, and this was not an unusual happening in the 
camps of North and South Kivu which were attacked between October and November 
1996.
1118
   
Also the camps which were set in the interior of Zaire as reception centres for the Hutu 
refugees who were fleeing the violence in the North and South Kivu regions were also 
attacked in an indiscriminative manner.  Attacks on the Amis, Tingi Tingi, Kasese and 
Obilio camps, which had hosted many refugees who had made secondary movements, 
were not uncommon. These attacks which took place between December, 1996 to May, 
1997; were punctuated with lethal attacks by the AFDL troops on unarmed civilian 
refugees. In the South and North Kivu hospitals were not spared from the attacks as 
depicted by the manner in which Lwiro hospital in South Kivu was attacked by the 
AFDL; taking way Hutu minors and their caretakers and subjected them to torture.
1119
 
Amnesty International, was informed by the Hutu refugees who managed to escape to 
Tanzania,  that in South-Kivu camps, which hosted about 200,000 refugees, the AFDL in 
an attempt to dismantle the camps, adopted the mechanism of ``indiscriminate violence``, 
leading to the death of many civilian refugees. The tactic seemed to have worked from 
the Rwandan Government for in North-Kivu, the repatriation of the around 500,000 
refugees in mid-November, 1996; was partly a result of the indiscriminate attacks on 
camps. It is reported that from mid-October onwards, the refugee camps of Kagunga, 
Runingo, Kibigoya and Luberezi were attacked by the AFDL. Kagunga was heavily 
shelled on 18
th
 October, 1996, then Runingo and Luberezi on 20-21 October. It is 
observed that the ``shelling`` of the camps was done even in instances where the Hutu 
militants had already escaped.
1120
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Indeed the attack on 2000 refugees around Boende is reported to have been done when 
the Hutu militants had already left.
1121
 Also the fact that the attack on camps were mostly 
executed at night serve to show how highly improbable it was to avoid the civilian 
refugee causalities. To Amnesty International, the attacks on camps, where no attempt 
was made to ensure the principle of distinguishing Hutu militias and the Hutu civilian 
refuges, was equal to a violation of the International Humanitarian Law.
1122
 What is 
particularly intriguing is that even the refugees who expressed interest in returning to 
Rwanda, although after the massive return of the around 500000-700000 refugees, were 
often massacred; particularly the men. Instructive of this is when refugees moved near 
Chimanga camp in anticipation that they were to access repatriation to Rwanda, but only 
to be attacked. The men were separated from women and children, and the latter 
massacred, either on or around 18 November 1996. A massacre which was executed in 
the same design also took place at an area near the Bilongo camp, and this took place 
after the former Rwandan army soldiers and the militias had left the camp.
1123
  
This seems to justify the logic of the attack on camps; meant to disable the Hutu warrior 
communities by denying them recruitment ground, and targeting the men was meant to 
deny the former Hutu armed elements potential combatants.
1124
 The Human Rights 
Watch observed that majority of the refugees who returned to Rwanda were women and 
children, and that they reported how men and boys had been taken away by the AFDL 
forces. It reported that whereas the killings were initially very selective, targeting only 
the former Rwandan army soldiers, former Rwandan government officials, Hutu militias, 
the Hutu intellectuals and young men, later the logic changed as refugees who moved 
west wards were killed indiscriminately.
1125
 Kisangani, quoting Boyer 1997:7, article 
titled: ``Rebels’’, provides vivid account of how male refugees were persecuted. It goes 
as follows:  
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They (Tutsi soldiers) separated the little boys from the girls…. And they started killing 
the boys. First they shot them, and then they cut them in half so that… if they come back 
to life they wouldn`t be able to escape
1126
 
So, Rwanda`s quest for state security was done at a heavy human security costs.  This 
study however does not extend it scope into the analysis of the extent to which 
International Humanitarian Law was abused, but rather to underscore how the quest for 
Rwanda and its Congolese allies to dismantle camps and annihilate the Hutu refugee 
warriors; as a measure which was aimed at ensuring the national security of Rwanda, 
ended up undermining the human security of the majority civilian Hutu refugees. It is this 
saga that shows the contradiction between human security and state security along the 
continuum of security policy options in the context of post-conflict reconstruction 
situations.  
The tactic of indiscriminate killings became a military imperative which was 
operationalised throughout the first Congo war, which was led by the Rwandan forces. 
Indeed, all refugees that made secondary movements were at the risk of being attacked by 
the Rwandan Government forces and its allies. This obtained from the absurd conclusion 
by the Rwanda; that all refugees who had failed, or refused to return to Rwanda were 
generally militants who had to be dealt with.  
Accordingly, several massacres took place along the paths of the secondary movements 
of refugees. Instructive of these massacres are those which took place along the Bukavu-
Shabunda axis in South-Kivu. Amnesty International reported of skeletons found along 
the Kingulubu-Shabunda road, a mass grave disguised as a site for construction behind a 
house in Mpwe a place that is around 12 kilometres from Shabunda, the 20 refugees 
killed in Tingi Tingi area, a mass grave in North of Katchungu along the road leading to 
Lulingu, twelve mass graves in Kivu at Langue-Langue  which is approximately 130 
kilometres west of Kingulabe, the 1-3 March massacres in Tingi Tingi camps of the sick 
and the old who failed to leave the camps with those refugees who fled on 28 February 
1996 before the camps were occupied by the AFDL on 1
st
 March, the massacres of 500 
Rwandese refugees by the AFDL in late April and early May 1997 at Kirundu near 
                                                          
1126
 Kisangani, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo 2000, citing Boyer, 1997, 7. 
400 
 
Mukoto monastery in Masisi District with a helicopter allegedly from Rwanda supplying 
the combatants, the famous Mbandaka massacres which took place on 13
th
 May 1997 at 
Mbandaka; which is the Capital of the North Western DRC Equateur province sitting on 
the bank of the Congo River where it is reported that approximately 800 refugees were 
massacred.  
It is reported that at the site of the Mbandaka famous massacre, forensic evidence was 
quickly removed as clean up exercise so that the UN Investigative team which was meant 
to unravel the evidence of the massacres would not find any.
1127
 Indeed, apart from 
sustaining the narrative of Amnesty International on how the refugees who made 
secondary movement were attacked violently leading to the death of many, the report of 
the UN Investigative team particularly illustrates how even those who made movements 
from South to North Kivu in the wake of the violence which started in Uvira were 
persecuted along the way. It is noted that 435 were killed in a banana plantation in 
Luvubu, 334 who were fleeing Kanganiro camp were killed at Ruzizi river, 851 persons 
from Lubarika were killed in the nearby Coffee and banana plantations, 648 
persons(locals and refugees) were killed at Kamanyola and 155 refugees were killed at 
Rwenema.
1128
  
Still on the treatment of how the survival of those who made secondary movement 
westwards was threatened, it was reported that 2000 refugees around Boende areas were 
massacred, and the massacre of 2,500 refugees who had boarded a boat to cross to the 
Congo Republic and those who were still waiting to board were shelled at, and some 
decided to throw themselves in water and drowned.
1129
  Also between 28 and 30 October, 
1996, 300 of  the refugees who were fleeing Uvira en route to Tanzania  were killed at 
the village of Mboko, and among these were arms wielding ``combatants``. 150 of the 
300 died on a boat which was sunk by the ``Banyamulenge``
1130
 militants.
1131
 These 
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massacres suffice to indicate the extent to which the human security of refugees was 
greatly undermined by the AFDL with the Rwandan forces at the helm in the quest of 
ending the Hutu refugee warrior phenomenon that had seen and continued to threaten a 
resurgence of violence in Rwanda. The movement of refugees westwards was punctuated 
with several massacres at several junctions and the following map illustrates that the 
logic of the movement of the troops of the AFDL was informed by the logic of the 
secondary movement of the refugees.  
Adopted Map 7: Secondary movements of the Hutu Refugees during the First 
Congo War (1996-1997) 
 
Accordingly, from the map, massacres occurred at the Shabunda junction leading refugee 
movements into further south as indicated by the map arrows facing in the south of 
Congo; where some refugees ended up escaping into Angola and others into Zambia 
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through Lubumbashi city. But those who decided to branch from Kananga-Kasai junction 
to Kwikwit in Bandundu and to Kapanga were massacred.  Massacres also occurred at 
Tingi-Tingi-Ubundu-Junction in the direction of those who were moving towards the 
direction of Central African Republic. Majority of those who continued towards the 
direction of Gabon and Cameroon were killed at different points: Ubundu, Boende and 
Mbambaka. Survival could only be guaranteed by reaching a third country; that is to say: 
Zambia, Angola, Central African Republic, Gabon, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo 
(Congo Brazzaville). This means that if the objective of the war was to ensure a decisive 
end to the Hutu refugee threat to the security of Rwanda, that objective was pursued to its 
logical conclusion. 
1132
 
Also, torture as a way of forcing the civilian refugee to return to Rwanda, served to 
undermine the personal security of refugees. The rationale was to make the conditions in 
the Congo unfavourable in order to prompt the return of refugees to Rwanda. Some were 
buried alive, others were tortured to death and others burnt alive. Painful deaths like 
throwing the refugees into rivers and lakes, and sometimes amputating parts of their 
bodies using machetes were not uncommon. The reportage of a woman who was burnt by 
the AFDL with her child on the back suffice to show the extent of the trauma that 
refugees went through in the ``Escape of Violence``. 
1133
 The refugees endured walking 
long distances as humanitarian agencies were not allowed to trace and later transport 
them to their final destination. It is reported that: 11,000 Rwandan refugees  reached the 
Republic of Congo after several months of trekking, 19,000 reached Angola, 15,00 
arrived in Central African Republic, but while tired and frightened.
1134
 
Equally callous was that sometimes announcements would be made calling on those who 
wanted to return to assemble, but only for the armed forces to open fire onto them. The 
tactics which were used by the genocidaires in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide were 
revisited onto the Hutu refugees by the Rwandan forces. Ironically the Rwanda force 
comprised majorly of the Tutsi and their key allies in the Congo were the Banyamulenge 
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people, who were also of Tutsi Rwandan decency. This point to the validity of the 
allegation that Rwanda`s incursions into Zaire were a vengeance scheme against the Hutu 
for the genocide of 1994.  
 The tactics which were employed by Rwanda and its allies with the strategy of thwarting 
the Hutu refugee warrior phenomenon in Zaire  yielded tangible for Rwanda`s state 
security  but negative results for human security  as the survival of the bonafide refugees 
was undermined for many died and many were forcefully returned to Rwanda. The 
bonafide refugees witnessed and indeed suffered a reign of terror, unleashed onto them 
by the Rwandan forces and the Congolese rebels. The persecution was overwhelming that 
some decided to engage in mass suicide as a way of avoiding painful deaths through 
massacres. 
1135
But was this reign of terror a matter of policy or just the sheer 
foolhardiness of the trigger-happy and coldblooded young men within the rank of the 
RPA? The extent and the manner in which torture and deaths were executed point to 
systematic planning and execution of a war that undermined human security. This study 
is on human security, and it goes without saying that by pursuing a campaign that directly 
undermined the survival of refugees, Rwanda in its quest of state security undermined 
human security. 
What undermined the human security of the Hutu refugees the more was the sealing -off 
of the escape routes by the Rwandan military and its allies as a way of numbing the 
refugee warriors who could not easily be identified from the civilian refugees. As such 
roadblocks where mounted along the escape routes which the refugees where using in the 
quest for another safe haven. Attacking of refugees after closing the roadblocks as a tactic 
was adopted to hoodwink the international humanitarian agencies that were sometimes 
following the refugees to a safer encampment. Refugees returning to Rwanda were 
subjected to arduous security checks; yet they were already tired and hungry. This led to 
death and those who survived were destined to a life of desolation in the concentration 
camps which were created in Rwanda as reception centres for returnees.
1136
 They had to 
grapple with improvidence of human needs which guarantee human security; particularly 
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food. Many returnees ended up escaping from Rwanda again in the quest of a safe haven. 
Some entered Uganda.  The survival of the Hutu refugees was being sacrificed for the 
security of the Rwandan state. The new Government in Rwanda had to resolutely solve 
the Hutu refugee crisis that had seen a resurgence of violence. The military approach to 
security policy was aggressively pursued.  
So, the Hutu refugees suffered a somewhat three-pronged set of human security related 
concerns, as they were first uprooted from Rwanda in fear of revenge killings; second the 
threats to their survival which they had to grapple with in their refuge in Congo, and third 
the suffering they had to endure as a result of the incursions of the Rwanda military 
together with its Congo and Ugandan allies onto the refugee camps. The persecution was 
overwhelming and it depicted the extent to which the quest for state security can conflict 
with preservation of human security during post conflict reconstruction situations.  When 
the need to thwarting a resurgence of violence by the post-conflict government becomes 
urgent, human security concerns become secondary.    
In conclusion, pejoratively speaking, it emerges from the Rwandan reviewed experience 
that either because of sheer naive simplicity of the policy makers or as a result of limited 
policy options for the policy makers, owing to circumstances, they make and undertake to 
implement policies that are either more inclined to either human or state security during 
post-conflict reconstruction process, a situation that might lead to a somewhat 
``boomerang effect``. This implies that whereas the ``security dialectic`` obtained at the 
causative level of violence during Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction episode; when it 
came to choosing among the security policy options to address the resurgence of 
violence, a ``boomerang effect`` was manifest. But it is Chapter five (5) which brings to 
bare the supporting answers to the ``boomerang effect`` phenomenon that was manifest 
during Rwanda`s Post-Conflict reconstruction experience.  
 
Accordingly, basing on the content of Chapter three (3) and Chapter five (5), the chapters 
are informative to the extent to which they bring to bear the imperativeness of both 
human security and state security as pillars of a polity`s security policy in post-conflict 
situations. Policy makers and even theorists in the security sector of particularly the 
generally conflictual Great Lakes Region where the case of this study, Rwanda lies; 
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ought be cognizant of the inevitability of a resurgence of violence after conflict as a result 
of  the refugee phenomenon;  aware that most if not all conflicts generate refugee 
situations. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This study is about Human-Security, state capacity and post-conflict reconstruction 
within the context of Rwanda during the period, 1994-2005, and it sought to understand 
how the development in the state-capacity of Rwanda during post-conflict reconstruction 
did serve to address the  human security related issues which threatened a resurgence of 
violence during the period in review.  Three specific questions were adopted to unravel 
the detailed concerns of the study and they are as follows: How did human security 
concerns historically structure violence during the genocide and did the weaknesses in 
state-capacity aggravate the situation? How did human security concerns threaten a 
resurgence of the structure of violence during post-conflict reconstruction, and how did 
they also serve to undermine state-security? What was the nature of Rwanda`s 
development in state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction? How did the 
development in Rwanda’s state capacity during post-conflict reconstruction serve to 
address the human security concerns that threatened and subsequently led to the 
resurgence of violence? 
 
Accordingly, in light of the major and specific questions that oriented this study, four 
questions are adopted at this point to complement, in terms guiding the of logic of the 
conclusions, the major and specific questions of this study; to guide the major 
conclusions of this study. They are as follows: What does this study teach us about 
Rwanda`s post-conflict reconstruction period and the narratives about Rwanda? What is 
the meaning of the Rwandan post-conflict reconstruction experience in light of the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of human security and state capacity during 
post-conflict reconstruction situations punctuated with a resurgence of violence? What is 
the meaning of this study in light of the application of social science research methods in 
post conflict reconstruction research? What is the meaning of this study in light of 
security policy thinking, making and implementation during post-conflict reconstruction 
situations punctuated with a resurgence of violence? 
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The afore-mentioned questions depict the four major elements to PhD form as delineated 
by Estelle M.Phillips and Derek S. Pugh.
1137
The elements are as follows: Background 
theory, focal theory, data theory and contribution, and these four elements oriented the 
narrative form of this study. 
First, as regards question one of the specific questions of the study, and question one of  
the complementary questions, from the examination of the histories about Rwanda, 
particularly those narratives that analyse the Rwandan genocide in light of the general 
historicity about Rwanda, it emerges that a considerable measure of the surveyed 
narratives about Rwanda are replete with emotional fallacies. Betty Mattix Dietsch 
discusses eight emotional fallacies that undermine the path to objectivity by researchers. 
They include: argumentum adhominem/straw man, bandwagon, plain fork appeal (ad 
populum), status appeal, scare tactics, testimonial, improper appeal to authority, and 
glittering generality.
1138
 
Accordingly, where the genocide and its outcome appeals to emotions, objectivity is 
either consciously or inadvertently compromised even in the writing of seasoned 
academicians. Without delving into details, this study has variously outlined bits of 
information that beg questions.  
On the second and third question of the specific questions of the study and question two 
of the complementary questions adopted to further guide the logic of the conclusions of 
this study, in detail, the study has presented off-putting evidence to the generalisation 
that: it was strength in the capacity of the Rwandan state that structured the genocide in 
Rwanda. It has succinctly emerged that improvidence of the critical human needs which 
to this study guarantee human security, the survival of the individual(s), and the 
subsequent manipulation of the ``want`` for the human needs by the political demagogues 
(both the antagonists and protagonists) have been part of the historical structure of 
violence in Rwanda. The government as the chief agency of the state ought to be at the 
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vanguard of the providence of human needs to the individual(s). Improvidence on the 
side of government depicts a lapse in the functionality of the state and it is a 
manifestation of low levels of state capacity. The genocide regime in Rwanda 
successfully manipulated the improvidence of human needs to mobilise the Hutus into 
group violence against the Tutsi and Hutu moderates. The conclusion has generally been 
that successful mobilisation of the Hutus into the systematic decimation of majorly the 
Tutsi; was strength in the capacity of the Rwandan government, but this study teaches us 
that such a conclusion ought not to be taken as a given in light of evidence to the effect 
that the historical structure of violent conflict in Rwanda depicted the extent to which 
improvidence of the critical human needs on the side of the authorities contribute to the 
structure of violence in a conflictual society. 
Also an addendum has been empirically made to the application of the human needs 
approach to the analysis of the Rwanda experience. From the evidence about Rwanda, it 
emerges that it is not the absence of all human needs that lead to violence, but rather the 
absence and the manipulation of those that are critical to the survival of individual(s) 
within a given society by the political demagogues. A review of histories and the survey 
of literature about Rwanda revealed that issues of land and the enduring refugee problem 
have been central to the structure of violence in Rwanda. It is this system of things that 
makes human security an appropriate addendum to the theorisation about human needs as 
part of the causative equation of conflict.  
The emerging human needs-human security dialectical approach to conflict analysis does 
not negate the important effect of   other intervening factors in the structure of violence. 
But much as they ought to be factored in the analysis of conflict, conceptual density on 
the particularities of the causative structure of violence require an empirical unit based 
inquiry (unit analysis) of the particular concepts that guide the area that is; conflict 
research, and how the concepts and the various levels of theorisation contradict and 
complement each other in the endeavour, that is, explaining and understanding our 
conflict earth.  Neither the contradictions nor the complementariness ought to be 
canonised. It is constantly problematisation of the concepts and theories that orient 
conflict research; in different conflict situations that will allow a deep understanding of 
the particular understanding of the instances where either contradictions or 
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complementarities obtain and the implication on policy making aimed at thwarting 
violent conflict.  
As such, it is a major recommendation of this study that the human needs-human security 
dialectical approach to conflict analysis be replicated in the context of other conflict areas 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the: South Sudan, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and  the conflict zones of West Africa. 
Related to all the specific questions of the study and to question one of the 
complementary questions and  complementary question three ; that partly orients the 
logic of this study, it is a major epistemological recommendation of this study that  more 
studies ought to problematise the conclusions made about the Rwandan genocide 
experience as a research agenda aimed at a detailed understanding of the emotional 
fallacies in conflict research and how they undermine the path to objectivity in conflict 
research and it outcomes. Indeed in light of this recommendation it ought to be outlined 
that epistemologically speaking this study had to adopt the logic of triangulation, 
particularly the logic of data triangulation and methodological triangulation, in order to 
attain a semblance of validity test of its sources of evidence. This means that the nature of 
conflict research require an understanding of the various techniques of social science 
inquiry for a research cannot easily tell, before an inquiry and even when a pilot study 
was done, the validity of the sources of evidence that will facilitate conceptual and 
empirical  density.   
On the third question of the specific questions and the fourth question of the 
complementary questions which further guide the logic of the conclusions, but obtaining 
from the logic of question two of the complementary questions; in specific details, the 
Rwandan experience with post-conflict reconstruction reveal the following about human 
security and state capacity: 
On human security and the debate surrounding the concept and its operationalisation, the 
Rwandan experience brings to bear the possibility of the appropriateness of the concept 
in explaining and understanding the structure of violence during and after conflict 
(resurgence of violence). The resurgence of violence in Rwanda particularly obtained 
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from the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo, and indeed refugee situations are 
perceived as human insecurity situations. 
However, much as refugee situations have been generally reduced to human insecurity 
situations, this study particularly highlights how refugees as agents of conflict help to 
clarify on the alleged conceptual conflict between human security and state security. The 
study using evidence from Rwanda empirically sustains the ``security-dialectics`` a 
somewhat ``communicative zone`` between the two security areas.  
The communication is at the causative of violence as the threats to the two security areas, 
human and state security reinforce each other to lead to a resurgence of violence in post-
conflict situations. The communication is facilitated by the manipulation of the human 
needs of refugees that are critical to their survival, which is human security in specific 
sense. 
The communication does not however obtain well at the security policy making and 
implementation level during post conflict reconstruction situations punctuated with a 
convergence of threats to human and state security. Prioritisation becomes problematic 
even among international actors. In the context of Rwanda, to the international actors, the 
challenge was to undo the convergence of the threats, symbolised by the quest to separate 
refugee warriors from the bonafide refugees. The course of policy action to be taken was 
hard to fathom. The separation would have allayed the military security threat which the 
refugee warriors posed to the Rwandan state.  
Progress was not made on the separation of refugees, and to the Rwandan state, survival 
was primary and the human security of the bonafide Hutu refugees were inconsequential 
and the primary concern of Rwanda`s security policy was the annihilation of the refugee 
warriors. Even the bonafide refugees were perceived to be part of the existential threats 
as the warriors were recruiting from that group.  
So, to the new government in Rwanda, the appropriate security policy option to 
addressing the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo was generally militaristic. 
This lead to a ``boomerang effect`` as in the quest for state security, the survival of the 
bonafide Hutu refugees was further undermined. This system of things implies that if at 
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the causative level of violent conflict the convergence of threats to human security and 
state security can be undone, then, at the policy level, addressing the threats to state 
security may not necessarily conflict with human security concerns. This hypothesis 
ought to be further investigated by research that will replicate the concerns of this study.  
On state capacity, from the Rwandan post-conflict reconstruction, coherent evidence is 
adduced to the effect that weaknesses in state capacity, which to this study is precisely 
taken to be the ability of the state to plan and execute its functions particularly the 
providence of the critical human needs to the survival of individual(s), complement the 
political objectives, particularly the quest for political power by the political demagogues 
who exploit the needs of the masses which are critical to their survival. Political 
demagogues in Rwanda exploited the critical human needs of Rwandan`s to repudiate the 
Tutsi led war against the Habyarimana led Hutu government as a war which was against 
the survival of the majority Hutu. The historical animosity between the Hutus and the 
Tutsis was as literally fuelled by the state/government; that was weak in providing for its 
people. But for the chicanery of the Hutu politicians, the Hutu masses were cogently 
coalesced into the violence which culminated into the genocide of 1994. 
Accordingly, the complicity of the masses in the genocide violence was as a result of the 
remarkable confluence of their thoughts with the propaganda of the Hutu political elite 
who were connoisseurs as far as manipulating ``want`` to inculcate ``fear`` in the minds 
of the Hutu masses. However, to pass the ability to manipulate improvidence by the 
agency which was supposed to provide as a strength for the then Rwandan government is 
to remonstrate against human security and a recipe for ``conflict continuous`` situations.  
Indeed, we learn from Rwanda`s experience that group violence was a corollary of 
improvidence of critical human needs on the side of the government and the calculated 
manipulation of that improvidence by the Hutu political elites. We also understand the 
debilitating effects of violent conflict on state capacity. The conflict which culminated 
into the genocide in Rwanda undermined Rwanda`s state capacity. The post-genocide 
government as such had to embark on the rather daunting task of reconstructing the state 
in Rwanda, and it is the Rwandan experience that provides an empirical case for the 
imperativeness of forging government institutions as an antecedent to the 
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operationalisation of a liberal agenda as a somewhat axiomatic framework recommended 
by the international democratic doctrinaires to countries emerging from violent conflicts. 
This scheme of things points to the need for a somewhat democratic-dialectical academic 
and policy discussion on not only democratic practices to be executed during post-
conflict reconstruction situations of a given state(s), but also the enabling 
government/state institutions critical to democratic development as part of the post-
conflict reconstruction agenda.  
Granted are the merits of democracy as a system of governance, and indeed dismissing its 
salutary effect would be like, if we may appropriate the words of the essayist, Arthur 
Koestler, in his essay: ´´Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917-1949``: ``…the classic 
argument of ruthless totalitarianism against the claims of humanity.`` But the rather  
forcible imposition of liberal political practices on countries emerging from violent 
conflicts can only make the post-conflict political elites of a given country either 
recalcitrant of international norms or become pretenders at liberal practices; that is 
adopting liberal practices for the purpose of gaining access to conditioned foreign aid for 
reconstruction.  
In light of that, the new government in Rwanda was cognizant of the salutary effect 
which aid would have had on its capacity to function, but it was cynical of any attempt 
that would have guaranteed the political involvement of particularly the members of the 
genocide regime in the functioning of the new government. But the liberal inclined 
government which the donors envisaged had to be inclusive. The outcome was pretence 
at the inclusion of the Hutu as many later resigned their positions as the Tutsi led 
government was impervious to the discursive requirement of democracy. Hutu politicians 
in the post-genocide government felt continuously beleaguered leading to flight than 
fight. 
It should be particularly outlined that the fear of the Tutsi led government in 
democratising accrued to the dearth of strong functioning government institutions that 
would have guaranteed regime security and state security in the midst of the Hutu refugee 
warrior military threat in Eastern Congo. 
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However, as the new government was resisting the politics of inclusion as a pillar of 
democracy as the political strand of liberal peace, it assiduously operationalised the 
liberalisation of its economic operations. This was a result of the direct benefits that 
liberalised economic practices provide to emerging countries. 
In the interim, the new government`s pretence at the politics of inclusion and observance 
of human rights, coupled with its assiduous efforts in operationalising the liberal 
economic agenda, guaranteed its access to foreign assistance. The foreign assistance was 
particularly inclined to institution building, yet, the conditionality before access to 
foreign assistance was on democratic practices like the observance of human rights. But 
observe human rights with what? 
Indeed, the more gains Rwanda registered in terms of state-capacity, owing to the 
increase in foreign assistance, the more it ascended, albeit cautiously, towards the 
operationalisation of the political liberal agenda of which the adoption of the Rwandan 
Constitution of 2003 is exemplar. As government institutions became functional, the 
confidence of the new government became manifest that it even resolved to forcefully 
ensure the return of the Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo. Hitherto, to the new government 
in Rwanda, it was judicious to have the rather belligerent refugees in Zaire (Congo DRC) 
than in Rwanda. Much as the outcome of the policy course of action taken by the 
Rwandan government, it goes without saying that gains in state capacity, depicted in the 
increased functioning of the institutions of governance in Rwanda, saw the new 
government in Rwanda gaining confidence in adopting democratic practices, though not 
at the fullest.  
Inference can therefore be made from the Rwandan experience that during post-conflict 
reconstruction the governance debate ought not to be on whether to liberalise before 
institutionalisation, but rather on the institutions to nurture for the liberal agenda to 
blossom. 
Also the Rwandan reconstruction experience teaches that whereas aid is sacrosanct in 
kick-starting the functionality of the institutions for state capacity, in the long run of the 
post-conflict state, the focus ought to shift to measures aimed at improving GDP and the 
trade balance deficit of the emerging post-conflict state. It is this system of things that 
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makes liberal economics a practice paramount in the reconstruction of a conflict 
emerging state. Attempts to foster industrialisation, attempts to attract investors, and 
other measures aimed at encouraging exports and job creation ought to be part of the 
agenda for reconstructing a given state.  A guarantee of access to foreign aid to augment 
the revenue of post conflict state is important  but insignificant in the long run recovery 
of a post-conflict state, and the international actors ought to focus on encouraging 
measures to improve a country`s GDP and trade deficit. 
It should also be outlined that the Rwandan experience, which this study documents 
corroborates the following specific conclusions concerning the conceptualisation of state 
capacity and human security in post-conflict reconstruction situations. 
On state capacity, whereas regimes that preside over group violence have been variously 
referred to as having been capable in their ability to mobilise for group violence, it 
deserves emphasis that the ability to organise violence against a group of people is an 
indication of low levels of state capacity. Maintenance of a hegemonic multi-ethnic 
alliance is strength on the side of the government presiding over a multi-ethnic society. 
Where a government, instead of building solidarity builds divisionism, then, such a 
government, as a functioning agency of the state, ought to be perceived as weak. 
Research on state capacity in the context of post-conflict reconstruction ought to always 
focus on understanding the underlying causes of violence, and how governments can be 
reformed not exploit the underlying causes to serve political objectives, but rather to 
thwart those ``conflict carrying`` challenges. 
The conclusion that strength than weakness in state capacity precipitate group violence is 
a concomitant of the kind of social science research that analyse violent conflict at its 
manifestation level- in the theatre of war. However, in the latency stage, the ``tipping 
point`` builds up as a result of the government`s inability to manage the tension in 
society, and recourse to highhandedness, manipulation of the impoverishment of the 
population to hoodwink them into joining group violence for the purpose of serving 
political objectives of the political elites in government becomes a somewhat survival 
strategy for the beleaguered regime in power. 
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Accordingly, the application of state capacity in the analysis of violent conflicts ought to 
be problematised by looking at its different indicators to guard against misconstruing the 
ability to organise destructive and distractive violence for strength in state capacity. It is a 
normative submission of this study that state capacity ought to be analysed and perceived 
in its positive effect on a given society. 
It should also be underscored that developing state capacity after post-conflict 
reconstruction requires the availability of the local political elite with capacity to play a 
vanguard role in accelerating development in state capacity. This does not negate the 
imperativeness of internationalised development assistance during post-conflict 
reconstruction, but local content in terms of a capable political elite base to exert unified 
leadership is paramount if the gains of the post-conflict reconstruction period are not to 
be reversed. Indeed, even before embarking on general institutionalisation, the daunting 
task should be on how to coalesce the local political actors to be at the centre of 
reconstruction and the aftermath of the reconstruction period. 
From the logic of the preceding paragraph, it goes without saying that further research is 
necessary to unravel how the local political elite base can be harnessed during post-
conflict reconstruction period as a way of ensuring government presence and influence 
beyond the participation of the international actors. 
On human security, during post conflict reconstruction, governments are preoccupied 
with the threat of the resurgence of violence and how to thwart it. The state capacity is 
consciously directed to serve that purpose. Indeed, though governments are important 
actors in the sustenance of human security, their preoccupation with the danger of the 
reoccurrence of violence makes them to put emphasis on the survival of the state (state 
security) than on the survival of individuals. Human security concerns can be sacrificed 
even where they converge with state security concerns at the causative level of violence. 
This points to the imperativeness of other actors to intervene to embark on the cause for 
human security in the midst of the state`s quest for security.  
It is the logic depicted in the preceding paragraph that underscores the functioning 
necessity of international intervention to uphold the respect for human security. The 
controversy at this level is however on the locus operandi of the international actors in 
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this system of things, where the survival of the state is at stake. The questions of who to 
lead the intervention, what the intervention should entail and what its mandate should be, 
and how to ensure timely intervention, are central to the operationalisation of the 
welfarist, norm of ``humanitarian intervention``, a favoured approach to promoting 
human security with Canada as its  guardian. 
Needless to mention that where the state is threatened, as the Rwandan experience has 
indicated, human security can be sacrificed for the survival of the state, but how 
international intervention is supposed to be operationalised without jeopardising the 
state`s legitimate quest for security is a research gap that needs further inquiry in different 
conflictual situations. The operationalisation of the human security agenda where state 
security is at stake is a puzzle that public policy thinking needs to focus on for human 
security is as important as state security. No security area ought to be sacrificed at the 
expense of the other for at the causative level of violence the two security areas have a 
somewhat ``convergence effect`` that lead to ``conflict continuous`` situations.  
Emphasis should be added that there are several interesting themes about Rwanda in its 
yesterday, today and tomorrow; that the temptation for many a consumer and even a 
producer of knowledge about Rwanda would be to expect a monograph of this nature to 
explain all the thematic concerns of Rwanda in their breadth. The plots and subplots of 
post genocide Rwanda are several and diverse. This study lightly touches the several 
subplots for instance the role of the Church and how the Rwanda society was 
systematically radicalised during the time that preceded the genocide, but this is done in a 
way that maintains the monographic treatment of this study, that is understanding and 
later explaining the meaning of the resurgence of violence which occurred in Rwanda. 
The context is the meaning of how the violence was externally addressed. 
Indeed, an attempt to explain everything about Rwanda, if an appropriation of Arthur 
Koestler`s phase is appropriate, could be like writing a detailed description of all the 
threads of an oriental carpet. This study metaphysically picks on a single thread, that is 
the resurgence of violence in Rwanda for the period 1994-2005 and the context is 
external; the Hutu refugee warriors in Eastern Zaire (now DRC). So, how this violence 
played out internally and how it impacted on the human security condition of the people 
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inside Rwanda is an area that ought to be investigated in a single and particular research 
agenda, and the point of departure may the several incursions which the Hutu refugee 
warriors made into Rwanda during the period in remove 1994-2005.  
Also the readership of Rwanda is diverse and the interests of the readership are diverse 
and the nitty-gritty of their interests abundant. A feminist will read and only be satisfied 
with confluence of the analysis with the gender issues, and economists will literally scan 
for macro and micro economic data and their lenses of reading Rwanda will be guided by 
the economic know-how and their interests in reading material about Rwanda will take 
that direction. An archaeologist will look for the artefacts of the Rwanda society and its 
violence.  
As such disciplinary boundaries ought to be taken into consideration when reading and 
writing about Rwanda, otherwise the catastrophe of talking past each other in the 
scholarship about Rwanda, selective perception, selective reading, and improper appeal 
to authority will always define the free trade in the ideas about Rwanda. But that aside 
there are concerns that ought to be problematised from all disciplinary angles if 
scholarship about Rwanda is to be of the peace dividend. For instance the imperative of 
problematising the development enterprise of Rwanda as it is known at its present. From 
the political science angle, the question should be whether  Rwanda has ignored the 
democracy of the politician by limiting his access to  political space for competition but 
to make gigantic strides in ensuring the democracy of the common man through 
providence of the basic needs; education, health, personal security, among others. Will 
the inadequacies in the democracy of the politician be compensated for by the democracy 
of the common man or a crash in the order of things might be highly probable? This 
particular study does not discuss that side of the Rwandan scheme of things, given its 
time scope (1994-2005), its geographical scope(that concentrates on the externality of the 
resurgence of violence which occurred in Rwanda) and its content scope that is on the 
refugee phenomenon,  but to be aware of the probable conflictual nature of that kind of 
arrangement. Research agendas can focus on that direction with the objectivity which it 
requires as a move towards sustaining the development and peace in Rwanda as we know 
it at the present 
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Accordingly, this particular study has problematised Rwanda`s post-conflict 
reconstruction experience in light of the conceptual framework availed by human 
security, state capacity and general discourse on post-conflict reconstruction situations. 
The purpose was to understand and explain the Rwandan experience with the resurgence 
of violence which accrued from the Hutu refugee phenomenon in Eastern Congo, then 
Zaire.  The monograph is written in theory building structures and a reading of one 
Chapter leads into the logic of a following chapter. Selective reading may lead to a 
selective understanding of the concerns of the narrative of the study as a result of missing 
out the way the chapters are interwoven. 
But anecdotally, the political map of Great Lakes Region of Africa, where Rwanda lies, 
continues to be literally dotted with violent conflictual situations, and the example of the 
recent resurgence of violence in the South Sudan is instructive on this. Somalia is yet to 
be pacified. Kenya continues to grapple with visitations of tribal violence and the threat 
of terrorism as a result of the spill-over effects of the Somalia insurgency. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo remains a lame leviathan that its Eastern part remains in a 
conflict continuous situation. In Uganda the Lord`s Resistance Army with Joseph Kony at 
the helm is still at large in the forests of the Central African Republic, and the fact that 
Uganda has never had a peaceful transfer of power despite the relative stability it has 
enjoyed during the reign of Yoweri Museveni is an issue that does not augur well for the 
continued stability of the East African state. The United Republic of Tanzania remains 
relatively stable but with latent fragility as far as its federation with the Island of Zanzibar 
is concerned, and public corruption continues to undermine public service delivery. 
Rwanda remains stable but fragile owing to history, the continued existence of the FDLR 
in Eastern Congo, and the internal power struggles and bickering within the ruling 
Rwanda Patriotic Front. Burundi is relatively stable but grappling with high levels of 
poverty and its politics is still generally ethnicised. Research about this region needs to 
focus on unravelling the practical governance challenges to the stability of the region and 
the practical governance approaches to thwarting conflict carrying practices.  
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Specialised computer Software and Audio-Visual/Motion pictures Used: 
 
Excel, Windows 2007. 
Friends of the Congo, James Kabarebe—Rwandan Minister of Defense-Speaks of the ..., 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mECN7JSsnxy , accessed on: 22/03/14, 14:27. 
 
MaximsNewsNetwork: 06 April 2010—UNTV: United Nations, New York—Interview 
with Francis Deng, United Nations (UN) Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gy5gDSrpuKU&list=PLF3AB2CE4577DA303&inde
x=1)  
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Appendices   
Appendix 1 
Table showing approximation of donor assistance for the judicial sector as of the year 
1997 
 Activity  Budget (USD) Donor 
Human Resources 
Training  
120 Judges 
(``Magistrats non-
juristes``) 
100 Judges (idem) 
104 Judges (idem) 
50 deputy prosecutors 
50 deputy prosecutors 
150 JPIs 
148 JPIs/JPOs 
150 JPIs/JPOs 
(Ongoing) 
50 registrars 
 
50 secretaries 
 
Law Students 
(University of Butare) 
550,0000 
534,000 
380,000 
150,000 
150,000 
170,000 
300,000 
300,000 
150,000 
 
150,000 
 
700,000 
 
1,000,000 
 
Belgium 
UNDP 
Canada 
Switzerland 
UNDP 
Belgium, Switz 
Canada, UNICEF 
Canada, UNHCR 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
USAID 
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Salary  50% salary top-up 
(1,300 judicial 
personnel) 
 
1,000,000 
 
Canada 
 
Institutional/advisory 
support  
1 Lawyer at Ministry 
of Justice(ongoing) 
 
5 legal advisors for 
prosecutor`s Offices 
(ongoing) 
3 Lawyers at Ministry 
of Justice (completed) 
2 Lawyers at Ministry 
of Justice (Pipeline) 
Support to the Judicial 
Training Centre 
Support to 
prosecutor`s offices 
and judicial police 
1,000,000 
 
 
1,000,000 
 
1,000,000 
 
1,300,000 
 
1,100,000 
UNDP 
(NETHERLANDS) 
 
NETHERLANDS 
 
BELGIUM 
 
BELGIUM 
 
BELGIUM 
Material resources  
Buildings  
Rehabilitation of the 
Supreme Court 
Building(pipeline) 
Rehabilitation of the 
Court of Appeal 
building  
Rehabilitation of the 
Tribunals of First 
1,700,000 
 
450,000 
 
40,000 
EU 
 
UNDP(JAPAN) 
USAID 
CHRISTIAN AID 
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Instance building  
 
Rehabilitation of 
Cantonal Tribunals 
(pineline) 
Rehabilitation of the 
``Bureau du 
Procureur General 
Pres la Cour 
Supreme``(pipeline) 
Rehabilitation of 
Prosecutor`s Offices 
 
Rehabilitation of 
Judicial Training 
Centre (Nyabisindu) 
Small-scale material 
assistance for tribunals 
of first instance  
 
200,000 
1,500,000 
 
235,000 
 
400,000 
 
700,000 
? 
 
120,000 
 
280,000 
 
USAID 
EU 
 
EU 
FRANCE 
 
SWITZERLAND 
BELGIUM  
 
TROCAINE 
 
UNDP 
 
Equipment  Benches, desks, 
chairs, etc 
Office material 
(copiers, type-writers, 
etc) 
Equipment for 
Cantonal Tribunals 
400,000 
 
500,000 
 
UNHCR 
 
EU 
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(pipeline) 
Cars, computers, etc. 
Ministry of Justice 
Cars, motorcycles, 
copiers, printers, etc 
for the ``Commissions 
de Triage``/ Mobile 
Groups 
Office materials for 
the Law Faculty 
(Butare) 
Legal documentation 
Ministry of Justice 
Library 
400,000 
 
1,886,000 
 
200,000 
200,000 
 
150,000 
1,900,000 
250,000 
 
USAID 
 
UNDP (NETHE)  
 
UNHCR 
BELGIUM 
UNDP 
 
Detentions  Extension of Prisons 
and / or construction 
of new detention 
centres  
Improvement of living 
conditions for 
vulnerable groups  
Construction of 
medical, water and 
sanitation facilities 
Extensions for women 
and Children 
Identification of 
1,000,000 
 
50,000 
 
 
247,0000 
 
400,000 
130,000 
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detainees 
Training of 400 
civilian prison guards 
(demobilised military) 
Capacity building of 
Communal Police for 
transfer of detainees  
Prefectural funds for 
small scale 
improvements in 
cachots  
Improvement of living 
conditions in cachots 
(pipeline) 
 
 
600,000 
 
? 
 
500,000 
 
 
60,000 
 
? 
 
Adopted from Stef Vandeginste, Justice For Rwanda and International Cooperation, 
Universiteit Antwerpen, September 1997:5-6 and 9-10 
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Appendix 2 
Sample of the guiding questions for key informant interviews and some focused group discussions 
conducted outside Rwanda (Tanzania, Uganda and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.  
1. Where were you born from? 
2. Are you a Munyarwanda? 
3. Are some of your relatives Banyarwanda? 
4. Do some of your blood relations leave in Rwanda? 
5. Are they your children, your parents, your brothers, your sisters or inlaws? 
6. Apart from Swahiri and French which other language do you speak? 
7. Do you speak Kinyarwanda? 
8. Do you fear being identified as a Munyarwanda? 
9. Why are have you not returned to Rwanda? 
10. Do you hope to settle in Rwanda in the future? 
11. Do you love to go back to Rwanda? 
12. How did the genocide in Rwanda affect you? 
13. What was your problem before you came here? 
14. In how many countries have your leaved? 
15. Why did you leave your country? 
16. How did it affect you? 
17. What problems did/have you meet after leaving your country?  
18. Did your home government help you to get out of those problems? 
19. What happened when the government did or did not help you? 
20. Do you think the government did something to get you out of your problems? 
21. Did you hear or have you heard of any group organising 
22. What was the ethnic composition of that group? 
23. Have they ever approached you or someone whom you know? 
24. How did they try to convince you to join them? 
25. Did they try to threaten you? 
26. How did they try to threaten you? 
27. Do you hate your home government? 
28. Do you find the government good? 
29. Why have you not returned home? 
30. For how long will you be here? 
31. Why do fear to go back home? 
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32. What is your fear at the moment? 
33. What do want in your life now? 
34. How will it affect you if you do not get it? 
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